Title: Apresenta
1The Shareholders Meeting Scope and Procedures -
Brazil 2nd Latin American Corporate Governance
Roundtable
Presentation by Bruno Rocha
Dynamo Asset Management
2The Shareholders Meeting Scope and Procedures -
Brazil
- What is the context
- Brazil ranks well by usual corporate governance
criteria for - shareholders meetings procedures
- Cumulative voting
- Voting by proxy ( though not by mail )
- Small to call E.S.M. (5 of total capital)
- Easy to obtain list of shareholders
- Shares are not blocked before a S.M.
- - However, most shareholders meetings are a
non-event
Dynamo
2nd Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable
3The Shareholders Meeting Scope and Procedures -
Brazil
- Why ?
- Almost all listed companies have a defined
controlling - shareholder (or a group of)
- High leverage from preferred non-voting shares
- separation of cash flow right from control
rights - which, coupled with
- Imperfect civil law
- Lack of jurisprudence and specialized courts
- No tag along rights
Dynamo
2nd Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable
4The Shareholders Meeting Scope and Procedures -
Brazil
- Leads to
- High value of control
- Structural conflict of interest between
controlling - and minority shareholders
- Dividends / Retained earnings
- Related party transactions
- De-listing procedures
Dynamo
2nd Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable
5The Shareholders Meeting Scope and Procedures -
Brazil
- US / Europe x Brazil
- Concentration of controlling power changes the
- corporate governance agenda from
- Independent board members
- Poison pills, staggered boards
- Proxy mechanisms ...
- ... to issues not directly related to
shareholders meetings - Tag along rights
- Conflicts of interest (dividend policy, related
parties) - De-listing procedures
- As a consequence, shareholders meetings in
Brazil are not a - democratic exercise.
Dynamo
2nd Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable
6The Shareholders Meeting Scope and Procedures -
Brazil
- Shareholders Meetings in Brazil
- Procedures
- Prior notice
- 8 days
- Problem for ADRS
- Nomination to the board of directors
- Only for voting shares
- Guaranteed for holders of 20 of voting shares
- Possible with less than 20 through cumulative
voting
Dynamo
2nd Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable
7The Shareholders Meeting Scope and Procedures -
Brazil
- Shareholders Meetings in Brazil
- Procedures
- Representation
- By power of attorney
- Bureaucratic but effective process
- Installment and Election for the Audit Board
- Installment 5 of non-voting or 10 of voting
shares - Election One seat for non voting
- One seat for voting with
10 of shares - Three seats for controlling
shareholders
Dynamo
2nd Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable
8The Shareholders Meeting Scope and Procedures -
Brazil
- Shareholders Meetings in Brazil
- Procedures
- Right to put items on the agenda
- Not clearly defined in the law
- Possible if included in Matters of General
Interest - Voting in situations of conflict of interest
- Conflicted shareholder cannot vote
- Problems Definition of conflict / non-voting
shares do not vote - 7. Fair amount of disclosure is granted by law
Dynamo
2nd Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable
9The Shareholders Meeting Scope and Procedures -
Brazil
- Conclusion
- Quality of shareholders meetings in Brazil is
poor not because of the law, but rather because
of the concentration of ownership - Participation (and voting) in shareholders
meeting is always important, even if meaningless
because decisions have already been made - But it is crucial when minority shareholders
may influence the decision - Situations of conflict of interest
- Corporate restructurings (de-listings,
spin-offs, mergers)
2nd Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable
Dynamo