Sea Power and Maritime Affairs

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Sea Power and Maritime Affairs
Lesson 18 The US Navy since 2001 (This
presentation is a work in progress)
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Learning Objectives

• Comprehend the policy goals of the George W. Bush
  administration (2001-2009) and their effect on
  the navy.
• Comprehend the navys role in the Global War on
  Terror (GWOT).
• Comprehend the trends of public commitment during
  the period from 2001 to 2008 relative to the
  support for defense budgets, force deployments,
  and administration policies.
• Know the essential elements of the document A
  Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
  (October 2007).

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Learning Objectives

• Know the causes of the US invasion of Afghanistan
  in 2001 and the international reaction to it.
• Comprehend the roles of the US Navy and US Marine
  Corps in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
  Iraqi Freedom.
• Comprehend the national strategic implications of
  the start of the war on terror and its effects on
  the US Navy.
• Comprehend the roles of the US Navy in domestic
  and international humanitarian assistance and
  disaster relief.

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Learning Objectives

• Comprehend the nature of joint operations in the
  post-9/11 era, especially the role of the navy in
  joint operations.
• Comprehend the changes in naval policy and
  technology of the 2000s and will know how to
  evaluate their relevance to the post-9/11 navy.

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Prologue Foreign Policy of President George W.
Bush

• Emphasis during 2000 presidential campaign
• was to keep up with the Revolution in Military
• Affairs (RMA) and within budget by
• modernizing the military. President Bushs
• plan included
• ? Missile system
• ? Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of
• Defense (mandated under transformation)
• ? Transformation Office

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Missile Defense System

• ?Hostile states (Iran, N. Korea) were developing
  long range missile programs
• ?China challenges U.S. protection of Taiwan
• ?It was suggested U.S. would not be willing to
  use nuclear weapons if challenged.

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September 11, 2001

• Unfortunately, it took the tragedy of 9/11 to
  initiate President Bushs call for change.

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The Challenge
The administration had to bring firepower to an
area with no immediately available bases, but how?
? Sea-based carrier warfare ? Network-centric
concepts (limited, PRECISION force)
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Coalition Warfare

• ? U.S. invokes Article 5 of NATO treaty
• ? NATO governments respond slowly to call for
  troops

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Maritime War

• ? Naval aircraft flew ¾ of all sorties, dropped
  1/3 of all bombs

?Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) provided
principal ground force in Southern
Afghanistan ?New tanking architecture and
cooperation with allied forces provided tanking
to support carrier based air strikes
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Coalition Forces

• ?England (heavy contributor of sea and air power,
  tankers, and surveillance)
• ?Australia, Bahrain, Canada, France, Germany,
  Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Japan (moderate sea
  power contributors)
• ?Pakistan (allowed integral covert use of
  airfields)

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Command

• ?Preexisting CENTCOM command structure makes
  command relationships clear from onset, its
  success prompts permanent Joint Task Force build
  up
• ?Exercise of command via satellite later blamed
  for important misunderstandings in the war
• ?USAF Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in
  Saudi Arabia vital for effective air power
  employment

USAF Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC)
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Precision Air Attack The New Kind of War

• ?Effects-based targeting
• ?New weapons GPS and Joint Defense Attack
  Munitions (JDAM)
• ?Improved Air Tasking Order
• ?Real time intelligence streaming

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Initial Strikes

• Mission Roll back Afghani Integrated Air
• Defense System (IADS) and destroy land
• communications
• 07OCT01 Attack on Taliban begins with TLAM
  launches, followed by carrier strike aircraft,
  USAF long-range bombers from Diego Garcia, B-2s
  from United States, etc.

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Taliban Response

• ? U.S. accused of killing civilians
• ?Taliban moves targets into civilian-populated
  areas
• ?Shoulder-launched Stinger missile threat

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Afghanistan
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War in the North

• ? Northern Alliance
• ? Special Force representatives
• ? 13NOV Northern Alliance take Kabul, then
  Konduz (last stronghold in the north) with little
  opposition

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War in the South

• ? Southern Alliance (weak)
• ? Fifth Fleet (based in Bahrain) responsible for
  most of theater
• ? Task Force 58 (2 MEUs minus heavy material)
  allow personnel insertion far inland with organic
  helicopters

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War in the South

• ? Task Force 57 (air support)
• ? Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)
• ? Camp Rhino

Camp Rhino Marines
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FOB Rhino

• ? Seized by the Marines 25NOV
• ? Position (tyranny of distance) limits rate at
  which Rhino can be built up.
• ? Marines thrived in smaller formations.
• ? Initial strikes eliminated Taliban anti-air
• capability.
• ? Rhino personnel was capped, so as not to anger
  native Afghanis, raids are limited, and conducted
  at night.

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War in the South

• 19OCT Southern campaign commences with special
  forces attack on Taliban compound outside
  Khandahar
• ? The U.S. proves itself and learns that Afghan
  fighters have limits
• ? Body armor keeps U.S. casualties low during the
  entire war

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War in the South

• 06DEC Kandahar taken by Marines from Rhino and
  Southern Alliance forces
• Jan 2002 TF 58 relieved in place by Armys
  101st Airborne Division. The fighting did not
  stop, and handover was not completed until the
  end of the month.

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Other Considerations

• ? Tribal leaders
• ? U.N. stabilization force (called in to
  legitimize Afghan government without the
  appearance of American occupation)

Map of tribal leader territories
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Oppositions Leadership

• ? Although major cities had fallen, none of the
  Taliban or Al Quaeda leaders had been captured.
• ? Leaders were believed to be either hiding in
  the mountains or escaping to Africa by sea.
• ? U.S. and allied warships set up an interception
  zone in Arabian Sea, but only a few leaders were
  caught.
• ? However, new campaigns waged in the mountainous
  regions of Tora Bora and Anaconda were fruitful
  in providing masses of documents, computers,
  personnel, and intelligence.

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Tora Bora

• ?Large Taliban concentration, including Osama Bin
  Laden
• ?Assault conducted by Afghan troops and U.S.
  firepower
• ?Many key figures escaped, perhaps due to
  difference in coalition and U.S. goals
• ?Taliban loses 50 of force
• ?Al Quaeda learn U.S. can intercept radio and
  cell phone communications

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Operation Anaconda

• ?U.S., British, Canadian forces, with Australian
  SOF
• ?Largest ground battle of the war
• ?Mostly Army operation, Naval support came via
  air sorties
• ? Considered a disappointment due to joint effort
  problemslives saved mostly due to effective body
  armor
• The war ends with U.S. and coalition forces in
  nominal
• control of Afghanistan, however, many Taliban are
  still
• in place, and there is general agreement that the
  war
• is not over, as conflict still exists.

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Disposition of forces and Topography of Shahi Khot
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Airstrike Footage
March 11, 2002 F/A-18 airstrike on fleeing Al
Qaeda forces attempting to exfiltrate the
Anaconda area
March 4 F-14 airstrike on a mortar position
that was engaging friendly forces.
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A Modern War

• ?RMA emphasis on network-centric war
• ?Initial air strategy attack Centers of Gravity
  (successful with addition of ground support,
  e.g., MEUs and Northern Alliance
• ?SOF liaisons with Northern Alliances
• ?New approach to presence--reflected in decision
  to form ESGs and ARGs (Amphibious Ready Groups).

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In Hindsight

• The Afghan air war was closer to network-centric
  models than past wars (Kosovo), but did not quite
  get there
• ?Not enough sensors
• ?Split objectives between hunt for Bin Laden and
  defeat of Taliban

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Conclusion

• The Afghan War demonstrated the value of naval
  forces which could operate free of bases, remote
  sensing assets (satellites), and special forces
  operations. Sea-basing offered independence, and
  sensing facilitated the information backplane
  necessary for network-centric warfare. All of
  this is integral to Sea Power 21.