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Game Dynamics Out of Sync

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Game Dynamics Out of Sync Michael Schapira (Yale University and UC Berkeley) Joint work with Aaron D. Jaggard and Rebecca N. Wright – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Game Dynamics Out of Sync


1
Game DynamicsOut of Sync
  • Michael Schapira
  • (Yale University and UC Berkeley)
  • Joint work withAaron D. Jaggardand Rebecca N.
    Wright

2
Motivation Internet Routing
  • Establish routes between Autonomous Systems
    (ASes).
  • Currently handled by the Border Gateway
    Protocol (BGP).

3
Internet Routing as a GameLevin-S-Zohar
  • Internet routing is a game!
  • players ASes
  • players types preferences over routes
  • strategies outgoing edges
  • BGP Best-Response Dynamics
  • each AS constantly selects its best available
    route to each destination
  • until a stable state ( PNE) is reached.

4
But
this talk
  • Challenge I No synchronization ofplayers
    actions
  • players can best-reply simultaneously.
  • players can best-reply based on outdated
    information.
  • Challenge II Are players incentivized to follow
    best-response dynamics?
  • Can a player benefit from not best-replying?

Nisan-S-Valiant-Zohar
5
Game Dynamics and Asynchrony
  • Dynamic environments
  • Internet protocols
  • large-scale markets
  • social networks
  • multi-processor computer architectures
  • Game theory provides useful tools to analyze
    these interactions, but.
  • has so far primarily concentrated on
    synchronous environments (simultaneous,
    sequential).

6
Illustration
Column Player


0,0
2,1
Row Player
0,0
1,2
7
Illustration
Column Player


0,0
2,1
Row Player
0,0
1,2
8
But
Column Player


0,0
2,1
Row Player
0,0
1,2
9
Agenda
  • Model for asynchronous game dynamics
  • Impossibility result
  • Circumventing our impossibility result
  • Complexity of asynchronous game dynamics
  • Directions for future research

10
Simple Model Nodes Interacting
  • n nodes 1,,n
  • Node i has action space Ai
  • AA1An
  • A-iA1Ai-1Ai1An
  • Node i has reaction function fiA?Ai
  • f(f1,,fn)

11
Simple Model Dynamics
  • Infinite sequence of discrete time steps t1,
  • Initial state a0, Schedule s1, ?2n
  • fair schedule
  • The (a0,s)-dynamics
  • Start at the initial state a0
  • In each time step t let the nodes in s(t) react.

12
Simple Model Convergence
  • Defn an action profile a(a1,,an) is a stable
    state if fi(a)ai for all i.
  • that is, a is a fixed point of f.
  • Defn The system is convergent if the
    (a0,s)-dynamics converges to a stable state for
    all choices of a0 and (fair) s.

13
Guaranteed Convergence?
  • Defn f is node independent if, for each node i,
    fiA-i?Ai
  • Thm If f is node independent, and there exist
    multiple stable states, then the system is not
    convergent.
  • Can be generalized to reaction functions that are
  • randomized
  • bounded-recall
  • non-stationary

14
Applications
  • Internet protocols
  • Internet routing Sami-S-Zohar
  • congestion control Godfrey-S-Zohar-Shenker
  • Best-response dynamics
  • with consistent tie-breaking
  • orthogonal to the results of Hart and Mas-Colell
  • Diffusion of technologies in social networks
  • 2 technologies A,B. Each node wants to be
    consistent with the majority of its neighbours.
  • Circuit design

15
Tightness of Our Result
  • Example 1 (node-dependent reactions)Each fi is
    such that for every a(a1,,an) it holds that
    fi(a)ai.

16
Tightness of Our Result
  • Example 1 (node dependent reactions)Each fi is
    such that for every a(a1,,an) it holds that
    fi(a)ai.
  • Example 2 (unbounded recall)
  • 2 nodes, 1 and 2, each with action space a,b.
  • Node 2 wants to match node 1s action.
  • Node 1 selects b if node 2 changed its action
    from a to b in the past, and a otherwise.
  • What happens at the initial state (b,a)?

17
Proving Our Result
  • Thm If f is node independent, andthere exist
    multiple stable states, thenthe system is not
    convergent.
  • Interesting connections to fundamental results in
    distributed computing theory.
  • the Fischer-Lynch-Patterson impossibility result
    for consensus protocols (1983)
  • But, neither result is a special case of the
    other.

18
The Dynamics Graph

State R
  1. aRaS except aRifi(bS)
  2. bRbS

i-transition
State S
knowledge transition
State T
action vector aS(aS1, aSn)knowledge vector
bS(bS1, bSn)
  1. aTaS
  2. bTaS

19
Visualising Dynamics
  • The dynamics graph captures all dynamics.
  • The scenario where
  • the initial state is a0.
  • nodes 1 and 3 react simultaneously.
  • then nodes 2 and 3 react simultaneously.
  • is captured as follows

20
Visualising Dynamics
  • The dynamics graph captures all dynamics.
  • The scenario where
  • the initial state is a0.
  • nodes 1 and 3 react simultaneously.
  • then nodes 2 and 3 react simultaneously.
  • is captured as follows

State SaSbSa0
21
Visualising Dynamics
  • The dynamics graph captures all dynamics.
  • The scenario where
  • the initial state is a0.
  • nodes 1 and 3 react simultaneously.
  • then nodes 2 and 3 react simultaneously.
  • is captured as follows

State SaSbSa0
1-transition
3-transition
k-transition
22
Visualising Dynamics
  • The dynamics graph captures all dynamics.
  • The scenario where
  • the initial state is a0.
  • nodes 1 and 3 react simultaneously.
  • then nodes 2 and 3 react simultaneously.
  • is captured as follows

State SaSbSa0
1-transition
3-transition
k-transition
2-transition
3-transition
k-transition
23
Stability and Fairness
  • Defn A state S in the dynamics graph is stable
    if every outgoing edge from S leads to S.
  • Defn A fair path in the dynamics graph is a path
    that (1) for each i, contains an i-transition
    and (2) also contains a knowledge transition.

24
Attractor Regions
  • Defn The attractor region of a stable state S
    are all states from which any (long enough) fair
    path reaches S.

25
Proof Sketch (Cont.)
  • Claim A fair cycle in the dynamics graph implies
    an oscillation in our model.
  • Proposition If there are multiple stable states
    then there are states in the dynamics graph that
    are not in any attractor region (neutral
    states).

26
Colouring States
  • Colour each attractor region in a different
    colour red, blue, etc.
  • Colour the neutral states in purple.

27
Creating Oscillations
  • Key idea We show that from every purple state
    there is a fair path that leads to another purple
    state.
  • The number of purple states is finite and so this
    implies a fair cycle.

28
Proof Sketch (Cont.)
  • Lemma There cannot be two edges leading from a
    purple state to two non-purple states that do not
    have the same colour.
  • Intuition We can swap the order of activations
    without affecting the outcome.

a
b
a,b different transitions
a
b
?
29
Proof Sketch (Cont.)
  • Fix a purple state p.
  • Let R be a maximal fair path from p to another
    purple state.

R
q


p
30
Proof Sketch (Cont.)
  • Let a be a transition that is not on R.
  • Observe that a at q takes us to a non-purple
    state.

R
q


a
p
31
Proof Sketch (Cont.)
  • Because q is purple it must have a fair path to a
    non-purple non-red state.

R
u


q


a
p
32
Proof Sketch (Cont.)
  • Now, we prove that a at u must take us to a red
    state --- a contradiction!

R
u

a

q


a
p
33
Circumventing Our Impossibility Result Randomness
  • Our result holds for randomized reaction
    functions.
  • adversarially-chosen schedule
  • What if the schedule is randomized?
  • our impossibility result breaks
  • but no general possibility result either

34
Circumventing Our Impossibility Result r-Fair
Schedules
  • Defn A schedule s is r-fair if each node is
    activated at least once within every r
    consecutive time steps.
  • Can we prove our impossibility result for
    schedules that are r-fair? If so, for what values
    of r?
  • We present positive and negative results.

35
Complexity Results
  • Thm Determining if a system with n nodes, each
    with two actions, is convergent requires
    exponential communication (in n).
  • The proof requires reaction functions to be of
    exponential size.
  • Combinatorial proof a Snake in the Box
    construction

36
Complexity Results
  • What if the reaction functions can be succinctly
    described?
  • Thm Determining if a system with n nodes is
    convergent is PSPACE-Complete.
  • Hence, there is no short characterization of
    asynchronous convergence!

37
Directions for Future Research
  • Other notions of asynchrony
  • Other reaction functions
  • fictitious play, regret minimization
  • Observation regret minimization is much more
    resilient to asynchrony (different framework).
  • Other restrictions on schedules
  • random schedules
  • r-fair schedules
  • more

38
Thank You
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