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Chapter 17: Making Complex Decisions

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... (1-q) q = 7/12 UO,E = -1/12 Maximin [7/12: one, 5/12: two] is the Maximin equilibrium or Nash equilibrium Always exists for mixed strategies! – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Chapter 17: Making Complex Decisions


1
Chapter 17 Making Complex Decisions
  • April 1, 2004

2
17.6 Decisions With Multiple Agents Game Theory
  • Assume that agents make simultaneous moves
  • Assume that the game is a single move game.

3
Uses
  • Agent Design (2 finger Morra)
  • Mechanism Design

4
Game Components
  • Players
  • Actions
  • Payoff Matrix e.g. rock-paper-scissors

5
Terminology
  • Pure Strategy deterministic policy
  • Mixed Strategy randomized policy, p a
    (1-p) b
  • Outcome result of game
  • Solution player adopts a strategy profile that
    is a rational strategy

6
Prisoners Dilemna
B testifies B refuses
A testifies A -5 B -5 A 0 B -10
A refuses A -10 B 0 A -1 B -1
7
Terminology
  • (testify, testify) is a dominant strategy
  • s strongly dominates s s is better than s for
    all other player strategies
  • s weakly dominates s s is better than s for
    one other strategy and is at least as good as all
    the rest

8
Terminology
  • An outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no other
    outcome that all players would prefer
  • An equilibrium is a strategy profile where no
    player benefits by switching strategies given
    that no other player may switch strategies
  • Nash showed that every game has an equilibrium
  • Prisoners Dilemna!

9
Example Two Nash Equilibria
no dominant strategy! B dvd B cd
A dvd A 9 B 9 A -4 B -1
A cd A -1 B -4 A 5 B 5
10
Von Neumanns Maximin
  • zero sum game
  • E maximizer (2 finger Morra)
  • O minimizer (2 finger Morra)
  • U(E 1, O 1) 2
  • U(E 1, O 2) -3
  • U(E 2, O 1) -3
  • U(E 2, O 2) 4

11
Maximin
  • E reveals strategy, moves first
  • p one 1-p two
  • O chooses based on p
  • one 2p -3(1-p)
  • two -3p 4(1-p)
  • p 7/12
  • UE,O -1/12

12
Maximin
  • O reveals strategy, moves first
  • q one 1-q two
  • E chooses based on q
  • one 2q -3(1-q)
  • two -3q 4(1-q)
  • q 7/12
  • UO,E -1/12

13
Maximin
  • 7/12 one, 5/12 two is the Maximin equilibrium
    or Nash equilibrium
  • Always exists for mixed strategies!
  • The value is a maximin for both players.

14
Repeated Move Games
  • Application packet collision in an Ethernet
    network
  • Prisoners Dilemna fixed number of rounds no
    change!
  • Prisoners Dilemna variable number of rounds
    (e.g. 99 chance of meeting again)
  • perpetual punishment
  • tit for tat

15
Repeated Move Games
  • Partial Information Games games that occur in a
    partially observable environment such as blackjack

16
17.7 Mechanism Design
  • Given rational agents, what game should we design
  • Tragedy of the Commons

17
Auctions
  • Single Item
  • Bidderi has a utility vi for the item
  • vi is only known to Bidderi
  • English Auction
  • Sealed Bid Auction
  • Sealed Bid Second Price or Vickrey auction
    (no communication, no knowledge of others)
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