On The Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup

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On The Untraceability of Anonymous RFID
Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup

• Presented By Professor LI Yingjiu

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Outline

• Background
• Review the BMM protocol in AsiaCCS08
• Crack the Protocol by three-run interleave attack
  
• Crack the supply chain based on our attack
• Improve the BMM protocol
• Conclusion

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Background

• It is still a challenge to balance the security
  and scalability.
• For example,
• The OSK protocol needs O(N) hash calculation.
• Numerous protocols based on tree-structure
  suffers from de-synchronization attack and
  compromising attack.
• It is emergent to setup a protocol balancing
  both the security and scalability.

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BMM protocol in AsiaCCS08

• Burmester, Medeiros and Motta (BMM) proposed an
  RFID authentication protocol with constant
  key-lookup to balance the security requirement
  and scalability.
• The protocol is based on challenge-response
  technique.
• Guarantee spoofing attack, replay attack,
  de-synchronization attack, etc..

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Overview of BMM Protocol
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Initiate System
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Mutual Authentication

• Tag Reader

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Update Process

• Tag Reader

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Three-run Interleave Attack

• This attack can trace the same tag by psr.
• The reason is updating ps inappropriately.
• Include three steps.

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Three-run Interleave Attack---Run 1
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Three-run Interleave Attack---Run 2
Not Update r
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Three-run Interleave Attack---Run 3
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Discussion

• Note that in the third run, a different challenge
  c could be used by a trusted reader to
  challenge the tag. As long as the r value is
  not updated in the second run, the ps value is
  still the same as the one in the first run.

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Crack the Whole Supply Chain

• Three assumptions
• Trusted zone
• One-time authentication
• Sticky adversary
• Two attack strategies
• Trace a single tag
• Trace multiple tags

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Crack a Supply Chain System Based on BMM Protocol
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Trace a Single Tag
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Trace Multiple Tags

• Adversarys database for tracing multiple tags

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Improve BMM Protocol
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Conclusion

• Under a weak adversary model, an attacker can
  launch a three-run interleave attack to trace and
  identify a tag.
• Attackers can crack the whole supply chain using
  BMM protocol.
• We improve BMM protocol to prevent tags from
  tracing.
• The improved Protocol is same efficient as BMM
  protocol.

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Thanks QA