1958: Charles de Gaulle

1
1958 Charles de Gaulle

• A new actor Charles de Gaulle
• Arrival in power in France in June 1958, with the
  Algerian crisis, reelected in December 1965,
  steps down in 1969
• Immense personal prestige, a constitution giving
  him huge powers in foreign and European policies
• A precise project for France (Frances rank),
  an uncertain project for Europe
• Uncertain image of Frances partners
• Western Germany
• 1934 a gorgeous and gloomy ocean, from which
  spurt both monsters and treasures
• The idea of a minor partnership (Germany has
  been vanquished...), the problem of Germanys
  contacts with the USSR and the United States
• England
• The Trojan horse of the United States, a
  competitor in Europe
• Yet, a possible balance to W.Germany

2
De Gaulle a traditionalist victory?

• De Gaulles movement had been the biggest
  opponent to European integration in France.
• Michel Debré, 1954 la bête est morte!
• Frances partners are worried
• The scheduled start of the transitional period
  (1959) seems jeopardized by De Gaulles arrival
  in power
• Yet pressures on him too
• Renewal of tensions in the world in the end
  1950s-beginning 1960s Cuba crisis in 1962,
  second Berlin crisis in 1961 (construction of the
  wall), etc
• The Algerian war weakens De Gaulles position
  until 1962, and he needs stability and support
  from European partners.
• One cannot tear apart what has been done, to
  Harold Mac Millan in June 1958 de Gaulle does
  not oppose the start ot the transitional period
• He will work, however, to model the communities
  along his own ideas
• The partnership with W.Germany
• Limitations to supranationality a Europe of the
  states, dominated by France
• A clear understanding of the communities role on
  behalf of Frances interests
• Economic stability
• An environment where France will be able to
  modernize and adapt
• A vision of the world situation that pushes him
  to emphasize a European pole around France in
  the Cold War a European Europe

3
The FTA project, 1956-1959

• The EEC threatens directly Great-Britain
• Trade barriers for non-members wishing to enter
  the common market London fears economic as well
  as political isolation
• EECs companies will develop at a quicker pace
  than others, EEC standards will impose
  themselves the comparative advantage
• A British project
• Gathering seven outsiders in a European Free
  Trade Association larger than the EEC
  (dissolving the EEC as a piece of sugar in a cup
  of tea, Le Monde)? United Kingdom, Denmark,
  Norway, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and
  Portugal. Finland becomes an associate member in
  1961, a full member in 1986. Iceland joins in
  1970.
• A project already conceived in 1955
• The British delegation leaves the Spaak committee
  and presents its own project in the summer of
  1955
• July 1956 presentation of the FTA project to the
  OEEC
• Free trade zone between 17 OEEC countries, not
  touching agricultural products and without a
  common external customs tariff
• Exactly the contrary of what France for example
  wanted with the communities
• Mitigated reactions among the six, but a will to
  keep the door open with London

4

• French caution February 1958 a cautious
  memorandum answering the British project
• De Gaulle takes his time, then opposes the
  project
• October 17th, 1958 the Ockrent report by the Six
  to the OEEC
• Maudling committee was created
• De Gaule ready to accept? Mostly the Ministry for
  Foreign Affairs
• November 14th 1958 Jacques Soustelles (Minister
  of Information) press conference It appears to
  France that it is not possible to create a FTA as
  the British government would like it
• The British break the negotiations. A mistake?
• De Gaulle cannot accept a political-economic
  project where London would be the driving force
• The Franco-German axis is better because France
  is the leading force
• The British project would have meant a
  non-regulated market between states, without the
  safeguards allowed by the EEC to facilitate
  adaptation to the market, without agricultural
  products, without an external common tariff, with
  more competition for French firms, etc
• Intense opposition to the FTA of the French
  economic world (patronat, trade unions,
  agriculture) Agriculture is left outside the
  British want to keep special agreements with the
  Commonwealth no common external tariff
• EEC means modernization and economic help for
  France.
• French protectionism? More French fear of being
  left in the cold

5
De Gaulle the white knight?

• October 1958 the support of Adenauer against the
  British project (meeting of Bad-Kreuznach)
• The Dutch and in W.Germany Ludvig Erhard defend
  the FTA
• OEEC emergency meeting in December 1958
• Richard Griffiths British arrogance and French
  stubbornness
• London launches the EFTA anyway, by the treaty of
  Stockholm in January 1960
• The OEEC disappears in the crisis, replaced in
  1960 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
  and Development (OECD)
• January 1959 EECs first round of quota and
  taxes reductions
• None of the Six ever considered letting go of the
  Common Market, even if reservations existed and
  the FTA was tempting
• The EEC could not exist without France, and the
  attitude of de Gaulle was the decisive factor in
  these years
• Why not reak directly in June 1958?
• De Gaulle arrives in the middle of a civil war.
  He has other things to do
• De Gaulle had to be careful. The arrogance and
  bluntness of the British negotiating position
  helped him justifying a refusal of the FTA

6
Creating the CAP, 1961-1962

• 1957 1 in 5 Europeans lived on the farm
  governments had intervened to support prices
  since the 1920s-1930s French farmers needed
  outlets, especially in W.Germany
• The EEC treaty provided for a common agricultural
  policy (articles 38 to 45, especially 39)
• De Gaulle quickly presents the CAP as a
  compensation to France for the risks of free
  market
• April 1958 conference of Stresa, the basic
  lines unified market, community preference,
  financial solidarity
• Brussels, December 21st 1961 decision on the
  principles of the CAP
• January 14th 1962 launch of the CAP price
  support, subsidies, modernization (1968, the
  Mandsholt plan)
• Paradoxically, the EEC commission and De Gaulle
  worked together on that
• For the commission, another common policy managed
  at the European level for De Gaulle, guarantees
  for the adaptation of French agriculture
• W. Germany accepts the compromise

7
A debated policy

• A common and successful policy, that managed to
  modernize European agriculture and keep farmers
  happy?
• A scandalous waste of money (roughly half of EU
  budget), geared towards intensive agricultural
  practices that cause technical, economical,
  environmental problems?
• European Commissioner Franz Fischler, 2002 A
  common agricultural policy that encourages
  surpluses which then have to be disposed of is
  no longer acceptable Public expenditure must
  yield something in return whether it is the
  food quality, the preservation of the environment
  and animal welfare, landscapes, cultural
  heritage, or enhancing social balance and
  equity

8
From agriculture to politics

• In the following years, De Gaulle will put on the
  table a more complex problem institutions and
  the political architecture of the communities
• The institutionnal conceptions of De Gaulle
• A Europe of the states control the supranational
  element, the commission as a technical
  secretariat. The states are the only legitimate
  actors, and delegation of competence can only go
  through representatives of the states, unanimity
  should be the rule
• A European Europe, independent of the United
  States, based on the 6 under the leadership of
  France. At the horizon, the redefinition of
  NATOs role in Europe
• September 1958 first contacts with Adenauer
• 1959 proposals to Washington of a triumvirate in
  NATO between France, Great-Britain, the US
• A minor partnership for W.Germany, mixed with
  regular resurgence of a fear of Germany
• The classical lines of a gaullist trend in
  French foreign policy European Europe
  subsuming French capacities, sharing of power in
  NATO with the US, a multipolar world, etc
• The problem of style there is a lot of
  overlapping between France, GB, Benelux and
  W-Germany, but de Gaulles perceived arrogance
  and blunt style alienate his partners

9
The Fouchet plan

• De Gaulle acts at the same time than with the CAP
  (1961-1962)
• Contacts with the 6 around creating an
  intergovernmental, political European
  organization an umbrella organization for the
  more supranational communities
• After January 1960, regular meetings between the
  6 to discuss political matters
• February 1960 France tests its first nuclear
  bomb whatever organization is created, France
  will be its only nuclear member, and thus a
  strategically dominant power
• March 31st 1960 press conference the intention
  to build a European political gathering, first
  step toward a powerful confederation...
• Draft project to Adenauer in July, and contacts
  with other member-states
• September 5th 1960 another press conference
• Official presentation of the project regular
  political cooperation of Western European states
  around economic, political, cultural, military
  issues. Specialized, technical, supranational
  organs, an intergovernmental cooperation, a
  European referendum Control to the states,
  distance from NATO

10

• Conference in Paris in February 1961 on the
  subject
• Reservations in W.Germany
• What of NATO? What of the communities main idea,
  supranationality? French domination?
• Adenauer, though, favours solidarity with De
  Gaulle, at the condition that this does not
  antagonize NATO or put into question toe EECs
  status Problems ahead
• The Netherlands clearly oppose the idea
• It undermines the communities, a protection for
  small states
• It threatens NATO and relations with London
• It emphasizes French leadership
• The US oppose the idea
• From Trumann/Acheson to John Fitzgerald Kennedy
  a new generation of US leadership
• Impossible to mitigate American position and
  treat as equals with a group of European
  countries
• The conference finally sends the problem to a
  committee led by Christian Fouchet (hence Fouchet
  plan)
• A compromise is found in Bad-Godesberg, July
  1961 regular meetings of heads of states around
  a European political architecture
• Tensed context, with the CAP discussions and the
  second crisis of Berlin during the summer 1961

11
July 1961, the first British application

• The first British application in July 1961 as an
  important step
• Great-Britain acknowledges the relevance of the
  community method to its own interests a turning
  point
• The tables turn
• Belgium and the Netherlands
• were reluctant to accept the Fouchet plan
• but they can accept it if Great-Britain enters
  the communities as a balance to France and a link
  to NATO
• Yet if Britain does not enter, then it is
  necessary to keep supranationality as a guarantee
  against French power, and thus reject the Fouchet
  plan
• De Gaulle, on the other hand, cannot accept
  Britains accession
• A relay of American influence, bent on stripping
  the communities of whats advantageous for France

12
Relegating the Fouchet plan

• Thus, when in October 1961, the Fouchet committee
  presents a draft treaty, the question is
  inextricably linked with Britains application
  and the draft is rejected.
• January 1962, the Fouchet committee has to
  present a second plan
• Debates What should be the organizations
  relations with NATO? How should it be organized?
  Should Great-Britain be accepted as a
  member-state?
• Last meeting in April 1962 impossible to
  compromise, the plan is relegated
• Incompatibility between federalists and
  intergovernmentalists, Atlantists and
  Europeans, the French vision and the
  Belgian/Dutch vision. W. Germany plays in-between

13
Europe of the states

• De Gaulles press conference, May 15th 1962
• A resounding, almost bitter declaration in
  extremely virulent terms, De Gaulle regrets the
  failure of the plan, and puts the blame on
  a-historical, a-national federalists, speaking
  strange integrated languages, bent on dissolving
  old states, their traditions, their legitimacy
• Jean Monnet criticizes the speech, even if he
  supported the Fouchet plan at first
• A failure for De Gaulle to adapt political Europe
  to his views

14
Coping with Britain, 1961-1963

• Britains PM Harold MacMillan is decided to
  conclude the negotiations, and he is under strong
  domestic pressure
• The failure of the Fouchet plan in 1962 makes
  negotiations more tensed. At the same time,
  domestic pressures force MacMillan to stiffen his
  position.
• Technical questions
• Common tariff, community preference (the idea
  that Britain would have to privilege community
  products instead of Commonwealth products),
  institutional problems
• Political questions Britains influence in
  Europe, Britains link with the United States
• December 1962 MacMillan signs in the Bahamas a
  nuclear defence agreement with the US De Gaulle
  reacts strongly, convinced that Britain is more
  an ally of the United States than a European
  country
• December 1962-January 1963 see the end of 16
  months of negotiations
• January 14th 1963 press conference, the first
  French veto to Britains accession
• Trojan horse of American influence, opposition to
  Britains economic vision we want Britain in,
  but we want it naked
• For most European leaders, it is clear that
  France will reject any enlargement to Britain as
  long as de Gaulle is President
• Negotiations with the applicant countries are
  dropped in the spring

15
The Elysée treaty

• De Gaulle will turn to classical cooperation with
  W.Germany for the next round
• The Elysée treaty, January 22nd 1963 a show of
  Franco-German friendship
• Press conference plus Elysée treaty
• Adenauer had promised to leave in 1963. He wants
  a treaty with France that would force his
  successors to continue a policy of Western
  integration. The treaty organizes regular
  meetings between Bonn and Paris, but there are
  ambiguities the Bundestag forces in February an
  amendment that emphasizes Western Germanys links
  with NATO
• The dilemma of W.Germany between Kennedys US and
  de Gaulles France
• The last show of old Adenauer
• An ambiguous relation
• W.Germany has two jealous suitors, and de Gaulle
  is not very patient
• The minor partnership and the ambiguities of de
  Gaulles vision of W.Germany

16
The empty chair crisis, 1965-1966

• After the failure of the Fouchet plan and the end
  of negotiations with Britain, January 1963 is a
  month of reaffirming De Gaulles options
• 1962 saw the end of the Algerian war
• France refuses the deployment of Polaris
  missiles, and will veto any further British
  application
• The Elysée treaty
• Even if De Gaulles policies annoy, solidarity
  appears to remain strong amongst the 6 nobody
  objects to De Gaulles veto
• Tensions will rise again in 1963-1965
• The CAP as a pretext
• De Gaulle demands in late 1963 a reform of the
  CAP, with better price guarantees and support for
  French agriculture (obligation to privilege
  community products)
• Interests overlap in many ways, but de Gaulles
  style roughs many feathers
• The reformulation of the institutional balance is
  De Gaulles real issue
• Less Qualified Majority Voting, more unanimity a
  veto for the states

17
CAP and QMV

• Problems around the CAP
• De Gaulle (and the Dutch to some extent) demand
  high prices, community privileges, subsidies
• A specific agreement is scheduled for before July
  1st, 1965
• The problem of the budget and of decision making
• January 1966 the unanimity rule in the Council
  of Ministers should have been replaced by more
  Qualified Majority Voting
• April 8th, 1965 the fusion of the executives of
  the communities one commission, one council of
  ministers, etc
• In order to manage the budget of the CAP, Walter
  Halstein, the head of this single commission,
  demands immediately the transfer of considerable
  financial authority from the Council to the
  Commission, and the extension of the QMV
  procedure

18

• For De Gaulle, such a system is unacceptable. He
  used Hallsteins declaration as a pretext to
  bully his partners on the CAP and on institutions
• De Gaulle withdraws Frances representatives from
  all intergovernmental meetings of the communities
  in Brussels, from June 1965 to January 1966 the
  empty chair crisis
• A psychological crisis more than anything lots
  of overlap in the interests
• Negotiations between the 5 to solve this problem
• January 1966 the compromise of Luxemburg
• Any state could block the proceedings of the
  Council of Ministers when its vital interests are
  threatened
• Only then did the discussions on agricultural
  matters start in earnest with France

19
Last crises, 1967-1969

• An uncertain mood, with De Gaulle trying to
  balance an increasingly bitter Western Germany
  with uncertain relations with Britain
• Old defiance toward Germany, fed by difficult
  relations with the successors of Adenauer after
  1963
• At the same time, problem with NATO 1966, he
  withdraws French forces from the integrated
  command of NATO and expels NATOs headquarters to
  Belgium
• December 1966 meeting in Moscow with the Soviet
  leadership, talks of deterring Germany
• The second French veto to British accession, May
  1967
• Harold Wilson, British PM, renews British
  application in May 1967
• Signals from De Gaulle are unclear, but after a
  while he repels British application, in December
  1967
• The De Gaulle-Soames conversation, February 4th
  1969
• A last crisis that shows De Gaulles uncertainty
• May 1968 De Gaulle appeared weakened by the
  students agitation
• February 4th, 1969 De Gaulle and British
  Ambassador to France Christopher Soames meet De
  Gaulle proposes a partnership with Britain,
  membership in the communities, and a new
  Franco-British axis
• Fear of Germany (De Gaulle feared Germany would
  find support in the East), slip of judgment
• Britain refuses, denounces De Gaulle and makes
  his statement public

20
De Gaulles legacy?

• April 28th, 1969 De Gaulle resigns
• His legacy in European integration
• De Gaulles European policy Nationalist
  integration (John Keeler), adaptation to the
  circumstances of European integration, bilateral
  relations
• The start of the Common market Enlargement
  blocked
• Intimate relations with Western Germany, yet also
  fear and uncertainty over Adenauers successors
• The Common Agricultural Policy
• The Luxemburg compromise and institutions
• The veto mechanism will be evoked about 10
  times between 1966 and 1992, mostly by France on
  agricultural matters
• A bitter atmosphere
• Economic and technical integration and the fusion
  of the executives (April 8th 1965, came into
  force in 1967)?
• The new commission has less power than its
  predecessors and the High Authority
• The states firmly in charge the Council, the
  Committee of Permanent Representatives, the QMV
  method, etc
• Legacy in French foreign policy shadow of de
  Gaulle, the illusion of French power, the force
  de frappe, a take on NATO
• A special place for France, now normalized?

21
The communities in 1969?

• Clearly an evolution from the 1950s
• Unfulfilled promises
• The potential for supranational decision making
  is quashed by De Gaulle QMV as a rule until 1992
• Fulfilled economic promises
• Intra-EEC import quotas are abolished ahead of
  schedule in 1961 and tariffs disappeared 18
  months ahead of schedule in July 1968
• A common tariff is decided, paid to the EECs
  commission
• Economic prosperity helps to offset the political
  and economic costs of liberalization-induced
  restructuring
• Cooperative habits have been taken
• Even in 1965, during the empty chair crisis,
  nobody suggests to press on without France
• Each states find interests in the communities
  system
• Two non-overlapping circles in Europe at the end
  of the 1960s the EFTA and the EEC
• British application as the recognition of the
  EECs relevance with all its defaults, the
  community method appears at the end of the 1960s
  as the most efficient mean of cooperation