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Title: History and Theory of European Integration


1
History and Theory of European Integration
  • Marina V. Larionova

2
Lecture 3
  • The Decade of De Gaulle (1958-1969)
  • British applications and rejections
  • Veto of the UK accession
  • Fouchet plan for a political community
  • Elysee Treaty
  • Merger Treaty
  • De Gaulles resignation
  • The Limits of Spill Over method

3
Readings for the lecture
  • Dinan Desmond (1999) Ever Closer Union. An
    Introduction to European Integration. Second
    edition. The European Union Series. Palgrave.
    Chapter 2 and Chapter 12
  • Monnet J. A Ferment of Change. (1962). The
    European Union. Readings on the Theory and
    Practice of European Integration, Nelsen B.F. and
    Alexander C G. Stubb (eds.), Palgrave, 1998
  • Monnet J. Europe Needs Britain (1961). The
    Pro-European Reader. Leonard D. and Leonard
    M.(eds.), Palgrave, 2002
  • Gaulle Charle de. A Concert of European States
    (1965). The European Union. Readings on the
    Theory and Practice of European Integration,
    Nelsen B.F. and Alexander C G. Stubb (eds.),
    Palgrave, 1998

4
De Gaulles contentions contribution to the
European integration
  • Foundations of the Common Agricultural Policy
  • Implementation of the EEC Treaty provisions for
    Common Agricultural Policy as a condition for
    the customs union and common external tariff
    enforcement
  • Keeping the UK out of the EEC
  • The triumph of intergovernmental method in EEC
    construction

5
Jean Monnets method for introducing change in
Europe Inherent features
  • 1. The profound change is being made possible
    essentially by the new method of common action
    which is the core of the European community. This
    method has become a permanent dialogue between a
    single European body, responsible for expressing
    the view of the general interest of the
    Community, and the national governments,
    expressing the national views.
  •  2. To agree on the objectives and to negotiate
    afterwards. An overall settlement is unlikely to
    be reached by haggling over the details. Details
    fall into place and specific problems are more
    easily solved when they are looked at in the
    framework of a general agreement.
  •  
  •  
  •    
  •  

6
Jean Monnets method for introducing change in
Europe Inherent features
  • 3. The system is not federal, because there is no
    central government the nations take their
    decisions together in the Council of Ministers.
    On the other hand, the independent European body
    proposes policies, and the common element is
    further underlined by the European Parliament
    and the European Court of Justice.
  • 4. Trust in the wisdom and strength of the
    existing institutions is needed to discuss the
    problems as common problems, using the machinery
    of the community, which has been devised for that
    specific purpose.
  •  

7
Jean Monnets method for introducing change in
Europe inherent features
  • 5.  Common rules applied by joint institutions
    give each a responsibility for effective working
    of the Community as a whole.
  •  6. European unity is not a blueprint, it is not
    a theory, it is a process of bringing people and
    nations together to find a way out of conflicts,
    to adapt themselves jointly to changing
    circumstances.
  •  7.  The new institutional method is permanently
    modifying relations between nations and men.
    Human nature does not change, but when nations
    and men accept the same rules and the same
    institutions to make sure that they are applied,
    their behavior towards each other changes. This
    is the process of civilization itself.

8
The EC four years of harmony between the
governments of the member states and the EC
institutions
  • Commission portfolios external relations,
    economic and financial affairs, the internal
    market, competition, social affairs, agriculture,
    transport, overseas territories
  • Progress in elimination tariff barriers, success
    of commercial and external relations policy
  • Economic growth in Western Europe / increased
    trade activity
  • EC emerging international identity / GATT and
    Yaounde Convention
  • Competition, social affairs, transport,
    agriculture policies impasse

9
Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community
  • Article 6
  • The Common market shall be progressively
    established during a transitional period of
    twelve years.
  • This transitional period shall be divided into
    three stages of four years each the length of
    each stage may be altered in accordance with the
    provisions set out below.

10
The key general findings of the analysis (1958)
  • The initiation of the integration process does
    not require absolute majority support, nor need
    it rest on identical aims on the part of the key
    participants.
  • Acceptance of a federal scheme is facilitated if
    the participating state units are already
    fragmented ideologically and socially.
  • Acceptance of the integration scheme is
    facilitated if the participating groups,
    political, industrial, labor, have a tradition of
    consultations and shared values.
  • Integration process is facilitated by existence
    of an external threat, real or imagined.

11
The key general findings of the analysis (1958)
  • The central institution once established will
    affect political integration process if it
    acquires the capacity to raise positive
    expectations.
  • Group pressure will spill over into the federal
    sphere and add to the integrative impulse.
  • National governments may attempt to sidestep, or
    sabotage the decisions of the federal authority,
    however, in the long run they tend to defer to
    federal decisions.

12
The key general findings of the analysis (1958)
  • The major interest groups determine their support
    or opposition to the central institutions
    policies on the basis of a calculated advantage.
  • The process of community formation will succeed
    if the crucial expectations, ideologies and
    behavior patterns of the key interest groups can
    be refocused on a new set of central symbols and
    institutions.
  • The spill over is not automatic and requires a
    measure of political activism.

13
De Gaulles Aims
  • Recovery of France, both economic and spiritual
  • Reestablishment of the country as a great power
    invested with world responsibility for political
    stability and social order
  • Regaining the countrys independence
  • Reclaiming France leading international role
  • Rejuvenation of industry and agricultural sector

14
Challenges Internal pressures
  • Colonial wars (Algerian crisis)
  • Collapse of the Fourth republic
  • 1958 De Gaulle negotiates a new constitutional
    regime
  • 1958 September referendum endorsing
    Presidential republic
  • Fifth republic strong Presidency / exclusive
    responsibility for foreign and defense policy /
    greater legitimacy of the executive power
  • 1958 December De Gaulle elected President of
    France

15
Challenges Internal pressures
  • The need for financial and monetary reform
  • 1958 - Devaluation of the frank / cutting on the
    government expenditure / tax increase
  • The need to stimulate the business sector facing
    fierce international competition
  • The imperative of industrial competitiveness
  • The priority of agricultural modernization

16
EEC instrumental to
  • Modernization of the agricultural sector
  • Industrial modernization
  • Enhancing Europe competitiveness
  • Franco-German reconciliation
  • De Gaulle-Adenauer accord

17
EC Common Agricultural Policy (Stresa conference,
July 1958)
  • Guarantee of high agricultural prices based on
    financial solidarity of the member states
    exercised through the price support and
    intervention mechanism
  • Provision of a European Community wide Market for
    agricultural goods based on the community
    preferences and the free movement of goods
    principles
  • Subsidization of surplus produce export outside
    the EC through export refunds
  • Protection of internal agricultural market
    through a system of import levies based on the
    community preference principle

18
De Gaulles Quid pro Quo
  • Industrial policy on tariffs and quotas versus
  • Agricultural policy on tariffs and quotas
  • Stage 1. May 1960 January 1962
  • Lowering internal customs barriers
  • Establishing external tariffs
  • Timetable for decisions to be taken on
    agricultural policy
  • Financial levy liability on imports of foodstuff
    from the third countries

19
1962 January 13 14 Council Resolution
  • France and common sense prevailed
  • Agriculture admitted into the Common Market
  • Aim 50 reduction in customs duties for
    agricultural goods by the end of the second stage

20
External pressures
  • Europe desolated and divided by the Iron Curtain
  • Cold War tearing apart both European continent
    and the World
  • International Institutions polarized by two
    opposing camps
  • Germany - divided, but reindustrialized and
    rearmed, hence EC perceived as an institutional
    framework embedding Franco-German reconciliation

21
External pressures
  • European free trade area perceived as Britains
    efforts to undermine European integration eroding
    the common external tariff
  • Free trade area (European Free Trade Association)
    versus Common market (European Economic
    Community)
  • The UK special position - application to join
    provided that their special relationship with
    the Commonwealth and their associates in the free
    trade area, as well as their special interests in
    agriculture are respected

22
De Gaulles Principles for the Concert of
European States
  • Independence of the nation
  • Reclaiming what was due to the country
  • Preserving the national identity
  • Shaking off the Atlantic supremacy over the Old
    World
  • Rejecting the doctrine of supranationalism
  • Intergovernmental cooperation on political and
    security affairs
  • Germany - the heart of the problem and the
    keystone of the European edifice
  • Germany - an integral part of the organized
    system of cooperation for the whole continent
  • Systemic rapprochement, not a fusion of peoples
  • Setting up of a concert of European states which
    in developing all sorts of ties between them
    would increase their interdependence and
    solidarity
  • Emergence of a strong, politically and military
    independent Europe

23
De Gaulles European Security Community
initiativeSeptember 1960 Fouchet Committee
  • Logic - Intergovernmental
  • Approach - a Confederation of member states
  • Aims - Common foreign and defense policy,
    cooperation on cultural, educational and research
    issues
  • Institutional framework heads of states or
    ministerial council, political commission based
    in Paris and an assembly of national
    parliamentary representatives
  • Results collapse of the Fouchet plan in April
    1962
  • Reciprocity of Adenauer - De Gaulle support
    policies (CAP/ESC)
  • Achievements - signing the Franco-German Treaty
    of Friendship and Reconciliation in January 1963
    to become a driving force of European integration
    later on

24
De Gaulles Manifestation of Nationalism
  • National interests neglected in ECSC (French
    relinquishment of coke in Ruhr)
  • National interests neglected in EURATOM (15 years
    history of the Atomic Energy Commissariat)
  • National interests neglected in EEC (agricultural
    versus industrial regulations)
  • The doctrine of supranationalism national self
    effacement by the leading school of thought
    inside France and support for Europe seen as
    edifice in which technocrats forming an
    executive and parliamentarians assuming
    legislative powers would have the authority to
    decide the fate of the French people

25
De Gaulles Manifestation of Nationalism
  • Atlantic alliance intentions to prevent France
    from becoming its own master
  • Ludwig Erhards Atlanticist position stalling the
    development of the Elyssee Treaty
  • Walter Hallsteins ambitions for Germany to
    regain its respectability and preponderant
    influence
  • The UK (Harold Macmillan) desire to undermine the
    project of the six dissolving Common Market in
    the Free Trade Area ( Having failed to prevent
    the birth of the Community from without, they
    planned to paralyze it from within)
  • Veto of the UK membership application following
    the intergovernmental bargaining process (August
    1961 January 1963)

26
The Empty Chair crisis and Luxembourg
Compromise1965 July 1966 January
  • in view of the initial financial regulation
    expiry date in July 1965 the Commissions
    proposals to
  • introduce the EC own resources funded from
    agricultural levies, customs duties and up to 1
    percent of the national VAT revenue
  • enhance the EP and EC budgetary powers
  • introduce a system of funding CAP from the EC
    own resources
  • introduce majority voting principle into the
    deliberations of the Council of Ministers

27
The Empty Chair crisis and Luxembourg
Compromise1965 July 1966 January
  • Walter Hallstein announcement of the proposals to
    the EP in Strasbourg
  • French counter proposal to continue funding CAP
    from the national contributions as of 1 July
  • The Council of Ministers meeting on June 28
    stalemate and withdrawal of the French
    representatives
  • De Gaulles attack on the qualified majority
    voting and insistence on the principle of
    unanimity
  • The Council meeting on October 25-26 with the
    French chair empty
  • December 1965 Presidential election in France
    De Gaulles narrow margin victory over the
    candidate of Europe, Francois Mitterrand
  • The Council of Ministers meeting on January
    28-29, 1966

28
January 28-29, 1996Luxembourg Compromise
  • Financial regulation for CAP
  • EC own resources
  • EP budgetary powers
  • Majority voting

29
Outcomes
  • Agreement to disagree
  • If one member state considered that a vital
    national interest was at stake, the Council would
    endeavor to reach within a reasonable period,
    solutions that could be adopted unanimously.
  • The French delegation special position that when
    very important interests were at issue,
    discussions must be continued until unanimous
    agreement is reached

30
Outcomes
  • Presumption within the Council in favor of
    unanimity / Transformation of the community
    spirit into a more cost-benefit attitude of the
    member-states
  • Demonstration of the community dependency on the
    political environment
  • Shaped the political environment for the next
    decade
  • Intergovernmentalism prevails

31
Objections to the Luxembourg Compromise
  • The Commission excluded from the meeting was not
    party to the agreement
  • The Court of Justice ruled that Resolutions and
    Declaration of political will by the Council can
    not prevail against the Treaty rules

32
  • Vetoing the accession applications

33
The UK first application for EC membership
August 1961 - January 1963 / Conservatives /
  • Reasons for realization of the mistake of self
    exclusion from the Treaty of Rome and decision to
    apply /Harold Macmillan/
  • Success of the customs union
  • Failure to dissolve the EC into the EFTA
  • Fear of economic exclusion
  • The Commonwealth proving inadequate instrument
    for promotion of British interests
  • Kennedys endorsement of the UK membership in the
    EC

34
The case for failure
  • British position on ensuring its special
    interests in the EFTA and the Commonwealth
  • Anglo-American missile accord, December, 1962
  • Decision to integrate UK nuclear force into NATO
  • The lack of trust and use of intergovernmental
    method of bargaining instead of Monnets
    community method
  • January 15, 1963 De Gaulles conference

35
The second application May December 1967 /
Labor / Harold Wilson
  • Increasing need for accession
  • growing European commercial contacts and slumping
    economic ties with the Commonwealth
  • Barriers to membership
  • De Gaulles anti Atlantisiam - Anglo-American
    special relations
  • De Gaulles quest to preserve Frances leadership
    role in the EC
  • December 1967 De Gaulles conference

36
1968
  • May protests, riots and strikes in France
  • June dissolution of the parliament by the prime
    minister George Pompidou / reelection of the
    parliament / victory of the Gaullists
  • April 1969
  • De Gaulles resignation

37
De Gaulles road towards European unity
  • United Europe is only achieved through
    organization of concerted action in every sphere
  • Individual States are the only valid elements,
    when their national interests are at stake
    nothing and nobody must be allowed to force their
    hands, and the cooperation between them is the
    only road that will lead anywhere.
  • although it is perfectly natural for the states
    of Europe to have specialized bodies available to
    prepare and whenever necessary to follow up their
    decisions, these decisions must be their own.

38
Arguments for Intergovernmental approach
  • Common market, a brainchild of technocrats,
    carrying all the hopes and illusions of a
    supranational school.
  • Fruitless bargaining with the British showed the
    fledgling Community that good intention are not
    enough to reconcile the irreconcilable, the Six
    found that even in the economic sphere alone the
    adjustment of their respective positions bristled
    with difficulties which could not be resolved
    solely on terms of treaties concluded to that
    end.
  • Executives of the common institutions were
    helpless when it came to making and enforcing
    decisions, only governments were in a position to
    do this, and then only as a result of
    negotiations carried out in due form between
    ministers and ambassadors.
  • The important measures should be subordinated to
    the decisions of individual states
  • The member states decisions should be the
    cornerstone of the Institutions and a guarantee
    of the members sovereignty

39
Recommended Readings
  • Macmillan Harold Britain Place and purpose in
    the World. Extract from speech at Conservative
    party conference, October 1961. Pro-European
    Reader. 2002. Palgrave.
  • Kennedy F. John The US Welcomes European Unity.
    Speech at Washington, DC, 17 may 1962.
    Pro-European Reader. 2002. Palgrave
  • Jenkins Roy Let us go in with Hope and
    Confidence. Speech at labor party conference,
    October 1062. Pro-European Reader. 2002. Palgrave
  • Wilson Harold We mean business. Extract from
    speech to the Council of Europe, Strabourg, 23
    January 1967. Pro-European Reader. 2002. Palgrave

40
Lecture 4 The Intergovernmentalist backlash
  • Critiques and contemplations of
    Neofunctionalism

41
Readings for the lecture
  • Hoffman S. Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the
    Nation State and the Case of Western Europe
    (1966). The European Union. Readings on the
    Theory and Practice of European Integration,
    Nelsen B.F. and Alexander C G. Stubb (eds.),
    Palgrave, 1998
  • Lindberg L.N. Political Integration Definitions
    and Hypotheses (1963). The European Union.
    Readings on the Theory and Practice of European
    Integration, Nelsen B.F. and Alexander C G.
    Stubb (eds.), Palgrave, 1998
  • Rosamond Ben. (2000) Theories of European
    Integration. The European Union Series. Palgrave
    Chapter 4

42
  • Thank you!
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