Title: History and Theory of European Integration
1History and Theory of European Integration
2Lecture 3
- The Decade of De Gaulle (1958-1969)
- British applications and rejections
- Veto of the UK accession
- Fouchet plan for a political community
- Elysee Treaty
- Merger Treaty
- De Gaulles resignation
- The Limits of Spill Over method
-
3Readings for the lecture
- Dinan Desmond (1999) Ever Closer Union. An
Introduction to European Integration. Second
edition. The European Union Series. Palgrave.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 12 -
- Monnet J. A Ferment of Change. (1962). The
European Union. Readings on the Theory and
Practice of European Integration, Nelsen B.F. and
Alexander C G. Stubb (eds.), Palgrave, 1998 - Monnet J. Europe Needs Britain (1961). The
Pro-European Reader. Leonard D. and Leonard
M.(eds.), Palgrave, 2002 - Gaulle Charle de. A Concert of European States
(1965). The European Union. Readings on the
Theory and Practice of European Integration,
Nelsen B.F. and Alexander C G. Stubb (eds.),
Palgrave, 1998
4De Gaulles contentions contribution to the
European integration
- Foundations of the Common Agricultural Policy
- Implementation of the EEC Treaty provisions for
Common Agricultural Policy as a condition for
the customs union and common external tariff
enforcement - Keeping the UK out of the EEC
- The triumph of intergovernmental method in EEC
construction
5Jean Monnets method for introducing change in
Europe Inherent features
- 1. The profound change is being made possible
essentially by the new method of common action
which is the core of the European community. This
method has become a permanent dialogue between a
single European body, responsible for expressing
the view of the general interest of the
Community, and the national governments,
expressing the national views. - Â 2. To agree on the objectives and to negotiate
afterwards. An overall settlement is unlikely to
be reached by haggling over the details. Details
fall into place and specific problems are more
easily solved when they are looked at in the
framework of a general agreement. - Â
- Â
- Â Â
- Â
6Jean Monnets method for introducing change in
Europe Inherent features
- 3. The system is not federal, because there is no
central government the nations take their
decisions together in the Council of Ministers.
On the other hand, the independent European body
proposes policies, and the common element is
further underlined by the European Parliament
and the European Court of Justice. - 4. Trust in the wisdom and strength of the
existing institutions is needed to discuss the
problems as common problems, using the machinery
of the community, which has been devised for that
specific purpose. - Â
-
7Jean Monnets method for introducing change in
Europe inherent features
- 5. Common rules applied by joint institutions
give each a responsibility for effective working
of the Community as a whole. - Â 6. European unity is not a blueprint, it is not
a theory, it is a process of bringing people and
nations together to find a way out of conflicts,
to adapt themselves jointly to changing
circumstances. -  7.  The new institutional method is permanently
modifying relations between nations and men.
Human nature does not change, but when nations
and men accept the same rules and the same
institutions to make sure that they are applied,
their behavior towards each other changes. This
is the process of civilization itself.
8The EC four years of harmony between the
governments of the member states and the EC
institutions
- Commission portfolios external relations,
economic and financial affairs, the internal
market, competition, social affairs, agriculture,
transport, overseas territories - Progress in elimination tariff barriers, success
of commercial and external relations policy - Economic growth in Western Europe / increased
trade activity - EC emerging international identity / GATT and
Yaounde Convention - Competition, social affairs, transport,
agriculture policies impasse
9Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community
- Article 6
- The Common market shall be progressively
established during a transitional period of
twelve years. - This transitional period shall be divided into
three stages of four years each the length of
each stage may be altered in accordance with the
provisions set out below.
10The key general findings of the analysis (1958)
- The initiation of the integration process does
not require absolute majority support, nor need
it rest on identical aims on the part of the key
participants. - Acceptance of a federal scheme is facilitated if
the participating state units are already
fragmented ideologically and socially. - Acceptance of the integration scheme is
facilitated if the participating groups,
political, industrial, labor, have a tradition of
consultations and shared values. - Integration process is facilitated by existence
of an external threat, real or imagined.
11The key general findings of the analysis (1958)
- The central institution once established will
affect political integration process if it
acquires the capacity to raise positive
expectations. - Group pressure will spill over into the federal
sphere and add to the integrative impulse. - National governments may attempt to sidestep, or
sabotage the decisions of the federal authority,
however, in the long run they tend to defer to
federal decisions.
12The key general findings of the analysis (1958)
- The major interest groups determine their support
or opposition to the central institutions
policies on the basis of a calculated advantage. - The process of community formation will succeed
if the crucial expectations, ideologies and
behavior patterns of the key interest groups can
be refocused on a new set of central symbols and
institutions. - The spill over is not automatic and requires a
measure of political activism.
13De Gaulles Aims
- Recovery of France, both economic and spiritual
- Reestablishment of the country as a great power
invested with world responsibility for political
stability and social order - Regaining the countrys independence
- Reclaiming France leading international role
- Rejuvenation of industry and agricultural sector
14Challenges Internal pressures
- Colonial wars (Algerian crisis)
- Collapse of the Fourth republic
- 1958 De Gaulle negotiates a new constitutional
regime - 1958 September referendum endorsing
Presidential republic - Fifth republic strong Presidency / exclusive
responsibility for foreign and defense policy /
greater legitimacy of the executive power - 1958 December De Gaulle elected President of
France
15Challenges Internal pressures
- The need for financial and monetary reform
- 1958 - Devaluation of the frank / cutting on the
government expenditure / tax increase - The need to stimulate the business sector facing
fierce international competition - The imperative of industrial competitiveness
- The priority of agricultural modernization
16EEC instrumental to
- Modernization of the agricultural sector
- Industrial modernization
- Enhancing Europe competitiveness
- Franco-German reconciliation
- De Gaulle-Adenauer accord
17EC Common Agricultural Policy (Stresa conference,
July 1958)
- Guarantee of high agricultural prices based on
financial solidarity of the member states
exercised through the price support and
intervention mechanism - Provision of a European Community wide Market for
agricultural goods based on the community
preferences and the free movement of goods
principles - Subsidization of surplus produce export outside
the EC through export refunds - Protection of internal agricultural market
through a system of import levies based on the
community preference principle
18De Gaulles Quid pro Quo
- Industrial policy on tariffs and quotas versus
- Agricultural policy on tariffs and quotas
- Stage 1. May 1960 January 1962
- Lowering internal customs barriers
- Establishing external tariffs
- Timetable for decisions to be taken on
agricultural policy - Financial levy liability on imports of foodstuff
from the third countries
191962 January 13 14 Council Resolution
- France and common sense prevailed
- Agriculture admitted into the Common Market
- Aim 50 reduction in customs duties for
agricultural goods by the end of the second stage
20External pressures
- Europe desolated and divided by the Iron Curtain
- Cold War tearing apart both European continent
and the World - International Institutions polarized by two
opposing camps - Germany - divided, but reindustrialized and
rearmed, hence EC perceived as an institutional
framework embedding Franco-German reconciliation
21External pressures
- European free trade area perceived as Britains
efforts to undermine European integration eroding
the common external tariff - Free trade area (European Free Trade Association)
versus Common market (European Economic
Community) - The UK special position - application to join
provided that their special relationship with
the Commonwealth and their associates in the free
trade area, as well as their special interests in
agriculture are respected
22De Gaulles Principles for the Concert of
European States
- Independence of the nation
- Reclaiming what was due to the country
- Preserving the national identity
- Shaking off the Atlantic supremacy over the Old
World - Rejecting the doctrine of supranationalism
- Intergovernmental cooperation on political and
security affairs - Germany - the heart of the problem and the
keystone of the European edifice - Germany - an integral part of the organized
system of cooperation for the whole continent - Systemic rapprochement, not a fusion of peoples
- Setting up of a concert of European states which
in developing all sorts of ties between them
would increase their interdependence and
solidarity - Emergence of a strong, politically and military
independent Europe
23De Gaulles European Security Community
initiativeSeptember 1960 Fouchet Committee
- Logic - Intergovernmental
- Approach - a Confederation of member states
- Aims - Common foreign and defense policy,
cooperation on cultural, educational and research
issues - Institutional framework heads of states or
ministerial council, political commission based
in Paris and an assembly of national
parliamentary representatives - Results collapse of the Fouchet plan in April
1962 - Reciprocity of Adenauer - De Gaulle support
policies (CAP/ESC) - Achievements - signing the Franco-German Treaty
of Friendship and Reconciliation in January 1963
to become a driving force of European integration
later on
24De Gaulles Manifestation of Nationalism
- National interests neglected in ECSC (French
relinquishment of coke in Ruhr) - National interests neglected in EURATOM (15 years
history of the Atomic Energy Commissariat) - National interests neglected in EEC (agricultural
versus industrial regulations) - The doctrine of supranationalism national self
effacement by the leading school of thought
inside France and support for Europe seen as
edifice in which technocrats forming an
executive and parliamentarians assuming
legislative powers would have the authority to
decide the fate of the French people
25De Gaulles Manifestation of Nationalism
- Atlantic alliance intentions to prevent France
from becoming its own master - Ludwig Erhards Atlanticist position stalling the
development of the Elyssee Treaty - Walter Hallsteins ambitions for Germany to
regain its respectability and preponderant
influence - The UK (Harold Macmillan) desire to undermine the
project of the six dissolving Common Market in
the Free Trade Area ( Having failed to prevent
the birth of the Community from without, they
planned to paralyze it from within) - Veto of the UK membership application following
the intergovernmental bargaining process (August
1961 January 1963)
26The Empty Chair crisis and Luxembourg
Compromise1965 July 1966 January
- in view of the initial financial regulation
expiry date in July 1965 the Commissions
proposals to - introduce the EC own resources funded from
agricultural levies, customs duties and up to 1
percent of the national VAT revenue - enhance the EP and EC budgetary powers
- introduce a system of funding CAP from the EC
own resources - introduce majority voting principle into the
deliberations of the Council of Ministers
27The Empty Chair crisis and Luxembourg
Compromise1965 July 1966 January
- Walter Hallstein announcement of the proposals to
the EP in Strasbourg - French counter proposal to continue funding CAP
from the national contributions as of 1 July - The Council of Ministers meeting on June 28
stalemate and withdrawal of the French
representatives - De Gaulles attack on the qualified majority
voting and insistence on the principle of
unanimity - The Council meeting on October 25-26 with the
French chair empty - December 1965 Presidential election in France
De Gaulles narrow margin victory over the
candidate of Europe, Francois Mitterrand - The Council of Ministers meeting on January
28-29, 1966
28January 28-29, 1996Luxembourg Compromise
- Financial regulation for CAP
- EC own resources
- EP budgetary powers
- Majority voting
29Outcomes
- Agreement to disagree
- If one member state considered that a vital
national interest was at stake, the Council would
endeavor to reach within a reasonable period,
solutions that could be adopted unanimously. - The French delegation special position that when
very important interests were at issue,
discussions must be continued until unanimous
agreement is reached
30Outcomes
- Presumption within the Council in favor of
unanimity / Transformation of the community
spirit into a more cost-benefit attitude of the
member-states - Demonstration of the community dependency on the
political environment - Shaped the political environment for the next
decade - Intergovernmentalism prevails
31Objections to the Luxembourg Compromise
- The Commission excluded from the meeting was not
party to the agreement - The Court of Justice ruled that Resolutions and
Declaration of political will by the Council can
not prevail against the Treaty rules
32- Vetoing the accession applications
33The UK first application for EC membership
August 1961 - January 1963 / Conservatives /
- Reasons for realization of the mistake of self
exclusion from the Treaty of Rome and decision to
apply /Harold Macmillan/ - Success of the customs union
- Failure to dissolve the EC into the EFTA
- Fear of economic exclusion
- The Commonwealth proving inadequate instrument
for promotion of British interests - Kennedys endorsement of the UK membership in the
EC
34The case for failure
-
- British position on ensuring its special
interests in the EFTA and the Commonwealth -
- Anglo-American missile accord, December, 1962
- Decision to integrate UK nuclear force into NATO
- The lack of trust and use of intergovernmental
method of bargaining instead of Monnets
community method - January 15, 1963 De Gaulles conference
35The second application May December 1967 /
Labor / Harold Wilson
- Increasing need for accession
- growing European commercial contacts and slumping
economic ties with the Commonwealth - Barriers to membership
- De Gaulles anti Atlantisiam - Anglo-American
special relations - De Gaulles quest to preserve Frances leadership
role in the EC - December 1967 De Gaulles conference
361968
- May protests, riots and strikes in France
- June dissolution of the parliament by the prime
minister George Pompidou / reelection of the
parliament / victory of the Gaullists - April 1969
- De Gaulles resignation
37De Gaulles road towards European unity
- United Europe is only achieved through
organization of concerted action in every sphere - Individual States are the only valid elements,
when their national interests are at stake
nothing and nobody must be allowed to force their
hands, and the cooperation between them is the
only road that will lead anywhere. - although it is perfectly natural for the states
of Europe to have specialized bodies available to
prepare and whenever necessary to follow up their
decisions, these decisions must be their own.
38Arguments for Intergovernmental approach
- Common market, a brainchild of technocrats,
carrying all the hopes and illusions of a
supranational school. - Fruitless bargaining with the British showed the
fledgling Community that good intention are not
enough to reconcile the irreconcilable, the Six
found that even in the economic sphere alone the
adjustment of their respective positions bristled
with difficulties which could not be resolved
solely on terms of treaties concluded to that
end. - Executives of the common institutions were
helpless when it came to making and enforcing
decisions, only governments were in a position to
do this, and then only as a result of
negotiations carried out in due form between
ministers and ambassadors. - The important measures should be subordinated to
the decisions of individual states - The member states decisions should be the
cornerstone of the Institutions and a guarantee
of the members sovereignty
39Recommended Readings
- Macmillan Harold Britain Place and purpose in
the World. Extract from speech at Conservative
party conference, October 1961. Pro-European
Reader. 2002. Palgrave. - Kennedy F. John The US Welcomes European Unity.
Speech at Washington, DC, 17 may 1962.
Pro-European Reader. 2002. Palgrave - Jenkins Roy Let us go in with Hope and
Confidence. Speech at labor party conference,
October 1062. Pro-European Reader. 2002. Palgrave - Wilson Harold We mean business. Extract from
speech to the Council of Europe, Strabourg, 23
January 1967. Pro-European Reader. 2002. Palgrave
40Lecture 4 The Intergovernmentalist backlash
- Critiques and contemplations of
Neofunctionalism
41Readings for the lecture
- Hoffman S. Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the
Nation State and the Case of Western Europe
(1966). The European Union. Readings on the
Theory and Practice of European Integration,
Nelsen B.F. and Alexander C G. Stubb (eds.),
Palgrave, 1998 - Lindberg L.N. Political Integration Definitions
and Hypotheses (1963). The European Union.
Readings on the Theory and Practice of European
Integration, Nelsen B.F. and Alexander C G.
Stubb (eds.), Palgrave, 1998 - Rosamond Ben. (2000) Theories of European
Integration. The European Union Series. Palgrave
Chapter 4
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