Title: GIST%20
1GIST The NSIS Transport Layerdraft-ietf-nsis-nt
lp-08.txt Slides http//nsis.srmr.co.uk/reh/dra
ft-ietf-nsis-ntlp-08.ppt
- Robert Hancock, Henning Schulzrinne (editors)
- IETF64 Vancouver
- November 2005
2Status
- Version -08 released 27th September
- Taking account of interop results, Paris
discussions - WGLC began 3rd October, now (officially) complete
- Comments from Jia Jia, Thomas Herzog, Nary Tra,
Georgios Karagiannis, Mayi Zoumaro Djayoon,
Martijn Swanink, Roland Bless, Martin
Stiemerling, Pasi Eronen, Hannes Tschofenig,
Xiaming Fu, Christian Dickmann, John Loughney,
Andrew McDonald - Involving people from 5 implementation
activities - Version -09 in progress
- These slides are whats being done for version
-09
3MA Hold Time Negotiation
- GIST-Confirm doesnt include the MA-Hold-Time
- So, a node which holds no state until the
handshake completes doesnt know what hold time
to use - Solution Add abbreviated SCD to confirm
4TLS Usage (1/2)
- (From discussion of Pasi Hannes Securing
GIST draft) - Current text on TLS 1.0/1.1 can stand
- Helpful to be more prescriptive about TLS
application profile (cipher suites etc.) - Can use Diameter base as example text
5TLS Usage (2/2)
- Several ways of using TLS require more out of
band configuration before the handshake starts - Essentially, choosing which credentials to use
and verify - Related choosing which type of handshake to
carry out - How to carry this data at the GIST level?
- Declare that credentials should be tied to the
Peer-Identity field (NLI object) - May need to define the format for this field more
precisely - Define option data format for TLS in SCD object
- Or, consider these advanced TLS uses as a GIST
extension (keep current TLS as basic option)
6Downgrade Attacks
Querying Node
Responding Node
- Current mechanism is to repeat Stack-Proposal
over the messaging association - This can then be verified at the Responder
- Need more description of what attacks this
does/does not prevent - In particular, dependence on policy about what to
offer, different strengths of what can be offered - To answer question is the echoed
Stack-Proposal-R actually useful
GIST-Query Stack-Proposal-Q(fixed for
interface and NSLPID)Stack-Configuration-Data-Q(
parameters for possible protocols)
GIST-Response Stack-Proposal-R(fixed for
interface and NSLPID)Stack-Configuration-Data-R(
parameters for possible protocols)
GIST-Confirm (in C-mode) Stack-Proposal-R
(echoed)
7Message Association Merging
- (Arose out of discussion of the GIST over SCTP
draft) - When nodes form adjacencies over multiple
interfaces, can get multiple MAs - Occurs e.g. when you have policy routing or load
splitting between peers - Now have to keep all the MAs (no merging)
- (This is a simplification)
8Cookie Liveness
- Liveness data in R-cookie can be used to
pre-filter Confirm messages - 2-stage cookie validation is it live does it
pass hash validation - Improved resistance to blind attacks
- Added text in security considerations on good
ways to include the liveness data to support this
9Adjacency Setup Clarifications
- Clarifying the sequence of events that takes
place when a node receiving a Query decides
whether to form an adjacency or drop out of the
signalling path - Mainly relates to API description and message
processing rules in section 6 - Also wrap up clarification on what to do with
piggybacked data carried in handshake messages
10Not sure about
- Need for text describing internal timer operation
and setting - E.g. how to manage the timer that controls the
generation of routing state refresh messages - Spec currently just defines when state expires
- Up to the implementor to generate a message
appropriately in advance, with jitter etc.
11Minor Technical Fixes/Clarifications
- Order of protocols in a stack profile
- Now defined as top-to-bottom
- Rules about Query retransmission apply to all
Queries - Stateless nodes can accept Data
- SetStateLifetime includes the NSLPID
- R flag controls whether to send a Confirm