The Bush Doctrine and Operations in Afghanistan

1
The Bush Doctrine and Operations in Afghanistan

• PO 326 American Foreign Policy

2
Whom to Fight?

• The Bush Doctrine indicated Americas willingness
  to use force against states to combat terrorism,
  but was vague in its indication of precisely
  which actors would be the targets of American
  military action (Afghanistan? Axis of Evil?
  Countries in which fundamentalist terrorism is
  rampant?)
• Some important questions
• Would it truly be a war on terror, or just
  against Al-Qaeda and its obvious supporters?
• What would actual American operations look like?
• How would Americas allies and other important
  states factor in?
• Though Bush declares his overarching doctrine
  with little expert input, he relies extensively
  on his advisers to answer these questions

3
Formulating a Plan of Action

• Immediately following 9/11, there is no off the
  shelf plan for counterterrorism abroad, but
  there are several general views held by various
  foreign policy actors
• Extensive meetings of principals, often with
  president absent
• CIA (Tenet) Al-Qaeda and Taliban should be
  primary targets, and Afghanistan primary
  battleground
• CIA paramilitaries deployed with Northern
  Alliance link up with US Special Ops forces to
  create united northern front
• Exceptional authority to be granted to CIA
  operatives
• Attempt to smoke out Bin Laden supporters
• Covert attack on Al-Qaeda finances
• Buy off limited Taliban opposition in south
• CJCS (Shelton) Three options in Afghanistan
• Cruise missile attacks against al-Qaeda bases
• Option 1 plus manned bomber attacks against bases
• Options 1 and 2 plus boots on the ground
  (Special Ops, Army, Marines)

4
Formulating a Plan of Action

• State (Powell) KISS
• Warns against extension of war focus on al-Qaeda
  and Afghanistan first
• Avoid unilateralism (initial support by Bush,
  Cheney)
• Avoid any discussion of Iraq at outset will cost
  support
• Overall, military operations to be only part of
  longer-term diplomatic effort
• Defense (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz) Broader views
• Emphasize that Afghanistan and even al-Qaeda are
  not our only enemies advocate global dimension
  of war on terror
• Iraq must be considered an enemy at the outset
  (Wolfowitz) WMD presents threat to US, should be
  addressed
• Defense believes simultaneous involvement in two
  major conflicts is possible
• Rumsfeld dislikes military options presented by
  Shelton unimaginative wants better defined
  role for revamped military (global role of
  special forces, etc.), and sees war as
  opportunity to accomplish this
• Chief of Staff (Card) Simultaneous attacks on
  terrorists across globe
• NSA (Rice) Coordinator of viewpoints closest to
  president, she often is his conduit to
  principals discussions

5
Afghanistan Considerations

• In Afghanistan, the administration faces a
  country that presents some daunting hurdles
• History of holding out against more powerful
  countries (UK in 19th Century, USSR in 20th)
• History of fundamentalism (e.g., Mujahadin), but
  it is largely imported
• Paragon of geographic inhospitality one reason
  it is chosen by Bin Laden as sanctuary
• Political situation is problematic Taliban is de
  facto ruling party (after lengthy civil war with
  Northern Alliance), but Northern Alliance is
  still fighting and al-Qaeda is thoroughly
  intertwined with Taliban
• Uneasy coexistence of Arabs and Afghans
  Taliban/al-Qaeda domination in Kabul and south,
  Northern Alliance and Pashtun opposition remains
  in north provides both problems (finding enemy)
  and opportunity (getting others to fight on the
  ground)

6
Afghanistan Laying the Groundwork

• Despite problems of strategy/potential costs,
  Afghanistan chosen as initial target (need for
  action, blank check)
• Administration does, however, make clear that
  operations in Afghanistan are only part of a
  larger war on all terrorist organizations
  (Presidential Directive 9)
• Iraq question temporarily put aside
• Bush approves all of Tenets suggestions,
  delivers ultimatum to Taliban to turn over Bin
  Laden or face consequences
• Administration hopes that the threat of US action
  will create fissures in the Taliban, separating
  them (or at least moderate portions) from
  al-Qaeda
• Bush freezes al-Qaedas financial assets by
  executive order

7
Afghanistan Laying the Groundwork

• The question of international coalition building
  (Powell Doctrine)
• Invocation of NATO Article 5 but what role would
  allies play?
• Favorability of maintaining international
  support, though burden-sharing less of a concern
  than moral support and basing (Bush repeatedly
  states that the US will go it alone if
  necessary)
• US seeks basing rights in nearby countries, some
  of which have large fundamentalist populations
  (Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Oman, Qatar,
  etc.), and tacit support from other powers
  (Russia, NATO)
• Ultimatum to Taliban eases the way to
  coalition-building amongst Arab states, but
  removal of Taliban problematic (esp. for Saudis
  and Pakistanis)
• Taliban does not respond to ultimatum (hopes of
  splitting allegiance dashed), and American action
  becomes necessary

8
Preparing for War Strategy Dictating Operations,
or Vice Versa?

• Despite international issues, the consequences
  decided upon become removal from power of the
  Taliban
• Main approach Get opposition forces to do most
  of the ground work, thus limiting the
  intrusiveness and danger of large-scale US troop
  involvement (Soviet failure)
• Problem Want to do this without re-installing
  Northern Alliance, which might lead to
  difficulties and further instability
• This meant that the US would seek Northern
  Alliance troop support for its activities, but
  would try at the same time to put a leash on
  their full fury becomes a difficult balancing
  act

9
Preparing for War Strategy Dictating Operations,
or Vice Versa?

• Military operations Hopes and obstacles
• CIA paramilitary and US special ops seek to
  mobilize anti-Taliban Pashtun and Northern
  Alliance in North against Taliban and are
  necessary to mark targets for US bombing, but
  money needed and allegiance uncertain (strong
  Taliban defenses, Russian problems)
• Introduction of overall military buildup and
  special ops, limited ground troops, air campaign
  in North necessary, but held up due to Combat
  Search and Rescue (CSAR) issues, basing
  negotiations, scant number of targets
• CIA claims that bombing alone would destroy
  Taliban, but Bush wishes to avoid weak
  Clintonian response
• In the South, more difficulty in finding friendly
  Afghans

10
Preparing for War Strategy Dictating Operations,
or Vice Versa?

• Associated Considerations
• Necessity of limiting collateral damage, not
  alienating Afghan people humanitarian aid needed
• Means engaging in nation-building, something
  Bush wanted to avoid in 2000 but which would
  become crucial to war on terror
• Concerns of retaliation by al-Qaeda on US
  homeland
• What would Afghanistans postwar government look
  like?
• In the end, the perceived need for action drives
  the Bush Administration into beginning the Afghan
  campaign before these obstacles and
  considerations are fully resolved in a sense,
  then, the overall strategy results as a product
  of the progress of the war, and not the other way
  around

11
The Conduct of the War The Opening Assault

• As per DoDs plans, the US opens air campaign
  against Taliban positions on 7 October 2001
• Limited number of targets, and initial failure to
  destroy all of them some frustration in first
  few weeks
• Focus also on Taliban positions in Mazar-e
  Sharif, Shamili Plains
• Covert ops are largely CIAs through this point
  special ops (DoD) are not on ground (tension
  between bureaus)
• CIA is attempting to both solidify Northern
  Alliance support and hold them back
• Attacks on areas in western Afghanistan aimed at
  Bin Laden
• In second week, US seeks to get teams into the
  south by contacting Pashtuns (Karzai), but this
  proves difficult
• Special Forces finally arrive at end of second
  week of bombing, but initial actions seem to
  embolden rather than weaken Taliban leads to
  public concern that larger-scale troop
  involvement is necessary (Americanizing the
  war)

12
The Conduct of The War Intensification and Quick
Resolution

• Due to concerns about progress (especially given
  the coming winter), the US steps up the conflict
  during its second month, but does not
  Americanize it
• Intensifies bombing of Taliban front-line
  positions and eastern areas, moving forward from
  predesignated target list to positions identified
  by CIA (problems with collateral damage)
• Inserts more Special Ops teams
• Most importantly, the US turns loose the full
  force of the Northern Alliance and Pashtun forces
  against the Taliban in early November Mazar is
  taken with American bombing and Special Ops
  support, and Taliban support begins to crumble
  and they flee south
• Southern opposition forces begin to coalesce,
  make headway
• Northern Alliance moves on Kabul while
  administration debates whether or not they
  should city falls in mid November
• Kandahar (southern city) falls to opposition in
  early December Taliban is effectively ousted
• All accomplished with little solicitation of or
  assistance by European allies

13
The Issue of Postwar Rule

• US seeks to negotiate with opposition groups for
  the purposes of putting together a coalition
  replacement government
• Agreement to settle upon Karzai as leader of
  coalition, a Pashtun moderate with broad contacts
  and appeal to most concerned parties
• American special forces, CIA remain in
  Afghanistan to smoke out Bin Laden and remaining
  al-Qaeda in the east (near Pakistani border)

14
A Review of the First Round of the War on Terror

• Afghanistan is initial focus, but administration
  makes clear it desire to maintain global aspect
  of war
• Afghan operations seek immediate results, but
  administration is constrained by problems
  associated with large-scale US troop involvement
  (Vietnam) results in strategy stemming from
  success of operations, not other way around
• Because it advocates global war and because
  military operations determine strategy, the stage
  is set for heavy DoD influence over war on
  terror State, with its focus on diplomacy and
  caution, is relegated to secondary importance
  (would be crucial in future)
• Joint CIA/DoD involvement in operations sets tone
  for new type of war
• Despite initial misgivings, Northern Alliance
  tapped to do the groundwork
• Beginnings of American unilateralism in
  operations, despite widespread international
  support
• Deposal of Taliban in line with dictates of Bush
  Doctrine how would the Doctrine be utilized in
  future stages of war on terror?