The nuclear option: human factors in safety

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The nuclear option human factors in safety

• Sue Cox
• Professor of Safety and Risk Management
• Dean
• Lancaster University Management School
• Blackett Memorial Lecture
• 14th March 2006

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Key questions

• Nuclear Power a problem or the solution?
• Can Safety Science help answer this question?

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Source http//www.cogema.com
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Current nuclear capacity (UK)
NDA Sites British Energy Sites
Source http//www.nda.gov.uk
Source http//www.british-energy.co.uk
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First Movers
Calder Hall, UK
Berkeley, UK
Source http//www.google.image.com
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FAQ - New reactors

• Why is nuclear back on the agenda? Due to alarm
  over climate change and the security of gas
  supplies. All but one of the existing nuclear
  stations will close by 2023 and ministers are
  anxious to keep the lights on.
• So whats stopping them? Fears over cost and
  issues of nuclear waste disposal.
• What about safety? The nuclear sector says the
  new reactor designs are much safer.
• How much would we pay for them? Fixed
  electricity prices, or so-called nuclear tax, is
  one option for the future.
• What happens next? Separate strands of research
  are due to come together in time for a decision
  which is due summer 2006.

Source The Guardian, 07.03.2006
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TVO Olkiluoto 3, Finland
As on 19th January 2006
Source http//www.tvo.fi/474.htm
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The Safety Imperative

• Defence in depth includes consideration of the
  following
• Preventing incidents and accidents by considering
  the potential for equipment failure, human error
  and external factors (for example seismic event,
  airplane crash, adverse weather conditions, etc)
  during the design phase - implementing effective
  systems and procedures
• Monitoring facilities during operation to detect
  and correct deviations
• Designing and implementing measures to limit
  consequences of any accidents that may occur
  despite the precautions taken.

Source IAEA (1996) Defence-in-Depth in Nuclear
Safety. A report by the International Nuclear
Safety Advisory Group, INSAG-10, Vienna.
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Nuclear Accidents
Three Mile Island, 1979
Chernobyl, 1986
Source http//www.google.image.com
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Defence in Depth
Human factors have been implicated in the
aetiology of many nuclear (and non nuclear)
accidents
Source IAEA (2003) Major Accident Summary.
http//www.iaea.org/index.html
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Human Factors

• Human factors is a multidisciplinary activity
  concerned with peoples characteristics and
  capabilities in relation to the design of jobs,
  products, workplaces and equipment (Cox Cox,
  1996).
• Hollnagel (1993) quotes figures which show a rise
  in human error rates from 25 of accident
  causation in the 1960s to 90 in the 1990s. He
  highlights the enhanced reliability of technology
  in part explanation.
• Whatever the causation, the message is clear
  managing the safety, reliability and efficiency
  of systems requires an understanding of human
  factors.
• However, human factors, as traditionally
  conceived, is too narrow an approach to people
  related issues in nuclear safety.

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People-related Issues Broader View
Wider Environments
Organisation
Social Environment
Job
Person
The Person as an Information Processor
Developed from Cox and Cox (1996) Safety,
Systems and People. Oxford Butterworth-Heinemann
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LearnSafe http//www.vtt.fi/virtual/learnsafe/

• Management of Change
• What are the perceived emerging challenges in the
  management of nuclear power plants?
• How do senior managers cope with emerging
  challenges in the management of nuclear power
  plants?
• What improvements could be made in respect to
  coping with emerging challenges in the management
  of nuclear power plants?

• Organisational Learning
• What kind of features and attributes characterise
  learning organisations?
• What are the most common barriers to
  organisational learning and how can they be
  removed?
• How are various national and company cultures
  influencing organisational learning?

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Methodology MetaFuzz

• 800 statements on emerging challenges were
  collected from 300 managers in 10 power plants in
  5 countries using a Metaplan method
• Data subject to a 3 stage procedure derived from
  fuzzy set analysis
• Common classification model 5 dimensions
  (derived from Competing Values Framework Cameron
  and Quinn, 1999) treated as fuzzy sets
• Classification of statements on emerging
  challenges in terms of these sets 0-100
  strength of membership
• Hierarchical cluster analysis clustering
  coefficient showed a large increase from 9 to 10
  clusters. K Means Method1 used to create 9
  clusters. Named on challenges close to centre of
  cluster.
• Cross tabs by cluster, country and management
  level (Chi-square)

1Tou JT and Gonzales RC. (1974). Pattern
Recognition Principles. Reading, MA Addison
-Wesley. (pp. 94-97).
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Key safety challenges for nuclear industry
Source http//www.vtt.fi/virtual/learnsafe/
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Culture and People Management

• LearnSafe data show very clearly that human
  resource management (22.6) and climate and
  culture (19.2) are perceived by the industry to
  be the two most important challenges for nuclear
  safety going forward.
• Other challenges range in perceived importance
  from 4.6 to 11.0 (ageing and modernisation).
• LearnSafe also collected case study data on how
  managers were coping with these challenges
  through safety culture change programmes,
  leadership training and staff development. .

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Interaction of Culture and Behavioural Safety

• There are two quite distinct approaches to
  promoting safety in high reliability industries
  the top down organisational change approach and
  the bottom up individually focused approach
• Today these are more enlightened and may manifest
  in
• Culture change (top down)
• Behavioural safety programmes (bottom up)
• Neither can fulfil its potential without the
  other and the key, going forward, is an
  integrative approach where individually focused
  behavioural safety programmes are supported and
  framed by strong leadership through
  organisational culture change.

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Safety Culture

• A plethora of definitions exist that are relevant
  to the nuclear industry (for example ACSNI and
  IAEA) and, associated with these, a wide array of
  measurement systems and tools
• Some definitons (and studies) make a distinction
  between safety climate and safety culture not
  always helpful in practice as most differences
  are based on methodological (research)
  considerations
• There is an obvious value of explicative models
  in the development and application of measurement
  systems and tools and in the interpretation of
  the data collected using them (for example,
  Cheyne, Cox, Oliver and Tomas, 1998)

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Modelling Safety Culture

• ACSNI definition as a starting point
• Safety culture is the product of individual and
  group values, perceptions, competencies and
  patterns of behaviour that determine the
  commitment to and the style and proficiency of an
  organisations health and safety management
  (HSC, 1993 p 23)
• Research model derived from this definition.
  Study based on about 1,000 workers within a
  multinational manufacturing company.
  Questionnaire data subject to structural equation
  modelling (LISREL).

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An Empirical Model of Safety Culture
.505
.197
.450
.796
.720
.384
.317
Safety activities
.867
Workplace hazards
-.232
.102
-.266
.284
Source Cheyne, A., Cox, S., Oliver, A. and
Tomas, J. (1998) Work and Stress, 12, 255-271
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Behavioural Safety Process
Modifications to environment, equipment or
procedures
Organisational learning
Review existing safety data
Coaching and mentoring
Management problem solving cycle
Feedback on an individual group and site wide
level
Make periodic observations of routine work tasks
Developed from Cox, S., Jones, B., and Rycraft,
H (2004) Safety Science, 42, 825-839
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Evaluation

• Difficult challenge to evaluate outcomes because
  of ceiling effect safety measures are,
  by-and-large, in place and nuclear safety
  performance is good both in terms of releases and
  accidents not able to experiment by withdrawing
  measures
• Some evidence (next slide for example) that
  additional new measures, such as those described
  here, have effect
• Emphasis therefore has to be on process based
  evaluation and compliance and involvement in new
  strategy

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NuSAC Reporting

• The 7th Annual Report, produced by NuSAC in
  January 2006 reviews the safety performance of
  the nuclear industry to date considering a wide
  range of safety related measures.
• It concludes that the substantial improvements
  (in safety) repoirted over the last decade for
  the Civil Licensees have been broadly maintained
  At the Defence Sites, performance on dose
  management continues to show good results with no
  employee or contractor experiencing a dose in
  excess of 5 mSv. ..
• All measures of safety risk show low levels on
  all measures, for example
• Licensee employee RIDDOR injuries 0 0.69 /
  100,000 hours (2004-05)
• Unplanned trips 1.30 / 7000 hours critical

Source Open document NuSAC (2006) P3
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Process Measurement

• A variety of different measurement procedures and
  tools have been developed to describe and
  evaluate the processes involved in managing
  nuclear safety, for example
• SCART (BNG)
• LearnSafe
• Lancaster groups work(next slide)
• Some have been developed specifically for the
  nuclear industry, some for the high reliability
  sector and some for general industrial use.

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Impact of Safety Initiatives Process

• Data collected by Lancaster group from 3 UK
  nuclear power plants interviews with key
  stakeholders followed by questionnaire-based
  survey of 150 staff
• Focus successful application of behavioural
  safety programmes (BSP)
• Key issues was sustainability
• Key factor Trust BSP would fail and not be
  sustained if
• Trust between key stakeholders is not evident
• BSP was used as a managerial tool to spy on
  staff
• BSP was used as a weapon against staff
• There was a lack of consistency between the BSP
  and the organisations just culture

Source Cox, S., Jones, B., and Rycraft, H (2004)
Safety Science, 42, 825-839
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Source http//www.nuclearsites.co.uk/
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Thank You