Title: Judea
1IMPORTANCE OF JUDEA SAMARIA MOUNTAIN RIDGES IN
THE ERA OF MODERN WEAPONRY
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
2Table of Contents
3HAS SADDAM's DEMISE ELIMINATED "EASTERN FRONT
THREAT" TO ISRAEL?
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
4HAS SADDAM's DEMISE ELIMINATED "EASTERN FRONT
THREAT" TO ISRAEL?
NEXT
- In 1967, Israel obliterated Egypt, Syria and
Jordan, producing a "No Threat" delusion. The
delusion was crashed in 1973, when Israel barely
escaped annihilation. - In 1979, Iran was abruptly transformed from an
ally (of US and Israel) to an enemy. - The 1989, demise of the USSR gave rise to the
illusion of global peace, but the world has
become more violent. - In 1948, King Abdullah (Jordan) promised Israel
to stay away from war, but reneged. In 1966 King
Hussein met with Israel's leaders, but bombed
Jerusalem in 1967, and provided the PLO with
terrorist infrastructure in 1968-70. In 1990
Jordan was a key supply channel to Saddam.
5HAS SADDAM's DEMISE ELIMINATED "EASTERN FRONT
THREAT" TO ISRAEL?
NEXT
- The 1993 Oslo vision of peace produced a
nightmare of unprecedented terror - War on terrorism is Bush's top priority will his
successor follow suit? A possible US retreat
from Iraq would exacerbate terrorism. - Saddam's regime was perceived doom in 1991,
became a non-conventional threat in 2002 and was
eliminated in 2003. When will a brutal regime
resurface in Baghdad? - How would the Mideast be impacted by a demise of
the current Hashemite, Saudi or Egyptian regimes?
6HAS SADDAM's DEMISE ELIMINATED "EASTERN FRONT
THREAT" TO ISRAEL?
NEXT
- Mideast precedents - in the most unpredictable,
volatile and violent region in the world -
behoove Israel to be prepared for realistic
scenarios, including "The Eastern Front Threat."
7CENTRALITY OF GROUND BARRIERS IN DEFEATING ENEMIES
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
8CENTRALITY OF GROUND BARRIERS IN DEFEATING ENEMIES
NEXT
- Thousands of tons of daily bombing did not end
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 70 of the
bombing was inaccurate. - Saddam was brought to submission when the ground
forces reached Baghdad - Ballistic missiles cause damage, but they don't
conclude wars. An Arab tank battalion in Tel Aviv
would be more significant than a shower of
missiles on Tel Aviv. - Without ground forces, the 1991 and 2003 wars
would've been prolonged, causing more casualties
and tension with allies, allowing Saddam to
declare victory - The centrality of ground forces suggests the
centrality of ground barriers (geographic depth
and topographic edge).
9CENTRALITY OF GROUND BARRIERS IN DEFEATING ENEMIES
NEXT
- "Enduring Relevance of Landpower", US Army's
Institute of Land Warfare, Oct. 2003 "Land force
(is) the cornerstone of deterrence...Ground units
can both destroy and occupy...sustain land
dominance and achieve a lasting decision...Remote
precision strikes will not provide this
capability, as was demonstrated (in Afghanistan
and Iraq)...Determined adversaries are seldom
defeated quickly. Achieving a lasting decision
requires the ability to conduct sustained,
multidimensional joint operations. Land forces
provide these qualities...During the Afghan
campaign of 2002, precision air strikes were
critical, but they neither annihilated opposition
nor finished the enemy...In the 1999 Kosovo
operation, the air war created the conditions for
negotiations, but it was the ground forces that
created the stability that now exists. In 1995,
in Bosnia, the threat of airpower did not
significantly deter Serbia. It took the ground
forces to create the conditions for the Dayton
Accords. In 1991, months of strike operations
did not achieve decision. The four-day ground
war led to Iraqi surrender...(In 1989 in Panama),
the surrender of Noriega was the result of
soldiers on the ground..."Â
10CENTRALITY OF GROUND BARRIERS IN DEFEATING ENEMIES
NEXT
- The US - the 1 ballistic power - stations
200,000 GIs (125 increase since 2001) in
overseas military land installations in 120
countries. - All wars are conventional, requiring ground
forces (India-Pakistan, US-Afghanistan, US-Iraq,
US-Panama, Britain-Argentina, Ethiopia-Eritrea,
Iran-Iraq, Morocco-Mauritania, etc.).
11U.S. GENERALS ON JS MOUNTAIN RIDGES
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
12U.S GENERALS ON JS MOUNTAIN RIDGES
NEXT
- The late Admiral Bud Nance The eastern mountain
ridge of the West Bank is one of the world's best
tank barriers. Invading tanks will have to climb
a 3,000ft steep slope from the Jordan Valley. The
western mountain ridge, which is a 2,000ft gentle
slope, constitutes a dream platform of invasion
to Israel's narrow (8-15 miles) coastal plain.
Control of the West Bank provides Israel the time
to mobilize its reservists, which are essential
to its survival during a surprise attack. - General (ret.) Al Gray, former Commandant, US
Marine Corps Missiles fly over any terrain
feature, but they don't negate the strategic
significance of territorial depth. The key
threat to Israel will remain the invasion and
occupation by armored forces. Military success
requires more than a few hundred missiles. To
defeat Israel would require the Arabs to deploy
armor, infantry and artillery into Israel and
destroy the IDF on the ground. That was true in
1948, 1967 and 1973, and it remains true in the
era of modern missiles.
13U.S GENERALS ON JS MOUNTAIN RIDGES
NEXT
- Lt. General (ret.) Tom Kelly, Chief of Operations
in the 1991 Gulf War "I cannot defend this land
(Israel) without that terrain (West Bank)...The
West Bank mountains, and especially their 5
approaches, are the critical terrain. If an enemy
secures those passes, Jerusalem and Israel become
uncovered. Without the West Bank, Israel is only
8 miles wide at its narrowest point. That makes
it indefensible." - 100 retired Generals and Admirals signed an Oct.
1988 advertisement in the Washington Times
Israel should not withdraw from JS, lest it fail
to provide security to its People. It is
impossible to demilitarize JS effectively - The late Admiral Bud Nance "No logical reason
for Israel to give up one inch of the disputed
areas. Quite to the contrary, I believe if
Israel were to move out of the Golan Heights, the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it would increase
instability and the possibility of war, increase
the necessity for Israel to preempt in war and
the possibility that nuclear weapons would be
used to prevent an Israeli loss, and increase the
possibility that the US would have to become
involved in a war."
14U.S GENERALS ON JS MOUNTAIN RIDGES
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earl
Wheeler The minimum required for Israel's
defense includes most of the West Bank and the
whole of Gaza and the Golan Heights (a secret
document submitted to the Secretary of Defense on
June 29, 1967). Wheeler realized that in the
Mideast peace is based on deterrence
15LAND - DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS - SURPRISE ATTACK
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
16LAND - DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS - SURPRISE ATTACK
NEXT
- The transition from peace to war, in the Mideast,
is as abrupt and unpredictable as Mideast
inter-Muslim politics. - A surprise attack provides Arab regular forces
(tanks and infantry) a 71 advantage adjacent to
the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area. 50 hours are
required to mobilize Israel's reservists (75 of
IDF), in order to close the gap and block the
Arab invasion. - The more advanced the Arab weaponry, the faster
and more destructive is the surprise offensive,
the longer it takes to mobilize Israel's
reservists, the more essential are JS mountain
ridges for halting the invasion. Control of the
mountain ridges enables a small Israeli force to
block the invasion until the arrival of
reservists - The slimmer is Israel's geographic depth, the
less time is available to mobilize reservists,
and the more critical is the control of the
mountain ridges. The demilitarization of JS
would provide Israel with merely 5-10 hours early
warning time (50 hours are required to mobilize
the reservists), before the invasion could reach
Israel's "Soft Belly."
17LAND - DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS - SURPRISE ATTACK
NEXT
- Most of Israel's reservist infrastructure is
located in the "narrow waistline" of
Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area (70 population,
80 industry and finance, key fuel depots and
intersections), which is dominated by the JS
mountain ridges. The control of JS determines
the time available for the deployment of
reservists and for blocking a surprise invasion. - Primitive Scud missiles created havoc in the
Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area during the 1991
Gulf War. The more advanced are the missiles, the
more vulnerable are population centers and air
force bases (which are crucial to stop invading
tanks). In 1967, Jordan shelled Israel's leading
air force base by JS-based artillery. - Security arrangements, as a substitute for ground
barriers, require geographic depth, which
provides early warning time, should a peace
accord collapse (as happens often in the
Mideast). Israel does not possess geographic
depth. Ground barriers was tactically pertinent
in 1948. In 2003 - due to modern weaponry -
ground barriers are strategically critical.
18IS TECHNOLOGY A SUBSTITUTE FOR GROUND BARRIERS?
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
19IS TECHNOLOGY A SUBSTITUTE FOR GROUND BARRIERS?
NEXT
- High Tech of today always becomes Low Tech of
tomorrow. But, High Ground of today remains High
Ground tomorrow. One can always develop a
superior response to any advanced weapon system.
However, one cannot develop superior ground
barriers to JS mountain ridges. - One can, eventually, jam any existing technology.
However, one cannot jam the topographic edge of
JudeaSamaria mountains - A country does not alter its boundaries in
accordance with the development of weapon system
and technologies . - The best surveillance systems, stationed in the
Persian Gulf by the US, failed to detect Iraq's
invasions of Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990). They
caused over 1 million fatalities and a
mega-billion dollar damage. - In 1973, Israel's technology detected Egypt's and
Syria's plans of invasion, but the human factor
failed to comprehend the data, as happens often
in other countries. Ground barriers, rather than
technology, stopped the invasion and prevented
annihilation
20IS TECHNOLOGY A SUBSTITUTE FOR GROUND BARRIERS?
NEXT
- Technology is fallible, while ground barriers
enables one to overcome technological,
intelligence and operational failures. In 1973,
Sinai, Golan and JS were the cushion, which
spared Israel oblivion. - US superior technology could not destroy Iraq's
missile launchers in 1991. - In 1999, "Newsweek" reported that China might
have developed a technology, capable of
neutralizing the US Air Force and paralyzing
Taiwan's air defense. - Advanced technology is not an effective
substitute to ground barriers. It could be a
temporary and uncertain improvement, deepening
dependence on outside powers. Its supply can be
suspended, curtailed or cancelled. - The US does not consider technology as a
substitute for ground barriers, and therefore it
operates military land installations in 120
countries.
21JUDEASAMARIA vs. SINAI
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
22JUDEASAMARIA vs. SINAI
NEXT
- The Sinai giveaway has constrained Israel's
strategic maneuverability and Israel's potential
of concessions in other fronts, including JS. - Sinai borders the Negev, while JS borders
Israel's "Soft Belly" (Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa
area), which contains 70 of the population, 80
of the industry and finance, key fuel depots and
intersections. - Sinai does not possess a topographic edge over
the Negev, while JS does possess a significant
edge over Israel's coastal plain. - The Negev (2/3 of pre-1967 Israel) is sparsely
populated, constantly accommodating most of
Israel's reserve maneuvers, and therefore can
absorb a surprise offensive by Egypt. The densely
populated sliver coastal plain may not be able to
absorb a surprise offensive by a resurrected
Eastern Front.
23JUDEASAMARIA vs. SINAI
NEXT
- A demilitarized Sinai (22,000 sqm) accords 40
hours early warning time for the deployment of
Israel's reservists. A demilitarized JS
(2,200sqm) would accord 5-10 hours, while the IDF
requires 50 hours for full deployment - Retaking Sinai would be less difficult due to the
Negev's similar topography. Retaking JS would
be more difficult due to JS' topographic edge - The Sinai giveaway was a calculated risk. A JS
giveaway might be a lethal gamble . - A JS giveaway would doom Jerusalem, transforming
the Jewish capital into an enclave, connected to
the coastal plain by a narrow 5 mile corridor,
overtowered by JS mountain ridges.
24SECURITYWISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF JS MOUNTAIN
RIDGES
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
25SECURITYWISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF JS MOUNTAIN
RIDGES
NEXT
- The eastern mountain ridge of JS - rather than
the Jordan Valley - constitutes one of the
world's best tank barriers (a 3,000ft steep slope
over the Jordan Valley). The five roads
traversing it are easily controllable by a
relatively small regular force. - The western mountain ridge of JS (a 2,000ft
moderate slope) constitutes a dream platform for
invaders into the sliver coastal plain, for the
firing of shoulder launched missiles at civilian
aircraft, and for daily terrorism, which would
transform the terror reality of the Gaza
bordering towns to the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa
area. - The JS mountain ridges constitute a platform for
air defense, jamming and surveillance systems,
which extend all the way to the Persian Gulf, and
is essential for the "Arrow" anti-missile system.
A Jordanian bomber could reach Israel in 4
minutes from the Jordan Valley, which is the
minimum time required to deploy Israel's
interceptors.
26SECURITYWISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF JS MOUNTAIN
RIDGES
NEXT
- JS mountain ridges prevent Israel's coverage by
Arab surveillance systems, thus enhancing
Israel's defensive and offensive capabilities. - A JS giveaway would exacerbate terrorism,
dwarfing the 1994-2003 losses. - Until 1967, Israel forced Jordan to limit its
military force in JS to 5,000 soldiers, in order
to preclude a lethal threat. In 2003, there are
40,000 armed Palestinian terrorists in JS, which
are equal to 4 infantry divisions .
27SECURITYWISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF JS MOUNTAIN
RIDGES
NEXT
- A JS giveaway would induce Arab belligerence.
JS mountain ridges constitute the "Golan
Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. They
enhance Israel's strategic profile and power of
deterrence. They transform Israel from a
strategic liability to a strategic asset. Without
JS, Israel wouldn't have been able to force a
Syrian withdrawal from Jordan in 1970 and might
not have been able to carryout the bombing of
Iraq's nuclear reactor in 198. - The signing of the Oslo Accord radicalized
Israeli Arabs. The current stage of Palestinian
terrorism (since 2000) has exacerbated
Arab-Jewish relations. A JS giveaway would
further deteriorate co-existence.
28UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
29UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT
- The world expects Israel to yield land, which it
does scarcely possess. Israel's area is 0.196
of the area of the Arab countries, which is 150
larger than the US and 130 larger than Europe.
The West expects the Arabs to accord Israel
peace, which they have yet to accord to one
another (Arieh Stav, Executive Director of the
Ariel Center for Policy Research).
NEXT
30UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT
NEXT
- The geographic depth of JS, Golan Heights and
Sinai enabled Israel to fend off the 1973
surprise offensive. The absence of geographic
depth would require more preventive wars. - Israel has a zero margin of error during wartime,
due to the violent and unpredictable nature of
the Mideast, due to the lack of geographic depth,
due to a critical topographic and geographic edge
enjoyed by its enemies, and due to a sustained
arms race conducted by them. - Topographic and geographic inferiority mandates
Israel to transfer war, promptly, to enemy's
territory.
31UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT
NEXT
- Unlike other countries - and due to the ideology
and track record of its enemies - Israel has to
win each war. The Jewish nation was defeated
2,000 years ago, and the Jewish People was
dispersed. In view of the ideology amplified
daily by official Arab education, media and
clergy, there would be no Diaspora, should Israel
be currently defeated... - Israel's pre-1967 borders were the longest in the
world per sqm (and therefore less defensible).
They were 360 kilometers (225 miles) longer than
the current borders, characterized by more
complex geography, which requires more personnel
and hardware
32ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
33ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
NEXT
- The width of Israel's coastal plain (8-15 miles)
is equal to the distance between JFK and La
Guardia airports in New York.
34ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
NEXT
- The width of Israel's coastal plain (8-15 miles)
is less than the length of DFW airport in Texas,
equal to the width of Washington DC, San
Francisco and Miami and equal to the distance
between Wall Street and Columbia University in
New York .
35ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
- The width of Israel's coastal plain (8-15) is
less than the distance between downtown London
and Heathrow Airport and equal to a roundtrip
distance between Albert Hall and the Tower of
London, between Bois Du Boulogne and La Place De
La Bastille in Paris and between the Kennedy
Center and the RFK Stadium in Washington, DC.
36ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
NEXT
- The late Admiral Bud Nance "The entire state of
Israel - including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip
and the Golan Heights - is smaller than the
gunnery range at Nellis Air Force Base...Israel
is only 9 miles across at is center close to Tel
Aviv. This is scarcely more than the distance
from the Pentagon to Mount Vernon. A modern tank
can traverse this distance in about 15
minutes...With the West Bank included, Israel is
approximately 40 miles across at its mid-point.
The city of Atlanta is more than 40 miles across.
- Israel's area - before 1967 - was just 6 times
more than the largest ranch in Texas, King's
Ranch. - The US military declared a 25 kilometer radius
area, in Bosnia, as a "killing zone", in order to
ensure the safety of US soldiers.
37PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
38PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST
NEXT
- 1,300 years of inter-Muslim and inter-Arab
conflicts have transformed the Mideast into the
most violent region in the world No
comprehensive inter-Arab peace, no inter-Arab
ratification of all borders, no compliance with
all inter-Arab agreements/treaties, no Arab
democratic regimes and no Arab regime which stays
in power without the use of violence. Is it
logical to assume that the Arabs are ready to
accord to the Jewish ("infidel") State that which
they have yet to accord to one another?! - Peace in the Mideast is Peace of Deterrence
- The test of peace boundaries in the violent and
unpredictable Mideast is not in their ability to
entice a peace accord. Rather, it is in their
ability to deter and/or withstand a typical
Mideast scenario An unpredictable violation of a
peace agreement, by a concerted inter-Arab
offensive against sliver Israel, led by a tank
and infantry invasion, and backed up by a barrage
of missiles, a wave of Palestinian terrorism and
a possible insurgency by Israel's Arabs.
39PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST
NEXT
- The durability of a peace accord in the Mideast
is as durable as Mideast politics, which is the
shiftiest and the most tenuous in the globe. - Peace accord enhance security as long as the
parties adhere to the agreement. Peace accord
undermines security, once it is violated, as a
result of the territorial concessions made. - "Territories for Peace" is logically flawed
While Israel should, supposedly, concede
territories in return for peace, would a reduced
peace - through Arab violations - entitle Israel
to retrieve territories?
40Hatikvah Educational Foundation www.acpr.org.il/ha
tikvah Tel. 6911145-03
Written and edited by Yoram Ettinger
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.