NASA Operations

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NASA Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 Safety Health (SH) Assessment
Jon Mullin/HQ/QS Art Lee/HQ/QS
Dr. Bill Barry/KSC/QA March 7,
2002
(1)
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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 Assessments

• OEB Activities for FY01
• OEB Reviews Performed
• Ames Research Center (March 6-8, 2001)
• Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT)
• Langley Research Center (August 28-31, 2001)
• National Transonic Facility (NTF)
• OEB Participants
• NASA Headquarters
• Safety Mission Assurance Office
• Chief Health Medical Office
• Facilities Engineering Division
• Environmental Management Division
• Institutional Program Offices
• NASA Centers

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001
• Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT)
• Areas of Concern Include Safety Fire
  Protection Lifting Devices and Equipment
  Emergency Preparedness Security Occupational
  Health Operations Maintenance
• Safety
• Conduct a complete Safety Walk-down of UPWT by
  experienced Safety, Fire, and Health Team
• Include all Collateral Equipment (Drives,
  Auxiliaries, etc.) in required Facility Condition
  Assessment IAW NPD 8831.1B
• Evaluate potential risks from a seismic event
  since unmodified portion of UPWT not meeting
  current seismic standard
• Evaluate risks from potential Failure of
  Compressed Gas Containers in event of an
  Earthquake

4
Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001
• Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT)
  (Contd.)
• Safety (Contd.)
• Recommend ARC Code Q update Hazard Risk
  Identification Control Documentation to include
  System Safety Hazard Reports
• What are the Root Causes from the extensive
  number of Contractor Failures during UPWT Project
  Upgrade
• Evaluate Customer Requirements to insure against
  Facility Failure
• Explain the Process assuring Document changes are
  flowed down to all related Documents
• Lack of Knowledge Concerning Agencys
  Lessons-Learned Information System (LLIS)
• Implement the GIDEP process and provide user
  training

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001
• Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT)
  (Contd.)
• Safety (Contd.)
• Review Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
  Configuration and consider tying in model homing
  system in case of Power loss
• Confirm how Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs)
  have been satisfied for UPWT
• Confirm Risk Based Acquisition Management (RBAM)
  was conducted for UPWT contracts
• Performance Evaluation Profile (PEP) results
  should be utilized to improve UPWT Safety
  Health Program
• Review Reliance on Unassisted Voice
  Communications in Test Environment and evaluate
  Recording of Voice Loops in UPWT Control Rooms,
  if Communication Systems installed

6
Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001
• Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT)
  (Contd.)
• Fire Protection
• Improper Storage of Chemicals and Flammable
  Materials in violation of NFPA and NASA
  requirements
• Lack of Fire Alarm Pull Stations at all Exits in
  violation of NFPA and NASA requirements
• Placement of Fire Extinguishers is extremely
  dense potentially causing unnecessary costs (ref.
  NFPA 10)
• Define and document Approval Process for
  transporting Hazardous Materials to UPWT in the
  Test Planning Guide WT Operations Division
  H.S.T.P.
• Add Fire Safety Information to the Test Planning
  Guide WT Operations Division H.S.T.P.

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001
• Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT)
  (Contd.)
• Lifting Devices and Equipment (LDE)
• Verify that Lifting Devices and Slings are
  properly tested IAW NSS/GO 1740.9B for LDE
• Confirm that required Hazard Analyses and Failure
  Modes Effects Analyses (FMEAs) were done prior
  to conducting Critical Lifts
• Emergency Preparedness Security
• Evacuation Routes from the UPWT Control Rooms and
  Other Intensive Work Areas need to be clearly
  marked
• All UPWT Workers need to be frequently trained
  and updated on the proper Emergency Egress with
  documentation of Training as required by OSHA
• Conduct Human Factors Study to Evaluate
  Standardized Emergency Shutdown Procedures for
  all WTs

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001
• Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT)
  (Contd.)
• Emergency Preparedness Security (Contd.)
• Add Emergency Information to the Test Planning
  Guide WT Operations Division H.S.T.P.
• Provide ARC Policy on Background Investigations
  for New Employees, especially unescorted access
  to Critical Facilities
• Occupational Health
• WT Guide for ARC requires an Eye Exam every 4
  years, but Center Medical Office unaware of the
  requirement - need resolution
• Concern with the Noise-levels in the UPWT
  Control Rooms

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001
• Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT)
• Observations
• ARC should consider using SOLAR Web-based
  Training for improving Training opportunities
  Center-wide
• Lessons-Learned for ARC Wind Tunnels should be
  better shared between Code R (Office of Aerospace
  Technology) Centers
• Revisiting Hazard Risk Analysis on a Regular and
  Periodic Basis by UPWT is fundamental to a Good
  Risk Management Program

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH
Assessments

• Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31,
  2001
• Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF)
• Areas of Concern Include Safety Emergency
  Preparedness Fire Protection Lifting Devices
  and Equipment and Operations Maintenance
• Safety
• Assure Operational Staffing Levels are maintained
  and Corporate Knowledge is being transferred and
  captured
• Explain how the Center Director is made aware of
  the Risk Acceptance decisions made for the
  Center
• Establish and communicate a strong and formal
  Timeout Policy Center-wide
• NTF Management should become more familiar with
  Johnson Controls (JCI) Safety Health Plan

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31,
  2001
• Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF)
  (Contd.)
• Safety (Contd.)
• Determine what Collateral Damage may occur should
  the NTF as a Pressure Vessel and System (PV/S)
  rupture during a Test and who updates the Hazard
  Analysis as part of the Facility System Safety
  Program
• A complete Inventory of Flexible Hoses for PV/S
  is required IAW NPD 8710.5
• Evaluate a Facility Closed Circuit TV System to
  improve Safety and Security
• Improve Confined Space Entry Management at the
  NTF
• Management should advocate Funding to Upgrade
  Software/Hardware for Reliable WT Control Data
  Acquisition System

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31,
  2001
• Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF)
  (Contd.)
• Safety (Contd.)
• Evaluate use of UPS in the NTF Control Room to
  protect Oxygen Monitoring Systems, Computers,
  Data Acquisition Systems
• Explain why the Oxygen Monitoring System is on a
  12- month Calibration Cycle
• Recognize LaRCs VPP Star Status however,
  Lock-Out/ Tag-Out (LO/TO) Program is less
  stringent than at many other Centers and should
  be re-evaluated independently
• Utilize the Agencys Lessons-Learned Information
  System (LLIS) Database
• Reconsider Philosophy on displaying NSRS Agency
  Safety Initiative (ASI) Information (Displays
  currently limited), especially in High Traffic
  Areas Center-wide

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31,
  2001
• Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF)
  (Contd.)
• Safety (Contd.)
• Project INFUSE should utilize the Agencys
  Risk Assessment Training (sponsored by HQ/Code
  QE)
• Confirm Data Retention (5 Years) complies with
  NPG 1441
• Review all Procedures or Actions to achieve
  orderly or Emergency Shut-down and generate or
  revise Procedures, where appropriate
• As changes are made in Safety Emergency
  Procedures, assure Personnel are properly trained
  and training is documented

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31,
  2001
• Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF)
  (Contd.)
• Fire Protection
• Many Emergency Lights were either partially or
  totally burned out along with a need to improve
  Egress Identification
• Evaluate Fire Extinguisher placement and Training
  in the NTF
• Review Under-floor Wet Fire Sprinkler System to
  determine if Gaseous Suppression may be better
• Lifting Devices and Equipment (LDE)
• Verify that LDE Program is consistent with NSS/GO
  1740.9B
• Ensure Compliance of Certifying and Tagging of
  Slings IAW NSS/GO 1740.9B
• Develop Center-wide Policy defining Critical
  Lifts

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31,
  2001
• Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF)
  (Contd.)
• Operations Maintenance
• How is NTF Maintenance Data, including Roles
  Responsibilities and reporting of Facility
  Health, communicated to Center Management
• Explain Value to be derived from Third Party
  (Plexus Scientific) review of Maintenance Program
• NTF Facility Safety Head should be included and
  utilized as Critical input to Project INFUSE
  Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) Plan
• Use Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS)
  as a source of information for developing Project
  INFUSE RCM Plan
• Include Construction of Facilities (CoF) in
  Backlog of Maintenance Repairs (BMAR) reduction
  planning

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
FY01 SH Assessments

• Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31,
  2001
• Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF)
• Observations
• Suggest using Third Party to conduct Facility
  Condition Assessment rather than the current
  Maintenance Contractor
• LaRC needs to continue their Program of replacing
  the recalled Omega Fire Sprinklers Heads and
  identifying recently recalled Central Sprinkler
  Heads
• Recommend installing Sound Discs for effective
  repeatable Vibration Analysis Data collection
• Suggest linking Customer satisfaction feedback
  data to a set goal to trigger corrective/preventiv
  e action part of ISO Program

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Operations Engineering Board (OEB)
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