Are You Ready For A Hazardous Materials Event In Your Community

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Are You Ready For A Hazardous Materials Event In
Your Community?

• Presented by Jeri Harwood

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Overview

• Background and review of a recent hazardous
  materials event
• Is your community prepared
• What is the training required
• Action planning
• Drill and exercise
• Budgeting

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Review of a Hazardous Materials Incident

• Background
• Incident, March 6, 2005 South Salt Lake City,
  Utah
• Resources
• Protective actions
• Action planning
• Preservation of evidence
• Accident investigation
• Costs

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Background

• A railcar subleased from Kennecott Copper to
  Philips Services
• Rail car was equipped to haul Sulfuric Acid only,
  due to the phenolic liner that is inside the
  tank. This liner is designed to protect the
  tankers steel walls from corrosion by sulfuric
  acid
• Rail car stenciled with Sulfuric Acid
• Philips Services put waste acids into the tank
  which does not meet the contract requirements
  from Kennecott

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Incident

• A railcar marked with sulfuric acid had just been
  moved to a different track at Roper Rail yard in
  South Salt Lake City, Utah on 6 March 2005
• It was noticed at 0550 hours, that there was a
  leak and a call was placed to 911 stating that
  there was a hazardous materials fire involving
  sulfuric and hydrochloric acid at Roper Rail yard
  
• The operations manager for the rail yard isolated
  the area

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First Response

• 0558 - South Salt Lake City and West Valley fire
  departments arrived on scene. At this hour it
  was still dark
• Firefighters did not notice any breach of the
  container, but had confirmed the rail car venting
  vapor
• 0700 - During shift change there was a
  yellow/brown vapor plume escaping the railcar.
  At this time the incident commander requested
  Midvale and Sandy City fire department for
  support

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• 0730 Initial evacuation of 600 west to I-15,
  which was a 330 meter isolation distance for
  sulfuric acid. Railcar stenciled with Sulfuric
  Acid on side
• 0800 Individual from Union Pacific stated that
  it appeared the railcar had two bullet holes in
  the side of the tank from an earlier observation
• FBI JTTF was contacted
• At approximately noon, the incident was reviewed
  and not considered a terrorist event

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• 0800 - Recon team in Level A PPE was sent to the
  tank car after decontamination was set up. This
  team observed approximately five holes on the
  side of the tanker with product actively flowing
• Waybill showed up with the emergency contact from
  Philips services which stated only sulfuric and
  hydrofluoric acids were included in the shipment.
  The company also stated that the rail car was
  properly loaded and labeled (Waste Corrosive
  Liquid) for the shipment
• The company was called by the Incident Commander
  (IC). Philips Services stated that the shipment
  included hydrochloric, hydrofluoric, nitric and
  sulfuric acids

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• Information was then passed to Union Pacific who
  was on scene with their hazmat responders
• UHP, IC, and FBI agent flew over the incident in
  a helicopter in an upwind direction
• A breach could be seen along the side of the
  railcar with product leaking
• 0930 A firefighter from the original recon team
  accompanied another flyover of the incident. He
  reported increased damage from the original
  finding. The car started showing signs of
  failure along the total length of the tank car

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Tank Showing Signs of Failure
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Continued Response

• 0930 - Plans made to off-load product
• 1225 Re-entry team sent in to offload. Team
  assessed the tank car and determined that the
  wrong couplings were sent for the offload. At
  this time they also noticed that there were
  approximately 15 holes in the side of the tank
  with one about the size of a softball
• Rate of failure and the integrity of the car were
  degrading rapidly
• Command Post was moved to a 1 mile radius from
  the tank car. At this distance there was no line
  of sight

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Continued Response

• Approx 1245 I-15 was shut down which took a
  little more than 1.5 hours
• 1530 IC requested a mandatory evacuation
• 1545 - Re-entry plans were discussed in further
  detail
• 1800 Plan was completed for offload
• 1830 IC contacted Philips Services again to
  clarify the tanks contents. He requested a fax
  from the company on the contents

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Inframetrics At 1829
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Continued Response

• 1859 The contents of the tanker was faxed to
  the IC which listed a different mixture of
  chemicals than the company previously had listed.
  This list is below
• Phosphoric Acid
• Sulfuric Acid
• Acetic Acid
• Fluoride Ions
• Ammonia
• 2000 Offload was started

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Corrected Product Information

• Later that evening the company corrected itself
  by saying the contents included waste acid and it
  had loaded approximately 12,500 to 13,000 gallons
  of the following products
• Sulfuric acid
• Phosphoric acid
• Hydrofluoric acid
• Acetic acid
• Ammonia

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• With the conflicting information from the
  company, the IC was uncertain if any of the
  information was correct
• Response was based on worst case scenario which
  was Nitric Acid due to the orange vapor coming
  from the rail car
• Further containment was set up and a berm was
  constructed in the retention pond
• 2000 Plans to start the off load began

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March 7, 2005

• 0001 - Approximately 6000 gallons went to the
  ground
• 0130 - 6500 gallons were offloaded into the tanks
• 0200 Evacuation was suspended
• 0500 Roads were reopened

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March 7, 2005

• 0900 Samples taken to the state lab was
  completed and products identified
• Sulfuric Acid
• Phosphoric Acid
• Nitric Acid
• Ammonia
• Acetic Acid
• Hydrofluoric Acid

• Hydrochloric Acid
• Tri-nitro phenol
• Di-nitro phenol
• Aluminum
• Other metals
• Water

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Resources Utilized

• South Salt Lake Fire and Police Departments
  (Dept)
• West Valley City Fire Depart
• Midvale City Fire Depart
• Utah Highway Patrol
• Utah Division of Emergency Management
• FBI and the JTTF
• Unified Fire Authority

• Union Pacific Railroad Hazmat Team
• Sandy City Fire Depart
• Utah DOT Incident Management
• SLC/Country Health Dept
• South Salt Lake C.E.R.T Team
• Gold Cross Ambulance

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• South Salt Lake and West Valley Fire Departments
  provided initial entry (Level A) hazmat teams
• Midvale Fire Department (Hazmat Team) provided
  their Hazmat Van which had the following
  capabilities
• Satellite uplink, radios, computers (with Cameo,
  Aloha and Marplot) which was used for plume
  projection), FAX, Video Imagery, weather station
  and Hazmat response gear if needed.
• Sandy City Fire Department provided the
  Decontamination Unit
• Two lane heated shower unit in a trailer

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• Utah Highway Patrol Helicopter
• Dept of Public Safety Emergency Mgmt Mobile CP
• Law Enforcement to shut down freeway and to
  evacuate personnel All South Salt Lake City
  Police were recalled
• Dispatch used to complete Reverse 911 calling
• Union Pacific Railroad hazmat teams, chemist,
  monitoring and still monitoring
• DEQ utilized for environmental impacts
• Philips Services removed waste

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Protective Actions

• IC requested a mandatory evacuation of the area
• This evacuation was based on forecast and plume
  modeling
• Evacuation was handled by South Salt Lake Police
  and surrounding law enforcement Agencies
• Reverse 911 was utilized
• There were approximately 6000 to 7000 personnel
  evacuated

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Action Plan

• Go through side of tanker
• Use of a JLG Lift with 100 ft boom
• Attached hose with pumps
• Ensure compatibility of tires and pumps
• Offload 200 gallons to ensure compatibility of
  containers that product will be stored in for
  shipment for approximately 1 hour.
• Procure samples to be taken to state lab for
  chemical identification
• Decontamination

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Other Actions

• Preservation of Evidence
• Accident Investigation
• Costs Exceeding 100K

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Is Your Community Prepared?

• What are the hazards that go through your
  community
• Does your community train and exercise together
• What are your resources
• Do you budget for training and drills

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Training

• What training has your Emergency Responders
  received
• For the team in Utah, all Hazmat Technicians have
  at least 200 hours plus any specialized training
  that they deem necessary
• Law enforcement are trained to Hazmat Awareness
• Incident Command Training is offered to all
  responders

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Action Planning

• How easy is it to do an action plan at the time
  of an incident
• Two action plans were written for this event. It
  took approximately 9 hours to coordinate the 2nd
  plan

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Drills and Exercises

• Do your emergency and community responders drill
  together
• The response agencies involved in this incident,
  drilled for the Olympics
• A drill was, also, held Sept 2004 with all
  involved at the same rail yard where this
  incident happened

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Budgeting

• How much does it cost
• Is it worth the cost
• The drill in Sept 2004 was approximately 300K

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Conclusion

• Prior planning and training successfully enabled
  the responders to respond effectively even though
  Placards were incorrect
• There were no injuries to first responders or
  civilians
• Reverse 911 was effective in notifying local
  residents
• Unified command was utilized effectively

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Questions?