HUGO, GEORGE, AND THE WAR ON TERROR

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HUGO, GEORGE, AND THE WAR ON TERROR
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• THE PINK TIDE
• REVIEW

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ORIGINS

• Economiclack of growth (through 2003), poverty
  and inequality, frustration with Washington
  Consensus
  
• Politicalweakness of representative
  institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of
  corruption
  
• Internationalwar in Iraq, opposition to Bush
  policies and growing distaste for American society

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GWB AND LATIN AMERICA

• Lack of high-level attention
• Abandonment of negotiations with Mexico for
  immigration reform
  
• Overriding concern with support for
  anti-terrorist campaign (not democracy)
  
• Hubs, spokes, and FTAs
• Politicization of drug war
• Awaiting Fidels demise
• Opposition to Chávez and the Pink Tide

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BUSH AND THE PINK TIDE

• Strategy of inoculation
• Circumvention through FTAs
• Cultivation (and cooptation?) of Lula
• The presidential tour (March 8-14)
• Carefully selected sitesBrazil, Uruguay,
  Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico
  
• Rhetoric of social concern
• Only deliverable ethanol agreement
• The Chávez counter-tour

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• THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO

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• Uses language of the street (including the Arab
  street)e.g., the devil speech
  
• Sits atop petroleum (now 100 per barrel)
• Puts money where his mouth is
• Breaks established rules of the game
• Plays off resentment of Bush, U.S. power
• Challenges Washington Consensus and FTAA
• Goes for high stakes
• Seeks rearrangement of prevailing world order

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THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION

• Domestic agenda
• Strengthening state
• Redistributing wealth
• Monopolizing power
• Global agenda
• Opposing U.S. hegemony
• Building continental solidarity
• Becoming leader of developing world
• Consolidating oil-producing alliances

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INTERNATIONAL UNCERTAINTIES

• Continuing strength of conservative or rightist
  tendencies in Latin America
  
• Role of Braziland discovery of oil reserves
• Lulas relationship with GWB
• U.S. presidential election
• Trends in global economy

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DOMESTIC WEAKNESSES

• Judiciary, rule of law and due process
• Absence of representative institutionse.g.,
  courts, legislature, unions
  
• Concentration of presidential power
• Chávezs own charisma
• Economic inefficiencies
• NB defeat in November 07 referendum

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THE ODD COUPLE

• Georges gifts to Hugo
• discourse on democracy (e.g., Second Inaugural)
• caricature of ugly American
• unpopularity of foreign policies
• inattention to Latin America
• And Hugos reciprocation
• exaggerated rhetoric
• potential threats to neighboring countries
• authoritarian tendencies
• Q1 What will Hugo do without George?
• Q2 What about oil?

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DOES HUGO POSE A MILITARY THREAT?

• The surrounding neighborhood?
• The continental balance?
• Self-defense?
• Destabilization of neighbors?
• Containment of domestic opposition?

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Table 1. Basic Statistics Venezuela and
Regional Neighbors, 2005 Population ____
____Active-Duty Military (000s)________
__Country____ (Millions)__ Army Navy
Air __Total__ __GDPb__
Venezuela 26.6 34 18
7 82a 140.2
Brazil 186.4 189 49
65 303 796.1
Colombia 45.6 178 22
7 207 122.3
Ecuador 13.2 37 6
4 47 36.5
Peru 28.0 40 25
15 80 79.4
a Includes 23,000-member National Guard.

b Billions of USD at current prices.
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Active-Duty Military Personnel Venezuela and
Regional Neighbors, 2005
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Military Spending Venezuela and Regional
Neighbors, 2005
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U.S. POLICY ALTERNATIVES

• 1. Continue containment of chavismo and pink
  tide
  
• 2. Engage Chávez and allies directly
• 3. Cultivate allies (e.g., Bolivia, Nicaragua,
  Ecuador)cut slack for Brazil as regional
  leaderand isolate Venezuela
  
• NB On hegemony and inattention

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WHAT DIFFERENCEDOES IT MAKE?

• Why does Latin America matter?
• Geography
• Market opportunities
• Potential terrorist movements?
• Regional peace Tacit subsidy for U.S. projection
  in the world arena
  
• A counter-intuitive hypothesis the Pink Tide,
  hemispheric peace, and American power