Balancing expertise: scientific advice in an international organisation

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Balancing expertise scientific advice in an
international organisation

• Katie Smallwood
• Harvard Sussex Program, SPRU
• Supervisors Julian Perry Robinson Daniel Feakes

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Dissertation

• The capacity of an international regime to keep
  abreast of and respond to technical change.

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Context The CWC and the OPCW

• 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention
• Entered into force 1997
• 184 states parties
• Verified disarmament and non-proliferation under
  intrusive inspection system
• Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
  Weapons
• 3 organs the Conference of States Parties the
  Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat
• 500 permanent Secretariat staff (about half are
  inspectors)
• Director-General at the Secretariats head

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The OPCWs Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)

• 25 independent members proposed by states
  parties, selected by Director-General
• Appointed on the basis of their expertise in the
  particular scientific fields relevant to the
  implementation of the Convention
• Maximum membership two terms of three years
• In operation since 1998 with one formal meeting a
  year and additional Temporary Working Groups to
  address specific issues

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Thesis

• Are scientific advisory boards actually useful
  when operating on an international level (and
  therefore in a highly politicised arena)?
• Concern regarding the impact of ST changes on
  the implementation of the CWC (e.g. Wheelis,
  2002 Parshall, 2002 IUPAC, 2002 Nguyen 2005
  IUPAC, 2007)
• But is the OPCWs Scientific Advisory Board the
  appropriate place for these to be addressed?

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Decision pathways

• Where do the questions originate from?
• Framing
• Discussion within the Board
• How are the Boards conclusions reported?
• What happens next?

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Functioning

• Membership participation
• Representation
• Geographic
• Fields of expertise
• Sectoral
• Type of advice monolithic? Pluralistic?
• Independence
• Intersessional programmes of work, memory

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Politicising science

• Within the Board
• Framing of the questions
• Wariness about certain subjects
• Topics discussed
• Outside of the Board
• Political associations with scientific positions
• Skepticism
• Claim to cognitive authority ?? (Jasanoff,
  1987)

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Consequences?

• The Second Review Conference requested the
  Council, through a meeting of governmental
  experts open to all States Parties, to consider
  the report by the Scientific Advisory Board which
  the Director-General had forwarded to the Second
  Review Conference.
• Standing committee of governmental experts?
• Looks likely to happen as precedent set in 2004,
  and now confirmed

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Conclusions

• So far, the OPCWs Scientific Advisory Board has
  only been effective in influencing policy on low
  impact issues (politically speaking)
• Politically charged issues are handled with
  clumsiness both in the framing of the tasks and
  in the ensuing discussion
• Most members are ill-prepared for the meetings
• Political knee-jerks could undermine the
  authority of the Board