The Bush Doctrine

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The Bush Doctrine

• Implications for North Korea

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Definition of Doctrine

• a principle or position or the body of principles
  in a branch of knowledge or system of belief
• a statement of fundamental government policy
  especially in international relations.

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Key Dates in Genesis ofBush Doctrine

• September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in New
  York and D.C.
• September 20th, 2001 speech to joint session of
  Congress
• June 1st, 2002 commencement speech at West
  Point
• September 2002 release of administrations
  first National Security Strategy

4
Understanding the Doctrine

• Applicability to future cases
• Foreign policy vision and world-view
• Radical departure from the past
• Limited in scope.

5
Historical Doctrines

• The X article, entitled, "The Sources of Soviet
  Conduct, is released in July 1947 in Foreign
  Affairs, proposed the policy of Containment of
  the Soviet threat.

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Deterrence

• International relations scholars would later
  develop a series of concepts and theories for
  understanding and ameliorating the threat of
  nuclear war between the U.S. and Soviet Union.
• This became known as
• deterrence theory.

7
Deterrence TheoryDefinition

• Definition the persuasion of ones opponent
  that the costs and/or risks of a given course of
  action he might take outweigh its benefits.

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Deterrence TheoryAssumptions

• Effective Signaling
• Understanding Calculations of Opponent
• Rationality of Opponent
• Can Alter Calculations of Opponent

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Cold War Experience

• Berlin Blockade (Eisenhower)
• Cuban Missile Crisis (Kennedy)
• Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Carter)
• End of Cold War (Reagan).

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Problems of Deterrence

• Deterrence, the promise of massive retaliation
  against nations, means nothing against shadowy
  terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to
  defend.
• President Bush, West Point address

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Problems of Deterrence

• Containment is not possible when unbalanced
  dictators with weapons of mass destruction can
  deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly
  provide them to terrorist allies.
• President Bush, West Point address

12
Problems of Deterrence

• For much of the last century, Americas defense
  relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence
  and containment. In some cases, these strategies
  still apply. If we wait for threats to
  materialize, we will have waited too long. We
  must take the battle to the enemy and confront
  the worst threats before they emerge.
• President Bush, West Point address

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Problems of Deterrence

• America will do what is necessary to ensure our
  nation's security. We'll be deliberate, yet time
  is not on our side. I will not wait on events
  while dangers gather. I will not stand by as
  peril draws closer and closer. The United States
  of America will not permit the world's most
  dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's
  most destructive weapons.
• President Bush, State of the Union Address (2002)

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Problems of Deterrence

• In the Cold War we faced a generally status quo,
  risk-averse adversary....But deterrence based
  only on the threat of retaliation is less likely
  to work against leaders of rogue states more
  willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of
  their people, and the wealth of their nations.
  ... Traditional concepts of deterrence will not
  work against a terrorist enemy.
• National Security Strategy of the United States

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Lessons from 9-11

• Religious fundamentalist terrorists are
  undeterrable
• Cost/Benefit calculations are inherently
  irrational
• No effective way to alter their calculations
• Radical aims, utopian goals
• Retaliation is not an option
• Intelligence failures.

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Assumptions

• Some threats are undeterrable
• When state leaders or non-state actors are
  irrational
• When state leaders or non-state actors are
  suicidal
• When attacks may come without warning or a return
  address.
• Appeasement is not an option.

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Assumptions

• Some risks are too great
• Disproportionate effects of terrorism
• WMD.
• Offense has the advantage.
• Alliance between Rogue States and Terrorists
  are an inherent threat to U.S.

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Conceptual Consequences

• Collapse of distinction between preemptive and
  preventive
• Collapse of distinction between an imminent and
  growing threat
• Reactive policies are not options
• Expanded utility of military action
• Linkage between rogue states and terrorism.

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Application in Iraq

• Saddam Hussein was personally unstable and likely
  undeterrable
• Saddam Hussein was developing or possessed WMD
• Our intelligence was never going to be sufficient
  to stop or react to threats
• Possible links to international terrorism
• Appeasement strengthens threat from Iraq.

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North Korea?

• Is the North Korean government either suicidal or
  irrational?
• What is the likelihood of North Korea providing
  WMD to terrorists directly or indirectly?
• Are negotiations viable?
• How much to we really know about North Korea?

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Applicable? Yes

• Questions about Kim Jong Ils rationality
• North Korea already has declared that is
  possesses nuclear weapons and may be willing to
  sell them to others
• The North Korean government is not serious about
  negotiations
• North Korea is an intelligence black box.

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Applicable? No

• The actions and rhetoric are merely a mix of
  posturing and bluffing.
• The regime is not suicidal.
• Negotiations can end the WMD threat.
• A carrot/stick approach can effectively contain
  North Korea.

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Links to More Information

• National Security Strategy of the United States
  of America www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html
• Jeffrey Record, The Bush Doctrine and War with
  Iraq, Parameters http//carlisle-www.army.mil/usa
  wc/
• Parameters/03spring/record.htm

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Thank You

• Thomas Ambrosio
• Assistant Professor of Political Science
• NDSU
• thomas.ambrosio_at_ndsu.nodak.edu