DPKO

1

• DGO Transition Workshop
• 3-6 March 2008
• Cairo, Egypt
• Making Integrated
• Missions Work Challenges and Opportunities

2
Integration Conceptual Framework

• High-Level Panel on Peace Operations The
  Brahimi Report (2000)
• Guidance Note on Integrated Missions (2000,
  revised in 2006)
• In Larger Freedom SG Report to the World
  Summit (2005)
• ECHA Report (Eide, et al.) (2005)
• High-Level Panel on Coherence Delivering as
  One (2006)
• Capstone Doctrine Peacekeeping Principles and
  Guidelines (2008)

3
Why Integration?

• Brahimi Need to better harness all UN resources
  to consolidate peace and support the
  re-establishment of a State.
• SG (In Larger Freedom)
• A gaping hole in the UN institutional
  machinery No part of the UN system effectively
  addresses the challenge of helping countries with
  the transition from war to lasting peace.

4
SG Guidance Note on Integrated Missions (2006)

• Integration is the guiding principle for the
  design and implementation of complex UN
  peacekeeping operations in post-conflict
  situations and for linking the different
  dimensions of peace-building (political,
  development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of
  law, social and security aspects) into a coherent
  support strategy

5
SG Guidance Note on Integrated Missions (2006)
contd

• An integrated mission is based on a common
  strategic plan and a shared understanding of the
  priorities and types of programme interventions
  that need to be undertaken at various stages of
  the recovery process. Through this integrated
  process, the UN system seeks to maximize its
  contribution towards countries emerging from
  conflict by engaging its different capabilities
  in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.

6
Applying Theory

• Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) (2000)
• Triple-hatting The DSRSG/RC/HC
• (e.g. UNAMSIL 2001)
• Inclusion of agencies/funds/programmes in
  technical assessment missions
• Otherwise, no institutionalized/structured
  cooperation and coordination
• IMPP (2005 present) work in progress

7
MINUSTAHs Experience

• MINUSTAH Mandate (June 2004 -)
• Safe Secure Environment
• Elections
• Political Constitutional Process
• Police reform
• Justice Corrections reform
• DDR -gt Community Violence Reduction
• Extension of State authority/sustainable State
  institutions
• Human Rights

8
MINUSTAHs Experience (contd)

• Challenges
• Different cultures (consultative vs. C2)
• Different timelines (incl. planning cycles)
• Mutual contempt/distrust
• No agreement on process
• No structured interaction
• Leaderships ambivalent commitment to, /or
  understanding of, integration

9
MINUSTAHs Experience (contd)

• Review of MINUSTAH as an integrated mission
  (conducted in April 2006)
• Elections (high-level of synergy)
• DDR (integrated MINUSTAH-UNDP unit but
  operational difficulties)
• Justice (low-level of synergy)
• Cite Soleil (No synergy)
• Civil Affairs (potential synergy)

10
MINUSTAHs Experience (contd)

• Joint Review Findings (excerpts)
• Common strategy necessary, including funding
  strategy
• Complete programmatic integration/merger not
  necessary but a clear division of labor is
• the UN needs to speak with one voice

11
Haiti Good practices since 2006

• Dedicated planning resources in both MINUSTAH and
  RC Office Integrated Mission Planning Team
  (IMPT)
• Structured interaction between UNCT and MINUSTAH
  staff members (senior and working-level)
• Increased joint programming (e.g. police reform
  rule of law reform)
• GoH/MINUSTAH/UNCT Task Force on the Red Zones
• MINUSTAH participation in Transitional Appeal,
  UNDAF and PRSP processes

12
Lessons Learned

• 2005 ECHA Report (Eide, et al.) recommendations
  still broadly valid
• Integration does not automatically happen through
  a triple-hatted individual
• Structured/institutionalized cooperation and
  coordination necessary.
• Commitment of the leadership necessary
• Insist on comparative advantages
• Share resources More impact

13
Lessons Learned (contd)

• Flexibility
• Get over it (No institutional hang-ups)
• National Government (where relevant) should be
  the driver of the planning process and
  coordination
• Transition dynamic. Continue to adapt.
• Integrated missions must be supported by
  integrated Headquarters