Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad

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Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad

• Fort Worth Tornado

Bobbie Severance-Roach, CBCP Project Manager,
Business Continuity Program
BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANNING helps you stay on
the right track
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BNSF System Map
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BNSF Facts Figures

• 33,500 miles of track operate in 28 states and
  two Canadian provinces
• 36,000 employees geographically dispersed
  throughout central and western US
• Corporate headquarters campus is located in
  Fort Worth
• Revenues are generated from transport of coal,
  grain, intermodal trailers and containers,
  chemicals, metals, minerals, forest products,
  automobiles, and consumer products

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10 Minutes of Devastation

• On Tuesday, March 28, 2000,
• at 623 PM an F2 tornado
• struck downtown Fort Worth.
• The tornado destroyed 8
• buildings and damaged 52
• businesses.
• The Fort Worth metroplex
• sustained over 500 million
• dollars in damage.

ENTERPRISE RECOVERY
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UPR Plaza Impact

• The UPR Plaza building had
• extensive damage, primarily on
• the north and west sides.
• Approximately 3,000 windows
• on all floors were broken by
• softball-sized hail and wind. No
• structural damage was
• sustained.
• Damage estimates to the building
• totaled 20 million dollars.

ENTERPRISE RECOVERY
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BNSF Impact

• We leased 5 floors in UPR Plaza
• for 450 Technology Services
• employees.
• Glass, wind, and water damaged
• furniture, carpet, computers,
• printers, fax and copy machines,
• phones, and documentation.
• It was May 1st before we could
• begin to return to UPR Plaza.

ENTERPRISE RECOVERY
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UPR Plaza -- west side
ENTERPRISE RECOVERY
Concrete floors
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Radisson Hotel -- across from UPR Plaza
Glass from building embedded into hotel
ENTERPRISE RECOVERY
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Radisson Hotel -- across from UPR Plaza

• The largest part of the safety
• concern and damage involved
• glass breakage. Glass
• disintegrated into fragments
• ranging in size from 2 feet to 2
• millimeters long and were
• propelled into work areas.
• Hanging glass was still falling
• on the streets below 2 weeks
• later.

ENTERPRISE RECOVERY
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Aftermath

• Police barricaded the entire
• downtown area for the first
• 24-hours following the tornado.
• During the next 6 days 20-25
• blocks remained cordoned off.
• Two weeks later, the area
• around UPR Plaza was still
• closed to vehicle and pedestrian
• traffic.

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UPR Plaza Clean-up

• Windows that were broken out were boarded up with
  braced plywood units per city code.
• Outside covered walkways were constructed around
  the building.
• Restoration and cleaning services were procured.
• The Fire Department only allowed people from
  pre-approved lists to access the buildings. BNSF
  Facilities Management teams had very limited
  access to the building to gather and remove
  contents due to tightly controlled narrow
  timeframes that UPR Plaza building management
  gave other companies trying to accomplish the
  same goal.

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Assumptions Realities

• We assumed
• UPR Plaza security personnel
• monitored weather data. The
• National Weather Service gave first
• advisory at 545PM and issued a
• tornado warning at 610 PM. The
• building had a public address
• system to provide emergency
• notification.

• In reality
• A BNSF employee received a
• personal phone call regarding the
• approaching storm and warned
• others.
• Immediate after the tornado passed,
• building security used public address
• to inform that a tornado had been
• sighted and advised people take the
• interior stairs down to the basement.

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Assumptions Realities

• We assumed
• Interior stairwells would provide
• access to the basement in the event of
• a tornado.
• ---------------------------------------------
• BNSF trained floor safety wardens
• would make sure everyone evacuated
• their floor and check headcount at
• their designed meeting places.

• In reality
• When employees got to the
• basement, access doors were locked.
• ---------------------------------------------
• Since it was past normal working
• hours, floor safety wardens were not
• available to make sure everyone was
• safe and accounted for.

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Assumptions Realities

• We assumed
• Our UPR Plaza business continuity
• team could meet at the pre-arranged
• location, the Radisson Hotel,
• following the tornado to provide a
• verbal damage assessment
• report to BNSF management.

• In reality
• Police barricades prevented access to
• the entire downtown area. No
• secondary meeting location was
• identified in the plan.

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Assumptions Realities

• We assumed
• That following the tornado we could
• get back into the building to salvage
• and remove items from our floors
• in a timely manner

• In reality
• Because we were one of many
• companies in leased space, we did
• not control access to the building.
• During our appointed times to
• access, not only were we
• collecting hardware, but many
• valuables and personal items
• employees were concerned about
• securing so recovery took much
• longer.

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Assumptions Realities

• We assumed
• Most of the Technology Services
• staff could work productively from
• home during a disaster.

• In reality
• Most of the staff could work from
• home, and fortunately we were also
• in the process of begin to relocate
• them to our campus and had an
• empty building available. All of the
• campus training rooms and available
• office space were also utilized. Extra
• hardware was shipped in from
• inventory at St. Paul and Topeka
• locations.

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Assumptions Realities

• We assumed
• We could communicate, provide
• information and updates to the
• Technology Services employees
• affected by the tornado.

• In reality
• Keeping displaced employees
• informed was difficult because we
• did not have an established
• communication plan in place for
• Technology Services. Although they
• could access their voice mail
• messages, telephones had not been
• installed in the new building location
• and not all employees had pagers
• and/or cell phones.

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Conclusions

• Timing is everything. Fortunately by 615 PM,
  the majority of the Technology Services staff had
  left for the day. There were no deaths or
  injuries to BNSF employees.
• An Emergency Communication Plan was created and
  copies were distributed to all directors and
  managers -- one copy for the office and one for
  home. This plan establishes calling trees and
  information about how, when, and who will provide
  updates during a disaster.
• The damage assessment teams have updated their
  plans to identify a primary and secondary meeting
  location.

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Conclusions

• We utilized conference bridges and voice mail
  messages to allow communication to many people at
  one time. The majority of BNSF employees now
  have a company provided pager and/or cell phone.
• We were lucky to have the empty building
  available even though it wasnt move-in ready.
  Identification of available training rooms,
  conference rooms, and other temporary work
  locations is important to rapid business
  recovery.
• We are pursuing the acquisition of permanent
  business recovery space.
• We created contracts with hardware quick-ship
  vendors to deliver workstations to BNSF recovery
  locations at time of disaster.

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Conclusions

• Employees are encouraged to secure laptops, lock
  desks and cabinets, and not leave valuables and
  personal effects in their desk or office areas.
• Productivity and project deliverables did not
  slip while employees worked from home, which
  resulted in a formal BNSF telecommuting policy.
• When employees returned to UPR Plaza each team
  was given a Safety Briefing document regarding
  conditions affecting the interior and exterior of
  the building and claim reimbursement information
  for any damaged personal items.

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Conclusions

• There was an increased corporate awareness for
  safety, disaster recovery, and business
  continuity. And, for a short period of time
  people stopped saying .
• that wont happen here