Lecture 23: Constructing International Regimes

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Lecture 23 Constructing International Regimes
1. International Regimes 2. The GATT and the
WTO 3. Weapons Of Mass Destruction 4. The Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty 5. The Chemical Weapons
Convention 6. The United Nations League of
Nations
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Regimes in IR Theory
Realists Regimes Reflect the Distribution of
Power Neo-Liberals Regimes Facilitate
Cooperation Constructivists Regimes Can Alter
Identities and Interests
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Definitions Of A Regime
Krasner Regimes Are Institutions Possessing
Norms, Decision Rules, And Procedures Which
Facilitate A Convergence Of Expectations.
Kegley And Wittkopf Regimes Are Institutionalized
Or Regularized Patterns Of Cooperation In A Given
Issue-Area, As Reflected By The Rules That Make A
Pattern Predictable.
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Prisoners Dilemma
PLAYER B
COOPERATE
DEFECT
5
10
COOPERATE
5
-20
PLAYER A
-20
0
DEFECT
10
0
1. DC A DEFECTS WHILE B COOPERATES (BEST) 2. CC
BOTH PLAYERS COOPERATE 3. DD BOTH PLAYERS
DEFECT 4. CD A COOPERATES BUT B DEFECTS (WORST)
PREFERENCE ORDER
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Modifying The Standard Prisoners Dilemma
1. Standard Prisoners Dilemma A) Dominant
Strategy Defect B) Equilibrium
Defect-Defect C) Expectation No Cooperation 2.
Modifications A) Multiple Plays Or
Iterations B) Communication Between The
Players 3. Some Mutual Interest Exists Not
Game Of Pure Conflict Or Pure Cooperation
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Prisoners Dilemma With Iteration
TOTALS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
DEFECT STRATEGY COOPERATIVE STRATEGY
PLAYER A D D D D D D D D D D PLAYER B C
D D D D D D D D D
10 -20
PLAYER A C C C C C C C C C C PLAYER B
C C C C C C C C C C
50 50
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Many Strategies Available In Multiple Iteration
Game
1. Random Strategy -- Flip A Coin 2. Always
Defect 3. Always Cooperate 4. Tit-For-Tat A
Conditional Strategy a) Cooperate On First Move
Reciprocate On All Other Moves b) Nice, Firm,
Clear, and Forgiving
Conditional Strategies Have Been Shown To
Increase Cooperation
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Prisoners Dilemma Examples Using Cardinal
Payoffs
STANDARD PRISONERS DILEMMA 1. DC -- 10 2. CC
-- 5 3. DD -- 0 4. CD -- -20
VERY HARSH PRISONERS DILEMMA 1. DC --100 2. CC
-- 5 3. DD -- 0 4. CD -- -200
VERY MILD PRISONERS DILEMMA 1. DC -- 6 2. CC
-- 5 3. DD -- 0 4. CD -- -1
Key Some Prisoners Dilemma Games Are More
Conflictual Than Others
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Possible Games
PRISONERS DILEMMA 1. DC 2. CC 3. DD 4. CD
CHICKEN 1. DC 2. CC 3. CD 4. DD
STAG HUNT 1. CC 2. DC 3. DD 4. CD
DEAD LOCK 1. DC 2. DD 3. CC 4. CD
Key Some Games Are More Conflictual Than Others
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Student Exercise
What is Your Preference Order?
See Handout
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General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade (GATT)
1. Established in 1947 as a Temporary
Organization Designed To Promote Free Trade 2.
Becomes Permanent After The Failure Of The
International Trade Organization (ITO) 3.
Series Of Negotiations Called Rounds The
Kennedy (1963-67), The Tokyo (1973-79) And The
Uruguay (1986-94). 4. GATT Was Replaced By WTO
In 1995
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Key GATT Norms
1. Non-Discrimination Norm (Also Called The
Most-Favored Nation (MFN) Status or in the case
of China Normal Trade Relations) 2.
Liberalization Norm 3. Reciprocity Norm (Or The
Tit-for-tat Norm) 4. Safeguard Norm 5.
Multilateralism Norm
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Final Points On GATT
1. GATT Has Greatly Expanded Free Trade 2. GATT
Has Continually Evolved As A Regime 3. GATT Has
Been Characterized By Pragmatism
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The World Trade Organization (WTO)
What is the Source of Conflict at the WTO Meeting?
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Biological Weapons
1. Oldest Weapon Of Mass Destruction 2. Modern
Types Anthrax, Botulinum Toxin, Q-fever, The
Plague, And Ricin 3. The Geneva Protocol
(1925) -- Banned Use, But Not Development
Production 4. Cold War Deter By Retaliation In
Kind 5. 1972 Biological And Toxin Weapons
Convention 6. Violations Continue Soviet Union
1979
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Chemical Weapons
1. More Recent Phenomenon Industrial
Revolution 2. First Major Use Ypres On 22 April
1915 3. 100,000 Dead From Gas By End Of World War
I 4. Geneva Protocol (1925) 5. Modern Uses
Italians, Japanese, Egyptians, Iraqis 6. Cold War
Stockpiles Sarin, Mustard Gas, VX, Soman --
Goal Retaliation In Kind
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Chemical Weapons
1. The Demand For A Regime Iraqs Use Beginning
In 1983 2. Reagan Administration Initiative in
1984 3. Chemical Weapons Scare During Persian
Gulf War (1990-1) 4. Bush Signs The Chemical
Weapons Convention In 1993 6. Renewed Demand A)
1995 Aum Shinrikyo Sarin Attack In Tokyo B) Gulf
War Syndrome Debate C) White Supremacists Get
Hold Of The Plague In 1995 6. U.S. Senate
Ratifies the Treaty in April 1997
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The OPCW Regime
1. Strongest Verification Measures Ever
Devised 2. Approximately 50 Chemicals Under
Control -- Classification into Three Schedules
Schedule 1 Military Use Ban on Production and
Sale Schedule 2 Dual Use Trade with Members for
Peaceful Purposes Schedule 3 Dual Use Trade
with Non-Members for Peaceful Purposes 3.
Rewards for Cooperation Encourage Compliance 4.
Costly Not To Sign -- U.S. Estimated Loss of
600m in Trade of Schedule 2 Chemicals
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Nuclear Weapons
1. Manhattan Project During World War II 2. First
Use Hiroshima On 6 August 1945 3. Proliferation
Soviet Union (1949) U.K. (1952) France
(1960) China (1964) Israel (1970s)
India (1974) Pakistan (1998) 4. Much
More Difficult To Develop
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Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)
1. Treaty Signed 1968 -- Do Not Develop Weapons
If You Dont Have Them -- Do Not Transfer
Technology Or Materials 2. Creates The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 3.
Regime Promotes Cooperation By A) Monitors For
Defection B) Provides Private Goods To
Members C) Links Issues Vertical And
Horizontal Proliferation D) Can Call On Member
Nations To Sanction Violators
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Has The NPT Regime Been Successful?
Supporters A) Many Countries Have Not Acquired
Weapons B) Several Active Programs Have Been
Halted C) Institutionalizes U.S.-Soviet
Cooperation Critics A) Many States Have Not
Joined (e.g., Israel) B) Some States Have
Violated (e.g., Iraq) -- Monitoring Mechanism
Is Flawed
Key Remember IAEA Is Just A Regime
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Norms versus Laws
How do norms differ from laws? Can norms become
laws? How are international laws created? Who
enforces international law? Does international
law simply reinforce the status quo?
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The U.N. and League of Nations
Why were these institutions created? How are
they structured? Are the institutions
successful? How would you alter the structure
of the UN today?