When Do States Sign on to New International Commitments Costly Moral Action and the Kyoto Protocol J

1
When Do States Sign on to New International
Commitments? Costly Moral Action and the Kyoto
Protocol Joshua William Busby Harvard
UniversityBelfer Center for Science and
International Affairsjoshua_busby_at_harvard.edu
2
Structure of the Talk

• (1) Research Question
• (2) Research Approach
• (3) Main Argument Strategic Framing
• (4) Application to Kyoto Protocol
• (5) Policy Implications and the U.S.

3
(1) New Troubles for the West

• Debt Relief
• Climate Change
• AIDS
• International Criminal Court
• Landmines
• Human rights
• Womens rights
• Religious rights in China and Sudan

• These so-called normative issues were
  politicized by morally-motivated advocates who
  saw injustices that needed to be corrected.

4
Process of Issue Acceptance
5
Research Question

• Under what conditions do states accept new
  normative commitments?
• Why do some states accept these commitments more
  readily than others?

6
Strategic Framing

• Costless Moral Action Where arguments are framed
  to fit with a countrys values and costs are
  modest, states are more likely to be supportive.
• Costly Moral Action Where arguments fit with a
  countrys values but costs are high, whether or
  not states are supportive depends on the position
  of veto players.

7
(2) Research Approach

• Qualitative case studies and process-tracing
• Competitive theory testing
• Multi-issue (climate change, debt relief)
• More scope for generalization
• Multi-country (UK, Germany, U.S., and Japan)
• More variation in government structure and
  outcomes
• Based on publicly available sources and 100
  interviews with principals

8
(3) Main Argument

• Point of departure Material constraints from the
  international system shape and shove but do not
  determine foreign policy outcomes.
• Project focuses on
• Domestic determinants of foreign policy
• Primarily values and institutions, but sensitive
  to material constraints

9
Where does this fit in the literature?
Strategic Framing Veto Powers


10
Argument Strategic Framing

• Advocates induce attention shifts
• Frame their arguments to fit with the values of
  the polities they are targeting

11
Argument Strategic Framing

• Advocates induce attention shifts
• Frame their arguments to fit with the values of
  the polities they are targeting

Global warming is an important problem but one
that can be solved through ingenuity and steady
commitment.
Climate change poses a catastrophic risk to the
welfare of mankind.
SOME CUTS NOW, INCREMENTALLY INCREASING. RD.
Global warming is not a real problem.
BIG CUTS NOW.
DO NOTHING.
12
When Will Framing Be Successful?

• Credible information
• Focusing events
• Low costs
• Value fit
• Position and Number of Veto Powers

13
Veto Powers

• Depends upon how those messages are received by
  domestic veto players
• Depends on their preferences
• More veto players makes approval harder
• Prediction When costs and values clash, values
  will win if veto players support them
• Example Climate change in Japan

14
Competing Explanation Utilitarianism

• Ruggies composite of neo-realism and
  neo-liberalism
• States are unitary actors
• Respond to material constraints in international
  system
• Prediction where costs and values clash, costs
  trump values

15
Matrix of Costs and Values Predictions of
Strategic Framing
16
4) Applications to Cases Climate Change
17
Comparison of EU and US Emissions Base Energy
Efficiency

• EU-15 emissions were 11.83 of world total in
  2000
• 2.9 tons C per capita
• 376mn pop.
• US emissions were 20.62 of world total in 2000
• 6.6 tons C per capita
• 286mn pop.

Sources Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), World
Resources Institute
18
Change in GHG Emissions 1990-2000
19
Change in C02 Emissions
20
Why did Japan ratify?

• The Kyoto Protocol was the Kyoto Protocol
• Sought concessions on sinks BUT more important
• Negotiated on home soil
• National honor and reputation

21
Veto Powers and Japan

• Environment Ministry, MOFA in Favor
• METI, Keidanren against
• P.M. decided to support
• LDP secured the support of its two small
  coalition partners
• P.M. tipped balance to side with Environment
  Ministry, MOFA over METI, Keidanren

22
Why did the U.S. not ratify?

• Environmental catastrophe frame tied to policy
  solutions unacceptable to veto powers
• Multiple veto powers
• 2/3 US Senate majority required for treaties
• 1997 95-0 Byrd-Hagel resolution
• Campaign finance, private sources
• Limits on green concessions
• Treaty practice

23
Veto Powers and the U.S.

• Senate Foreign Relations Committee against
• Senate against
• Business against
• President for
• X President opted not to submit the treaty for
  advice and consent of the Senate

24
So what?

• Better explanations of FP outcomes
• Can explain instances of costly moral action
• Better explanations of FP process
• Accounts for influence of veto actors
• Predictions about future behavior
• Roadmap for advocates

25
Part V Policy Implications Can the U.S.
Change?

• Federal Policy
• State Policy
• A lot happening at the state level (Northeast,
  New York, California)
• Center for Clean Air Policy http//www.ccap.org/
• Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use
  Management http//www.nescaum.org/
• Advocacy
• National Commission on Energy Policy
• Apollo Alliance
• Energy Future Coalition
• What Would Jesus Drive?

26
Bush Approach

• Voluntary Energy Intensity Target (ratio of
  emissions to GDP)
• Reduce energy intensity by 17.5 2000-2012
• Energy intensity fell by 16.7 in the 1990s
• RD
• FutureGen
• Hydrogen fuel cell
• Not likely to change trends much.

27
McCain/Lieberman S.139 Climate Stewardship Act

• Elements
• Mandatory cap-and-trade
• Return emissions levels to 2000 by 2010 through
  2016
• Distribute allowances in a given year
• Allowances can be bought and sold
• Companies would have to report emissions

• October 30, 2003
• 43 senators voted for
• 55 voted against
• 2 were not present

28
S. 139 continued

• VOTES FOR
• Republicans (McCain, Lugar, Snowe, Chafee,
  Collins, Gregg)
• VOTES AGAINST
• Democrats (Baucus, Conrad, Dorgan, Byrd, Breaux,
  Landrieu, Levin, Lincoln, Pryor)

• Key Votes Against
• Coal-intensive (W.Virginia, Montana)
• Agricultural (Midwest)
• Industrial (Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania)

29
Future of S. 139

• Likely introduce again in Senate
• Introduced March 30, 2004 in House as H.R.4067
  (79 co-sponsors)

• Requires domestic popular support
• Probably requires Presidential support b/c
• House difficult

30
What Impact Will the Elections Have?

• Bush May Still Do Nothing More
• Big issue reaction to Californias plan to
  reduce greenhouse gas emissions from autos
• Kerry May Disappoint
• B/C of Congressional constraints

31
Additional Slides
32
Position of the Veto Players on the Kyoto
Protocol
33
Conclusions

• (1) What was special about the 1990s and the
  post-Cold War era?
• Low security threat
• (2) What made the debt relief case different than
  climate change?
• Stakes
• (3) What general points can we take away for
  other issues?
• Moving the core state, understanding the position
  of domestic veto actors in that core state
• (4) What differentiates the foreign policy
  process in the four countries?
• Few veto players in the UK, mixed in
  Germany/Japan, many in the U.S.
• More in all when compliance the issue.

34
Potentially Relevant Causal Variables
35
Strategic Framing vs. Utilitarianism

• Strategic framing
• They would predict states will accept new
  commitments when
• CULTURAL MATCH.
• CREDIBLE INFORMATION.
• CRISIS/FOCUSING EVENT.
• LOW COSTS.
• FEW VETO POWERS.
• They would explain disputes between countries
  when
• DIFFERENCES IN FRAME FITNESS.
• DIFFERENCES IN VETO POWERS.

• Utilitarianism
• They would predict states will accept new
  commitments when
• COERCION.
• SELF-INTEREST.
• LEARNING.
• They would explain disputes between countries
  when
• COMPETING SELF-INTERESTS.
• COORDINATION PROBLEMS.

36
Strategic Framing vs. Communicative Action

• Strategic framing
• They would predict states will accept new
  commitments when
• CULTURAL MATCH.
• CREDIBLE INFORMATION.
• CRISIS/FOCUSING EVENT.
• LOW COSTS.
• FEW VETO POWERS.
• They would explain disputes between countries
  when
• DIFFERENCES IN FRAME FITNESS.
• DIFFERENCES IN VETO POWERS.

• Communicative Action
• They would predict states will accept new
  commitments when
• PERSUADED.
• They would explain disputes between countries
  when
• VALUES GAPS.

37
Carbon Intensity of Energy Use
38
(5) Extensions for Future Research

• Application to other issues AIDS and ICC
• Application to general foreign policy
• Compliance
• Game theoretic
• Social learning and deeper preference change