Title: Module VI: Corporate Governance
1Module VICorporate Governance
- Week 14 November 25 and 27, 2002
2Objectives
- Place the issues raised concerning corporate
governance into an analytical framework - Review the major issues concerning corporate
governance - In the United States, considered a leader
- Around the world, a hot issue
- Raise considerations relevant to corporate
governance in practice - Analyze concerns with insider trading
3Preliminary Theory and Practice
- We have analyzed the implications of financial
theory for corporate policies using cases - Valuation
- Financing and dividend decisions
- Investment
- What are the underlying assumptions of
micro-economic theory underlying finance?
4Corporations Objective Function
- Maximize shareholders wealth
- Satisfactory for all equity investors
- Must provide products wanted in the market place
at lowest costs and fewest resources (economic
efficiency) - Other stakeholders benefit
- Customers, employees, and vendors
- Parties to contracts (e.g. creditors)
- Tax authorities and communities
5Efficient Markets
- Market participants absorb relevant information
concerning firms prospects and future government
policies - Prices reflect the impact of this information
- Types of information past, public, private
- Market imperfections and efficiency
- Markets provide signals necessary for the
efficient allocation of investment capital - Information is valuable and critical
6Corporations and Stakeholders
Goods Markets
Governance
Capital Markets
Board of Directors
Customers
Shareholders
Management
Vendors
Firm
Creditors
Government
7Corporate Governance U.S.
- Shareholders Investors Owners
- Private shareholders
- Investors in public companies
- Insiders officers and directors
- Directors
- Fiduciary responsibility to shareholders
- Legal liabilities contracts, crimes,
regulations, securities laws, torts - DO insurance
8Boards of Directors
- Elected by shareholders to term in office
- Duty of care requires performance of duties in
good faith, acting like a prudent person, based
on reasonable belief (Model Business Corporation
Act, Section 8.30(a)) - Independent versus inside directors
- Committee structure
- Audit committee
- Compensation committee
9Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
- Provisions affecting management
- Boards must have audit committees with a
financial expert - Timely reporting of insider trading and material
changes - Audit committees
- Receive adequate funding
- Approve auditor non-audit services services
10Sarbanes-Oxley Act (continued)
- Corporate officers
- Certify financial statements
- Prohibited from misleading auditors
- Accounting firms
- Establishes a new oversight board
- Registration of audit firms with SEC
- Restriction on accepting employment with audited
firms (one year)
11GEs 2002 Board Changes
- Changes announced November 7, 2002
- Go beyond requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley
- Increases power and autonomy of independent
directors and 11 of 17 directors will be
independent - Eliminate stock and options as compensation
12Insider Abuses
- Insider trading
- Self-serving policies
- Defense of jobs (entrenched management)
- Self-dealing (loans, affiliated firms, etc.)
- Deception for self-serving advantages
- Deceptive reporting to increase bonuses, share
prices - Abuse of minority rights, other stakeholders
13Transparency A Global Issue
- Information flows and legal environment differ
around the world - Foreign conditions
- Korean chaebols
- Japanese keiretsu
- Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
- Indonesia family firms
- U.S. usually taken to be a standard
14Issues with Insider Trading
- Examine the key economic and legal issues
regarding insider trading - Discuss whether insider trading affects firm
value, and if so, how and why - Periodic episodes of insider trading cast doubt
on the fairness of markets
15Definition
- Illegal insider trading refers to the unlawful
trading in securities by persons with material,
nonpublic information - Who is an insider? It depends
- Corporate insiders are officers, directors, and
shareholders with more than 10 of the
outstanding stock - Others corporate outsiders and tipees, who
pass information to those that do trade
16Insider Trading is Not Obvious
- Until 1929, insider trading was an acceptable
business practice - It is still common -- and legal -- in many parts
of the world, although European countries (e.g.,
Germany) are copying the US laws - For private placements insider trading does not
apply - Manne argues that insider trading rules reduce
market efficiency
17Transmission of Information
Information becomes available to insiders
Informed trading by public possible
Share Price
Issues Trading During Adjustment Period
Time
Adjustment Period
18Insider Trading and Fairness
- It is unfair and a violation of ethics
- Corporate executives are fiduciaries, and their
use of proprietary information (owned by
shareholders) constitutes theft - It compromises market integrity and may
discourage participation by small retail traders
who are the source of liquidity
19Efficiency and Insider Trading
- It may hurt economic efficiency by widening
bid-ask spreads and possibly causing market
failure - Regulations against insider trading eliminate
perverse incentives to managers to, withhold bad
information or increase stock price volatility - Hidden compensation for executives
20Insider Trading and Criminal Law
- Review key provisions of the securities laws
- Disclosure
- Trading activities
- Major cases illustrating problems with
prosecuting insider-trading cases
21Insider Trading Rules
- Two provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 are commonly applied - Section 16(b)
- Section 10(b)
- Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA) of 1984 and
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) of 1988 - Increase penalties for violations and widen the
scope of laws to include derivatives etc.
22Section 16(b) (Short Swing Rule)
- Provides for profit recapture from short swing
trading (a round-trip transaction within six
months) by a corporate insider - Does not require proof of possession or intent of
use of inside information - Only corporations or shareholders can sue for
profit recovery - Although the burden of proof is minimal, the law
applies very narrowly
23Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
- Rule 10b-5 is an anti-fraud provision prohibiting
insider trading, prohibiting manipulation, fraud,
and deception - Does not distinguish between corporate and
non-corporate insiders - Trading on material nonpublic information is not
per se illegal - Must be linked illegal activity like a breach of
fiduciary duty or misappropriation of information
24US v. Chiarella (1978)
- Chiarella, a printer, made 30,000 of profits on
trades based on documents he was printing - Although found guilty in District Court under
10b-5, the Supreme Court reversed this since he
was not a fiduciary with whom sellers had trust
and confidence, but a complete stranger. - Rule 14e-3 was passed to fix this loophole
25Dirks v. SEC (1983)
- Ray Dirks, an analyst, learned from an employee
that Equity Funding Corp.s assets were
overstated and fraudulent - He informed his clients who sold Equity stock
- The SEC censured Dirks for tipping his clients
about inside information, - The Supreme Court reversed this arguing Dirks had
no fiduciary duty to Equity
26US v. Winans (1985)
- In the Winans (Heard on the Street) case, the
author tipped off brokers and others about his
stories in the WSJ (1982-1984) - Brokers made 700,000, passing 30,000 to Winans
- Winans served 18 months in Federal prison,
convicted of mail and wire fraud, not section
10b-5
27Civil Litigation
- Shareholder legal actions
- The so-called plaintiffs bar
- Class-action lawsuits
- Effectiveness depends on enforceability of court
rulings - Damages and role of experts
- Costs to corporations and economic efficiency
28Assessment
- There are still clearly some gaps in the law,
especially as regards to defining fiduciary
responsibility and identifying the source of
inside information - Misappropriation theory is gaining ground
- Illegalities focus on using information obtained
for reasons other than securities trading for the
purpose of making profits while trading
29Detection of Insider Trading
- To be effective, mechanisms must be put in place
to detect insider trading - But what organization or institution should
perform this function? - Candidates
- Corporations
- Markets
- Government agencies
30Enforcement of Insider Laws
- Corporations
- Not credible
- Not effective against insider trading rings
- Markets
- The current practice. The NYSEs StockWatch
invests considerable resources in attempting to
detect insider trading - Government Agencies
- Unrealistic? Unsuitable?
31Insiders Takeover Defenses
- Poison pill defense discussed next
- Staggered board
- Usually three classes of directors with
three-year terms - Takes two years for potential acquirer to gain
control - Packing the board
- Finding the right banker
- Opinion letter from investment bankers used to
defend against accusation of bad decisions
32Poison Pill Takeover Defense
- Provisions of corporate bylaws
- Typical provisions
- If one investor acquires a trigger level
(typically 10 to 20), remaining investors gain
rights to buy more shares at sharply discounted
price - Effect is dilution of voting power of acquiring
investor - Statutory authority varies among states
33Insider Accounting Abuses
- Typical of recent scandals (Enron, Global
Crossing, WorldCom, Adelphia) - Insiders are motivated by
- Stock options and stock ownership
- Compensation schemes based on performance
- Previous scandals
- Equity funding
- Legislative response Sarbanes-Oxley
34Next Week Dec. 2 and 4, 2002
- Prepare to discuss Vyaderm case on Wednesday
- Begin reviewing for final examination to take
advantage of course summary and review on
Thursday and special optional session on Friday - Review midterm to understand answers and see me
if you have any questions about your grade going
into the final