Title: Joint Advanced Warfighting Program
1Joint Advanced Warfighting Program
- Joint Close Air Support Conference
- Hampton, Virginia
- 2-4 Nov 99
2A Fundamental Truth
We say, "Flexibility is the key to air
operations, " and this is a fundamental truth.
But we also enshrine in doctrine the notion of
"centralized control and decentralized
execution.
3A lost operational virtue?
What I'm suggesting is that centralized
"control" as now practiced, may be robbing us of
one our most important operational virtues --
flexibility.
4A Cultural Transformation
There is much more to maneuver warfare than the
ability to undertake centrally planned, centrally
directed, methodical operations... But, just
maybe we can make it part of a cultural shift
from a system featuring centralized,
inward-focused, imposed discipline to a
decentralized, outward-focused (on the enemy and
situation), innovative, self-disciplined
approach. Gen Merrill A. McPeak Message to
HQ ACC/CC 23 November 1992
5Five Small Experiments
- Hunter Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment
-- Mar 97 - Battlefield Shaping Task Force I Experiment --
Nov 97 - Battlefield Shaping Task Force II Experiment --
Mar 98 - Tactical Targeting Trial I -- Oct 98
- Capable Warrior Limited Objective Experiment III
-- Nov 98
6Scenario (BSTF-1,2, CW LOE III 1997-98)
West Shore of Chesapeake Bay
Simulates Littoral Region
Country Y
B
- Religious Center, Possible Chem. Plant
Inf Reg
C
Inf Reg
Mech Reg
B
LAR -
MEU
Mech Reg
MPF MEB
Reserve
Mech Div
CVBG
A
LAR -
Inf Div
Afloat Pre Pos
Notional Naval Expeditionary
Task Force (NETF)
Country X
7Three Future Capabilities
- The capability for aviation to
- Detect, Identify, Engage Mark (DIE-M)
appropriate ground threats in a timely
cooperative fashion - To effectively counter a moving enemy force by
modifying the command, control, and communication
functions - Shape the battle, not only through the use of
fires, but also through the timely sharing of
intelligence back forth with the lead elements
of column of light armored ground vehicles
8Nine Measures of Effectiveness
- Aviation fire response times of less than 60
seconds (which includes less than 10 seconds
weapon time of flight) - Indirect surface fire response times of less than
10 minutes ( which includes 8 minutes weapon time
of flight) - Total number of times
- Command elements decisively engage an enemy at a
time place of their choosing - Naval surface fires help ground elements avoid
decisive engagement - Aviation helps ground elements avoid decisive
engagement - Ground helps aviation avoid decisive engagement
- Naval surface fires help aviation avoid decisive
engagement - Unmanned sensors help the force avoid decisive
engagement - Unmanned sensors help the force engage decisively
9An Assessment Model
10A Measure of Effectiveness
?
0
Response Time (Minutes from Detect to
Acknowledge)
11LOE III Measure of Effectiveness
Joint CAS Training
Joint CAS Deployed
12Conventional Vs Experimental
Conventional
Experimental
- Positive Control
- Coordination (FSCL)
- 45/90 Min Resp. Time
- Absolute Position
- Reasonable Assurance
- Cooperation
- lt 10 Min Resp. Time
- Blue Relative Position
- Commanders Intent
- Scheme of Maneuver
- Dynamic Targeting
- Battlespace Shaping
Joint Pub 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)
13Cooperative Command Control
1. Co-Equals 2. Can Hear Talk to Each Other 3.
Free Fire Unless Negative Anyone can 4. Abort
or 5. Mass
Voice
Voice
Voice
14Fundamental Element
15Fourteen Total Elements
Aviation (6)
Remote Shooters
Remote (2)
Ground (6)
Unmanned Sensors
16One OODA Loop
Aviation
Remote
Ground
17Three Functions
18One Decision
Engage or Avoid
19Voice Harmonizes Efforts
Aviation
Remote
Ground
20LOE III DATA
Aviation Ground
Joint CAS Training
Joint CAS Deployed
0 5 10 20 45 90
Remote (Simulated Naval Surface Fires)
Joint Fires Response Time -- Minutes from Detect
to Acknowledge
21Revised Response Times
NEW CW MAX
NEW Aviation Ground
Joint CAS Training
Joint CAS Deployed
0 1 10 20 45 90
Remote (Simulated Naval Surface Fires)
Joint Fires Response Time -- Minutes from Detect
to Acknowledge
22BACK UP SLIDES
23Joint Command Control (Coordination)
24Joint Conventional Wisdom
25Joint Direct Air Support (Coordination)
26Operational Vs Strategic Tempo
January 91 Al Khafji, SA Why was the Iraqi
advance not stopped prior to Khafji? It was not
the Air Forces Best Day.
BGEN Buster Glosson, USAF
Director, Special Planning Group for Offensive
Air Operations Against Iraq --
The Black Hole WGBH Frontline The Gulf War
Part I
27Operational Vs Strategic Tempo
April 94 Gorazde, BH You do not wait until
the tanks are inside the city and then say you
cannot use airpower because the tanks are inside
the city. F. C. Carlucci
Former Secretary of Defense