Radiation Detection in the Maritime Environment

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Radiation Detection in the Maritime Environment
UCRL-PRES-217588

• Arden D. Dougan
• International Maritime Protection Symposium
• December 12-14, 2005

This work was performed under the auspices of the
U.S. Department of Energy by University of
California, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory under Contract W-7405-Eng-48.
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The threatDelivery of weapons of mass
destruction in intermodal cargo containers

• 90 of the worlds trade moves by shipping
  containers
• Intermodal cargo is an attractive venue for
  smuggling illicit material
• The volume and mass of material in each container
  is large
• Of even more importance, the volume of traffic is
  enormous
• More than 6,000,000 containers enter the U.S.
  annually
• West coast ports are processing 11,000/dayAn
  average of 8/min on a 24/7 basis
• The rate of container arrivals is expected to
  increase dramatically over the next decade
• Arrival rate is so large that time for inspection
  is short
• Successful delivery of one weapon of mass
  destruction in a container can be catastrophic

The shipping container has revolutionized world
trade. Now it is a potential carrier of
terrorists and their weapons. -- The
Economist, Apr 6, 2002
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Overview

• Search and Find mission for nuclear and other
  radioactive materials
• Identification of the materials to determine
  level of concern
• Lessen source confusion
• Increased cargo security

A radioactive source in a cargo container
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What are the key issues that radiation detection
can help solve?

• Search and Find mission for nuclear and other
  radioactive materials
• Identification of the materials to determine
  level of concern
• Increased cargo security

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What are the key detection issues for the Search
Find Mission?

• Limited range of detection
• Intervening materials shorten the range (i.e.
  cargo)

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Detection at a seaport vs. at sea
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Our objective is to develop a practical/reliable
means for detecting WMDs in cargo containers
without impeding trade

• When is the optimum time to inspect for WMD?

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Goals of an inspection system for detection of
fissile material

• Reliably detect small quantities of HEU or 239Pu
• 1 false positives
• 1 false negatives
• Maintain reliability
• In cargos ranging in thickness from 0-60 g/cm2
• For a wide range of cargo types, including
• Agricultural products
• Electronics products
• Machinery
• Even when inspection time is limited to about one
  minute
• This must be done while maintaining the safety of
  port workers and cargo consumers

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Detection complicated by background from
naturally occurring and medical and industrial
radioactive materials
NORM
Medical/Industrial

• Food items
• Salt substituteK
• Lean beefK
• BananasK
• Dry cocoa powderK
• Brazil nutsRa
• MilkK
• Many green vegetablesK
• Non-food items
• Porcelain bathroom fixturesTh
• Welding rodsTh
• FertilizerK
• Tile/CeramicsTh/U
• Heating elementsTh
• Gas lantern mantlesTh
• Cinder blocksU

• Medical gamma-ray sources
• 99mTcMedical imaging, other
• 201TlCardiac, perfusion
• 131IThyroid
• 125IBlood, plasma volume
• 67GaTumor, imaging
• 51CrBlood, red cell volume
• 133XeLung, ventilation
• 89SrTherapy, bone pain
• Many more
• Industrial gamma-ray sources
• 60CoCal, radiography, food
• 137CsCal, therapy, gauging
• 192IrRadiography
• 90SrRTG, gauging
• Industrial neutron sources
• 252CfNAA, well logging
• 241Am/BeSoil moisture gauge

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Gamma-ray background varies as a function of
location, time, and adjacent structures
Time 222Rn diurnal variation
Location LLNL 5th Ave
Structures in Amarillo _at_ test range
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Current technology for Material Identification

• Isotope Identification Equipment (Gamma
  Spectroscopy)
• Can identify simple materials (low resolution
  NaI) or complex materials (HPGe)
• Complex to operate
• Radiation spectroscopy experts often needed for
  confirmation of identification
• Library-dependent analyses
• Battery life is limited
• Delicate instruments make boardings a challenge
• Can be used as a search tool

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Key Detection Issue Material Identification is
limited by the spectral resolution of the detector
Handheld sodium iodide (NaI) detectors can
identify some materials

Several handheld NaI detectors are commercially
available
Fieldable HPGe detectors are now available -
provides lab capability in a field system
HPGe detectors can confirm NaI data and identify
other materials because of better spectral
resolution
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Joint experiments show how communications
improvements will save time and improve false
identifications

• NPS and LLNL simulate a Level II boarding of a
  Vessel of Opportunity
• Contraband plutonium source is found using USCG
  radiation detectors
• Real time data and video are sent via wireless
  communication to Naval Command Center at NPS and
  on to LLNL via the internet
• Spectroscopy experts at LLNL request a second
  analysis with more sophisticated instruments
• The source will be identified as non-SNM
• No additional responders are needed on the scene!

Collaboration with Alex Bordetsky, NPS
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May 2005 Boarding Party experiment used radiation
detection and ultra-wide band communications
Tactical Network Targeting
Target Vessel Radiation source in engine room
Gamma data
Prototype HPGe radiation detector tested for
Ergonomics
Exercise roles LLNL UWB comms, Radiation source,
radiation detectors and Reachback NPS Exercise
lead, comms backbone, NOC, situational
awareness TACSAT Provided imagery and ELINT
targeting
UWB within ship
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August 2005 Boarding Party experiment emphasized
communications and reachback
Target Vessel Radiation source in engine room
Radiation source discovered
Gamma spectra sent to LLNL for analysis
LLNL experts requested photo of source and
re-measurement
Fingerprints analyzed at Biometrics Fusion
Center, Clarksburg, West Virginia
Communications demonstrated UWB within ship to
NPS mesh to Secure internet
Boarding party collects fingerprints
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There is no Silver Bullet for finding WMDs in a
maritime environment

• Detection is a challenge
• Energy
• Shielding
• Background interferences
• Time
• Distance
• Detector resolution
• New techniques are in our future
• Active interrogation
• Smart containers
• Imaging