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KHIP A Scalable Protocol for Secure Multicast Routing

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Title: KHIP A Scalable Protocol for Secure Multicast Routing


1
KHIP- A Scalable Protocol for Secure Multicast
Routing
  • by
  • Clay Shields and J.J.Garcia-Luna-Aceves
  • University of California, Santa Cruz

2
Outline
  • Background
  • Introduction to KHIP
  • KHIP features
  • Secure tree construction in KHIP
  • Transmission of data/control traffic
  • Key management in KHIP
  • Tree maintenance tasks in KHIP
  • Denial of service attacks counter measures by
    KHIP
  • Conclusion

3
Background
  • Goals of multicast protocols
  • To build a tree of routers to route multicast
    traffic
  • To detect and eliminate loops during a multicast
    session
  • E.g. When a user joins the group, the protocol
    must be able to add this user to the group
    without creating loops in the multicast tree

4
Background
  • Classes of multicast protocols
  • Sender initiated protocols
  • E.g. DVMRP, PIM-DM etc
  • Receiver initiated protocols
  • E.g. CBT, OCBT, PIM-SM etc
  • The focus in this presentation is on receiver
    initiated protocols

5
Background
  • Sender initiated protocols
  • There is a separate tree from each source to all
    destinations
  • These protocols build optimal (least path cost)
    multicast trees, since path information is
    exchanged between the routers
  • These schemes are not scalable if the number of
    users is sparse and they are widespread
  • DVMRP is the current internet standard for
    multicasting. Most new protocols being proposed
    have interoperability with DVMRP

6
Background
  • Receiver initiated protocols
  • Each receiver wishing to participate in multicast
    sends an explicit join message towards a known
    designated central router
  • A single shared tree spanning all sources and
    receivers is built, instead of a separate tree
    for each source and all destinations
  • Shared trees are not optimal (least path cost)
    trees
  • These schemes however scale well as the routers
    need only maintain state information of a single
    shared tree

7
Background
  • CBT - Core Based Trees by A.Ballardie
  • Join mechanism
  • A user who wishes to join the group sends a join
    request towards a designated router called the
    core
  • The join request is acknowledged by a node which
    is already part of the multicast tree
  • The path taken by the acknowledgement message
    creates a new branch for the multicast tree

8
Core Router
Join Request
Join ack
Joining User
Core Based Trees , construction mechanism
9
Background
  • Core Based Trees
  • Failure Detection and Loop avoidance mechanisms
  • If an on-tree node fails, then its descendant
    sends a "flush" message downstream to remove the
    branch
  • all the removed nodes will rejoin the tree
    through different paths
  • if any router receives a rejoin request that it
    had forwarded earlier, then it sends a quit
    notification to its parent and flushes its
    downstream. This way loops can be avoided

10
Failed node
descendant
Flush
Core Based Trees , flush mechanism
11
Parent, on-tree node
quit
descendant
flush
Join
Loop
Joining user
Core Based Trees , loop detection mechanism
12
Background
  • OCBT - Ordered Core Based Trees by Clay Shields
    and J.J.Garcia-Luna-Aceves
  • OCBT is an improved version of CBT
  • The goals of OCBT are
  • to eliminate loops which creep into a CBT when
    the network is in a transient state
  • to eliminate denial of service caused by the loop
    detection/avoidance mechanism used in CBT protocol

13
Background
  • Features of OCBT
  • each node has a particular logical level
    (integer) associated with it
  • the levels of primary and secondary cores are
    fixed
  • any nodes level is less than or equal to its
    parents level
  • any joining router includes the level it wishes
    to join
  • if an on-tree router receives a request with a
    level higher than its current level, it quits its
    parent and joins the branch which the current
    join request is forming
  • due to ordering of the tree, the control traffic
    is much lesser in OCBT

14
Level 1
Core Router
Level 1
Level 1
Join Request
Join ack
Level 2
Joining User
Ordered Core Based Trees
15
Background
  • Some issues in OCBT
  • placement of cores
  • knowledge of address of the core
  • knowledge of level of any core

16
Background
  • HIP - A protocol for Hierarchical Multicast
    Routing by Clay Shields and J.J.Garcia-Luna-Aceves
  • Features of HIP
  • an entire domain is organized and controlled in a
    way so as to appear as one single virtual
    router
  • HIP uses OCBT to create a multi-leveled hierarchy
    of virtual routers for inter-domain routing
  • each virtual router simulates the output of an
    OCBT router
  • HIP solves the problem of placement of cores by
    using border (or, exit) routers as cores

17
Core
On-tree router
Border Router
HIP Tree
18
KHIP-A Scalable Protocol for Secure Multicast
Routing
  • KHIP (Keyed HIP) is a protocol aimed to counter
    attacks against multicast trees. Typical attacks
    include
  • replay attacks
  • loops caused by unauthorized branches
  • flooding attacks

19
Features of Current Secure Multicasting Schemes
  • Control messages are not protected, only data is
    secure
  • A set of malicious routers can collaborate to
    isolate a set of multicast users
  • Loops can be introduced by a malicious router
  • To counter these attacks, a secure multicast
    protocol must only include those links which
    connects trusted routers

20
Core
Corrupt Router
Other Routers
a. Isolation
Core
b. Loops
Attacks on HIP
21
Issues Addressed by KHIP
  • Authentication -only known participants should be
    allowed to join
  • Authorization -only authorized participants can
    change routing structure of the multicast tree
  • Integrity -data and control packets should not be
    altered during multicast transmissions

22
KHIP Features Overview
  • KHIP creates an authentication server(s) which
    issues certificates to trusted entities
  • the core signs reply messages and includes its
    certificate in all acknowledgements
  • an on-tree router signs all control messages to
    prove its authority and identity to others
  • the multicast tree is divided into multiple
    sub-branches
  • members along each sub-branch communicate using a
    shared sub-branch key

23
SB-3
SB-2
SB-1
Core
SB-4
Border Router
KHIP Tree
24
Secure Tree Construction in KHIP
  • Member authentication
  • authentication is through the use of certificates
    and public/private key pairs
  • a joining user obtains a certificate from the
    authentication server
  • the certificate contains group or groups
    information that this user is authorized to use

25
Secure Tree Construction, contd.
  • Creation of groups
  • an initiator for the group obtains an appropriate
    certificate from the authentication service
  • the address (or identity) of the center point
    (core) is notified to the location service
  • the location service then creates a group using
    this core
  • the core then serves as the root of the multicast
    tree
  • any joining users send join requests to this core

26
Secure Tree Construction, contd.
  • Building the Secure Tree
  • KHIP introduces two additional messages, Core
    Request and Core Acknowledgement
  • a joining user initially sends a signed Core
    Request to the core
  • a trusted router or the core, reply with a signed
    Core Acknowledgement.
  • only a trusted router replies back to any join
    message, unlike CBT or OCBT

27
Secure Transmission of Data/Control Traffic
  • the data/control traffic is encrypted using a
    random key
  • this random key is encrypted with the branch key
    and transmitted along the branch
  • when a branch member receives this information,
    it decrypts the random key and verifies the
    sequence number, branch ID and checksum
  • retransmission only requires new sequence numbers
    and branch IDs
  • checksum verification is the only expensive
    operation in this process

28
Key Management in KHIP
  • when a user leaves in a sub-branch the nearest
    core changes the branch key
  • this key is then multicasted to all the members
    using their individual public keys
  • This scheme however is not scalable, if the
    branch has hundreds of users

29
Tree Maintenance Tasks
  • when a node fails then its child node will flush
    the entire downstream
  • when a node receives a join request with a
    higher level number than its own, then that
    branch needs to be dissolved -this is done by
    sending a quit notice to the parent of this node

30
Denial of Service Attacks counter measures by
KHIP
  • KHIP limits flooding attacks by verifying
    sequence numbers and branch numbers
  • also the access to a branch is difficult due to
    the security mechanisms
  • the use of the random branch key eliminates
    replay attacks, since the random key would be
    different each time
  • KHIP however allows untrusted routers to drop
    control packets

31
Conclusion
  • KHIP is a secure hierarchical multicast protocol
  • KHIP reduces threats by replay attacks and
    flooding attacks
  • KHIP uses security mechanisms to eliminate loops
    and isolation of valid users by corrupt routers
  • Unsigned control messages however are subject to
    dropping by corrupt routers
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