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Phenomenal Indeterminacy and the Bounds of Cognition

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(1) Sense-datum theory & the speckled hen (2) The argument from indeterminacy ... The Problem of the Speckled Hen ... The Speckled Hen (cont... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Phenomenal Indeterminacy and the Bounds of Cognition


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Phenomenal Indeterminacy and the Bounds of
Cognition
  • Brian Fiala
  • April 28th, 2007
  • University of Arizona

3
Overview
  • (1) Sense-datum theory the speckled hen
  • (2) The argument from indeterminacy
  • (3) Generalizing the argument
  • (4) Resisting the argument

4
Overview
  • (1) Sense-datum theory the speckled hen
  • (2) The argument from indeterminacy
  • (3) Generalizing the argument
  • (4) Resisting the argument

5
Sense-datum theory
  • Acts of sensing involve a relation between a
    subject and a mental object (a sense-datum).
  • Sense-data exist only when sensed. There are no
    unsensed sense-data.
  • There is no appearance/reality distinction with
    respect to sense-data and their properties.

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The Problem of the Speckled Hen
  • Let us consider the visual sense-datum which is
    yielded by a single glance at a speckled hen. The
    datum may be said to comprise many speckles.
  • But what of the question of the number of
    speckles? If we judge that there are
    forty-eight, it would seem, at first
    consideration at least, that we might very well
    best mistaken.
  • Chisholm (1942)

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The Speckled Hen (cont)
  • Chisholm is pointing out that there is no number
    n of which one can say with complete certainty,
    My sense-datum comprises n speckles.
  • Judgments about sense-data are not basic
    judgments (rather, they are inferential).
  • Such judgments are fallible.
  • Inferences about sense-data are defeasible.

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Overview
  • (1) Sense-datum theory the speckled hen
  • (2) The argument from indeterminacy
  • (3) Generalizing the argument
  • (4) Resisting the argument

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Indeterminacy is in the head
  • There is no indeterminacy in the world.
  • Instead, indeterminacy is a feature of
    representations of the world.
  • Here Ill suppose the above two theses.
  • Not everyone will accept the suppositions.
  • Still, many will accept the suppositions.
  • Both are intuitively plausible.

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Indeterminacy is in the head
  • Our concepts mountain and foothill are
    indeterminate with respect to some objects
  • Yet the fundamental physical structure of
    mountains and foothills is fully determinate

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Phenomenal knowledge thesis PK
  • (PK) If a subject S is sensing a sense-datum D,
    and if P is a phenomenal property, then S is in a
    position to know whether D determinately
    instantiates P.

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Argument From Indeterminacy
  • (P1) If D is a sense-datum for S and D
    determinately comprises 48 speckles, then S is in
    a position to know that D comprises 48 speckles.
  • (P2) S is not in a position to know that D
    determinately comprises 48 speckles.
  • (C1) Its not the case that D determinately
    comprises 48 speckles. (P1, P2, modus tollens)

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Overview
  • (1) Sense-datum theory the speckled hen
  • (2) The argument from indeterminacy
  • (3) Generalizing the argument
  • (4) Resisting the argument

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Generalized PK thesis
  • (PK) If a subject S undergoes a conscious
    experience E, and if P is a phenomenal property,
    then S is in a position to know whether E
    determinately instantiates P.

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Why is PK an Attractive Thesis?
  • Experience is immediate.
  • Experience is self-presenting.
  • There are no illusions with respect to the
    properties of ones experience. That is, one
    cant be mistaken about what its like to have an
    experience (cf. Kripke on fools pain).

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HO-Representationalism and PK
  • Higher-order representationalism
  • Conscious mental states (experiences) are states
    that the subject is aware of. Consciousness
    entails awareness.
  • A mental state M is a conscious experience iff
    there is a mental state M that (appropriately)
    represents M.

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HO-Representationalism and PK
  • We can individuate mental states such that there
    is a 1-1 correspondence between phenomenal
    properties and mental states
  • HOTs are normally available for behavior guidance
    (including rational behavior)

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HO-Representationalism and PK
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Overview
  • (1) Sense-datum theory the speckled hen
  • (2) The argument from indeterminacy
  • (3) Generalizing the argument
  • (4) Resisting the argument

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Sperlings Matrix (1960)
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Sperling Experiments
  • Tone
  • High
  • Medium
  • Low
  • or
  • Full report
  • Blank display
  • and
  • No mask
  • 15-500ms

15-500ms
S reports letters
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Sperling Experiments (cont)
  • The subjective image or sensation induced by
    the light flash outlasts the physical stimulus at
    least until the tone is heard. The stimulus
    information is thus stored for a fraction of
    a second as a persisting image
  • As the visual image fades, its legibility
    (information content) decreases, and
    consequentially the accuracy of reports based
    upon it decreases.
  • Sperling (1960 20)

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Rejecting PK
  • The information carried by an experience may be
    highly determinate (and complex).
  • But it takes time to extract that information.
  • If the info is sufficiently complex (e.g. the
    property 48-speckled-ness), the subject may not
    have sufficient time to extract it.
  • It doesnt follow that the property was not
    determinately present in the sensation.

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THE END
  • THE END
  • THE END
  • THE END
  • THE END
  • THE END

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