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Safety Speed WP 4: Containment of Damage and Fire

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... that a compartment or group of compartments will be flooded ... reached, quantity of smoke produced, etc.) inside the compartment when a fire occurs; ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Safety Speed WP 4: Containment of Damage and Fire


1
Safety _at_ SpeedWP 4 Containment of Damage and
Fire
Mid Term Meeting,5 February 2003, Nantes
2
WP 4 Objective

The principal WP4 objective is to develop
risk/cost models for HSC with reference to the
key factors pertinent to damage and fire
containment
3
WP 4 Tasks
  • Task 4.1 Confirmation of the main means for
    containment (COMPLETED)
  • Task 4.2 Formulations of Models (COMPLETED)
  • Subtask 4.2.1 The human factor as the means for
    containment of damage and fire
  • Subtask 4.2.2 Passive design systems as the
    means for containment of damage and fire
  • Subtask 4.2.3 Active design systems as the means
    for containment of damage and fire
  • Task 4.3 Risk-cost model for the containment of
    damage and fire (ACTIVE)

4
WP 4 Participants
  • Task 4.1 (Confirmation of main means) SSRC, DAP,
    FORCE
  • Task 4.2 (Formulation of risk/cost models) SSRC,
    DAP, FORCE, UNEW
  • Task 4.3 (Implementation of risk/cost models)
    SSRC, DAP, SEA, FIN

5
Task 4.1 Overview
A critical review of the main means for
containment of damage fire and their design
implications has been carried out, with the view
to provide input to the development of the
relevant risk/cost models to be developed in
subsequent tasks of WP 4
6
Task 4.1 Overview
The critical review focused in the following
three identified categories of available
means 1. Human factor i.e. the response of
humans to crisis situations and training (crisis
management) relevant to the scope of WP4 2.
Passive design systems for example, structural
safety-enhancing design measures, such as
double-bottom, subdivision, freeboard, fire doors
and materials used 3. Active design systems for
example, LSAs, fire fighting systems and
equipment.
7
Failure Modes Human Factor
8
Failure Modes Passive Systems
9
Failure Modes Active Systems
10
Task 4.1
  • Critical review of Active Design Systems (Life
    Saving Appliances (LSA) and Fire Fighting
    Systems (FFS)) as means for containment of fire
    and their design implications
  • Sources
  • International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and
    European Commission regulations
  • literature review and use of the internet.
  • Detailed information and references to products
    that are on the market and installed onboard
    High Speed Craft and vessels are provided.

11
Task 4.1
12
Task 4.2 Overview
To develop and validate models for assessing HSC
damage and fire resistance, based on advanced
calculation tools
13
Risk-Cost Model for Flooding
  • Primary initiating events
  • Parameters
  • Extent of damage
  • First-principles methods
  • Event trees

14
Primary Initiating Events
  • Collision
  • Grounding
  • Structural failure of bow or stern doors
  • Mechanical failure of watertight barriers
  • Operational safety management systems failure /
    human error

15
Parameters
16
Extent of Damage
  • Side Damages
  • The longitudinal extent of damage shall be 0.75 V
    1/3, or (3 m 0.225 V1/3 ), or 11 m, whichever
    is the least
  • The transverse extent of penetration into the
    craft shall be 0.2 V1/3
  • The vertical extent of damage shall be taken for
    the full vertical extent of the craft

17
Extent of Damage
  • Raking Damages

18
Damage Survivability
Subdivision Index A
  • Factor pi represents the probability that a
    compartment or group of compartments will be
    flooded
  • Factor si represents the probability that the
    ship will survive flooding of the said
    compartment or group of compartments

Survival Probability
  • Factor sa reflects the probability that the ship
    will survive pure loss of stability, heeling
    moments, cargo shift, angle of heel and
    progressive flooding
  • Factor sw reflects the probability that the ship
    will survive large scale flooding on the main
    vehicle deck Sw FHscritical(h, f)

19
Distribution of Capsize Hs Cumulative Curve
Probability to Capsize
Target Hs
20
Event Tree for Collision Outcomes
Source Joint NEW Project
21
Task 4.2 (1/2)
  • A Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) methodology focused on
    passive design systems has been developed.
  • The scope of FRA is to recognise parameters and
    variables influencing the development of a fire
    event.
  • Fire Risk Analysis methodology consists of the
    following four steps
  • Step 1 Analysis of Requirements
  • Step 2 Definition of Parameters and Variables
  • Step 3 Analysis of Parameters
  • Step 4 Fire Event Trees.
  • The FRA can be used by designers in the early
    design phase of HSC.

22
Task 4.2 (2/2)
Steps 12 parameters and variables influencing
fire resistance of construction and the reaction
to the fire of products have been identified by
analysing passive systems requirements specified
in the HSC Code. Step 3 the set of variables
(1st and 2nd order) that are in relationship with
the parameters and that determine the states of
identified parameters has been identified. Step
4 consists of the identification of gates of the
event tree related to the passive systems. The
identifications of gates has been achieved
through the identification and the analysis of
parameters and variables.
23
Task 4.2
24
WP 4 Subtask 4.2.3 Active Systems
  • Subtask was competed by UNEW (6MM) with input
    from DAP
  • From work done by other partners in task 4.1
    there where to areas of interest to this part of
    the WP. These were
  • Life Saving Appliances
  • Fire detection and fighting

25
WP 4 Subtask 4.2.3 Active Systems
  • The LSA work was based on event/fault trees from
  • Formal Safety Assessment of Life Saving
    Appliances for Bulk Carriers - Agenda item 5,
    74th Maritime Safety Committee submitted by
    Norway and ICFTU, 26th February 2001
  • After some consideration by the members of the WP
    it was decided not continue this line of research
    for budgetary reasons

26
WP 4 Subtask 4.2.3 Active Systems
  • Fire detecting and fighting
  • A vast generic event tree was constructed to
    represent all the design choices available
  • In reality this will be cut down as it is
    unlikely that you will have every active fire
    detection and fighting system and therefore parts
    of the tree will drop out

27
WP 4 Subtask 4.2.3 Active Systems
  • Fire detecting and fighting
  • The risk model was further developed by input
    into and application of the model developed for
    fire passive systems
  • Input was given to WP5 for the development of the
    project wide cost model that can evaluate every
    cost aspect of the active systems involved in the
    detecting and fighting of fire

28
Task 4.3 Overview
To synthesise a systematic method, which
contrasts risks and associated costs pertaining
to HSC damage and fire resistance, suitable for
integration into WP5 and for use in WP6.
Potential societal and economic consequences
(losses/gains of human life, cargo, money,
environment etc.) are the measures used for the
assessment of effectiveness of the different risk
control options. Example applications will be
undertaken to assist in the refinement of the
work.
29
Task 4.3 Overview
Risk-Based Tool for Flooding (SSRC)
Risk-Based Tool for Fire (DAP)
Scenarios under Consideration
Risk/Cost Model for Containment of Damage
and Fire
Means for Containment Database
Fault and Event Trees
Models for the Effect of the Human Factor (DMI)
Active Systems Models (UNEW)
Cost of Implementation and Incurred Cost
30
Task 4.3 Fire Risk Model (1/2)
  • The risk model will be developed through the
    following main steps
  • Preparation of a simplified Fire Event Tree
    taking into account active, passive and human
    factors elements
  • Quantification of probability of the Event Tree
    gates through Fault Trees. Data needed to perform
    this step will be retrieved from literature and
    S_at_S partners
  • Identification of scenarios (sub-sets of the
    simplified Event Tree) to be used for
    quantification of consequences.

31
Task 4.3 Fire Risk Model (2/2)
  • Quantification of the consequences by means of
    fire modelling tools (zone model as CFAST or CFD
    model as FDS.
  • The fire modeling will be applied to HSC spaces
    (public spaces, engine spaces and car decks) in
    order to evaluate the variation of consequences
    with the variations of the parameters identified
    in Task 4.2 (refer to D420).
  • The consequences will be quantified on the basis
    of the conditions (in terms of peak of
    temperature reached, quantity of smoke produced,
    etc.) inside the compartment when a fire occurs

32
Task 4.3
FDS (Fire Dynamics Simulator) is a computational
fluid dynamics model of fire-driven fluid flow.
Smokeview is a visualization program that is used
to display the results of an FDS simulation.
33
WP4 Distribution of Work
Task 4.1
SSRC has carried out 100 of the work allocated
in Task 4.1
Task 4.2
SSRC has carried out 100 of the work allocated
in Task 4.2UNEW has carried out 100 of the work
allocated in Task 4.2
34
WP4 Distribution of Work
Task 4.3
SSRC has carried out 10 of the work allocated in
Task 4.3The work remaining for completion by DAP
and FORCE in Task 4.2 will be reported within
Task 4.3
35
Conclusions
  • Work progresses in accordance with the provisions
    of the Technical Annex
  • Results achieved so far promising for the
    achievement of the Work Package objectives
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