Normative Guidance and Moral Motivation

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Normative Guidance and Moral Motivation

• Peter Railton
• Department of Philosophy
• University of Michigan
• Oslo, October 2008

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Normative guidance

• Normative guidance is pervasive
• Morality, of course
• What we believe
• How we think
• How we feel
• What we want
• How we talk, eat, stand, move, work, cooperate,
  compete, play, grieve, express affective, joke,
  give talks at conferences, build
• We are in some sense made for normative
  guidance our psychology rapidly acquires norms
  and can be guided effectively by norms without
  direct supervision. This enables us to be guided
  by vastly more norms than we recognize.

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Normative force

• But what sort of psychology is this?
• What is it to follow a norm, or find something
  normative? How is normative force operative
  within our psychology or any psychology?
• I will argue a compound attitude of a special
  kind. It involves not one but two distinctive
  families of normative concepts.

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Two families of normative concepts

• (1) Normative concepts proper
• Norm
• Rule
• Correct
• Right/Wrong
• Duty
• Law
• (2) Evaluative concepts proper
• Good/Bad
• Value
• Worth
• Virtue
• Beauty

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(1) Normative concepts proper

• Norm from norma (carpenters square)
  originally from gno- (to know similar
  cognition, recognition, nomological, gnomon,
  abnormal)

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Norma
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The norma permits and enables

• A priori guidance
• A standard of correctness
• Building rectilinearly
• Cutting uniformly so that separate pieces match
• Sharing tasks of building
• Reproducing a model in arbitrary scale
• Compare Wittgenstein on logic

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Contour gauge
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(1) Normative concepts proper, continued

• Rule from regula (ruler) originally from reg-
  (to be straight, to move in a straight line
  similar direct, rectify, regulate, reign,
  royal, Reich, Recht, riki)

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Regula
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(1) Normative concepts proper, continued

• Right also from reg-
• Wrong from Scandanavian originally from wer-
  (to bend or turn similar divert, invert,
  pervert, version)
• Correct from co (with) reg- (straight)

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(1) Normative concepts proper, continued

• Just from iustus (justice) originally from
  yewes (law similar jury, abjure, injury)
• Law from Old Norse lagu (that which is laid
  down) originally from legh- (to lie, to lay
  similar ledger, belay, fellow, coverlet)

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(1) Normative concepts proper, continued

• Duty from devoir (must), originally from ghabh-
  (to give or receive similar debt, gift, able)
• Obligation from ob- (inverse) ligare (to
  bind), originally from leig- (to bind similar
  ligament, religion)

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An example of normative force?Obligation and
the power of the gift

• Marcel Mauss (1872-1950), The Gift "What power
  resides in the object given that causes its
  recipient to pay it back?"
• Gifts are not free, but a form of reciprocal
  exchange
• In return for the gift is an obligation to the
  giver
• Therefore, a social bond is created, with a norm
  of giving due return
• The gift therefore bears a symbolic power, that
  remains tied to the giver and that binds the
  receiver
• This is a social fact, a norm transcending the
  individual exchange

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Normativity and norms

• This sort of explanation traces normative force
  back to norms, to the idea of conforming to a
  standard correctness and incorrectness.
• But What gives us the norm? Why is conformity
  to this standard normative?
• In many cases, the answer seems to be obvious
• The custom of gift-giving
• The standards of a practice or profession
• Religious and secular laws
• Social norms or codes
• Languages
• Rules of logic
• Agreements and conventions
• Individual principles or resolutions

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Why or when is a standard normative?

• Positive theory of law A law is a command
  backed by force
• This cannot be the concept of a law. Many
  commands are given between individuals, backed by
  force or threat of force. (Rousseaus highway
  robber.)
• To be law, there must be some recognition or
  standing as law the command must be issued by an
  appropriate authority. This is already a
  normative concept. (Hart.)
• Handbook of Sociology A norm is a rule backed
  by social sanction
• The notion of a sanction (as opposed to a mere
  infliction of harm upon oneself or others),
  already is a normative concept.

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Normative regress

• Meta-rule A norm can be given force by a
  meta-rule that requires it.
• This simply launches a regress. It cannot be
  norms all the way down. (Compare Wittgenstein
  on rule-following.)
• Could norms be self-requiring? There are too
  many norms and meta-norms norms of language,
  norms of politeness, norms of prudence, norms of
  morality, etc. A proliferation of requirements
  and standards that cannot all be met.

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Normativity without norms?

• Must there therefore be some forms of normativity
  that do not presuppose a standard or take the
  form of a rule? They might support or justify a
  standard or rule to supply an answer to the
  question Why follow this rule rather than that
  one? but not on the basis of yet another
  standard or requirement.
• A norma or regula tells us how to build
  rectilinearly, but not whether this is a good
  idea, whether we want this, whether this would be
  desirable or beautiful, what good or harm it
  might bring, etc. It does not give us the
  concepts to discuss this.

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(2) Evaluative concepts proper

• Value from valoir (to be strong, to be worth),
  originally from wal- (to be strong similar
  valid, valor, prevail, equivalent, valence)
• Good from Middle English, originally from
  ghedh- (to unite or join, to fit similar
  together, gather)
• Virtue from virtus (manliness, excellence)
  originally from wi-ro (man similar virile,
  world, werewolf)
• True from trewe (firm, trustworthy) originally
  from deru- (to be firm, solid similar tree,
  trust, endure, truce, Druid)
• Beauty from deu- (to do, to favor or revere
  similar benefit, benefaction, beatitude,
  dynasty)

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Two families of normative concepts

• (1) Normative vocabulary proper
• Rule, norm, standard, law, regulate, correct,
  rectified, required, permitted
• fit conforms to rule or standard, satisfies
  condition
• Voluntary ought implies can compliance can be
  required (Kant observantia)
• Formal one can operate correctly in full
  conformity to the guidance or requirements of
  this domain without endorsing conclusions form,
  rite, ritual, contract normative detachment
  not guaranteed
• (2) Evaluative vocabulary proper
• Good, valuable, true, credible,
  desirable, beautiful, important
• fit appropriateness, suitability, intrinsically
  compelling, endorsed, appreciated, admired (Kant
  reverentia)
• Non-voluntary the credible yields confidence
  the evident convinces the compelling wins over
  or impresses the good and the beautiful attract
  the desirable seduces
• Substantive one cannot operate in this domain
  responding fully appropriately to its guidance
  without endorsing, appreciating, or aiming for
  the conclusions support normative detachment
  accept, endorse, commit, believe, seek, love

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Mental acts and attitudes

• Normative concepts proper are applicable to
  mental acts that are more or less voluntary
• Reasoning
• Calculating
• Deciding
• Obeying or complying
• Evaluative concepts proper are applicable to
  involuntary attitudes as well as acts
• Believing
• Desiring
• Valuing
• Admiring

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Affect and emotion

• Discussions of normativity tend to emphasize two
  dimensions of the agents psychology cognition
  and motivation.
• For some, the puzzle about normativity is how an
  attitude could be both cognitive and motivating
  (the problem of internalism for normative
  judgments).
• Note that an agent equipped with cognition and
  motivation alone is in principle capable of
  compliance with norms or rules meeting
  normative requirements.
• For the evaluative, however, emotion or affect,
  the third sphere of psychology, comes into play
  trust, confidence, admiration, appreciation,
  affection, disgust, enjoyment

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Affect and emotion, continued

• The involvement of affect permits the evaluative
  to play a role in the psyche complementary to
  rules and prior, completing the picture of
  normative guidance.
• The affective revolution in psychology dual
  processes express and implicit.
• The implicit is faster than the explicit, shapes
  or colors it, and is mediated pervasively by
  affect.
• This intuitive psychology is sometimes
  contrasted with normative psychology. But it
  also is part of normative psychology.

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Normative guidance from the inside out

• What is it to be normatively guided?
• Explicitly or actively, e.g., to take something
  as normative or accord it authority?
• Implicitly or passively, e.g. to have ones
  thoughts, feelings, and actions shaped by norms,
  to experience a rule as normative?
• Two elements appear to be essential in both
  cases
• Attitude norm
• E.g. trust rule
• respect law
• accept custom
• admire role or model

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Explaining normative guidance requires concepts
from both families

• Epistemology Rule of probability or logic
  doesnt govern ones inferences unless one
  trusts or has confidence in the rule.
• Belief itself reflects this belief that p
  degree of confidence that p
• Prudence Rule of promoting long-term well-being
  doesnt govern behavior unless one cares or has
  self-concern.
• Desire itself reflects this desire that p
  degree of preference that p
• Social practice Rule of conduct doesnt
  govern behavior normatively from the inside out
  unless it is internalized, accepted, deferred to,
  identified with.

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A simple model of normative guidance

• Let us say that agent As conduct is in the
  relevant sense guided by norm N only if
• Agent A is disposed to act in a way conducive to
  compliance with N such that some representation
  of N plays a regulative role in As C-ing, where
  this involves
• - some disposition on As part to notice
  failures to comply with N
• some disposition on As part to experience
  discomfort when this occurs and to exert effort
  to establish conformity with N even when the
  departure from N is subject to no external
  punishment and has no further effects of its own.
• E.g., infants over-regularization of English.

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Normative guidance, beyond custom and acceptance

• For mere custom or ritual, internalization of
  the sort indicated above may suffice.
• This is just how we do things.
• An agent, however, could experience such
  normative guidance as alien or recalcitrant
  e.g., discomfort with behavior the agent no
  longer deems inappropriate. (Experiments on
  compliance.)
• We seem to need a stronger connection between the
  agent and the norm in order to understand the
  normative force of morality and possibility of
  moral motivation.
• Durkheim on religion devoir vouloir and vouloir
  devoir

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Normative endorsement

• Understanding morality seems to require more than
  internalizationattitude of accepting,
  identifying with, or endorsing a norm. This can
  be latent. Some of its marks
• Freely avow and defend N
• Treat N as non-optional, non-hypothetical
• Treat N as objective rather than merely
  subjective reify
• See disagreement with N as error
• See judgment relative to N as placing a demand
  upon all others
• See sanctioning attitude or punishment for
  violation of N as warranted, directed at self and
  at others

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Some questions

• Do we find societies where no norms show these
  marks?
• This is hard to imagine. Consider
• Norms of authority regarding what to believe
• Norms of fairness in exchange
• Norms concerning gender or family roles
• Norms concerning in-group and out-group
• Norms of social hierarchy

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Our morality

• Consider morality in the sense most familiar to
  us not a descriptive or anthropological notion,
  but the idea of what system of norms really is
  authoritative for us. What we endorse.
• This seems to embody at least the following
  elements of a moral point of view
• Rational
• Impartial
• Universal
• Benevolent
• Binding
• This sort of scope is unprecedented in the
  environment of early human adaptation.
• We would need to leverage and redeploy our
  inherited moral psychology.

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Antecedents

• On the other hand, we have ample testimony to
  this sort of normative ambition in the
  monotheistic religions that prevail in much of
  the world. Clearly there is a normative
  aspiration to universality that finds a strong
  root in human nature.
• Humean ingredients
• Self-interest
• Limited generosity
• Empathy
• Capacity for rule-following
• Planfulness
• Kantian ingredients
• Reciprocity
• Reflection
• Generalization

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Moral motivation

• Cobbling these together, we can motivation on
  behalf of a moral point of view
• That would be a social and cultural achievement,
  using evolved psychic capacities that may fight
  with other evolved sentiments.
• We should expect moral intuitions to fit only
  approximately.
• No different in principle from theoretical reason
  or language. Build refined tools with simple
  tools.

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Normative force and normative freedom

• To have the sort of authority we attribute to it,
  morality must be more than a set of normative
  requirements we happen to have internalized, a
  sense of devoir vouloir.
• It must also be an expression of our normative
  freedom, our evaluative aspiration to be able to
  see and understand ourselves and one another in
  terms free of all coercion, parochialism, and
  mystification.
• This is the vouloir devoir of our
  self-representation as moral beings. It could be
  hubris.

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Vindicating vs. debunking

• Can we see ourselves without illusion and still
  have this sense of ourselves as moral beings?
• The reflection test
• Debunking stories Nietzsche, Freud?
• Vindicating stories Hume, Darwin?