GOVERNING POLARIZED CITIES

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GOVERNING POLARIZED CITIES A
comparative overview of different approaches to
dealing with antagonistic group identity claims
on the city.
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Sustainable Brussels (Belgium) Montreal
(Canada) Johannesburg (South Africa)
Fragile Belfast (Northern
Ireland) Beirut (Lebanon) Sarajevo
(Bosnia-Herzegovina) Mostar (Bosnia-Herzegovina
) Nicosia (Cyprus) Combustible Jerusalem
(Israel/Palestine) Baghdad (Iraq) Kirkuk
(Iraq) Mitrovica (Kosovo)
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Johannesburg (South Africa)
Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina) Mostar
(Bosnia-Herzegovina) Baghdad (Iraq)
Kirkuk (Iraq) Mitrovica (Kosovo) Major
political transitions.
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POLARIZED CITIES Intense inter-communal
conflict and violence reflecting ethnic or
nationalist fractures. Ethnic identity and
nationalism combine to create pressures for group
rights, autonomy, or even territorial separation.

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• 3 main options that acknowledge group identity in
  the urban arena
• Political (or physical) separation
• Two-tier federated governance
• Consociational local government
• Although they are not mutually exclusive, these
  three options run the gamut from least to most
  inter-ethnic cooperation.

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BRUSSELS (BELGIUM) Complex institutional
accommodation Linguistic and nationalistic Dutch
speaking Flanders to north Francophone Wallonia
to south. Brussels in the contested
middle. Creation of an officially bilingual
Brussels Capital Region (BCR) Directly elected
regional parliament for Brussels region chosen
from candidates put forth by each of two main
linguistic communities and Parliament decisions
require a majority in each language group.
Regions and Communities Communities
are non-territorial and exercise their
legislative authority over cultural,
educational, and health matters within
linguistically determined geographical
boundaries.
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In Brussels, bi-communitarian public
authority, the Common Community
Commission, responsible for implementing
cultural policies of common interest Two
linguistic community-specific public
authoritiesthe Flemish Community Commission
and the French Community Commission--implement
policies of the respective Communities in the
Brussels Capital Region Language borders,
oil stain, and iron collar
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MONTREAL (CANADA) Boundary drawing,
multi-tier government Linguistic (Francophone
vs. Anglophone) and Nationalistic largely
Francophone central city of Montreal contrasts
with more bilingual and English-speaking
communities elsewhere on Montreal
Island Multi-level reform of Montreal
government both consolidation and
decentralization Since 1996, reorganized
metropolitan-level government amalgamated local
governments in the urban core decentralized some
political power to boroughs.
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Creation of 27 boroughs (arrondissements).
Boroughs are viewed as a key ingredient of the
urban reforms because they preserve a place for
the expression of local distinctions and thus
made the larger municipal and metropolitan
restructuring more politically palatable. Dec
entralization at the local level as set up for
secession? Demergering Tensions inherent in
amalgamating (and in decentralizing) power in a
binational urban area marked by linguistic and
cultural contestation.
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JOHANNESBURG (SOUTH AFRICA) Transitional
power sharing, boundary drawing, metropolitan
restructuring Legally enforced segregation
white, black, and colored residential areas of
Johannesburg and townships. Consociational
negotiations and power sharing used as effective
transitional devices on the way to eventual
majoritarian democracy Transition-period
Johannesburg (1991-1995 pre-democratic
elections) process negotiated by officials of
the old regime, black political leaders, and
non- governmental organizations. Use of
boundary drawing and metropolitan government as
social justice mechanisms
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Metropolitan scale as a focal point for
local government transition negotiations, and use
of metropolitanism as a means to integrate and
transcend old local authority boundaries that
had separated races. 1995 democratic election--
ensure white minority representation during the
transition period ease the eventual change to
majoritarian democracy.
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BELFAST (NORTHERN IRELAND) Third party
intervention, impotent local government National
istic and religious divide Protestants
(Unionists / Loyalists) Catholics
(Nationalists / Republicans) "Direct rule"
midst sectarian conflict from 1972 to 1998--
legislative power for Northern Ireland was held
by the British House of Commons Obstacles by
impotent local city councilors, whose relative
lack of power freed them to be extreme in their
interactions with government 1998 Belfast
Agreement transfers day-to-day rule to a new
directly-elected Northern Ireland Assembly, in
which Protestants and Catholics have
shared power decisions require concurrent
majorities within both unionist and nationalist
camps. The Belfast Agreement called for
comprehensive review of local governments in
Northern Ireland. A Review of Public
Administration, initiated in 2002, called for
the existing 26 local councils in Northern
Ireland to be reduced to seven. Local
power-sharing?
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BEIRUT (LEBANON) Urban and national power
sharing rigidified 18 confessions officially
recognized, with Maronites, Orthodox Christians,
Druze, Shiite and Sunni Muslims being main
antagonists/ competitors. Power sharing
necessary and successful in early years of
country, but now more a roadblock to needed
political evolution and maturation in the country
and city. Political confessionalism
allocates political power among the various
confessional and sectarian communities according
to each communities percentage of the overall
population. The Lebanese National Accord
signed soon after independence in 1943 used the
national census of 1932 to assign political
positions and shares of parliamentary seats to
each religious group.
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Prior to 1990, the ratio of Parliament
representation stood at 65 in favor of
Christians. In 1990, at the end of the
1975-1990 civil war, this ratio was adjusted to
50/50. Estimates today about 60 percent
Muslim. City of Beirut Confessionalism most
clearly runs up against demographic realities.
Newly emergent urban Shiite Muslims have been
met with systematic political and economic
exclusion. Instead of urban social and
economic dynamics spawning new more
urban secular and cross-confessional
communities, new urban politics was thwarted and
rigidified into a static consociational
edifice Urban coexistence has emerged as the
weakest link within the Lebanese model (Salamey)
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SARAJEVO (BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA) Multicultural
city unraveled Pre-war mixed ethnic
population in 1991 of 540,000 Bosnian Muslims
(40), Bosnian Serbs (30), and
Bosnian Croats (20)   Early post-war
years became an approximately 80 Muslim city of
about 340,000 population. Sarajevo
demonstrates the difficulty of sustaining the
multiculturalism of a city after it has
experienced the trauma of massive war aimed at
its death. Local power sharing efforts
sought electoral representation of displaced
residents and provided minimum representation to
minority groups. Protocol on the Organization of
Sarajevo (1996) specified that at least 20
percent of city council seats go to Bosniaks,
Croats, and to other. Minimum representation
quotas.
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An initial strategy during early diplomatic
efforts to counter possible ethnic claims on the
city was to create a special status as a district
under United Nations or European
Community administration a corpus separatum
strategy. By the time of the 1995 Dayton Accord
that ended the war, the idea for
international governance or oversight of the
city had been overtaken by the give-and-take nego
tiations of ethnic leaders. Peace- making
paradoxically started processes that unraveled
Sarajevo as a multicultural space amidst a
fracturing state. Strategy to reunify
post-war Sarajevo transferred certain
Serbian-populated districts and suburbs into
post-war Sarajevo city boundaries in effort to
maintain the Bosnian Serb population within the
post-war city. Yet, to be reunified within the
city, Serbs would also under Dayton be
simultaneously incorporated into the
Muslim-Croat Federation. Resistance and
substantial out-movement of Bosnian Serb
population.
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MOSTAR (BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA) Fragmented
city War within a war between Bosniaks and
Croats. Post-war city contested and
divided. Direct international administration
of the city Representation of displaced
residents in municipal governments Creation of
a central zone to act as neutral buffer in
post-war development. Six municipal
districts, or city municipalitiesthree in
Croat-controlled areas and three in
Muslim-controlled areas . Early elections--the
intent of the IC was that the holding of
municipal elections would be a concrete and
positive first step toward the citys
democratization and normalization. In effect,
however, democracys early emergence in the city
locked in obstructive ethnic elements that
would then act to retard the citys
normalization.
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Central zone Approximately 1 mile long and
one-half mile wide, a central zone in the
traditional commercial and tourist center of the
city was to be administered by an ethnically
balanced city council and administration. The
same forces that captured the six municipalities
for ethnic gain also were able to warp and
dismantle the integrative goals of the central
zone. Unification decree, 2004 UN High
Representative imposed through a unilateral
decree the political unification of the city of
Mostar. Mostar to have a single city
administration for the entire pre-war area of
the city. Limits the ability of the
demographic majority to rule and imposes power
sharing governance model.
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NICOSIA (CYPRUS) Physical partition Inverse
of power sharing.   Since 1974 a "green line"
(wall) has physically separated the city into
Greek Cypriot (south) and Turkish Cypriot (north)
municipalities. Extreme physical partition has
created separate and self-contained
municipalities on either side of the barrier.
This has resulted in each of the two urban
regimes having a solid territorial base that
has, ironically, set the foundation for some
bridge-building in terms of functional planning.
Such cooperation dependent upon local
leadership. Recent promising signs
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JERUSALEM (ISRAEL/PALESTINE) Hegemonic
control Israel exercises de facto
hegemonic control over Jerusalem.
Visible and stark inequalities in public services
and living conditions. Recent political changes
Between 1920 and 1948 a multicultural mosaic
under British control. Two-sided physical
partitioning between 1948 and 1967 into Israeli
and Jordanian- controlled components. Since
1967, it has been an Israeli-controlled
municipality three times the area of the pre-1967
city (due to unilateral annexation) and
encompassing formerly Arab East Jerusalem. The
international status of East Jerusalem today
remains as occupied territory.
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Corpus separatum proposal When the British
Mandate period (1917-1948) came to a close, there
was a United Nations resolution that the city of
Jerusalem be a demilitarized and neutral
corpus separatum (separate entity) governed by a
special international regime and administered by
the U.N. The resolution was approved by the
national leadership of the Jewish community
in Palestine, and rejected by the Arab Higher
Committee. Intense warfare turned Jerusalem
instead into a physically divided city for
almost twenty years, with Israeli west and Arab
east parts separated by concrete barriers and
no-man lands. Borough Plan proposal In the
early years of contested Jerusalem under Israeli
control, a plan was debated from 1968 to 1977
envisioning a single municipal government under
dual sovereignty and the creation of
semi-autonomous borough governments to manage
local affairs in different ethnic neighborhoods.
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Camp David Summit 2000 Key elements of a
Jerusalem proposal provided Palestinian
sovereignty over specified outer neighborhoods
and over the Muslim and Christian quarters of
the Old City, Meaningful Palestinian
self-government in inner neighborhoods (although
under Israeli sovereignty). Metropolitan
Jerusalem? A metropolitan expansion of
Jerusalem's borders would encompass within the
new larger city approximately equal Arab and
Jewish populations. There could then be two
ethnically-based municipalities under a joint
umbrella metropolitan council -- a metropolitan
federalism of two sovereignties. Sovereignty
issues within todays Jerusalem would remain,
however.
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BAGHDAD (IRAQ) Capital city of a federalist
Iraq? (1) How to locally
govern a city that has been segregated, cleansed,
and sorted during war?   (2) How to
govern the city in a way that might hold together
a country that likely faces some federalist
devolution of national power to ethnic autonomous
zones? Can Baghdad constitute a multiethnic
capital district or zone that holds together a
fragmented or federalized state? The
stability of Baghdad has consistently been a key
plank of American military and political
planners. Protection of the Iraqi population in
Baghdad is primary because it would allow
breathing space to Iraqi leaders to achieve
needed political reconciliation. Localized
security through agreements at the local level,
including with militias and former insurgents,
would be a necessary complement and encouragement
to national compromises.
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U.S. is attempting to establish a three-tier
system utilizing neighborhood, district, and
city council representation. Federalism and
the city The 2005 Constitution allows
semi-autonomous regions to be created
through referenda out of one or more existing
provincial governorates. One scenario is that
there would be reconstitution of the countrys 18
provinces as three self-governing entities and
reconstruction of Iraq as a loose confederation
of these governments. Key centerpiece of any
sustainable federalist arrangement for Iraq would
be creation and protection of Baghdad city as a
multi-ethnic capital district. Within this
special district, power-sharing of local
governance and protections afforded minority
residents would be needed to avoid dismemberment
of Baghdad into sectarian districts of autonomy.
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KIRKUK (IRAQ) Northern flashpoint Flashpoin
t of ethnic and sectarian conflict and a key
element of national negotiations over the future
status of the country.   Will contested lands of
Kirkuk join region of Kurdistan or remain with
the rest of Iraq? Oil-rich region of ethnic
contestation City of Kirkuk makes up about 90
percent of provincial population. Saddam Hussein
displaced thousands of Kurds from Kirkuk and
adjacent provinces as part of his Arabization
plan. Hussein also gerrymandered borders by
detaching four Kurd-majority districts from
Kirkuk province. Today, there are three
provinces currently fully under authority of the
Kurdistan Regional Government however, the
regional government claims in whole or in part
four other provinces, including
Kirkuk. Provincial elections in 2005 produced a
Kurdish majority in Kirkuk province (26 of 41
seats).
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Normalization Plan The intent of national
legislation is that there is to be
normalization process to include the
re-integration of the four detached districts,
followed by a referendum (by November 2007) to
decide whether the province would become part of
the Kurdistan regional government. Efforts
have been underway by all sides to create
demographic "facts on the ground" in advance of
the referendum. Kurdish negotiators have
proposed a binding political pact between the
leadership of the Shia, Sunni and Kurdish blocs
to return the administrative boundaries of
Kirkuk to the 1970 map. In July 2008, an
Arab-sponsored plan was put forth to delay
elections in Kirkuk province and city and impose
a quota-based power sharing arrangement. This
proposal further inflamed the situation and put
in jeopardy provincial elections in all of Iraq.
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MITROVICA (KOSOVO/SERBIA) U.N. supervised
reintegration or separation? Divided
Serb-Albanian city of Mitrovica presents a
critical challenge to the
sustainability of the disputed newly independent
country of Kosovo.   City split
between a northern Serbian part and a southern
Albanian part.   The population of the
city in 1998 was approximately 82 percent
Albanian and 9 percent Serb. Local
self government United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(Unmik) sought to promote self-government in
Kosovo as a preliminary run-up to possible full
independence. At the same time, Kosovos Serbs
with backing from Belgrade suggested that
self- government be based on a functional
partition of the region so that minority Serbs
could be assured of some protections and
rights. Illegal parallel administration set up
in the northern part of the city and supported by
Serbia Belgrade was able to stake out a de
facto division of Kosovo.
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Mitrovica-- two strategies by international
community (1) Serbs in Mitrovica were offered
substantial decentralization of existing
municipal powers, plus various economic
development incentives, if they participated in
local elections. (2) When this failed, Unmik
established in late 2002, with Belgrades
cooperation, a special UN-administered area in
the north, created a council of local Serbian,
Albanian, and Bosniak leaders and brought local
Serb police officers into the fold. Is this
reunification program by Unmik legalizing a
previously defacto division? Do they run counter
to international goals of having Kosovo as a
unified, multi-ethnic province? Tensions rose
considerably after the Kosovo Assembly declared
independence in early 2008. Soon after, UN
forces were withdrawn from the northern Mitrovica.
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CONCLUSIONS
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• 1
• Institutional Diversity
• Political (or physical) separation
• Nicosia
• Mostar
• Sarajevo ( City majoritarian democracy
  Bosnia political separation )
• Two-tier federated governance
• Johannesburg
• Brussels
• Montreal
• Consociational local government

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2 Institutional Adaptation Even in the
sustainable casesBrussels, Montreal, and,
sustainability does not necessarily connote
stability of institutions and arrangements. Many
of the fragile cases will likely need to undergo
significant restructuring and experimentation
regarding local governance structures. The
Beirut case dramatically highlights the need for
power sharing arrangements to appropriately
adapt and evolve in response to changing
circumstances. Experimentation possible with
local and metropolitan government power sharing.
Possibly more than at national level. Local
governance more a power-dividing approach that
begins at the bottom and creates diverse,
numerous, and non-overlapping political bodies
able to foster multiple and cross-cutting
constituencies.
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3 Cities as key anchors or flashpoints in
national reconciliation All the combustible and
many of the fragile cities can be major
roadblocks and obstacles to larger national peace
agreements and constitutional arrangements.
If cities are left unprotected and unmanaged,
ethnic antagonists who recognize the power of
the city will likely submerge and fragment the
peace-constitutive potential of the city in
pursuit of their own group aspirations. Mostar,
Jerusalem, Baghdad?, Mitrovica? Shared urban
policies and institutions can set important
precedents that positively shape long-term urban
and political development. Brussels, Montreal,
Johannesburg
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4 City governance during national political
transitions International agreements that stop
war must be cognizant of the new ethnic
geographies of local and substate governments
Rush toward democratization at local level will
probably not bring to power leadership needed to
move a city toward stability and mutual
co-existence. Two-tier governance utilizing
metropolitan and local levels can be particularly
useful during political transitions.
Metropolitanism can be an effective mechanism not
only during times of major political transitions,
but also in more stable arrangements.
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5 Paradox of local government reform amid
inter-group tensions Fragile local governance
arrangements must be able in the short term to
produce tangible positive outcomes (jobs,
services, safety) for there to be public
acceptance of shared local governance. Only
with such public acceptance can we be assured
that these precarious city institutions survive
and become key agents of inter-group coexistence
and local anchors to national stability over the
longer term future. However, in the short term,
constraints on local democracy in terms of
minority guarantees and shared power may make
local government less effective in producing
tangible changes in the city. Democracy at
the possible expense of effectiveness /
impact.