Europe and North Africa:

1

• Europe and North Africa
• Migration as a common challenge
• Ferruccio Pastore
• (Deputy Director, Centre for International Policy
  Studies-CeSPI, Rome)
• International workshop in the framework of the
  project Managing migration in the neighbourhood
  of the EU and the US. Towards a Transatlantic
  forum for comparative research and policy
  dialogue
• (Academy of Graduate Studies, Tripoli, 18-19 June
  2008)

2
Structure of the presentation

• Europe in the global migration geography
• European migration policies convergences and
  divergences
• Overall trends opening to the East, closing to
  the South?
• Cross-Mediterranean migration mutual perceptions
  (and misperceptions)
• Cross-Mediterranean migration dominant policy
  responses
• Externalisation and transit migration
• Future outlooks and open questions

3
The global context (migrant stocks, millions)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
World 75.9 81.5 99.8 154.0 174.9 190.6
Africa 9.0 9.9 14.0 16.2 16.3 17.1
Asia 29.3 28.1 32.3 50.0 49.9 53.3
Europe 17.0 21.8 25.4 48.4 56.1 64.1
Lat. Am. Carib. 6.0 5.7 6.1 7.0 5.9 6.6
North Am. 12.5 13.0 18.1 27.6 40.8 44.5
Source UNDESA, Population Division.
4
The relative weight of Europe and Northern
America in the global migration landscape
(stocks 000s).
2000 2005
Global migrant stock 174,781 190,634
Of which Europe (in absolute values and as of global stock) 56,100 32.1 64,116 33.6
Of which EU (in absolute values and as of global stock) 26,429 (EU-15) 15.1 39,788 (EU-25) 20.9
Migrants stock in Northern America (in absolute values and as of global stock) 40,844 23.4 44,493 23.3
Of which in the USA (in absolute values and as of global stock) 34,988 20.0 38,355 20.1
5
The relative weight of Europe and Northern
America in the global migration landscape (in
terms of net migration absolute values are
expressed in thousands).
1995-2000 2000-2005
European net migration (average annual) 769 1,083
EUs net migration 621 (EU-15) 1,178 (EU-25)
Northern America net migration 1,394 1,370
Of which USA net migration 1,250 1,160
Source CeSPI, based on UN Population
Division, International Migration, 2002 and 2006.
6
The largest EU immigration countries (net
migration, 000s)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Spain 378.5 Spain 427.8 Spain 649.9 Spain 738.5 Spain 610.1 Spain 652.3 Spain 636.0
UK 168.5 Germany 274.8 Italy 349.3 Italy 600.6 Italy 558.2 Italy 338.1 France 160.5
Germany 167.8 UK 184.3 Ger. 218.8 UK 260.5 UK 203.6 UK 196.3 UK 159.5
Netherlands 57.0 Portugal 64.9 UK 126.4 Ger. 142.2 France 105.0 France 102.9 Italy 157.0
Italy 55.2 France 60.4 Port. 70.1 Port. 63.5 Ger. 81.8 Germany 98.5 Ireland 80.0
Source CeSPI based on Eurostat.
7
Five main EU countries of immigration among OECD
countries (inflows, 000s, 2002-4) (source OECD)
2002 2003 2004
Germany 658.3 Germany 601.8 Spain 645.8
Spain 443.1 Spain 429.5 Germany 602.2
UK 418.2 UK 406.8 UK 494.1
Italy 388.1 France 135.1 Italy 319.3
France 124.8 Austria 97.2 France 140.1
Non harmonised statistics. Data for Italy
not available.
8
Five main EU countries of immigration among OECD
countries (inflows, 000s, 2003-4) (source OECD)
2003 2004
Germany 238.4 UK 266.5
UK 214.6 Germany 202.3
France 173.6 France 175.2
Italy 121.8 Italy 156.4
Netherlands 60.8 Austria 59.6
Harmonised statistics (long-term only Spain
not included). 2002 regularisation not
included.
9
Deep differences in national economic migration
policies among EU member states

• Heterogeneity of national approaches (out of
  historical, economic, cultural and demographic
  reasons)
• We can group national approaches in a few
  families or blocs
• a) Conservative continental bloc (France,
  Germany, Benelux, Scandinavians) closure to
  low-skilled immigration narrow and selective
  opening to high-skilled flows
• b) Liberal bloc (UK, Ireland) innovative and
  technocratic admission policy competitiveness as
  priority opening to free mobility of EU8 in 2004
  as key component
• c) Mediterranean bloc (Greece, Italy, Portugal,
  Spain) common challenges (acute ageing, wide
  underground economy, weak administrations) and
  similar strategie frequent regularisations
  attempts to manage low-skilled inflows (quota
  systems/agreements with sending countries)
• d) Eastern European bloc heterogeneous still
  struggling with institution building and
  migration transition.

10
Families of EU countries according
to fundamental characters of admission system
Conservative bloc
Liberal bloc
Eastern bloc
Mediterranean bloc
11
In the long term persisting differences, but
also convergence ( over-65 and over-80 on total
pop. today and in 2050)
North Europe 15,9 4,4 24,2 9,1
Western Europe 17,8 4,7 27,7 11,5
Eastern Europe 14,1 2,7 26,6 6,9
South Europe 17,8 4,5 31,4 11,6
12
MEASURING POLICY DIFFERENCES (AND POLICY
OUTCOMES) (total regularised foreigners
collective schemes, not including individual
reg. 000s, 1973-2008)
Italy 1,431
Greece 1,166
Spain 1,130
France 302
Portugal 249
Belgium 65
13
TRENDS IS THE EU OPENING TO THE EAST WHILE
CLOSING TO THE SOUTH? African-born among
total foreign-born pop. in selected EU countries
(Source OECD)
Belgium France Germany NL PRT Spain UK
North-Africa born 12.7 39.1 0.5 10.1 0.2 15.8 0.5
Sub-Sahara-born 9.8 9.6 1.2 7.2 53.5 3.6 16.7
14
African nationalities among top 10 nationalities
in terms of yearly inflows (main EU receiving
countries, 2005, French data NA) - Source OECD
2007
Receiving country African nationalities among top 10 flows Ranking Trend compared to average 1990-2004
BELGIUM Morocco 3rd community ?
ITALY (2004) Morocco 3rd ?
ITALY (2004) Tunisia 10th ?
NETHERLANDS Morocco 7th ?
PORTUGAL Capo Verde 2nd ?
PORTUGAL Angola 5th ?
PORTUGAL Guinea-Bissau 6th ?
PORTUGAL Sao Tomé and Principe 9th ?
SPAIN Morocco 2nd ?
SWEDEN Somalia 9th ?
UK (2001) South Africa 6th ?
15
RELATIVE CLOSURE OF LEGAL IMMIGRATION CHANNELS TO
AFRICANS of Africans in stocks of legal
immigrants(Italy and Spain, selected years)
1991 1996 2000 2003 2006
Spain n.a. 18.3 29.2 26.3 23.5
Italy 35.0 28.7 27.7 24.0 23.4
Sources Min. of Interior for Italy, Extranjería
for Spain.
16
AFRICANS ARE LITTLE REPRESENTED ALSO IN
AMNESTIES North-African nationals in subsequent
Italian regularisation schemes
1986 1990 1995 1998 2002
Morocco 26.3 22.4 14 11 7.4
Tunisia 8.4 12.1 4.2 2.6 /
Egypt 3.8 3.5 3.3 4.4 2.4
Algeria / / 3.1 1.5 /
Source G. Sciortino based on Italian Min. of
Interior.
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ASYMMETRIC LIMITS TO AFRICAN MOBILITY?Italian
visas for Africans (000s, 1999-2006)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
N. Afr. Middle East 110,9 132,6 128,9 106,9 114,6 123,9 128,4 140,2
Sub-Saharan Africa 43,0 58,3 51,1 47,4 50,0 58,7 63,3 63,3
World Total 834,7 1.009,0 947,1 853,5 874,9 983,5 1.076,7 1.198,2
Source Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
18
INCREASED AFRICAN SHARE IN CLANDESTINE FLOWS of
Africans among irregular migrants apprehended
upon (or before) landing (Italy and Spain-Canary
Islands, different years)
Italy
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
N. Africa 11.9 17.2 11.7 n.a. 69.6 70.52
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.8 25.0 41.4 n.a. 24.6 24.8
Spain
1994-8 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Morocco 100 88.2 36.2 32.5 39.8 32.6 9.1
Rest of Africa 0 11.8 63.2 66.2 58.1 62.9 86.8
Sources Plan Canario para la Inmigración
2004-2006 for Spain Min. of Interior for Italy
19
Irregular migration by sea relatively small but
dominates perceptions (apprehensions, 000s de
Haas)
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
Spain mainland 7.0 7.2 12.8 14.4 6.8 9.8 7.2 7.0 6.4
Spain Canary 0 0.9 2.4 4.1 9.9 9.4 8.4 4.7 31.0
Italy Sicily 8.8 2.0 2.8 5.5 18.2 14.0 13.6 22.8 21.4
Italy Calabria 0.9 1.5 5.0 6.1 2.1 0.2 0.02 0.08 0.3
Malta 0.2 0.2 0.02 0.05 1.7 0.5 1.4 1.8 NA
TOT 16.9 11.8 23.0 30.2 38.7 33.9 30.7 36.5 59.2
20
Intra-African mobility much more important than
outbound mobility Source Hein de
Haas, International Migration Institute (IMI),
Oxford. Arrows do not indicate migration routes
but depict major country- to-country migration
flows. Due to lack of reliable data,
the dimension of arrows reflects estimates, not
exact size of flows

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BUT the dominant perception
22
Perceptions, on the other side
23
Clandestine crossings dominate the debate also
because(Victims at wider European borders,
2005-2007, Fortress Europe)
Adriatic Sea 2003 29 2004 28 No reported
victims since 2004
To Southern Spain/ Ceuta/Melilla 2005 123 2006
184 2007 (till 10/22) 37
Sicily channel 2005 437 2006 302 2007 (till
10/28) 529
Aegean Sea 2005 98 2006 73 2007 (till 10/22)
138
To the Canary Islands 2005 185 2006 1,035 2007
(till 10/25) 444
Cross-Saharan routes 1,578 deaths reported since
1996
Including missing migrants.
24
Policy responses spheres of EU institutional
openness to human mobility
EU/EEA SCH/FM
EU/EEA SCHFM
EU/EEA SCH/FM
EU/EEA SCH/FM
TC AA/NO-VISA
TC AA/VISA-FAC
TC AA/VISA
TC NO-AA/NO-VISA
TC NO-AA/VISA
EUEuropean Union EEAEuropean Economic
Area SCHSchengen zone FMFreedom of
movement TCThird country AAAssociation
agreement VISA-FACVisa facilitation
25
Policy responses the European multi-layered
migration control model

• 1. Sample controls within EU
• borders (e.g. on workplaces)
• 2. Sample controls at
• internal borders
• 3. Border controls and
• surveillance strictly defined
• 4. Patrolling at high sea
• 5. Privatisation of controls
• carriers responsibility
• 6. Visa offices in consulates
• 7. Outsourcing to third states

26
Policy responses the main financial chapters in
EU migration policy, millions , 2007-2013)
External Borders Fund 1,820
European Return Fund 676
European Refugee Fund 699.3
European Integration Fund 825
27
Do migration controls work?Evolution of
smuggling routes in the Mediterranean (as
consequence of new push factors international
cooperation and law enforcement)
1991-2001
1999-2001
Early1990s-2006
From 2006 on
Early 2000s
Late 90s
Since mid-2000s
Since late 1990s
Since 2005
28
Relative effectiveness of international law
enforcement is confirmed by figures on
apprehensions upon disembarkment rescues by
coastal regions (000s, peaks for each line in red
- Source Min. Interior)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Apulia 28.4 46.5 19.0 8.5 3.4 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.2 0.06
Sicily 8.8 1.9 2.8 5.5 18.2 140 13.6 22.8 21.4 16.6
Calabria 0.8 1.5 5.0 6.1 2.1 0.2 0.02 0.08 0.3 2.0
Sardinia / / / / / / / 0.008 0.09 1.5
TOT 38.1 50.0 26.8 20.1 23.7 14.3 13.6 22.9 22.0 20.1
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Transit routes from Sub-Saharan to North Africa
(different sources)
30
Transit routes from Sub-Saharan to North Africa
(logistics and practicalities)
31
Core and periphery in the European
migration control system STAGE I
? Until 1973-4 Only formal Controls ?1973-1985
Unilateral and competitive closure ?1985
Schengen agreement ?1990 Implementing Convention
?1995 Entry into force in the green core
?Italy, Austria, Greece as red transit belt
32
STAGE II The Southern enlargement of the core
? 1997-8 Full integration of Austria and
Italy ?2000 Greece is also admitted as part of
the core ?Eastern Europe emerges as
transit belt ?Western Balkans, Turkey and
North Africa still perceived more as sources
33
STAGE III The Northern and Eastern enlargements
? 2001 Scandinavian enlargement (limited
impact on irregular migration patterns) ?2004
EU-10 accession ?2007 EU-2 accession ?2007
Schengen Eastern enlargement (EU-10 but Cyprus)
?Western Balkans, former CIS, Turkey, N. Africa,
etc. in transit belt (transit boom) ?2005 Ceuta
and Melilla 2006 Lampedusa and Canarias focus
on Sub-Saharan A. as source
34
STAGE IV The Transit Belt expands further South
?July 2006 Rabat EU-Africa conference on
MD ?November 2006 Tripoli EU-AU Conference on
MD ?December 2007 Lisbon Africa-EU
Summit ?Migration Great Game enlarges to whole
Africa New candidates as transit countries
(i.e. privileged control partners) Senegal,
Niger ?When transit countries are failed states,
intervention not ruled out (Chad)
35
Being a transit country and performing a
control function on behalf of neighbours has
advantages and disadvantages
COSTS BENEFITS
Altering priorities Neglecting immigration or emigration might be internally destabilising Access to EU and bilateral targeted aid
Worsening of political/economic relations with poorer neighbours More bargaining power in negotiations about own emigration (e.g. quotas)
Impact on migrants rights? international reactions Overall gain in strategic relevance