Classical Indian Metaphysics

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Classical Indian Metaphysics
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Idealism

• Classical Indian metaphysics centers on the
  contrast between realism and idealism
• Buddhism and the most popular school of Hinduism,
  Advaita Vedanta, are thoroughly idealist
• They insist that everything is mind-dependent

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Idealism

• What appear to be independent objects are mental
  constructions
• Objects do not really endure over time they
  exist for no more than a moment
• What we take to be objects are really bundles of
  momentary entities that we group together for our
  own purposes

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Realism

• Hindu philosophers of the Logic and Particularist
  schools, in contrast, are realists
• They hold that objects such as rocks, stones, and
  trees are truly out there in the world
• These objects in no sense depend on our minds
• They endure over time

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Vaisesika (Particularism)

• Kanada (c. 100) I will enumerate everything
  that has the character of being.
• Fundamental question of ontology What is there?
• Everyday speech and behavior is the touchstone
• Categories (padartha, types of things to which
  words refer)

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Basic Categories

• Substance pot, cloth, fire, soul
• Quality square, blue
• Motion (action) move, eat, throw
• These correspond to items in Aristotle's
  categories, and to
• Nouns, adjectives, and verbs
• They are existent (sat)

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Additional Categories

• Universality triangularity
• Inherence the pot's being blue
• Individualizer differentiates atoms (this)
• Absence the elephant in here
• The first three are present (bhava) the last,
  absent (abhava)
• But they can all be talked about and named

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Inherence

• Quality
• Inherence
• Substance

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Individualizer

• Blacks two iron spheres
• They are qualitatively identical
• But they are different
• What distinguishes them?

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Absences
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Kanadas Beard?

• How do we know anything about
• Universals
• Inherence
• Particularizers
• Absences?

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Another Trilemma?

• We must either
• Reinterpret sentences that lead us to introduce
  these entities (the semantic strategy)
• Reinterpret the entities as concepts (the
  metaphysical strategy)
• Postulate some way of knowing these entities (the
  epistemological strategy)

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Substance

• All the other categories depend on substance
• Qualities, quantities, relations, etc., are
  always of substances
• There are many senses in which a thing may be
  said to be
• But all depend on a focal meaning of being,
  substance

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Vaisesika Kinds of Noncomposite Substance

• Earth
• Air
• Fire
• Water
• Ether
• Composite substances are the causal result of
  combinations of these

• Space
• Time
• Self
• Mind

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Two Concepts of Substances

• Realist (Aristotle/Vaisesika) Idealist (Buddhist)
• The world is divided into We divide the world
  into
• Substances bearers of Objects bundles of
• Qualities
  Qualities
• We carve the world at joints There are no
  joints

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Hinduism

• Hinduism is the primary religion of India.
• It regards the Upanishads (900-200 BCE) as sacred.

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Henotheism

• There are many gods,
• But all are forms of one being, Brahman.

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Rg Veda

• They have styled Him Indra (the Chief of the
  Gods), Mitra (the Friend), Varuna (the
  Venerable), Agni (Fire), also the celestial,
  great-winged Garutma for although one, poets
  speak of Him diversely they say Agni, Yama
  (Death), and Matarisvan (Lord of breath).
• All these gods exist, but as diverse appearances
  of one God, the divine architect, the impeller
  of all, the multiform.

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Bhagavad Gita

• Even those who are devotees of other gods,And
  worship them permeated with faith, It is only
  me, son of Kunti, that even theyWorship, (tho)
  not in the enjoined fashion. For I of all acts
  of worshipAm both the recipient and the Lord. .
  . .
• I see the gods in Thy body, O God. . . .

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Concepts of Brahman

• Nirguna brahman God without attributes neti . .
  . neti (not this)
• Saguna brahman God with attributes

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Attributes of God

• Abstract
• Sat being
• Chit awareness
• Ananda bliss
• Concrete
• Creator (Brahma)
• Preserver (Vishnu)
• Destroyer (Shiva)

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Six Orthodox Schools (darshanas)

• Vedanta (end of Veda, or sacred knowledge)
• Samkhya (nature)
• Yoga (discipline)
• Purva Mimamsa (exegesis, interpretation)
• Vaisesika (realism)
• Nyaya (logic)

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Vedanta

• Brahman the Absolute, ground of all being,
  reality as it is in itself
• Atman the soul

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Advaita

• Nondualism soul (atman) Brahman
• Monism Everything is ultimately one
• Everything is Brahman
• Brahman is the child and the elephant, you and me
• We are one with everything
• Everything is holy

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Advaita

• Idealism The world as it appears is not real
• Distinctions are illusory
• The world is maya (play, illusion)

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Theism

• Dualism soul (atman) ? Brahman
• Not everything is identical with everything else
• Realism Some aspects of the world are
  independent of us
• At least some distinctions are real

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Buddhaghosa (-400)

• There are 89 kinds of consciousness
• Nothing unifies them
• There are only streams of consciousness
• Nothing unites past, present, and future

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Buddhaghosa

• A living being lasts only as long as one thought
• People, minds, objects are only ways of speaking

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People and Passengers

• Jane flies from Austin to Houston and back
  ltgt
• She is one person
• She is two passengers
• Passenger is just a way of counting
• Buddhaghosa every noun is like passenger

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Questions to King Milinda

• there is no ego here to be found
• there is no chariot here to be found
• No one element is the whole
• The combination isnt the whole parts could
  change while object remains the same

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Consciousness-Only

• Vasubandhus idealism gt Dharmapala gt Xuanzong
  (596-664)
• Idealism Everything depends on mind
• No-self There is no mind

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The Atomic Theory of Matter

• The atomic theory poses a challenge to this
  conception of substances
• Atomic theory things are composed of atoms
  properties of things depend on nature and motion
  of atoms

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Dignaga (c. 450), Buddhist

• Though atoms serve as causes of the
  consciousness of the sense-organs, they are not
  its actual objects like the sense organs because
  the consciousness does not represent the image of
  the atoms. The consciousness does not arise from
  what is represented in it. Because they do not
  exist in substance just like the double moon.
  Thus both the external things are unfit to be the
  real objects of consciousness.

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Platos Philosophy of Mind
The Good

Participation
This is a triangle
Form
Recollection
Perception
Object
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Nyaya-Vaisesika Philosophy of Mind

Instantiation
Quality
This is a triangle
Inherence
Universal
Perception
Object
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Making Universals Mind-Dependent

Application
Quality
This is a triangle
Inherence
Concept
Perception
Object
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Buddhist Philosophy of Mind

Application
This is a triangle
Concept
Dharma
Perception
Internal Object
Actual Object
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Nyaya-Vaisesika Conception

• There are continuing substances
• Qualities inhere in substances
• Our talk of substances is a good guide to
  metaphysics
• Substances are the basic constituents of the
  world
• They have essences properties necessary to them
• Their essences give them identity through change

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The Buddhist Conception

• There are no continuing substances
• Everything is momentary
• Substances are just bundles of qualities
  (dharmas)
• Our talk of substances is a convenient fiction
• Substances are conceptual constructions
• Nothing gives them unity
• They have essences only as constructed

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Yogi Berra

• Heres your pizza, Mr. Berra. Would you like me
  to cut it into four pieces or eight?
• Yogi Better make it four. I dont think I can
  eat eight.

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Actual and Internal Objects

• Aristotle objects cause perceptions, and are
  represented in them
• Causes of perception objects of perception
• Dignaga No
• causes are the atoms actual objects alambana
• objects are appearances internal objects artha

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Causes and Effects

• Causes of perception are the atoms
• We dont see atoms, but their effects
• What we see doesnt exist in reality it is like
  the double moon
• How could we distinguish aspects of the effects
  (appearances) that do match the causes?

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Buddhist Arguments

• Yogacara (Buddhist idealism) Vasubandhu, Asanga,
  Samghabhadra (4th century)

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Argument from Change

• Distinctness of discernibles The same thing
  cant have contrary properties
• Any difference in properties implies numerical
  difference
• Change implies a difference in properties
• So, change implies numerical distinctness
• Change occurs at every moment
• So, things persist only for a moment

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Nyaya-Vaisesika Response

• Substances can endure through change
• Substances can have contrary properties
• Change does not occur at every moment
• These relations are different
• Substance/properties
• Whole/parts
• Properties/parts
• Things have essences

• Qualities
• Substance
• Atoms

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Argument from Destruction

• Everything is destroyed by its own nature, with
  no external cause
• Everything destroyed by its own nature is
  destroyed immediately
• So, everything is destroyed immediately
• So, nothing persists for more than a moment

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Against External Destruction 1

• A cause cant have contradictory effects
• External causes of destruction would also be
  causes of production (e.g., fire causing ash)
• Destruction and production are contradictory
• So, there are no external causes of destruction

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Against External Destruction 2

• Nonexistence cant have a cause
• Destruction is nonexistence
• So, destruction cant have a cause
• Nyaya-Vaisesika response absences can be causes
  and effects

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Immediate Destruction

• Say an object is destroyed, not at t, but at a
  later t
• Some contributing factor must have absent at t
  but present at t
• But no external factor can contribute to the
  things destruction
• So, the factor must be part of the things nature
• But the thing has the same nature at t and t
  contradiction

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Argument from Causality

• Everything that exists is causally efficient
• Everything causally efficient is momentary
• So, everything that exists is momentary

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Capacities

• There are no unrealized capacities
• So, anything that can cause something causes it
  immediately
• So, things have different capacities at different
  times
• Difference in capacities implies numerical
  distinctness
• So, nothing persists for more than a moment

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Argument from Momentariness

• Mental states are momentary
• Anything that depends on something momentary is
  momentary
• The body depends on mental states
• So, the body is momentary

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Argument from Momentariness

• Mental states are momentary
• Anything that causes something momentary is
  momentary
• Physical objects cause mental states
• So, physical objects are momentary

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Argument from consciousness

• Dignaga We know world only through sense organs
• So, we know objects only insofar as they become
  internal objects
• They are objects of consciousness, constituted by
  consciousness
• We know objects only as conditioned by
  consciousness

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Jainist Perspectivism

• Jainism, a religion and philosophy tracing from
  Mahavira (599-527 BCE), is best known for its
  emphasis on nonviolence
• Jainism also advances a version of perspectivism

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Jain Ethics

• Jains base their ethical views on five great
  vows
• 1. noninjury
• 2. truthfulness
• 3. respect for property
• 4. chastity
• 5. nonattachment

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Jain Metaphysics

• They believe that these vows can be fulfilled
  only from a certain metaphysical standpoint
• A conviction that one has the absolute truth, for
  example, is likely to lead one to be willing
• to injure others for its sake, and
• to become attached to it

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Nonabsolutism

• Nonabsolutism (anekantavada, non-one-sidedness)
  no statement captures the truth absolutely
• Everything we say is true, at best, in some
  respect
• Nothing is true simpliciter

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Nonabsolutism

• The same is true of falsehood
• Every statement approaches its topic from one
  point of view
• To understand any topic, however, we must see it
  from many points of view

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Respect

• We should respect people no matter what they
  believe or say, therefore, because every
  statement contains some element of truth
• Everything is true in some respect, or from some
  point of view

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Multifaceted Reality

• Reality is many-sided
• Indeed, it has infinitely many facets, some of
  which are opposites
• Whatever we say is true syat, maybe, perhaps, in
  some respect
• It is also false in some respect
• We never capture the whole truth

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Language

• Accompanying nonabsolutism is a view of language
• Maybeism, or relativism (syadvada) language can
  express the truth only from some point of view

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Law of Sevenfold Predication

• Vadi Devasuri (twelfth century) develops this
  into a theory of language based on the Law of
  Sevenfold Predication
• 1. It is
• 2. It is not
• 3. It is and is not
• 4. It is indeterminate
• 5. It is and is indeterminate
• 6. It is not and is indeterminate
• 7. It is and is not and is indeterminate

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Pluralism

• Nonabsolutism implies a positive pluralism of
  perspectives
• Reality is so rich that it makes true, with
  qualifications, every intellectual stance
• Reality is so incredibly rich that it can
  underlie and give rise to opposed pictures

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Skepticism

• Nonabsolutism ? skepticism
• It promises reconciliation of apparently opposed
  points of view
• It targets only the absolutism that partisans
  propose for their preferred positions, blind to
  the truth in their opponents theories

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Intellectual Nonviolence

• The point is not to deny but to affirm seemingly
  incompatible perspectives
• The special sevenfold logic, the maybeism, was
  developed to facilitate the disarming of
  controversy
• Here are the tools of intellectual nonviolence
  (ahimsa)

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Self-Defeating?

• Is the Jain position self-defeating?
• Jainists say no. It is not meant to be an
  absolute claim
• That would be like practicing ahimsa toward
  everyone except oneself
• Nonharmfulness requires humility
• So, the Jainist offers it merely as one
  perspective alongside others