Finding a New Way Forward in Afghanistan

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Finding a New Way Forward in Afghanistan A
Presentation for Selected Members of the House of
Representatives
A presentation by Douglas Macgregor, PhD Colonel
(ret) US Army Lead Partner Potomac League LLC
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Bottom line up front Understand what it is you
are trying to accomplish with military
power! Whats the purpose, appropriate method and
desired, attainable end state in Afghanistan?
The first, the supreme, the most
far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman
and commander have to make is to establish by
that test the kind of war on which they are
embarking neither mistaking it for, nor trying
to turn it into, something that is alien to its
nature. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book 1,
Chap. 1, Sect 27, page 100. Karzai is very
dirty by all accounts, but I am not sure you
could replace him with someone who isnt.  Plus,
its not our place to choose an Afghan head of
state (as we did this one). The more I think
about it the more I think we need to talk
seriously about leaving. A former CIA officer
with extensive experience in the Middle East and
Afghanistan recently returned from Afghanistan. 
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What you should take away from this presentation!

• The United States cannot fix Afghanistan.
• We cannot undo nearly 40 years of continuous
  bloodshed, destruction, and occupation or
  manipulation by outside powers.
• Afghanistan is a country, not a nation.  It has
  four distinct national groups in it -- three tied
  by ethnicity and/or religion to one of the
  country's neighbors and divided from the fourth
  by the Hindu Kush the fourth being a collection
  of loosely confederated tribes.
• The best we can do is withdraw our forces with
  the publicly stated understanding that how the
  Afghans govern themselves is their business.
• However, if the Afghans harbor anyone al Qaeda
  or anyone else who threatens the United States
  and its allies, we must state clearly we will
  annihilate those who threaten us without concern
  for the welfare of those Afghans who harbor them.

Damage control, not total victory, is the
most realistic goal for U.S. national military
strategy in Afghanistan.
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What does the McChrystal Report Urge the
President to do?

• The centerpiece of General McChrystal's "new"
  counterinsurgency strategy of "clear, hold,
  build" is the accelerated training and expansion
  of the Afghan Army and Police Forces (ANSF)
  (along with a major increase in the size of our
  forces by as much as 45,000 troops) to support
  clear/hold/build.
• The strategic goal is to establish an expanding
  zone of security for the Afghan people that would
  enable a steady build up of aid and development
  efforts to improve the Afghan populaces well
  being with jobs, new infrastructure, new
  education systems, new agricultural techniques,
  etc., thereby winning the hearts and minds of the
  Afghan people.
• There is nothing new in General McChrystal's
  strategy, it is merely a rehash of the failed oil
  spot (tache d'huile) strategy, first tried by
  French colonialist General Louis-Hubert-Gonsalve
  Lyautey in Algeria then tried again under
  various guises by the US in Vietnam.

• The problem is clear/hold/build cannot be
  executed on behalf of another government
  (particularly a weak and corrupt government) by a
  foreign army (unless the foreign army plans to
  permanently and ruthlessly occupy on the old
  European or Ottoman colonial models). Americans
  dont want that!
• Buying off the Pashtun Tribes with hard cash as
  Petraeus did in Iraq wont work! Incentive
  structure does not exist.

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Whats wrong with the McChrystal Report?

• Soldiers and Marines cannot control, secure,
  stabilize, direct, democratize, or secularize
  Afghanistan or the rest of the Islamic World. The
  numbers work against us, time works against us,
  distance works against us, and above all culture
  and religion work against us. (McChrystal Report
  (authored by Fred Kagan) is totally
  unrealistic). 
• In Afghanistan the U.S. is repeating mistakes we
  made in Vietnam in 1965 we misconstrued a
  region of temporary, tactical importance as being
  of enduring strategic value. Afghanistan is not
  strategically vital to U.S. interests.
• The LBJ government had unfounded, naive, and
  unrealistic expectations of Vietnams near-term
  potential to evolve into a modern social
  democratic constitutional republic if the US put
  the "right people" in charge and provided a pile
  of cash and some "military assistance." 
• The Muslim world does not want the United States
  to be its savior or to Westernize through
  military occupation regardless of the material
  benefits American-led Westernization offers.
• For Afghanistan to become a unitary state ruled
  from Kabul, and to develop into a modern,
  prosperous, poppy-free and democratic country
  would be a worthy and desirable outcome. But it
  is not vital for American interests (Graham
  Allison and John Deutsch, The Real Afghan Issue
  Is Pakistan, Opinion, 30 March 2009)

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If the large-scale commitment of general purpose
ground forces is not the answer for Afghanistan,
what is the answer?

• Next Steps
• Economy of Force (damage control) is the
  principle that must shape future U.S. military
  engagement in Afghanistan and most of the Islamic
  World.
• Limit American involvement in Afghanistan when
  necessary to modest, low-profile SOF and covert
  operations backed by air and naval power to
  eliminate al-Qaeda elements/camps and local
  elements that support them.
• Meanwhile, work with those in the region who will
  work with us in the fight to destroy, suppress
  and neutralize Islamist terrorism.
• But scale back expectations regarding change in
  the Islamic World in general and Afghanistan in
  particular.
• Remember, a culture that supports the "Rule of
  Law," respect for private property,
  pluralism/tolerance, due process, a standard of
  integrity and competence for public officials, as
  well as the separation between the government and
  private/communal sectors in society does not
  emerge spontaneously nor does it emerge through
  foreign military occupation.
• Remember, no matter what happens in Afghanistan
  and/or Pakistan, al-Qaeda will survive and remain
  a threat, but not an existential threat. There
  are many options for them from Morocco to London,
  England!

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Final Thoughts for Consideration

• The objective in conflict or crisis is not to
  spend lots of American blood and treasure, but to
  spend as little as possible!
• The goal is to make the AQ irregular bleed for
  his tribe/ religion/country while we expend as
  little blood and treasure as possible to secure
  vital US interests. (Key point is vital!)
• Dont confuse liquidating al-Qaeda with
  liquidating the Taliban. Defeating the
  Taliban/Pashtun is on par with "eliminating
  global poverty. Its a bridge too far and it
  is unnecessary.
• The Taliban are the organic socio-religious glue
  that unites the tribes against non-Pashtun
  invaders -- whether British, Russian, or
  American. They fight us because we are there.
• The Pakistani military and security services will
  use and manipulate the Pashtun (43 million
  people), but they are not going to give them WMD.
• When conflicts or crises involve U.S. forces, the
  use of American military power should be limited
  or terminated before the cumulative human and
  political costs defeat the original purpose of
  U.S. military action destroying/disrupting AQ,
  not creating a modern nation-state in Afghanistan
  where none exists. (Selected SOF/CIA with air
  power makes sense.)
• In 1959, President of France, Charles de Gaulle
  confronted similar circumstances when he decided
  to leave Algeria. French generals insisted a
  withdrawal would deliver Algeria into the hands
  of Soviet-backed communists. It did not and de
  Gaulle replaced the generals.