Local Economic Development, dangerous climate change and resource depletion

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Local Economic Development, dangerous climate
change and resource depletion

• What are the major issues around a radical
  conception of LED as restructuring is now
  complete??
• New consensus on LED
• Knowledge economy
• Infrastructure development
• Specialisation, Insertion into global economy
• Place marketing, festivals
• Is this good enough?

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No! The new consensus ignores..

• climate change, leading to extremes of and
  greater instabilities of weather, or economic
  activities which fit current climatic conditions
  becoming no longer viable
• the end of the era of cheap and plentiful oil,
  with the knock on that will have for
  carbon-fuelled economies, cheap transport, less
  long-distance tourism, and the need to focus more
  on local production of that which can be produced
  locally. 

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Unsustainable? the irresponsible face of
capitalism?
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Aims and objectives.

• What are the major threats to prosperity and
  social justice to local economies from climate
  change and resource depletion?
• What threats/opportunities for developing local
  economies and livelihoods?
• What steps should UK local economies take?
• What contribution can local authorities, NGOs,
  citizens and academics make, which require more
  structural change?

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Future Seminars

• "Strategies for surviving dangerous climate
  change Localisation. 29th March in Sheffield
• The radical region         July 2007 in
  Manchester
• Learning from the South.   Winter 2007 in
  Newcastle
• Entrepreneurialism and business creation       
  Spring 2008 in Liverpool
• Towards post carbon local economies.
• Summer 2008 in London

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The Team

• Dr Peter North, Department of Geography,
  University of Liverpool (co-ordinator)
• Dr Paul Benneworth, Institute for Policy and
  Practice, University of Newcastle.
• Professor Irene Hardill, College of Business, Law
  and Social Sciences, Nottingham Trent University
• Dr Helen Lawton Smith, School of Management and
  Organisational Psychology, Birkbeck, London.
• Professor Simon Marvin, SURF Centre, University
  of Salford.
• Dr Alan Southern, Management School, University
  of Liverpool
• Dr Aidan While, Department of Town and Regional
  Planning, University of Sheffield
• Dr Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Department of Sociology,
  University of Liverpool
• Professor Colin C. Williams, Management School,
  University of Sheffield

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What (we think) we know about global warming
Warming is unequivocal, as observed from global
air and ocean temperature measurements,
widespread melting snow and ice, and rising sea
levels. Global temperatures have risen by
0.74oC 1900-2005. 1995-2006 saw the 12 hottest
years since records began, perhaps hottest in the
last 10 000 years (post ice age). The rise
parallels the C20th rise in atmospheric CO2
concentrations
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• CO2 at 379 ppm (2005) is higher than anytime in
  last 650 000 years. (Pre-industrial rates 180-300
  ppm).
• CO2 growth rate at 1.9 ppm per year 1995-2005
  exceeds 1960-2005 average of 1.4 ppm. Warming
  may be speeding up.
• The links between human activities, the surface
  environments and global warming are complex and
  involve feedbacks. Human activities have warming
  and cooling effects.
• There is a very high probability (gt95) that
  the causes of warming are anthropogenic.
• Warming and sea level rise will continue for
  centuries due to the time required to transport
  heat to the deep ocean and for icecaps to melt,
  even if emissions are stabilised. Question is
  by how much?

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• Even if greenhouse gases were still at 2000
  levels, over the next two decades global
  temperature rises of 0.2C a decade are expected.
• With emissions set to rise its is "very likely"
  the increase will be twice that - 0.4C higher by
  2030.
• By the end of this century, temperatures could be
  between 1.8 and 6.4C higher than in 1999. (IPCC
  2001 predicted 1.4 to 5.8C.). Likelihood is 3C
• Anything above 2C is dangerous
• changes in the climate will be greater than those
  seen in the 20th century.

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High latitudes have warmed the most
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Dry regions have become drier
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• Annual averages of
• land-air temperatures
• 1860-2000 have risen
• global
• N. Hemisphere
• c) S. Hemisphere.

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Scenarios

• A1 Rapid technological and population growth,
  with technological innovation second half of
  century.
• A2 a heterogeneous world, with pop growing and
  uneven growth.
• B1 a convergent world with information-based
  growth and sustainable politics.
• B2 local solutions, less population growth, less
  technological development.
• B1 scenario 1.4o warming.
• A1 (Business as usual worst case) 4o

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Scenario generation greenhouse gasses are
projected to increase during the 21st century
Scenario A2 yellow - population 15 Billion by
2100 and fairly slow economic and technological
development Scenario B2 blue -population growth
10 Billion by 2100 and faster development and
more emphasis on environmental protection
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global mean surface temperatures during the 21st
century
40C
2.50C
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Mean sea level is projected to rise by 0.09 to
0.88m by 2100
Why? - expansion of water and melting glaciers
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Generally warmer - no region gets cooler.
UK Climate Impacts Programme, Oxford
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Generally more seasonal differences in
precipitation - wetter winters and drier summers
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Where in Europe has currently a mean annual
temperature 3-40C warmer than NW England
(150C)?
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Where in Europe has currently a mean annual
temperature 3-40C warmer than NW England
(150C)?
Answer SW France, Northern Spain, Portugal
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UK Sea level

• Expected to rise all
• around the UK coastline
• Rising 3.3m/year (Hadley), 3.1m (IPCC).
• 14 86 cm above present day level by 2080 in
  Southern Britain.
• 1M rise London, New York, Tokyo (Liverpool)
  underwater.
• More frequent winter storms and surges predicted
• Greenland icecap melts? 7M rise in sea level.
  Most UK coastal cities underwater. (very unlikely
  to completely melt this century)

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Feedbacks, thresholds and sleeping giants

• Models do not take into account the full range of
  thresholds and feedback which may accelerate
  warming.
• Warm climate may increase rate of permafrost
  melting and deep ocean ice hydrate release, so
  increasing release of methane
• Greenland Icecap melting may speed up and become
  irreversible leading to 7m sea level rise.
• Runaway Carbon dynamics. Warmer atmospheres lead
  to more plant growth, more CO2 release biomass
  becomes a source of carbon, not a sink all
  positive feedback.
• Warmer atmosphere may lead to melting of ice-caps
  and disruption of Gulf Stream leading to colder
  Europe an example of long term negative
  feedback

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..especially NW Europe
The River Thames in London last froze in the 17th
century. Will it happen again?
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The collapse of the thermohaline
circulation Simulated change in mean annual
temperature after 30 years
Climate Research Centre UEA
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Where in Europe has currently a mean annual
temperature 80C cooler than NW England (150C)?
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Where in Europe has currently a mean annual
temperature 80C cooler than NW England (150C)?

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The day after tomorrow?

• It is very likely that the North Atlantic
  circulation will slow down before 2100 (25
  less), but very unlikely that it will switch
  off.
• North Atlantic temperatures expected to rise.
• Long term changes are unknown.

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So what is to be done about it?

• Nothing climates change naturally. UK grew
  wine in the middle ages, froze in the c16th.
• Nothing the costs are too great, the science
  unproven and money would be best spent elsewhere.
• Its too late global heating means this is the
  last generation. Form a commune in Scotland.
• A ten year window of opportunity but national,
  local or individual action inadequate.
• UK only responsible for 2 of emissions. Global
  action necessary re US, China, India.
• Adaptation, not mitigation.

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Thank you to our sponsors

•  The Economic and Social Research Council.
• Department of Geography, University of Liverpool