The Tactic of Suicide Terrorism

1
The Tactic of Suicide Terrorism

• PO 335 The Politics of Terrorism

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Suicide Terrorism

• Throughout the course, we have described ways in
  which terrorists are rationally and
  psychologically compelled to use violence against
  innocents
• As the terrorist views himself primarily as an
  altruist, it is perhaps not surprising that he is
  willing to engage in self-sacrifice for a
  greater good
• However, suicide terrorism raises some important
  questions about this commitment and other
  processes
• While most terrorists seem willing to risk
  imprisonment or death, suicide terror guarantees
  death can this be viewed as rational, and under
  what circumstances is it rational?
• It is widely believed that religious
  (specifically, Islamic) terror groups are
  especially likely to conduct suicide attacks? Is
  this so? Why or why not?
• Why does the suicide attack currently seem so
  attractive to terrorist organizations? What does
  this mean for the role of technological
  innovation in terrorism?

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The Rationality of Suicide Terrorism

• Lets begin by looking
• at an expected
• utility representation
• of the decision to engage in
• terrorism
• Suicide terrorism is only an individually
  rational decision if death is preferable to
  survival (i.e., if BS is derived by some function
  other than worldly benefit)
• Alternatively, when benefits, costs, and
  probabilities are conceived of as applying only
  to surviving individuals, the decision to conduct
  suicide attacks can be collectively rational if
  PS and/or BS are sufficiently high relative to
  1-PS and/or Cf
• Thus, the rational suicide terrorist either must
  be convinced that his/her postmortem reward will
  outweigh the benefits of the continuing to live,
  or s/he must be a total altruist (or some
  combination of the two)

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The Psychology of Suicide Terrorism

• While the rational logic of suicide terrorism is
  highly specialized, it seems more compelling than
  the explanations offered by psychology
• Though general suicide rates vary among
  societies, they dont vary enough to explain why
  most societies including those experiencing
  political problems experience no suicide
  terrorism
• Over 95 of all suicide terrorism occurs within
  organized campaigns that are concentrated in time
  (17 from 1980 to 2003)
• The general demographic profile of suicidal
  individuals (e.g., uneducated, unemployed,
  socially isolated, single men in the late teens
  and early twenties) does not fit the profile of
  suicide terrorists, who come from a broad range
  of backgrounds and lifestyles (Pape)
• Finally, psychological explanations of terrorism
  do not help us understand why individuals, who
  ostensibly join for intrinsic benefits, would
  kill themselves

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Suicide Terror Campaigns, 1980-2003 (from Pape,
2005)
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Individual-Level Facilitators of Suicide Terrorism

• Motives generally described as egoistic
• Demand-Side Possibilities
• Nothing Left to Lose
• Poverty identified as a facilitator, but studies
  have shown that countries in which suicide
  terrorism is prevalent are generally
  middle-income
• Humiliation suicide terrorism offers the
  opportunity to strike out at oppressors while
  removing the possibility of retribution against
  the individual
• Supply-Side Possibilities
• Eternal Reward Religious belief can provide
  selective incentives that make the hereafter much
  more palatable than the here and now (77 virgins,
  etc.)
• However, information is incomplete (matter of
  faith)
• Moreover, Pape argues that, since a large
  proportion of suicide terrorism takes place in
  separatist efforts with few or no religious
  referents (e.g., LTTE), eternal reward is
  neither necessary nor sufficient for suicide
  terror
• Thus, while religion can be a prime facilitator,
  it is not the only one

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Collective-Level Facilitators of Suicide Terrorism

• Motives generally described as altruistic
• Strategic
• If suicide terrorism increases the political
  strength/coercive capacity of the group, then the
  altruistic terrorist concerned with group success
  might be convinced to make the ultimate sacrifice
• Social
• If the terrorist will be held posthumously in
  high social esteem in the group and broader
  community, then altruistic suicide becomes more
  attractive
• Thus, mass support for both the cause and the
  method must be apparent
• Immediate
• If the terrorist can be convinced that his
  immediate family and associates will be made
  financially or reputationally better off in the
  wake of his attack, then altruistic suicide
  becomes more attractive
• Increased respect for family (e.g., Gods
  Children)
• Money or social support for family

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Focusing on the Strategic Benefits of Suicide
Terror

• According to Pape, the central reason we have
  seen a significant increase in suicide terrorism
  is that it is extremely effective in a strategic
  sense
• Given the capacity to provide individual and
  collective level incentives for suicide
  terrorists to kill themselves, the tactic
  provides a massive increase in a groups coercive
  capacity
• Human Smart Bomb The suicide terrorist can
  allow for the regulation (or maximization) of
  damage while minimizing or eliminating targeting
  error
• The Employment of Female Terrorists Especially
  productive in cultures where the involvement of
  women in political life and/or physical search of
  women is taboo (Bloom)
• Example of the degree to which strategic
  attractiveness supersedes adherence to broader
  tradition

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History, Technology, and Suicide Terrorism

• While the type of suicide terrorism we see today
  was largely unknown before 1980, attacks that
  almost guaranteed the death of the attacker have
  been observed for millennia
• Zealots and Sicarii (Romans) Assassins (Sunni,
  Persian and Crusader states)
• The use of the suicide terrorist in modern times
  speaks to the likelihood that technological
  advancements in terrorist tactics are constrained
  by considerations of effectiveness
• Many claim that agro, cyber, and information
  terrorism are the wave of the future in
  terrorist tactics
• However, suicide terrorism (which, though
  politically effective, is decidedly low tech)
  shows us that political goals are likely more
  important to terrorist groups than tactical
  revolution or keeping up with the Joneses
• As such, we may have only seen the beginning of
  the employment of this tactic

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Countering Suicide Terrorism

• Suicide terror is, by its definition, especially
  difficult to counter, as its mere commission
  sends a costly signal (showing that attackers
  could not have been deterred by costly
  retaliation willing to kill selves, violate any
  and all norms)
• Moreover, the social benefits selectively given
  to suicide terrorists makes it more plausible
  that others will follow in their footsteps
  (eliminates moral backlash)
• Thus, countering suicide terrorism involves not
  only the defeat of current operatives, but the
  removal of the conditions that will otherwise
  produce a much larger second generation pool
  (inherent tradeoffs)
• Force is primary option to defeat operatives
• However, since the way in which to defuse future
  terrorism is to decrease attractiveness of
  selective incentives (focus on immorality work
  to limit feelings of impotence increase in-group
  policing all of which are difficult under the
  best of circumstances), countering current terror
  likely engenders future terror
• Winning hearts and minds most crucial