Network Centric Warfare,

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Network Centric Warfare, Cyber Warfare, KSCO
Nort Fowler AFRL/IF 26 Electronic parkway, Rome
NY 13441 Email fowlern_at_rl.af.mil Tel (315)
330-4512
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Network Centric Enterprise
The Entry Fee
Enabler
Process for generating awareness
Enabler
Process for exploiting awareness
The Bottom Line (Measurable)
Results
From Alberts, Garstka, Stein, Network Centric
Warfare Developing Leveraging Information
Superiority, 2nd edition, Washington, DC, CCRP
Press, 1999 www.dodccrp.org/publica
t.htm
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Military as a Network Centric Enterprise
Battlespace Awareness Knowledge
Execution (Measurable)
From Alberts, Garstka, Stein, Network Centric
Warfare Developing Leveraging Information
Superiority, 2nd edition, Washington, DC, CCRP
Press, 1999 www.dodccrp.org/publica
t.htm
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Network Organizational Models

• Nodes The actors, or points on a network. A
  node can form connections with any and all other
  nodes on the network
• Centrality The degree to which a node
  connects other nodes
• Boundary spanners Nodes that have
  connections between groups
• Self-synchronization The ability of low-level
  groups to coordinate and act without going
  through a central authority
• Swarming The act of attacking a target from
  many different directions, using many different
  means, often making a force appear larger than it
  is

From Friel, Hierarchies and Networks ,
Government Executive, April, 2002
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Key Observations

• The World has become a network of networks,
  filled with actors who behave in increasingly
  interconnected ways and with wide-reaching and
  rapid consequences
• One major component of a network centric
  enterprise is speed. The payoff is in the
  initial very high rate of change
• A Northern Alliance commander suggested bombing
  Taliban positions. Nineteen minutes later the
  positions were struck
• The critical functions of a network centric
  enterprise are NOT tied to any one platform
  multiple new pathways to delivering capabilities,
  shifting in time
• The swarming technique requires a key feature of
  networks -- adaptability
• Swarming behavior visible in the war on terrorism

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One Vision of Future Cyber Warfare

• Two competing all-channel network
  organizations dueling in Cyberspace.
• Each of these organizations might have many
  multiple ways they can deliver fatal blows
• No longer "platform centric", their lethality
  is now multi-threaded
• Multiple pathways imply that no single asset
  is on the critical path
• The number of network pathways is growing
  exponentially.
• Cyberwar might involve identifying and
  managing the network means of delivery in such a
  way that the adversary never has a lethal
  combination of delivery mechanisms for massed
  effects.
• Once the adversary achieves just one such
  combination, the swarming strike will come at the
  speed of electrons.
• A large scale, fast paced, distributed, deadly
  game of Cyber chess with missing or unknown
  pieces (capabilities, vulnerabilities).

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Active Defense in Cyberspace
Future Cyberwars will be fought to defend /
destroy, not just the individual assets of the
computer network, but the future combat
capabilities achieved through a networked force
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Cyber Warfare Model vs. Classical Warfare Model
Kinetic Warfare
Cyber Warfare
Characteristics Aerospace Vehicle UCAV Flight
Medium Air Space Weapons Missiles
Bombs Desired Effect Destroy Target Control
Flight Path LPI Stealth (Physical) LPD Terr
ain Masking Homebase Predetermined
Airfield Logistics Heavy, Continual
Characteristics Cyberspace Vehicle
Info-Craft Flight Medium Cyberspace Weapons
Virus, Worm, Soft Bombs, etc Desired Effect
Destroy, Degrade, Co-opt Control Network
Links LPI Stealth (Software) LPD Network
Masking Homebase Any Cyberspace
Portal Logistics Light, Infrequent (software)
Net Result or Effect Can be Exactly the Same
Impede the Enemy
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Principles of War Remain

• Objective
• Focus effort to achieve objective
• Economy of Force
• Minimize use of capacity in pursuit of
  non-objective goals
• Security
• Protecting maintaining operational LOCs
• Offensive
• Seizing maintaining the offensive in order to
  dictate the terms of combat
• Maneuver
• Constrain enemy COA through environmental other
  aspects

• Surprise
• The ability to strike the enemy at a time, place
  or manner for which he is not prepared
• Mass
• Concentrating military capabilities at the
  decisive time space
• Unity of Command
• The ability to build and maintain a shared
  understanding of the commanders intent
• Simplicity
• Need to keep plans, guidance orders clear and
  uncomplicated

Allied Coalition
Joint
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Some Possible Future Cyber Weapons
Cyber weapons attack and control our adversarys
Information and C3I capabilities through
intelligent use of information and controlled
effects generated in Cyberspace. Stealthy
Agents Network Blocking Mines Traffic
Redirection (active passive) Network
Re-mapping Camouflaged Implants Sleeper
Agents Adversary Finger Printing
Tracking Cyber Identity Theft Obfuscation
(speed/mobility/deception) Tools Tribal
Operators Remote Cyber Forensics
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KSCO Opportunities