Knowledge and Warfare: The Revolution in Military Affairs - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 40
About This Presentation
Title:

Knowledge and Warfare: The Revolution in Military Affairs

Description:

Knowledge Management and Warfare in the Information Age Dr Michael Evans Land Warfare Studies Centre The Meaning of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) The ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:180
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 41
Provided by: DrMicha3
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Knowledge and Warfare: The Revolution in Military Affairs


1
Knowledge and Warfare The Revolution in Military
Affairs
Knowledge Management and Warfare in the
Information Age
  • Dr Michael Evans
  • Land Warfare Studies Centre

2
The Meaning of a Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA)
  • The contemporary RMA refers to the transformation
    of war by information-age technologies such as
    computers, microelectronics and precision weapons

3
The RMA and Information Superiority
  • The cornerstone of the RMA is information
    superiority, the capability to collect, process
    and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of
    information while exploiting or denying an
    adversarys ability to do the same

4
The US Philosophy of Information Superiority
  • To find, fix, track and target - in near real
    time - anything that moves or is located on the
    face of the Earth.
  • General Ronald R. Fogelman, Chief of Staff, US
    Air Force, February 1997
  • Information superiority is at the core of
    military innovation.
  • General Henry Shelton, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs
    of Staff, March 1999

5
Three Themes of the Presentation
  • Overview the American RMA and the role of
    knowledge in war
  • Outline US Pentagon response to information-age
    warfare
  • Assess Australias Knowledge Edge philosophy and
    its implications

6
An Overview of the American Revolution in
Military Affairs
7
Key Technologies of the RMA
  • C4ISR (command, control, communications,
    computers, intelligence, surveillance and
    reconnaissance)
  • PGMs (long range precision strike)
  • Stealth (low-observable platforms)

8
Four Characteristics of the RMA Debate
  • RMA is at once a process, a hypothesis and a
    debate
  • RMA closely linked to globalisation and
    information revolution
  • RMA largely an American phenomenon
  • Notion of an RMA is attractive to Western
    theorists for cultural reasons

9
American RMA Schools
  • System of systems
  • Dominant battlespace knowledge
  • Global reach, global power school
  • Economic determinists
  • Contingent innovators
  • Vulnerability school
  • Essential continuity school

10
System of Systems
RMA School
  • Promotes information superiority via situational
    awareness
  • Believes information grid connecting sensors to
    shooters will emerge
  • Future of war lies in network-centric warfare
    (exploiting OODA Loop)

11
Dominant Battlespace Knowledge RMA School
  • Believes new technology will create DBK and
    transparent non-linear battlespace
  • Believes that unity of C4ISR, PGMs and Stealth
    technology will make military operations
    full-dimensional
  • Linear mass in war will give way to non-linear
    effects-based operations

12
Dr Libicki and The Terminator Vision
  • Future warfare will be a conflict between
    machines (MEMS, robotics, nanotechnology
    battlefield meshes)
  • The small and the many will triumph over the
    large, the complex and the few
  • To see is to know to know is to be able to
    strike to strike is to be able to win

13
Global Reach, Global Power RMA School
  • Associated mainly with USAF and based on Rapid
    Decisive Operations (RDO)
  • Promotes deep strike air power (B-2 bombers,
    cruise missiles, JDAMs)
  • Sees evolution of USAF into an aerospace force
    based on UAVs/UCAVs and lasers

14
Economic Determinist or Third Wave RMA School
  • RMA shaped by civilian IT/knowledge economy
  • Third Wave war the way we make war reflects the
    way we make wealth
  • Third Wave militaries will be small, specialised
    and knowledge-based

15
Contingent Innovation RMA School
  • Looks to lessons of military history for guidance
    (e.g. 16th century gunpowder revolution and 20th
    century blitzkrieg doctrine)
  • Argues that military revolution springs from
    technology added to knowledge (doctrine and
    concepts)

16
Technology, Knowledge and Military Revolution
  • A military revolution occurs when the
    application of new technologies into a
    significant number of military systems combines
    with innovative operational concepts and
    organisational adaptation in a way that
    fundamentally alters the character and conduct of
    conflict
  • Andrew Krepinevich, From Cavalry to Computer
    Patterns of Military Revolution (1994)

17
The Vulnerability RMA School
  • Fears rapid weapons proliferation, WMD threat and
    asymmetric challenges
  • Future may not be Son of Desert Storm but
    Stepchild of Somalia and Chechnya - General
    Charles C. Krulak, USMC (1996)
  • Fears of this school realised on September 11
    with al-Qaeda attacks on US homeland

18
Essential Continuity RMA School
  • Sees no revolutionary paradigm shift in warfare
  • Believes in military transformation rather than
    military revolution
  • Warns that many RMA models ( e. g. blitzkrieg)
    were based on evolution not revolution

19
The Heart of the American RMA Debate
  • At the heart of the RMA debate lies the impact
    of electronics, computers and precision munitions
    on warfare and the notion of a transition towards
    information-age knowledge based warfare
    although there are differences over pace and
    direction

20
Towards Knowledge Warfare
The Pentagon and the RMA
21
Main Features of
Joint Vision 2020
  • Seeks information superiority by
  • dominant manoeuvre (using IO)
  • precision engagement (missile power)
  • full-dimensional protection (battlespace
    control)
  • focused logistics (force sustainment)

22
US Military Caution over Transformation
  • Lack of RMA consensus provides limited options
    for rapid force transformation
  • Uneven technology means much experimentation and
    field trials
  • RMA developments in computers, electronics,
    munitions not matched by revolution in sensors or
    platforms

23
Legacy Systems and Information Superiority
  • US still requires legacy systems (artillery,
    manned aircraft, helicopters)
  • Legacy systems accompanied by revolutionary
    weapons systems (JDAMs, UAVs, UCAVs)
  • Complete information superiority still an
    aspiration rather than a reality

24
The Experience of Kosovo
  • NATO had information superiority but
  • Did not achieve full battlespace awareness or
    perfect precision
  • Aircraft struck wrong targets and could not stop
    ethnic cleansing by Serbs
  • Sensor technology was inadequate
  • Campaign showed dangers of information
    saturation

25
The Experience of Afghanistan
  • USAF pulversised Taliban/al-Qaeda but
  • Unlike Kosovo key role played by Special Forces
    and Afghan proxies
  • Overreliance on PGMs led to possible escape of
    Osama bin Laden
  • Air power like teenage sex offers instant
    gratification not lasting commitment

26
The Precision Revolution and Knowledge-Based
Warfare
  • Parts of RMA greater than whole
  • From information superiority to DBK still more
    theory than reality
  • Precision revolution coexists with legacy systems

27
Australia and the Knowledge Edge
28
Defining the Knowledge Edge
  • Outlined in 1997
  • as ADFs highest capability priority
  • and defined as the effective exploitation of
    information technologies to allow us to use our
    relatively small force to maximum effectiveness

29
The RMAs Potential for Australia
  • The RMA will introduce a fundamentally
    different style of warfare . . . where distance
    offers no protection where if a target can be
    found it can be destroyed where the most
    precious commodity will be information and the
    most deadly military weapon will be speed
  • Ian McLachlan, Minister for Defence, June 1996

30
Information Warfare and the ADF Knowledge Edge
  • Information warfare. . . The Revolution in
    Military Affairs . . . Is where our comparative
    advantage over potential adversaries is likely to
    last longest. In coming years, it will be harder
    for Australia to match regional numbers of
    platforms such as ships and aircraft.
  • Defence Review 2000 Our Future Defence Force,
    June 2000

31
Developing the Knowledge Edge in the 21st Century
  • A Knowledge Edge exists when, as a result of
    leveraging and exploiting information,
    communications and other technologies, and by the
    application of human cognition, reasoning and
    innovation, there is a comparative advantage in
    those factors that influence decision making and
    its effective execution
  • ADF Brief on the Knowledge Edge, June 2000

32
Defence 2000 and the Knowledge Edge
  • 2000-12 A 2.5b to be spent on ADF Information
    Capabilities
  • Will include JSF, stealth, ARHs, UAVs and UCAVs
  • Knowledge Edge will be the foundation of our
    military capability

33
Knowledge Management and the Knowledge Staff
  • ADF Knowledge Staff created in mid-2001
  • Focuses on Network-Enabled Warfare (NEW) and
    creating a surveillance system
  • NEW described as warfare deriving power from
    robust, rapid networking of well-informed,
    rapidly deployable forces and/or effects (July
    2002)

34

The Character of the Australian Knowledge Edge
  • Viewed in terms of American RMA schools
  • Is a blend of system of system and contingent
    innovation schools
  • Growing recognition of asymmetric challenge may
    mean closer affinity with vulnerability school

35
Conclusion
36
Future Scenarios to 2025
  • Likely system of systems or variant of DBK will
    emerge making the battlespace much more
    transparent
  • Unlikely a Terminator-style battlefield mesh
    based MEMS, robotics and biotechnology. These
    trends are in their infancy operationally

37
Information, Knowledge and Wisdom
  • What shapes the conduct of international
    relations and therefore the course of history is
    not only the number of people with access to
    information it is more importantly how they
    analyse it. Since the mass of information tends
    to exceed the capacity to evaluate it, a gap has
    opened up between information and knowledge, and
    even beyond that, between knowledge and wisdom
  • Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign
    Policy? (2001)

38
21st Century Modes of Conflict
  • Pre-modern conflict (religious terrorists,
    low-tech ethnic militia)
  • Modern conflict (conventional wars a la Gulf or
    Korea)
  • Post-modern conflict (combinations of high-tech
    warfare and casualty limitation)

39
Why a Knowledge Edge is Important in War
  • War is a matter of vital importance to the State
    the province of life or death the road to
    survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be
    thoroughly studied
  • Sun Zi, The Art of War

40
Questions?
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com