Title: Knowledge and Warfare: The Revolution in Military Affairs
1Knowledge and Warfare The Revolution in Military
Affairs
Knowledge Management and Warfare in the
Information Age
- Dr Michael Evans
- Land Warfare Studies Centre
2 The Meaning of a Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA)
- The contemporary RMA refers to the transformation
of war by information-age technologies such as
computers, microelectronics and precision weapons
3 The RMA and Information Superiority
- The cornerstone of the RMA is information
superiority, the capability to collect, process
and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of
information while exploiting or denying an
adversarys ability to do the same
4 The US Philosophy of Information Superiority
- To find, fix, track and target - in near real
time - anything that moves or is located on the
face of the Earth. - General Ronald R. Fogelman, Chief of Staff, US
Air Force, February 1997 - Information superiority is at the core of
military innovation. - General Henry Shelton, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs
of Staff, March 1999
5Three Themes of the Presentation
- Overview the American RMA and the role of
knowledge in war - Outline US Pentagon response to information-age
warfare - Assess Australias Knowledge Edge philosophy and
its implications
6An Overview of the American Revolution in
Military Affairs
7Key Technologies of the RMA
- C4ISR (command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance) - PGMs (long range precision strike)
- Stealth (low-observable platforms)
8Four Characteristics of the RMA Debate
- RMA is at once a process, a hypothesis and a
debate - RMA closely linked to globalisation and
information revolution - RMA largely an American phenomenon
- Notion of an RMA is attractive to Western
theorists for cultural reasons
9American RMA Schools
- System of systems
- Dominant battlespace knowledge
- Global reach, global power school
- Economic determinists
- Contingent innovators
- Vulnerability school
- Essential continuity school
10System of Systems
RMA School
- Promotes information superiority via situational
awareness - Believes information grid connecting sensors to
shooters will emerge - Future of war lies in network-centric warfare
(exploiting OODA Loop)
11Dominant Battlespace Knowledge RMA School
- Believes new technology will create DBK and
transparent non-linear battlespace - Believes that unity of C4ISR, PGMs and Stealth
technology will make military operations
full-dimensional - Linear mass in war will give way to non-linear
effects-based operations
12Dr Libicki and The Terminator Vision
- Future warfare will be a conflict between
machines (MEMS, robotics, nanotechnology
battlefield meshes) - The small and the many will triumph over the
large, the complex and the few - To see is to know to know is to be able to
strike to strike is to be able to win
13Global Reach, Global Power RMA School
- Associated mainly with USAF and based on Rapid
Decisive Operations (RDO) - Promotes deep strike air power (B-2 bombers,
cruise missiles, JDAMs) - Sees evolution of USAF into an aerospace force
based on UAVs/UCAVs and lasers
14Economic Determinist or Third Wave RMA School
- RMA shaped by civilian IT/knowledge economy
- Third Wave war the way we make war reflects the
way we make wealth - Third Wave militaries will be small, specialised
and knowledge-based
15Contingent Innovation RMA School
- Looks to lessons of military history for guidance
(e.g. 16th century gunpowder revolution and 20th
century blitzkrieg doctrine) - Argues that military revolution springs from
technology added to knowledge (doctrine and
concepts)
16Technology, Knowledge and Military Revolution
- A military revolution occurs when the
application of new technologies into a
significant number of military systems combines
with innovative operational concepts and
organisational adaptation in a way that
fundamentally alters the character and conduct of
conflict - Andrew Krepinevich, From Cavalry to Computer
Patterns of Military Revolution (1994)
17The Vulnerability RMA School
- Fears rapid weapons proliferation, WMD threat and
asymmetric challenges - Future may not be Son of Desert Storm but
Stepchild of Somalia and Chechnya - General
Charles C. Krulak, USMC (1996) - Fears of this school realised on September 11
with al-Qaeda attacks on US homeland
18Essential Continuity RMA School
- Sees no revolutionary paradigm shift in warfare
- Believes in military transformation rather than
military revolution - Warns that many RMA models ( e. g. blitzkrieg)
were based on evolution not revolution
19The Heart of the American RMA Debate
- At the heart of the RMA debate lies the impact
of electronics, computers and precision munitions
on warfare and the notion of a transition towards
information-age knowledge based warfare
although there are differences over pace and
direction
20Towards Knowledge Warfare
The Pentagon and the RMA
21Main Features of
Joint Vision 2020
- Seeks information superiority by
- dominant manoeuvre (using IO)
- precision engagement (missile power)
- full-dimensional protection (battlespace
control) - focused logistics (force sustainment)
22US Military Caution over Transformation
- Lack of RMA consensus provides limited options
for rapid force transformation - Uneven technology means much experimentation and
field trials - RMA developments in computers, electronics,
munitions not matched by revolution in sensors or
platforms
23Legacy Systems and Information Superiority
- US still requires legacy systems (artillery,
manned aircraft, helicopters) - Legacy systems accompanied by revolutionary
weapons systems (JDAMs, UAVs, UCAVs) - Complete information superiority still an
aspiration rather than a reality
24The Experience of Kosovo
- NATO had information superiority but
- Did not achieve full battlespace awareness or
perfect precision - Aircraft struck wrong targets and could not stop
ethnic cleansing by Serbs - Sensor technology was inadequate
- Campaign showed dangers of information
saturation
25The Experience of Afghanistan
- USAF pulversised Taliban/al-Qaeda but
- Unlike Kosovo key role played by Special Forces
and Afghan proxies - Overreliance on PGMs led to possible escape of
Osama bin Laden - Air power like teenage sex offers instant
gratification not lasting commitment
26The Precision Revolution and Knowledge-Based
Warfare
- Parts of RMA greater than whole
- From information superiority to DBK still more
theory than reality - Precision revolution coexists with legacy systems
27Australia and the Knowledge Edge
28Defining the Knowledge Edge
- Outlined in 1997
- as ADFs highest capability priority
- and defined as the effective exploitation of
information technologies to allow us to use our
relatively small force to maximum effectiveness
29The RMAs Potential for Australia
- The RMA will introduce a fundamentally
different style of warfare . . . where distance
offers no protection where if a target can be
found it can be destroyed where the most
precious commodity will be information and the
most deadly military weapon will be speed - Ian McLachlan, Minister for Defence, June 1996
30Information Warfare and the ADF Knowledge Edge
- Information warfare. . . The Revolution in
Military Affairs . . . Is where our comparative
advantage over potential adversaries is likely to
last longest. In coming years, it will be harder
for Australia to match regional numbers of
platforms such as ships and aircraft. - Defence Review 2000 Our Future Defence Force,
June 2000
31Developing the Knowledge Edge in the 21st Century
- A Knowledge Edge exists when, as a result of
leveraging and exploiting information,
communications and other technologies, and by the
application of human cognition, reasoning and
innovation, there is a comparative advantage in
those factors that influence decision making and
its effective execution - ADF Brief on the Knowledge Edge, June 2000
32Defence 2000 and the Knowledge Edge
- 2000-12 A 2.5b to be spent on ADF Information
Capabilities - Will include JSF, stealth, ARHs, UAVs and UCAVs
- Knowledge Edge will be the foundation of our
military capability
33Knowledge Management and the Knowledge Staff
- ADF Knowledge Staff created in mid-2001
- Focuses on Network-Enabled Warfare (NEW) and
creating a surveillance system - NEW described as warfare deriving power from
robust, rapid networking of well-informed,
rapidly deployable forces and/or effects (July
2002)
34 The Character of the Australian Knowledge Edge
- Viewed in terms of American RMA schools
- Is a blend of system of system and contingent
innovation schools - Growing recognition of asymmetric challenge may
mean closer affinity with vulnerability school
35Conclusion
36Future Scenarios to 2025
- Likely system of systems or variant of DBK will
emerge making the battlespace much more
transparent - Unlikely a Terminator-style battlefield mesh
based MEMS, robotics and biotechnology. These
trends are in their infancy operationally
37Information, Knowledge and Wisdom
- What shapes the conduct of international
relations and therefore the course of history is
not only the number of people with access to
information it is more importantly how they
analyse it. Since the mass of information tends
to exceed the capacity to evaluate it, a gap has
opened up between information and knowledge, and
even beyond that, between knowledge and wisdom - Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign
Policy? (2001) -
3821st Century Modes of Conflict
- Pre-modern conflict (religious terrorists,
low-tech ethnic militia) - Modern conflict (conventional wars a la Gulf or
Korea) - Post-modern conflict (combinations of high-tech
warfare and casualty limitation)
39Why a Knowledge Edge is Important in War
- War is a matter of vital importance to the State
the province of life or death the road to
survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be
thoroughly studied - Sun Zi, The Art of War
40Questions?