Nuclear Proliferation

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Nuclear Proliferation

• Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle

Erin Madsen April 17, 2007

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What is the scope?
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What is the scope?

• Scenario A 150 Kiloton device is detonated at
  foot of Empire State Building.
• 1 sec./.4 mile. 75,000 dead. Reinforced concrete
  and steel buildings destroyed.
• 4 sec./ 1 mile. 300,000 dead. 100,000 injured.
  Thermal pulse destroys all building interiors.
  Subway commuters trapped under several thousand
  tons of debris.
• 6 sec./ 1.5 miles. 220,000 dead. 60,000 dead.
  Fire destroys about half of the buildings .
• 10 sec./ 2.5 miles. 235,000 dead. 525,000
  injured.
• 16 sec./ 4 miles. 500,000 injured and mostly dead
  before the years end.
• Total 830,000 killed. 875,000 injured.
• At the outermost blast ring
• At least 24 hours before rescue services can
  begin work.
• 30,000 burn beds needed. Only 3,000 available in
  entire country.

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What is the scope?

• US refuses to consider a no-first-strike policy
• Approximately 4,500 strategic, offensive nuclear
  warheads forward deployed
• 8,000 active or operational overall
• 2,000 on hair-trigger alert (15 minutes to launch
  24/7)
• Average warhead yield 400 kilotons (Hiroshima
  x20)
• Russia 3,800
• China 145
• Israel 75-130 more possible with Plutonium
  stockpiles
• India 30-35 Uranium, enough plutonium for 50
  more
• Pakistan 24-48 Uranium, 3-5 Plutonium stored in
  component form

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A lesson from history

• Cuban Missile Crisis
• Castro urged Khrushchev to counter a US attack
  with a nuclear response knowing Cuba would be
  annihilated.
• Meanwhile, 4 Soviet submarines armed with nuclear
  torpedoes trailed US naval vessels.
• Subs were out of contact with their Soviet bases
  and continued their patrols for four days after
  the missile withdrawal.
• Each sub commander had launch authority.
• Rational men came within a hairs breadth of
  nuclear war.
• LESSON
• The inescapable human element of the nuclear
  equation constitutes a grave threat to nations.

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A lesson from Hollywood

• Dr. Strangelove
• Insane General Ripper orders first strike against
  Soviet Union.
• Russian Ambassador reveals existence of Russian
  Doomsday Device capable of extinguishing all life
  on earth.
• Bombers recalled but for one, the emergency radio
  of which accidentally self-destructs.
• Bomb falls, presumably initiating global
  annihilation.
• Remaining War Room occupants discuss ratio of
  males to females in survival bunkers.
• LESSON
• Automated systems can also present a grave threat.

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How do we proceed?
I know of no one that has put down on paper a
scenario for the use of nuclear weapons that
ensures it will be a limited nuclear war. I know
of no way to accomplish that. The indefinite
combination of human fallibility and nuclear
weapons will lead to the destruction of
nations. Robert S. McNamara (SECDEF
1961-1968)
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Deutch

• A new US nuclear posture should encourage
  international nonproliferation efforts without
  sacrificing the United States ability to
  maintain a nuclear policy that deters attack.
• Arsenal should be managed with two purposes to
  deter a nuclear attack against the US or its
  allies by retaining an overwhelming nuclear force
  with high survivability and to respond flexibly
  and precisely to a broad number of contingencies,
  including CB attacks.

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Carter

• Deny fissile materials to non-state actors.
• Revamp outdated arms control agreements.
• Expand counterproliferation programs in DOD and
  DHS.
• Counter WMD with non-nuclear measures.
• Develop coherent strategies for heading off
  crises with N. Korea and Iran.
• Improve intelligence collection and analysis.

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Fissile Material Denial

• Near unanimous support for a Fissile Material
  Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).
• Unfortunately, the venue for passing an FMCT, the
  Conference on Disarmament (CD), has been
  deadlocked for almost a decade over the major
  nuclear powers failure to fulfill 1995/2000 NPT
  Review Conference commitments.
• Internal political instabilities present the
  gravest danger in the form of existing materials
  falling into the wrong hands.

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Fissile Material Availability

• Collapse of the Soviet Union put approx.
• 400 kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium and
  uranium on the market. (8kg1kt).
• 2/3 of remaining supply inadequately secured.
• Since 1993, IAEA has reported 18 cases of
  weapons-grade material trafficking.
• 20 year old black-market nuclear
  equipment/expertise trade only discovered in 2004.

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Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan

• Founder of Pakistani nuclear
• program, national hero.
• Found guilty of espionage by
• Netherlands. Released on re-
• commendation of CIA.
• Admitted involvement in black-
• market network trading nuclear
• equipment and expertise to the
• highest bidder.
• Customers include Libya, North
• Korea and Iran.

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Pakistan

• President holds delicate balance
• between western allies and large
• population of militant Islamists.
• Intelligence service heavily
• infiltrated by militant Islamists
• including Al Qaeda and Taliban.
• (April 11, 2007) UN Ambassador Akram
• Danger of nuclear weapons use today is as high
  as during the Cold War due to the lack of
  political will to advance disarmament and a
  non-proliferation agenda.

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Remember the NY Scenario?

• 2000 British agents in Herat, Afghanistan,
  observe manufacture of dirty bomb by Al Qaeda.
• October 2001 Mossad intercepts a subject on the
  Allenby Bridge carrying what they believe to be a
  dirty bomb. Further analysis confirms that it is,
  in fact, a tactical nuclear weapon.
• 2002 Canister of Uranium-238 found in Kandahar.
• September 2002,2003 ABC news smuggles 15lbs of
  depleted Uranium past customs, first in a cargo
  container, then in a clothes trunk.
• 2007 Administration continues to ignore 9/11
  Commission recommendations on port security and
  intelligence reforms.

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Al Qaedas nukes

• CIA raid in Kabul confirmed 1
• nuclear device forward
• deployed from Karachi to US.
• Transports, like this one for
• an MK54 Small Atomic
• Demolition Munition, can be
• easily worn on the back and
• detonated at a time and place
• of the carriers choosing.
• Gen. Eugene Habiger regarding nuclear
  megaterrorism on US soil not a matter of if,
  but when.

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8 Ds of Counterproliferation

• Deterrence
• Disarmament
• Defense
• Defusing
• Dissuasion
• Diplomacy
• Denial
• Destruction

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Deterrence

• Commit to a no-first-use policy.
• Relaxes postures of other nuclear states.
• Encourages other nuclear states to adopt similar
  stance.
• Restores a measure of credibility to US
  leadership capability in world governance.
• Legitimizes use of nuclear weapons by grounding
  stated policy within a reasonable moral
  framework.
• One cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of
  an incredible action.

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Deterrence

• Remove all weapons from hair-trigger alert,
  excepting 1.5MT of strategic warheads.
• Removes risk of accidental destruction of
  nations.
• Still presents credible 2nd strike retaliatory
  capability while additional weapons are deployed.
• Encourages corresponding posture changes
  worldwide similar to no-first-strike.

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Disarmament

• Multilateral and collective decommission of
  nuclear arsenals to reasonable levels (480MT
  for major states, .5-1.5 MT for regional powers).
• Allows states minimum required for sufficient 2nd
  strike capability without risking the destruction
  of nations.
• Still allows dispersed deployment of major
  states arsenal in case of first strike.
• Cuts US arsenal by 87.

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Defense

• Permanent UN Nuclear Security Authority composed
  of 12 world leaders (2 for each populated
  continent) holding launch codes.
• Ensures democratic response to first strike
  necessitates good diplomacy.
• Could proliferate radiation countermeasures like
  KI pills, decon facilities, atmospheric
  engineering and disaster service training beyond
  just nuclear events.

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Defense

• Missile Defense Net
• Past efforts beleaguered by poor management, poor
  politics, poor design and poor execution.
• Future efforts will be multilateral and achieve
  accountability through transparency.
• A true missile defense shield will protect
  everyone on Earth.
• It can be done, and must be done.

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Defusing

• Prioritize up IAEA inspection-related taskings.
• IAEA must have the means to put feet on the
  ground anywhere in the world within 24 hours and
  anywhere in-country within 6-12.
• Must have resources to turn administrators and
  security officials guarding scientists.
• Must have freedom to exploit all available
  intelligence collection disciplines with 24 hour
  turnaround. (MASINT, IMINT,MEDINT)

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Disuassion

• Offer energy, water and security guarantees to
  good-faith NPT signers.
• Worked in North Korea and Libya.
• Environmental disasters will only increase
  tensions. Guarantees would provide a much-
• needed safety net for all nations.
• We already wield the worlds most robust military
  power. Its about time we leverage it for real
  security and considering true costs.

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Diplomacy

• Restore humanist model to rhetoric of freedom.
• Freedom does not mean freedom to serve our
  interests at the business end of a gun.
• Our freer than thou culture is killing us.
• Humanism is the only sociological theory that
  provides for all 4 Ps universally.
• We can no longer afford to remain ignorant of the
  world.
• No empire lasts forever, many principles do.

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Diplomacy

• Nothing less than a nation-wide transpartisan
  dialogue on American principles.
• We have let ourselves be mesmerized by our past
  successes.
• Global opinion currently puts US in same category
  as Nazi Germany. What might this tell us about
  our actions?
• If our founding fathers principles of life,
  liberty and the pursuit of happiness truly are
  righteous, why not live by them where we live?

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Diplomacy

• Remove multinationals from the policy process by
  legislating special economic penalties for
  interference in government affairs.
• We must address multinationals for what they are
  regional and world powers.
• Multinationals regularly subvert nations
  security postures to serve their own interests.
• Dont make them move their headquarters, make
  them move their decimals.

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Denial

• Enforce export controls and account for every
  ounce of nuclear material and conventional weapon
  out there.
• The Nunn-Lugar program went a long way.
• Lugar-Obama program went further.
• Lets keep going.
• No more removing lost/stolen missiles from the
  balance sheets. No more unsecured fissile
  material. No more live and let die.

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Destruction

• Reserve the right to strike known WMD sites where
  use is imminent.
• Preemptive action didnt cause the Iraq War,
  Feith-based Intelligence did.
• Pressures of climate change, refugee crises and
  water shortages will likely tip at least one
  nuclear power past the breaking point.
• We must consider what amount of evil is necessary
  to do good.

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Departmental Expansion

• Carter recommends expansion of DOD and DHS
  counterproliferation programs, but should that be
  their mission?

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DOD Expansion

• Current DOD programs are
• insufficient for their lack of IAEA
• procedural integration and
• territorial in-fighting between
• CIA and DIA.
• Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
• have exhausted troops and all but
• obliterated necessary training
• cycles.
• Deterrence Destruction are the only missions
• to which the DOD is adequately suited.

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DHS Expansion

• Absolutely hopeless.
• Incompetent leadership.
• Poorly understood mission.
• Consistently fails trials tests.
• Grave risk to citizenry.
• The Department of Homeland
• Security has one mission,
• Defense, and should be held ac-
• countable to that mission including NBC suits, KI
  pills and a trained service of disaster
  professionals

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Crises avoided

• February 2007, North Korea
• agrees to shut down Yongbyon
• Reactor and cease enrichment
• program in exchange for 50,000
• metric tons of energy aid.
• November 2003, Libya
• simultaneously announces
• existence and end of nuclear
• weapons program in exchange
• for lifted sanctions and security advantage.

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Iran

• IAEA reports Iran is years,
• not months, from a weapon
• prototype.
• Mullahs continue to press
• hard line, but leadership not
• ignorant of strategic realities.
• Potential targets are
• amorphous and true size unknown.
• Presents a much larger political than
  proliferative threat. Would be very useful as a
  back-room ally.

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Collection Analysis

• Big changes already underway
• 50 of the current CIA staff hired after 9/11.
• 20 of analysts hired in the last 12 months.
• Technical Collection unsurpassed.
• Human Intelligence sources still insufficient.
• Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 provides better
  funding, but still fails to address structural
  failings. A 1/3 reduction in budget may provide
  better results.

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How do we proceed?
A final remark
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A final remark
October 27, 1962 (Day 13 of the Cuban Missile
Crisis) We and you ought not to pull on the
ends of a rope which you have tied the knots of
war. Because the more the two of us pull, the
tighter the knot will be tied. And then it will
be necessary to cut that knot, and what that
would mean is not for me to explain to you. I
have participated in two wars and know that war
ends when it has rolled through cities and
villages, everywhere sowing death and
destruction. For such is the logic of war. If
people do not display wisdom, they will clash
like blind moles and then mutual annihilation
will commence. Nikita Khrushchev to John F/
Kennedy
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I welcome your questions
An expanded version of this briefing can be
found at http//www.alternium.net/proliferation.pp
tx After this, I can be reached by email at
erin.a.madsen_at_gmail.com Thanks for your time!