DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION

1
DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION

• Measuring the impact of nuclear activities begins
  with measuring the effluence from the industry
  into air and water and retained radioactive
  waste, the distribution of this debris in the
  biosphere over space and time its uptake in the
  ecosystem and food web and its persistence in the
  biosphere together with transfer factors in the
  environment human uptake, physiological
  distribution in the body and biochemical
  properties energy deposits dose estimates to
  the public and workers and the human and
  environmental health implications of this
  exposure. Some method for quantifying the impact
  on living systems is necessary to relate
  concentration levels to health effects.
•  

2
Hazard identification
3
Recommendation

• Regardless of the nature of fires or detonations
  of high explosives in nuclear weapons, the major
  radiological threat will be the release of
  plutonium. When associated with a fire, metallic
  plutonium may burn, producing radioactive
  plutonium-oxide particles, which may present
  serious hazards if inhaled or deposited in
  wounds. Also, detonation of the high-explosive
  component in nuclear weapons may pulverize
  plutonium into very small particles, which can
  cause contamination over a large area. If the
  high explosives burn instead of detonating, the
  amount of plutonium dispersed into the atmosphere
  usually is small and represents a serious health
  hazard only in the immediate area and from the
  smoke cloud. Plutonium is not a radiation hazard
  if it remains outside the body, because it is an
  alpha-emitter. While alpha particles have a very
  short range and lack the ability to penetrate the
  skin, plutonium contamination can be a very
  serious hazard if inhaled or ingested.

4
RISK CHARACTERIZATION

• In a narrow sense, risk characterization is an
  integral component of risk assessment process and
  involves complex and value-related judgments 1.
• Based on hypothetical exposures considered,
  life-threatening damage could reach the possible
  or likely range if the worker is exposed to a
  very large gamma spike during a work shift, say
  owing to a hydrogen explosion.
• The Fukushima Disaster
• A radiological emergency situation currently
  exists at the Fukushima Dai-ichi (No. 1) nuclear
  power station (NPS) in Japan as a result of the
  Mar 11, 2011, magnitude 9.0 earthquake, which
  triggered a massive tsunami that killed thousands
  of Japanese citizens
• If a person is exposed to a large gamma dose
  delivered to the entire body, cells in irradiated
  tissues can be destroyed in large numbers. This
  can lead to deterministic radiobiological effects

5
Modeling Methods

• The cumulative normalized dose is indicated by ,
  and for a given absorbed radiation dose differs
  for different deterministic effects.

6
Risk managment

• Yamashita kept repeating that the radiation dose
  between 10 to 100 millisievert (mSv) was an
  uncertain level, whereas the dose over 100 mSv
  was associated with a dose dependent cancer risk
  throughout life.
• Evacuation Most people within 20 kilometers of
  the nuclear power plant were rapidly evacuated
• Moreover, in terms of iodine tablet intake for
  children, refer to the disaster manual and
  administer iodine syrup.  Also, for individuals
  over age 40, administer stable iodine tablets
  only if they want to. If radioactive particles
  exist, worry about rain
• .  For the amount of radioactivity in Tokyo area,
  rain is important to wash out such kind of
  fallout in this area.
• Production of food was stopped, locally produced
  food was no longer distributed outside Fukushima
  or even from Ibaraki
• Distribution of food was indeed halted during the
  acute stage, but over time this protocol was
  relaxed, with rice grown in contaminated areas
  being sold to wholesalers or mixed in with
  uncontaminated rice for distribution to food
  industry, destined for hospital food and school
  lunches.    

7
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT OF OCEANIC OIL SPILL
CEL899

• Somya Singla
• Harsh Arya
• Kshitij Mittal

8
OIL SPILL CAUSES
9
RISK IDENTIFICATION

• For spill, we need to estimate
• The duration of input
• The rate of dispersion
• The period of time over which the components will
  persist
• The concentrations at which biological effects
  will and will not be observed
• For the fate of the material, consider its
• Environmental component (water, air, sediment)
• Form in which itll be present
• Concentrations
• Information to be collected
• Types of oils frequently stored in, or
  transported through, that area
• Locations where oil is stored in large quantities
  and the mode of transportation used to move the
  oil
• Extreme weather conditions
• The location of response equipment and personnel
  trained to use that equipment and respond to the
  spill swifty

10

• Vulnerability analysis information
• List of public safety officials in the community
• List of facilities such as primary health
  centres, nursing homes and hospitals
• List of recreational areas, such as camping
  grounds
• List of critical habitats that can be affected
  when a spill occurs
• Identification of parts of the environment that
  are particularly susceptible to oil or water
  pollution
• Direct impacts
• Localized nutrient enrichment
• Saprogenic effects
• Temperature increase
• Pollution from oils and chemicals
• Oil toxic initially, later emulsifies
• Diving sea birds encounter floating oil
• Evaporation of lighter fuel oil fractions
• Near-shore oil spill more dangerous than offshore

11
IMPACT OF OIL SPILL

• Oil contains hydrocarbons
• Can affect air quality
• Potential fire hazard
• Effect on recreational areas, harbors,
  industries, commercial fishing grounds and
  tourist attractions
• Effect on marine life
• Cut-off of oxygen from atmosphere
• Marine food chain affected
• Aquatic flora fauna killed damaged

Risk assessment matrix for oil spill
12
CONTINGENCY PLAN

• First step towards effective oil spill response
• Aspects sources of spillage, prevailing risk
  with possible size, maximum rate of oil
  discharge, likely reasons, types of oil handled,
  oil characteristics, spill movement data,
  trajectory, fate of the spilled oil through time,
  mechanical recovery plan, application of
  dispersants, sensitivity mapping and logistics
• Response actions
• Notifying all private companies or government
  agencies
• Getting trained personnel and equipment to the
  site quickly
• Defining the size, position and content of the
  spill, direction and speed of movement,
  likelihood of affecting sensitive habitat
• Ensuring the safety of all response personnel and
  the public
• Stopping the flow of oil and preventing ignition
• Containing the spill to a limited area
• Removing the oil
• Disposal of oil once removed from the water or
  land

13
HUMAN HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENTofHEAVY
METALSfromBHALASWA LANDFILL

• Balsher Singh Sidhu (2009CE10292)
• Dikshant Sharma (2009CE10297)
• Smit Gupta 2009CE(10344)
• Tushar Tuteja (2009CE10351)

14
Introduction

• Bhalaswa Landfill
• North Eastern part of Delhi
• 21.06 acres
• Unlined, so hazardous leachate situation
• 2200 tonnes of waste per day
• Health Hazards
• Leachate contaminated groundwater, used for
  consumption without proper treatment
• Focus of this study Heavy metals
• Methodology
• Reviewed research papers on landfills heavy
  metals
• Study by Bhalaswa Lok Shakti Manch chose Zinc
  and Lead

15

• Hazard Identification
• Lead
• Affects children more than adults reduced IQ,
  stunted growth, impaired hearing, kidney damage,
  death.
• Among adults fertility problems, nerve
  disorders, muscle pain, memory problems, nausea,
  diarrhoea, weight loss, gastrointestinal
  disorders.
• Lack of studies to document its carcinogenic
  effects.
• Zinc
• Indirectly causes copper deficiency, leading to
  anaemic symptoms, like fatigue and weakness.
• Irritates the intestinal tract, causing nausea,
  vomiting, diarrhoea, appetite loss, fever, loss
  of consciousness.

16

•  

17

•  

18

• Risk Characterization

Zones Radial Distance (in metres) Pb Maximum Concentration (mg/L)
Zone I 0-2520 m 0.053
Zone II 2520-3740 m 0.027
Zone III Beyond 3740 m ND
Zones Non-Carcinogenic Risk (HQ) Carcinogenic Risk Carcinogenic Risk Decision
Zones Non-Carcinogenic Risk (HQ) Lead Acetate Lead Sub-acetate Decision
Zone I 5.3 Risk
Zone II 2.7 Risk
Zone III NA NA NA No Risk
19

• Risk Management and Communication

Risk management Step Risk Communication Task
Initiation Stakeholder identification
Preliminary analysis Issue identification and familiarity
Risk Estimation Involves Exposure Assessment Communication of results with stakeholders
Risk Evaluation Assess stakeholders perception of risk Create awareness programmes
Risk Control Informing stakeholder of benefits, cost and new risk associated Evaluate acceptance of control Trade off possibility
Monitoring Ensure implementation of communication strategies Regular monitoring of hazards
20
RISK ASSESMENT ON MINAMATA DISEASE (JAPAN)

• BY DEVENDER KUMAR AND GROUP MEMBERS.

21
STEPS FOLLOWED DURING RISK ASSESMENT.

• CAUSE OF MINAMATA DISEASE WAS METHYL MERCURY
  POISIONING IN MINAMATA BAY IN JAPAN AND RESULTS
  IN MINAMATA DISEASE TO LACALITY PEOPLE.
• 1. - HAZARD IDENTIFICATION - SINCE IT WAS
  OFFICIALLY DISCOVERED IN 1956 THAT DANGEREOUS
  MINAMATA DISEASE WAS CAUSED BY METHYL MERCURY
  POISIONING AND NEEDS A WAY TO COME OUT.
• SO THERE WAS NO ISSUE OF IDENTIFICATION OF
  HAZARD CAUSED BY METHYL MERCURY POISIONING.
• THERE WAS TOTAL OF APPROX. 2000 PATIENTS WERE
  IDENTIFIED AND LATOR ON THAT WAS CONTINUED
  BECAUSE OF UN AWARENESS OF THEIR GOVERNMENT.
• 2.EXPOSURE ASSESMENT- ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE
  DATA AROUND 67 LOCALITY PEOPLE WAS INFECTED.
  SO ON AN AVERAGE 65 TIME IN A YEAR POPULATION
  WAS IN EXPOSURE OF METHYL MERCURY.

22
DOSE RESPONSE ASSESSMENT

• The influence of age and sex on the threshold
  dose of mercury in Minamata disease was studied
  by dose-response analysis based on mercury
  concentrations in hair obtained mainly from
  adults living near the Agano River at the
  beginning of Niigata Minamata disease outbreak in
  1965.
• The subjects were 174 male and 694 female
  inhabitants of polluted areas including 55 males
  and 66 females officially recognized as Minamata
  disease patients.
• Symptoms were ataxia, numbness in the hands and
  feet, general muscle weakness, narrowing of the
  field of vision and damage to hearing and speech.
  In extreme cases, insanity, paralysis, coma and
  death follow within weeks of the onset of
  symptoms. A congenital form of the disease can
  also affect foetuses in the womb.
• One-compartment model is widely used in the EPA
  for the following reasons
• 1 Methylmercury exposure via foods is
  continuous and relatively stable.
• 2 Methylmercury is not unevenly distributed
  to a specific organ in the body.
• 3 Methylmercury is difficult to metabolize
  (into inorganic compounds) in the body

23
ONE COMPARTMENT MODEL

• Daily methylmercury intake d (µg/kg bw/day),
  which becomes C (the blood mercury level) (µg/L)
  in the steady state, is calculated using the
  following formula
• Maternal daily methylmercury intake d
  (µg/kg bw/day)
• d C b V/A f bw
• In this
• b elimination rate constant 0.014 per
  day
• bw body weight 60kg
• V blood volume 0.0960liters
• A fraction of the dose absorbed0.95
• f the absorbed fraction distributed to
  the blood 0.05
• 10 ppm was taken as the NOAEL and the RfD came
  out to be 2.0µg/kg bw/week of Hg by using the
  following formula
• RfD NOAEL/VF1VF2VFn
• where VF is the variance factor.
• ONE COMPARTMENT MODEL IS FITTED TO ANALYSE IT.

24
RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION

• In order to understand the level or magnitude of
  risk associated with the disease and to create a
  clear risk perception, its good to evaluate it
  using the following major dimensions
• Catastrophic potential- Besides the direct damage
  to nature and peoples bodies, the damage brought
  to Minamata by pollution is incalculable.
• Familiarity- Minamata Disease was reported by the
  Chisso Corporation Hospital as a strange disease
  of unknown cause, and was officially discovered
  in May, 1956.
• Voluntariness- Since the disease reaches a human
  body with unconscious ingestion of Methyl mercury
  poisoned media(food and water), the infection is
  involuntary
• Origin- As it is indicated before, the disease is
  caused by human actions or failures
• Effects on future generations- Minamata disease
  is not a hereditary disease. If proper care is in
  place its effect on future generation is rare.

25
DIAGRAM SHOWING THE ENTRANCE OF MERCURY IN DAILY
LIFE
26
VARIOUS CONTAMINANTS IN YAMUNA RIVER AND ITS
RISK ASSESSMENT

• SREELAKSHMIBABU 2012CEV2267 (GROUP LEADER)
  
• KARISHMA BHATNAGAR 2012CEV2274
• MEGHA KANOJE 2012CEV2283
• SADAF NOORUDHEEN 2012CEV2279
• BIKRAM SINGH 2012CEV2285

27
INTRODUCTION

• The main objective compare concentrations of
  metal contaminants present in the Yamuna water
  (Delhi) with the permissible limits do risk
  assessment.
• Area of study-Yamuna River between Wazirabad
  barrage and Okhla barrage because drains between
  them contribute 80 of total pollution load.
• The steps done -Hazard identification, exposure
  assessment, dose response assessment, risk
  characterisation, risk management, risk
  communication

28
1.HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
The metal concentrations in the specific region
of Yamuna were obtained.
NAME OF THE METAL CONCENTRATION
Cadmium ND-0.20
Nickel 6.42-9.90
Copper 6.25-16.31
Lead ND-0.9
Cobalt 4.40-9.96
Chromium 18.08-34.15
Iron 42-68
Manganese 62.3-84.3
Zinc 156-168.2
29
2. EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT

• Possible exposure routes are Ingestion finished
  drinking water, Accidental ingestion during
  recreational activities, Food pathway
  consumption of fishes, vegetables grown on the
  banks, River bathing and washing.
• Exposed Population- blood lead level when exposed
  to Yamuna bank area -8 times that in rural area .

LOCATION River Water Abstraction(MLD) Abstraction Use
Wazirabad 1,100 Drinking water supply
Wazirabad to Okhla Stretch 5,000 Irrigation and others
30
3. DOSE RESPONSE ASSESSMENT
Chronic Daily Intake(CWIREFED)/(BWAT) HQgt1
risk present.
METAL CDI Reference Dose (mg/kg/day) HQCDI/RfD Risk
Cadmium 0.000857143 0.0005 1.71 Yes
Nickel 0.042428571 0.02 2.12 Yes
Copper 0.0699 0.0272 2.57 Yes
Lead 0.003857143 0.0004 9.64 Yes
Cobalt 0.042685714 ND - -
Chromium 0.146357143 .003 48.8 Yes
Iron 0.291428571 0.009 32.4 Yes
Manganese 0.361285714 0.14 2.58 Yes
Zinc 0.720857143 0.3 2.4 Yes
31
4. RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT

• Risk Communication
• Objective-Educating target audience, health
  professionals, municipal Corporation, improving
  the quality of information in public domain on
  the issue.
• Methods-putting some hoardings near polluted
  zones, distributing pamphlets, brochure etc to
  people residing by the river.
• Risk Management
• Risk assessors -Analyse are in terms of cost
  effectiveness.

32
THANK YOU
33
ENVIROMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT(CEL899)

• A
• REPORT ON
• RISK ASSESSMENT ON BOMBAY HIGH OIL
  SPILL
• Submitted by-
• Manish Bhardwaj 2011AST3530
• Rahul Saini 2011AST3566
• Amrendra Kumar 2011AST3564
• Pawan Pal 2011AST3563
• Rajeev K Singh 2011AST3572
• Karanjeet Singh 2011AST3578
•  

34

• INTRODUCTION
• Bombay high field discovered in 1974 and it is
  located in Arabian sea 160 km west of the Mumbai
  coast.
• The oil operations are run by Oil Natural gas
  Corporation.
• The rupture in pipeline in Bombay high was on 17
  may 1993 which results in spillage of crude oil.
• The exact amount of oil spill is not known, thus
  spilling roughly expected 3000-600 tonnes of oil
  into the sea.
• Oil continued to leak out of the pipeline at the
  rate of around three barrels per minute.

35

• Objectives -

To identify immediate change if any in marine
environmental quality of Murud in the event
of pollution by petroleum hydrocarbon residue.
Water samples were collected at different depths
for dissolved-dispersed petroleum hydrocarbon
residues (DPH) using Niskin water samplers
All the water samples were analysed for their DPH
by spectrofluorometry after preconcentration by
hexane extraction.
36
Result
The sizes of oil patches were estimated to vary
between 1x 05 m to 10 x 2m. Only onepatch of
untreated oil (about 100 x 2 m) was observed
Aerial survey carried out on 25 May however
showedseveral oil patches of varying sizes
drifting towards thecoast of Murud-Zanzira, south
of Bombay.
Table 1 Comparison of data of floating tar ball
and DPH concentration
Variable Spill Area Normal Area Remarks
Floating Tar ball (mg/m2) 0 - 95.82 0 - 6 Increased
DPH Concent. (mg/l) 0.19 3.65 0.003 0.022 Increased
37
Table 2Data on chl a, phaeophytin and
primaryproductivity in the oil spill area.
Variable Spill Area Spill Area Spill Area Spill Area Normal Area Normal Area Normal Area Normal Area
Max Min Mean SD Max Min Mean SD
Extinction Coeff. 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.95 0.36 0.33
SURFACE WATER SURFACE WATER SURFACE WATER SURFACE WATER SURFACE WATER SURFACE WATER SURFACE WATER SURFACE WATER SURFACE WATER
Chlorophyll a (mg/m3) 0.24 1.78 0.64 0.07 0.27 3.18 1.21 1.1
Phaeophytin (mg/m3) 1.37 8.32 3.2 3 1.39 12.4 5.44 4.2
Primary Productivity (mgC/m3/day) 9.3 0.79 4.36 2.58
Zooplankton biomass (mg/100m) 13.1 100 19.4 32 4,8 65.5 23.2 20.4
VERTICAL WATER COLUMN VERTICAL WATER COLUMN VERTICAL WATER COLUMN VERTICAL WATER COLUMN VERTICAL WATER COLUMN VERTICAL WATER COLUMN VERTICAL WATER COLUMN VERTICAL WATER COLUMN VERTICAL WATER COLUMN
Chlorophyll a (mg/m2) 3.9 37.4 14.2 13.6 10.4 85 30.9 24
Phaeophytin (mg/m2) 21 190 77.9 66 63.7 407 152.6 112
Primary Productivity (mgC/m2/day) 0.19 0.2 0.29 0.25
38
Observational Impact
Localized impacts in terms of decrease in its
rate of primary productivity and changes in the
composition of zooplankton were evident . The
beach tar melted under the summer heat and
percolated into the sand spreading the
contamination at least up to 5 cm below surface.
39
CEL 899-ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENTRISK
ASSESSMENT OF BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

• GUIDED BY SUBMITTED BY
  Dr. ARUN KUMAR
  RAVEEN PPATEL (ENTRY
  NO.-2012CEW2296)
• 
  AMIT KUMAR VYAS (ENTRY NO.-2012CEW2289)
• 
  PARAG AGRAWAL (ENTRY
  NO.-2012CEW2292)
• 
  HARSHA YADAV (ENTRY NO.-2012CEW2297)
•  
•  
• DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING
• INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY DELHI
• NEW DELHI-110016

40
INTRODUCTION -

• The incident took place in the mid night of 3rd
  December 1984. It was one of the greatest
  industrial disaster ever happened. During the
  incident 40 tones of MIC ( methyl isocyanate
  ) and various products such as mono methyl amine
  , hydrogen cyanide and other lethal gases were
  released from UNION CARBIDA CORPORATION pesticide
  factory in Bhopal, India which flooded the
  atmosphere of Bhopal. The immediate effects on
  the people due to the exposure were vomiting,
  headache, burning of lungs and searing in their
  eyes. Within 72 hours of the incident about 8,000
  people had died and total of 25,000 have since
  died due the released gases.
• METHODOLOGY
• Hazard identification
• Exposure assessment
• Dose response assessment
• Risk characterization
• Risk communication

41
RESULTS

• Effect On society-
• After 28 years after the bhopal gas tragedy the
  victims continue to suffer from problems like
  mental retardation cerebral palasy and multiple
  disabilities.
• Economically they became very week only 70 of
  the exposed population were earning minimal
  wages.
• Ground water became polluted as tones of toxic
  substance are underlying under ground.
• It was noticed that a large amount of heat was
  generated during the release of MIC. It is known
  that MIC reacts with moisture rapidly. In
  addition, MIC could have undergone a series of
  chemical reactions.
• They are still carrying the load of the past
  hazzards on their shoulders.

42
METHODOLOGY

• Hazard identification During this disaster
  various gases like CO, HCL, CO2, HCN, Mono Methyl
  Amine, MIC(methyl isocyanate) were released.
  Incident took place mainly due to release of MIC
  and its reaction products. Having such a pressure
  that it rises up to 33 meter from the ground. Due
  to prevailing wind and temperature conditions the
  gas was taken from release valve to the
  residential areas of the city.
• Exposure assessment. Initially it was due to
  respiratory tract and eyes, and for long term it
  was through the GI tract from ingestion of food
  and water. A number of contaminants still remain
  on site. So it would be difficult to link an
  illness specially to MIC leak exposure. The leak
  itself lasted for 90 minutes. However the gas
  remained in the area for many hours after the
  leak. Between 210-270 min after the release of
  the gas, it mixed with the air, cooler and
  descended on the city still moving downwind.

43
.

• Dose response After lot of studies it has been
  found that MIC(methyl isocyanate) is of
  non-carcinogenic nature. CalEPA(California
  Environmental Protection Agency) calculated a
  chronic inhalation reference exposure level of
  0.001 milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m3).
• Refrence limit/refrence doseA chronic
  non-cancer Reference Exposure Level (REL) of 3.6
  x 10-1 µg/m3 is listed for methyl isocyanate in
  the California Air Pollution Control Officers
  Asociation.
• Symptoms may include cough, chest pain,
  shortness of breath, watery eyes, eye pain
  (particularly when exposed to light), profuse lid
  edema, and corneal ulcerations. Respiratory
  symptoms such as pulmonary edema and bronchial
  spasms may occur in immediate response to
  exposure or develop and progress in severity over
  a period of hours to days post-exposure.

44
.

• Risk characterization SEVERE EFFECTS
• Initial effects of exposure
  wereCoughing,Vomiting, Severe eye
  irritation, Feeling of suffocation
• Acute symptoms were-Burning in the
  respiratory tract and eyes,Blepharosphasm,Breathle
  ssness,Stomach pains and vomiting.
• Causes of death wereReflexogenic
  circulatory collapse,Pulmonary oedema,Tubular
  necrosis of kidney,Fatty degeneration of liver.
• Risk management It was suggested to people to
  close there windows and doors and spread the
  water to their floors and lay down on the floor.
  The State Government established a number of
  hospitals, clinics and mobile units in the
  gas-affected area to cure the victims.

45
CEL 899 Oil Spill Risk Assessment

• Name Entry Number
• Arnav Kumar Guha 2012CEV2268
• Samarpreet Singh 2012CEV2270
• Swaagat Das 2012CEV2275
• Dheeraj Chaudhary 2012CEV2284
• Govind Narain 2012CEV2280
• Neeraj Golhani 2012CEV2281

46
Oil Spill Risk Assessment Introduction

• Oil spill is release of liquid petroleum,
  hydrocarbon into the ocean or coastal waters, due
  to human activity, mainly
• Sinking or leakage of oil carrying vessels or oil
  pipelines.
• Countries at war
• Illegal damping by industries
• Terrorist activities
• Natural disaster
• The oil spill basically covers the surface of
  water by a thick film and thereby
• Effects the entire marine life
• Fishes die, because they cannot breathe
• Nature takes up to 10years to recover. if oil
  reaches the sea beds

47
Methodology

• Our study will focus on risk assessment due to
  oil spill and taking BPs oil spills as a prime
  case example. The study will be having following
  steps
• Study of major oil spills
• Establishing the system Boundaries
• Risk assessment through
• Hazard Identification
• Frequency Analysis
• Consequence Analysis
• Risk Evaluation and Calculations
• Suggesting mitigation strategies

48
Fault Tree of a oil spill
Risk Perception Psychometric Map
Location of risk in factor space (based on Slovic
et.al)
49
Frequency Analysis
Frequency analysis is important as it enables us
to estimate the probability of another oil spill
based on trends of spill accidents in time for
example the following graph Source
www.itopf.com/stats.html shows that in the
coming decades the number of spill will be less
than 7.3 spill per ten year
Rank Oil spill per decade probabilty of exceeding n oil spills per decade
1 24.1 0.25
2 8.8 0.20
3 7.3 0.17
Figure 3International Oil spill trends
50
Risk Communication

• The main part of risk communication includes
  bridging the gap between the actual facts and
  scientific revelations with the perception of
  the people to be affected.
• In case of oil spills, the risk communication
  should primarily include
• Making the people aware of the exact scale and
  circle of loss due to the mishap.
• Analysing and discussing the future related
  occurrences (if any).
• Making the communicators aware of the various
  standard allowable guidelines related to the
  spill, as led down by the concerned authorities.
• Circulating proper preventive suggestions and
  controlling measures which ought to be taken by
  the audience on their own and also helping them
  implementing those techniques.
• Assuring the people of the measures being taken
  on behalf of the organization as a whole in order
  to counter act and minimize the losses, if
  possible.
• Making publis certain important figures related
  to the mishap like-
• Origin of the spill
• Cause(s) and there proper and understandable
  analysis.
• Degree of occurrence
• Areas most adversely affected
• Maximum people and property expected to have been
  affected
• Time expected to be need for complete
  rehabilitation

51
Health Impacts Risk Assessment of
Cutting-fluids and Lubricating oil
Term Paper Report Environmental Risk Assessment
(CEL899)

• By
• Arun Unnikrishnan
• 2012MEZ8250

52
Methodology Followed

• For the health impact for the direct body contact
  with cutting fluids, the scientific approach
  descried on the Greba risk assessment hand out
  was used. Steps-
• Hazard identification Defining the hazard and
  nature of the harm, identifying a chemical
  contaminant, and documenting its toxic effects on
  metal workers.
• Exposure assessment Determining the
  concentration of a contaminating agent in the
  environment and estimating its rate of intake
• Doseresponse assessment Quantifying the adverse
  effects arising from exposure to a hazardous
  agent based on the degree of exposure
• Risk characterization Estimating the potential
  impact of a hazard based on the severity of its
  effects and the amount of exposure
• Systems analysis- Fault tree analysis and
  Reliability block diagram.
• Risk Zonation

53

• Hazard Identification The major detrimental
  effects of the metal working fluids were taken
  from the article published by NIOSH in 1998.
• Direct exposure measurement of metal working
  fluids on skin and through inhalation Data were
  taken from B van Wendel de Joode, et al. Three
  methods were used for this study conducted on 80
  metal workers.
• Video imaging technique for assessing dermal
  Exposure (VITAE)
• Surrogate Skin Technique (Pads method )
• Dermal Exposure Assessment Method (DREAM)( Semi-
  Quantitative)
• The average exposure concentration
  on the Skin from VITAE method was found to be
  1354mg/hr and from Pads method it was 3706mg/hr.
  DREAM as a pessimistic method came up with the
  value 14985 mg/hr(which was used for this paper)
  and the air borne inhalation rate was found to be
  0.63 mg/m3.

54

• Doseresponse assessment and risk
  characterization As a general approach Compound
  A has been identified having a concentration of
  2 in the Metal working fluid.
• Average daily dose 8hrs 14985 Mg/hr 0.02/ 70
  kg 34.25 mg/kg/day
• Hazard quotient (HQ) ADD/Rfd 34.25
  (mg/kg/day)/ 2(mg/kg/day) 17.125
• The incremental risk of cancer(8hrs 14985
  Mg/hr 0.022505years)/ (70 kg365 70years)
  1(mg/kg/day)-1 1.68
• The risk of the aerosol mist for a worker 0.63
  mg/m3/0.4mg/m31.57 (0.4mg/m3 is the allowable
  concentration)
• Risk Management
• There are four ways for managing these
  risks were proposed by NIOSH (1) safety and
  health training, (2) worksite analysis, (3)
  hazard prevention and control, and (4) medical
  monitoring of exposed workers.

55
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Fault Tree
The failure probability of the top event P (P1
P2 P3)( P4 P5) ( P7 P8) (P9 P10) (P11
P12)( P6)
56
Reliability Block Diagram
So the overall reliability of the system S (1-
(1-S1)(1-S2)(1-S3))(1-(1-S4)(1-S5))S7S8(1-(1-S
9)(1-S10))(1-(1-S11)(1-S12))S6 S (1-P1P2P3)
(1-P4P5)(1-P6) (1-P7) (1-P8) (1-P9P10)
(1-P11P12)
Risk Zonation
Zone I cutting zone where the cutting fluid is
applied as spraying, dropping or flooding
Zone II equipments, helping and machining tools,
clamping devices, material handling devices,
storage devises etc
Zone III far away area from cutting zone, other
departments in the shop, offices etc
57
RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENDOSULFAN ISSUE IN KERALA

• GAYATHRI KRISHNA K (CEW122291)
• PONNI MARIET GEORGE (CEW122293)
• VILAKSHNA PARMAR (CEW122287)
• SANDHYA GUPTA (CEV122276)
• SOWJANYA UPPULURI (CEW122288)
• SYEEDAH RAAZIA (CEW122290)

58
Introduction

• Use of endosulphan in Kasaragod district of
  Kerala.
• Endosulfan is a pesticide used to control insects
  on food crops.
• It is a chlorinated pesticide (C9H6Cl6O3S) of the
  cyclodiene group.
• It has two stereo isomers alpha-endosulfan and
  beta-endosulfan in an approximate ratio of 7030.
• Endosulfan was aerially sprayed for period of 25
  years by Plantation Corporation of Kerala (PCK).
• Health effects- deaths, retarded growth and
  mental illness.
• Effects on animals, biodiversity and ecology of
  the area.

59
Methodology

• 1- Hazard Identification
• 2- Exposure Assessment
• 3- Dose Response Assessment
• 4- Risk Characterization
• 5- Risk Management
• 6- Risk Communication

60
RESULTS
61
(No Transcript)
62
RESULTS
63
Risk management and communication

• Risk management includes social, economic,
  political and engineering issues.
• management system should be such that
  unacceptable risk is brought to acceptable risk
  with alternatives and minimal cost.
• Hoardings, Pamphlet, Radio telecast, Programs on
  national television, Newspapers and articles,
  Working with the media, Social service schemes.

64

• ENVIRONMENT RISK ASSESSMENT
• OF
• RELEASED RADIONUCLEOTIDES
• DUE TO CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
• GROUP MEMBERS
• SAUJANYA KUMAR SAHU
  2012CEW2286
• ARVIND KUMAR BAIRWA
  2012CEW2302
• RAHUL GAUTAM
  2012CEW2301

65
Outline of Presentation

• Introduction
• Environmental Risk Assessment
• Hazard Identification
• Exposure Assessment
• Dose Response Assessment
• Risk Characterization
• Risk Management and Communication
• Analysis
• Event Tree
• Fault Tree
• Reliability Block Diagram
• Conclusion
• Reference

66
Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster Introduction

• Occurred on 26th April 1986 at reactor No. 4 of
  nuclear power plant at Chernobyl.
• The operators switched off an important control
  system -gt reactor reached unstable state -gt A
  sudden power surge -gt steam explosion -gt rupture
  of reactor vessel -gt destruction of reactor core
  and reactor building.
• Intense graphite fire -gt release of radioactive
  materials like 131I and137Cs
• Regions affected - Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.

67
Environmental Risk Assessment of Chernobyl
Nuclear Disaster

• Step 1 Hazard Identification
• Dose of 131Iand 137Cs estimated to be around
  1,760 and5 PBq, respectively (1 PBq 1015Bq).
  Doses estimated on basis of environmental and
  thyroid or body measurement
• Main areas of contamination with137Cs deposition
  density gt 37 kBq m2(1 Ci km2) Belarus, the
  Russian Federation and Ukraine
• Step 2 Exposure Assessment
• Pathways
• Ground
• Consumption of leafy vegetable(short lived 131I)
• deposited on soil, contaminated milk, meat and
  potatoes ( for long lived 137Cs
• Aquatic
• Runoff of surface layers of soil in the watershed
  to water bodies containing radioactive substance

68
Environmental Risk Assessment

• Step 3 Dose response
• External exposure
• where Da the absorbed dose in air Fkthe
  conversion factor, Li,klocation factor
  Bi,kthe occupancy factor,
• Internal exposure where
• D the thyroid dose n the age of the
  individual (years) K scaling parameter
• Step 4 Risk Characterization
• group 1persons engaged in the recovery
  operations
• group 2, persons evacuated from contaminated
  areas (131Cs deposition gt1,480 kBq m2)
• group 3, residents of highly contaminated areas
  (131Cs deposition gt555 kBqm2)
• group 4, children born after the accident
  registered above
• Step 5 Risk Management and Communication
• Compulsory registration and continuous health
  monitoring of recovery operation workers
• Systematic linkage of the Chernobyl registry
  population data with existing mortality and/or
  cancer incidence registries

69
Event Tree for Release of Nucleotides at
Chernobyl Disaster
Outcome
Preventive Aids present
No Release
S
Improper Maintenance
p4
Manual Flaws
Preventive Aids absent
Release
F
p3
1-p4
p1
Control Systems working
Operator turned off important switch
No Release
S
p5
Building not damaged
1-p3
No Release
S
Control Systems not working
Sudden Power Surge
p6
Building damaged
1-p5
Release
F
1-p6
Reactor Core destroyed
Building not damaged
No Release
S
p8
p9
Reaction vessel ruptured
Building damaged
Design Flaws
Reactor Core intact
Release
F
p7
1-p9
1-p8
p2
Reaction vessel intact (not ruptured)
S
1-p7
No Flaws
S
1-p1-p2
70
Fault Tree for Release of Nucleotides at
Chernobyl Disaster
Release of Radio nuclides
OR
Improper Maintenance
Reaction Core Destroyed
Control System failure
AND
AND
Prevention aids absent
Sudden Power Surge
Design Flaws
Sudden Power surge
AND
Manual Flaws
Reaction building damage
Rupture of reactor vessel
Reaction building damage
Operator turned off important switch
Reaction building damage
Control system not working properly
Manual Flaws
71
Reliability Block Diagram of Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Plant
No manual flaws (A)
Operator didn't turn off imp. Switch (D)
No design Flaws (G)
Proper Maintenance (B)
Reactor vessel intact (H)
Control system working (E)
Preventive aids present (C)
Reactor core intact (I)
Building not damaged (F)
Here A Failure event A Success event
A No Manual Flaws F Building not
damaged B Proper Maintenance G No Design
Flaws C Preventive Aids Present H Reactor
vessel intact D Operator didnt turn off
switch I Reactor core intact E Building
not damaged
72
Conclusion

• accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in
  1986, a tragic event. Many lost lives and still a
  many suffering from radiation hazards.
• necessary to expand research of long term effects
  of the acute radiation sickness to support
  survivors.
• Its findings methods developed to combat and
  manage radiation hazards can be readily
  applicable to disaster of similar kind,e.g.
  Fukushima Diiachi nuclear disaster
• Need to generate positive public opinion about
  harnessing of clean nuclear energy.

73
Reference

• www.unscear.org/unscrea
• http//www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/ba
  ckgrounder/en/index.html
• http//www.world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/WNA
  _Personal_Perspectives/jaworowski_chernobyl.pdf
• http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster
• http//www.davistownmuseum.org/cbm/Rad7b.html

74
MICROBIAL RISK ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED SEWAGE
TREATMENT PLANTS IN NCR REGION

• REPORT BY
•  
• TROPITA PIPLAI- 2012CEZ8079
• AGNES SHIJI JOY-2011CEV2845
• SANGEETA PEGU-2011CEV2865
• MALAVIKA VARMA-2011CEU2873
• KAVITA GANESH-2011CHE3091

75
OVERVIEW AND SCOPE

• An analysis was done to study and quantify the
  Microbial Risk Analysis of the selected Sewage
  Treatment Plants (STPs) based on the five step
  methodology.
• The objective of this study is to perform a
• Microbial Risk Analysis of the selected Sewage
  Treatment Plants
• Identification and Solutions applicable to these
  risks
• Management and Communication of these risk
  effectively
• The limitation of our study we have conducted on
  are
• Of the many pathogens only 3 commonly found
  pathogens were considered
• Ingestion route was considered as the mode of
  infection
• The effects was considered on specific sub
  populations
• Awareness study was evaluated on students
• Delhi was taken as the study area

76
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

• Pathogens selected
• Salmonella
• Shigella
• E.coli
• Site-Description Two Sewage Treatment Plants has
  been selected for our study having different
  treatment methods.
• NOIDA It is a Sequential Batch Reactor (SBR)
  based STP having a capacity of 27MLD.It was
  started in March 2012 and its source of water in
  the treatment plant is completely domestic.
• VASANT KUNJ It is based upon Extended Aeration
  Process and has a capacity of 22.7 mld and flow
  of 18.16 mld. The source of water in the
  treatment plant is completely domestic.

77
EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT

• The reference risks of the micro organisms which
  we are studying, as per the U.S.EPA are 
• Salmonella 0.0001 Shigella 0.0001 E.coli
  0.0001
• The Hazard Quotient is calculated by
  dividing the Annual risk calculated (both Exp and
  Poisson) by the reference risks listed by US EPA.
  If the Hazard Quotient is above 1, a definite
  step has to be taken towards improving the whole
  scenario as the situation is definitely at risk.
  If it less than 1, then the situation is under
  control and not at risk.
• The most common pathways for these pathogens to
  enter the human body are ingestion, inhalation
  and dermal, can be listed as

S.No Target Subpopulation Ingestion rate (mL/day) Frequency (times/year)
1 Workers working in WWTPs 6 260
2 Children Playing 6 3
3 Recreational activities 50 10
4 Exposure to leafy vegetables 3 15
78
DOSE-RESPONSE ASSESSMENT

• For estimation of Risk on a daily basis, the
  following mathematical models were used. They
  are
• Exponential p(daily) 1- (-exp rN)
• Poisson p(daily) 1-(1N) a
• ß
• After estimating the daily risk, the annual risk
  was calculated using the following equation
• RISK ANNUAL 1-(1-Pdaily)Exposure time

TARGET SUBPOPULATION HAZARD QUOTIENT SALMONELLA HAZARD QUOTIENT SHIGELLA HAZARD QUOTIENT E.COLI
Workers working in WWTPs 52.26 4.03 4.15
Children Playing 2.01 0.04 0.04
Recreational activities 25.15 1.29 1.33
Exposure to leafy vegetables 0.3 0.11 0.119
79
RISK CHARACTERIZATION, MANAGEMENT AND
COMMUNICATION

• Risk Characterization
• From the previous table it can be seen that,
• Workers working in WWTPs Children playing
  Recreational Activities are at RISK from
  SALMONELLA.
• Workers working in WWTPs Recreational
  Activities are at RISK from SHIGELLA.
• Workers working in WWTPs Recreational
  Activities are at RISK from E.COLI.
• Also Ingestion through swimming (Recreation) case
  needs to be addressed with top priority for both
  Salmonella and Shigella as it poses maximum risk
  the concern population.
• Risk Communication and Management
• Based on a student survey conducted in the
  campus,
• Most of the students rank all the above diseases
  between 2 to 6.5 and considered as dread.
• As expected the most fimiliar disease was
  diarrhoea.
• Unlike expected most of the students did not
  consideres Hepatitis as a dreadful disease.
• Most of the students were fimiliar with urinary
  tract infection and did not considered it very
  dreadful.
• People had very little knowledge about
  Salmonellas and Neonatal meningitis. And
  considered these diseases as dreadful.

80
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•  
• Pant, A. and Mittal ,A.K. (2007). Monitoring of
  pathogenecity of effluents from the UASB based
  sewage treatment plant. Environ Monit Assess,
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•  
• Jamwala P, Mittal A K., (2009). Reuse of treated
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•  
• Hencha K.R, Bissonnettea G.K,, Sexstonea A.J,
  Colemanb J.G, Garbuttb K,. Skousena J.G., (2002)
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  contaminants in domestic wastewater following
  treatment by small constructed wetlands Water
  Research 37 (2003) 921927
•  
•  
• Mara D D, Sleigh P.A, Blumenthal U.J and Carr R.
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  risk analyses and epidemiological studies
  Journal of Water and Health (2007)
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• Y. Karamoko, K. Ibenyassine, M. M. Ennaji, B.
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• Sadovski A Y, Fattal B, Goldberg D, Katzenelson E
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• Ahmed AM, Furuta K, Shimomura K, Kasama Y,
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