Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference PLUTONIUM UTILIZATION IN REACTOR FUEL A. Zro

1
Second Moscow International Nonproliferation
Conference PLUTONIUM UTILIZATIONIN REACTOR
FUEL A. Zrodnikov Director General State
Scientific Center of the Russian Federation
Institute for Physics and Power Engineering
September 18-20, 2003
2
RUSSIAS NUCLEAR POWER AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE
21st CENTURY

• Operating nuclear power plants
• RBMK-1000 (11)
• VVER- 440 (6)
• VVER-1000 (71)
• EGP-6 (4)
• BN-600 (1)
• Transport power systems
• Research reactors
• Nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure

3
NUCLEAR POWER STRATEGY

• Maintenance of safe and efficient functioning of
  operating NPPs and fuel infrastructure.
• Progressive replacement of operating NPPs with
  3-rd generation traditional power units,
  a moderate increase of generating
  capacity in the first quarter of the 21st
  century
  expanding the export potential.
• Development and introduction of innovative
  economically competitive reactor and nuclear
  fuel cycle technologies.

4
LARGE SCALE NUCLEAR POWER FOR THE 21st CENTURY

• Liquid-metal cooled fast reactors of inherent
  safety
• Proliferation-resistant closed fuel cycle
• Reduce the volume and long-term toxicity of
  nuclear wastes and radiation-balanced disposal of
  radwastes
• Technological support for non-proliferation
• Economic competitiveness

5
SMALL AND MEDIUM REACTORS

• No on-site refueling and sophisticated nuclear
  infrastructure, long-lived core lasting 1020
  years
• Completely sealed reactor, transportable to
  and from the site
• 50 to 150 MWe class, fuel enrichment ? 20
• Simplified design, high level of passive safety
• Cost comparable to the cost of competitive
  systems

6
SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT CURRENT STATUS

• Short - term storage in cooling ponds
• Accumulation and interim wet storage for
  subsequent placement in long-term centralized
  dry storage
• Radiochemical reprocessing with U and Pu
  separation followed by their involvement in the
  fuel cycle

7
GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OFPLUTONIUM
STOCKS

• Plutonium, as a nuclear material, has a unique
  energy potential, it is a national asset, and it
  can be put to maximum effective use under
  Russias national energy strategy
• The ultimate strategic goal is to make full use
  of plutoniums energy potential, with the waste
  converted to a state, that makes it unusable for
  subsequent weapons-production and ensures their
  secure ecological isolation
• Once approved, plans for plutonium utilization
  must be implemented in a manner which ensures
  that it is stored, transported and handled in
  accordance with the highest national and
  international standards in terms of nuclear
  safety, ecology, physical protection, accounting
  and control

8
PLUTONIUM CONTAINED IN SPENT FUEL

• Totals for the country
• As of December 31, 1999
• Plutonium contained in spent
• fuel at civil reactor sites 47 000kg
• Plutonium contained in spent
• fuel at reprocessing plants 4 000kg
• Plutonium contained in spent
• fuel kept elsewhere 20 000kg

9
CIVIL UNIRRADIATED PLUTONIUM

• As of December 31, 1999
• Unirradiated separated plutonium in product
• storage facilities at reprocessing
  plants 30 900kg
• Unirradiated separated plutonium in
  manufacturing
• or fabrication and the plutonium contained
  in
• unirradiated products at fuel fabrication or
  other
• plants or elsewhere -
• Plutonium in unirradiated MOX fuel or other
• fabricated products at reactor sites or
  elsewhere 200kg
• Unirradiated separated plutonium kept elsewhere
  900kg
• The quantities of Pu withdrawn from the
  military sphere will be declared when placed in
  storage at PA Mayak

10
EX-WEAPONS PLUTONIUM MANAGEMENT CONCEPT

• Reliable and controllable interim storage
• In-pile transformation, including MOX-forms,
  into spent fuel with subsequent utilization in
  the proliferation-resistant closed fuel cycle

11
HISTORY

• BR-5 (1959) BR-10 Obninsk
• BOR-60 (1966) Dimitrovgrad
• BN-350 (1972) Kazakhstan
• BN-600 (1980) Urals
• BN-800 (1992, design)

12
120 REACTOR/YEARS EXPERIENCE BR-10, BOR-60,
BN-350, BN-600

• Major technological problems have been already
  solved
• 5000 MOX fuel rods have been irradiated
• Closed fuel cycle is realized for BOR-60
• Pyrochemical technology and vibro-compacted MOX
  can significantly decrease cost and terms
• Advanced design of BN-800 is available

13
BN-600 NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR
Electricity to the consumer
Transformer
Control rods
Steam generator
Generator
Turbine
Cooling water pond
Condenser
Circulation pump
Feedwater pump
Fuel
Main coolant pump of the secondary circuit
Main coolant pump of the primary circuit
14
BN-800 REACTOR
1 - primary pump 2 - large rotating plug 3 -
refueling mechanism 4 - small rotating plug 5 -
central rotating column with control and
scram system mechanism 6 - upper stationary
shield 7 - reactor vessel 8 - guard vessel 9 -
heat exchanger 10 - core
15
BN-600 CURRENT STATUS

• Hybrid core as the first stage,
• 280 kg Pu/year
• 100 MOX fueled core,
• 1250 kg Pu/year
• Some features of MOX fuel

16
BN-600 CURRENT STATUS (cont.)

• Radiation characteristics of fuels
• Neutron radiation rate, Gamma radiation rate,
  
• Fuel n/s SA
  ?/s SA
• fresh irrad. fresh
  irrad.
• UO2 4.8 ? 102 1.2 ? 105
  2.9 ? 109 4.5 ? 1014
• MOX (wPu) 6.7 ? 105 1.3 ? 106 1.1 ?
  1012 5.2 ? 1012

17
SCENARIOS OF THE EX-WEAPON PU STOCK-PILE
REDUCTION IN RUSSIA
18
PLUTONIUM NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES

• Storage and management
• Reliable security measures
• Safeguards and control
• Minimum personnel with authorized access
• Minimum handling operations
• Minimum transportation
• Minimum sites with plutonium handling
• Conversion into spent fuel
• Dilution in MOX fuel
• Cladding and assembling
• Irradiation in nuclear reactors

19
PLUTONIUM NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES (cont.)

• Unified models for non-proliferation analysis
  ISTC project and bilateral collaboration
• Is closed cycle potentially less protected to
  proliferation than open one?
• How does BN-800 minimize the proliferation risk?
• Development of an internationally
• recognized methodology for the
• quantitative assessment of the
• proliferation risk

20
CLOSED NUCLEAR CENTER CONCEPT

• Russian specific features
• - rather large territory
• - many sparsely populated regions
• MAYAK site in South Urals
• - RT-1 reprocessing plant, in operation
  now
• - 30 t of civil Pu are stored
• Complex-300 MOX fuel fabrication plant
• BN-800 fast reactor

21
OPTIONS FOR TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE OF MOX
FUEL
22
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

• Russian - US cooperation
• Russian - French - German Research Program
• Russian - Canadian collaboration
• Russian - Japanese cooperation

23
Conclusions

• The use of existing fast BN-600 reactor and,
  subsequently, fast BN-800 reactor (to be
  constructed) makes it possible to consume 50MT of
  weapons plutonium by the year 2020 and to reduce
  the cost of the Russian Ex-W Pu disposition
  Program.
• Dual-use BN-800 reactor (Ex-W Pu utilization and
  the new electricity production) opens
  opportunities for potential investment options.
• There are no proliferation concerns with the fast
  reactor technology at the stage of final
  disposal elimination of the breeding zones in
  both BN-600 and BN-800 could be the first step to
  a more self-protected fast reactor technology.
• Closed nuclear centers are the best way to ensure
  the non-proliferation of fissile materials,
  especially ex-weapons plutonium in Russia.