PS 142 War and Peace

1
PS 142War and Peace

• Lecture 20
• The Six Day War

2
A War Nobody Wanted

• Six Day War had dramatic implications for Middle
  East
• Central problems of West Bank and Gaza have root
  in this war
• Golan Heights still obstacle to peace with Syria
• Sinai blocked Israel-Egypt relations until Camp
  David Accords in 1977
• Like WWI the Six Day War was arguably
  inadvertent
• Miscalculations intersect to cause escalation

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Areas Occupied by IsraelAfter the Six Day War
4
The Calm Before the Storm

• Decade from Suez War to 1967 was peaceful time in
  Arab-Israeli relations
• Settlement of Suez kept the peace
• UNEF forces in Sharm-el-Sheik, Gaza border
• Prevented terrorist raids
• Secured Israeli access to the Red Sea
• 1966 Baathist party comes to power in Syria and
  relations deteriorate
• Close ties with the USSR
• Allows terrorist operations and raids into Israel
• El Samu, November 1967

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Setting the Fire

• December 1966 Egypt and Syria form alliance
• April 1967 Israeli jets retaliate against Syria
• Buzz Damascus in taunting fashion
• Egypt remains silent
• May 1967 USSR warns Egypt of Israeli attack on
  Syria
• Soviets were clearly wrong
• UN inspections found no Israeli preparations
• Not clear whether it was deliberate deception
• Mistranslated cable or prodding Egypt?

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Escalation Begins

• Egyptians believe the Soviets
• Soviets are serious people
• Want Soviet military support
• Egypt begins military mobilization to deter
  Israeli attack on Syria
• Troop movements very public
• Problem is UN forces block access to Israel
• Threat to fight looks hollow
• Egypt ridiculed by radical Arabs

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Losing Control

• Nasser asks for partial withdrawal of UN forces
  to allow access to the border
• U Thant (UN Sec. Gen) says partial withdrawal is
  impossible all or nothing
• Not true Thant trying to force Nasser to back
  down
• Nasser fears costs of capitulation and chooses to
  escalate
• Demands total UNEF withdrawal

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Sliding to the Brink

• With UNEF gone Nasser feels pressure to close
  straits of Tiran at Sharm-el-Sheik
• Closing straits has been official policy since
  56
• For Israel closing straits is causus belli
• Nasser closes straits and then tries not to
  provoke further
• Troops cease provocative action
• Signals accommodation to UN, USSR
• Offers UN arbitration of Straits issue

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The Israeli Response

• Early response is to match Egyptian mobilization
  in Sinai with troops in Negev
• When Egypt asks for partial withdrawal of UNEF,
  Israel begs U Thant to accept the offer
• When Straits are closed, Israeli attitude changes
• Unimpressed with Nasser offers
• Begins preparation for war within 48 hrs.

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The Failure of the Great Powers

• Israel looks to Britain, France and the US for
  support
• France bails
• UK hedges and looks to the US
• US offers diplomatic support
• Begs Israel to wait they allow 1 week
• US tries to create Red Sea Regatta
• No military support because of Vietnam
• Regatta idea collapses ineffectual

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War Begins

• In Israel even waiting 1 week is viewed as
  appeasement
• Dyan replaces Eshkol as Defense Minister
• Nasser orders troops not to make provocation
• Promises UN and UK he will not attack
• But remains publicly intransigent
• Israel launches devastating surprise attack
  against Egypt on June 5
• Syria and Jordan give token support to Egypt and
  Israel takes W. Bank and Golan Heights

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What Explains this Escalation?

• Poor bargaining strategies!
• Criticized by Stein and Bar-Simantov
• Egypt is a bully (publicly) and confuses private
  assurances with public rhetoric
• All major powers fail to restrain client states
• Israel becomes a bully too impatient over
  straits
• U Thant (and UN) give ultimatum

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Why Such Bad Strategies?

• Most common explanation is misperception
• Especially by Nasser
• Nasser misperceived Egypts military capability
• But his military actions show he was not
  confident
• Nasser thought Israel would not fight alone
• Was a reasonable initial expectation that he
  changed as the crisis escalated

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Why Such Bad Strategies

• Constituency politics constrained state
  strategies
• Egypt constrained by Arab radicals
• Nasser sees himself as Pan-Arab leader
• Pressure across Egypt, Jordan, Syria
• US constrained by Vietnam
• Israel constrained by domestic opposition
• Costly to wait even 1 week
• What about the UN?

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The Failure of UNEF

• U Thant and UN is one group that was NOT
  constrained by constituents
• Security council members and disputants all
  wanted partial UNEF withdrawal
• Thant could have received new authority to make
  this work
• But Thant too brash and then too weak
• Why??? He just made a stupid mistake