The Economics of US Civil War Conscription

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The Economics of US Civil War Conscription

• Tim Perri
• Department of Economics
• ASU
• September 15, 2006

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? 5 times the United States used conscription
during wars in the CW, WWI, WWII, the Korean
War, in the Vietnam War. ? In the 20th
century wars with conscription, the of those
who served who were draftees 59, 61, 27, and
21. ? The same for the CW is 2.
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? Civil War conscription (CWC) was not designed
to directly attract volunteers. ? The federal
govt. was weak had little ability to tax. CWC
was used to shift some of the payroll cost of
the army to state local govt. ? Historians
have criticized bounties, substitution,
commutation.
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? Others (including economists) have argued sub.
commutation were only for the relatively
affluent. ?Draft riots suggest it was not easy
to avoid service. ? However, only 2 of those
who served were drafted.
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? Among the arguments herein are 1) Riots did
not reflect draft risk. 2) There were many ways
to avoid svc. 3) Commutation substitution
were used to reduce the of those who were
conscripted. 4) The bounty system worked
reasonably well given constraints. 5)
Commutation could have lowered social cost but
was used as a price ceiling.
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History of conscription in the US
? All but Pa. of the colonies allowed sub. in the
militia some allowed payment of a fee to
avoid svc. ? Militia drafts were used in Indian
Wars, War of 1812, in the Revolution. ? 1812
Troup/Monroe plans classes of 25 men, each class
of ? wealth. No volunteer from a class? Pay a
tax.
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? Lindsay (1968) Rafuse (1970) Troup/Monroe
similar to vol. army. ? I argue CWC was similar
shift some of the tax burden to the local level
without taxing only draftees or compelling anyone
to enter military service.
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? CW early attempts to raise troops were left
to the states (militias were used). Recruiting ?
in summer 1862. ? Demand for men ?. ? In the
army 1/62 575,917 1/63 918,121 1/64 860,737
1/65 959,460
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? Militia law of 1862 transition to federal
authority to raise troops. ? Before this,
federal troop calls were voluntary states
appropriated to pay for militia. ? With
militia law, draft from militias if troop calls
were not met.
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? Exemptions and substitutions were allowed.
Riots occurred the draft was rescinded. ? The
Enrollment Act of 1863 completed the transition
to federal control of recruitment and to
national conscription.
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? Enlistment quotas were assigned to each
Congressional district by its pro rata share of
the called minus the of previous enlistees
from the district. ? After 50 days, a lottery
would be held to obtain the remainder of a
district's quota. ? Not all districts had
drafts. ? The draft calls were 10/63, 3/64,
7/64, 12/64.
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Substitution commutation ? All 4 drafts
hire avoid svc. for 3 years. ? Pay 300 1st
draft, avoid svc. for 3 yrs. 2nd draft, avoid
svc. for that draft 3rd 4th drafts, only COs
could avoid svc.
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Table One. Draft Statistics from the US Civil
War.
Draft called () reporting discharged () examined exempted held to service commuted hiring subs. drafted
1 292, 441 253,026 460 252,566 164,395 88,171 52,288 26,002 9,881
2 113, 446 86,253 1,296 84,957 39,952 45,005 32,678 8,911 3,416
3 231, 918 165,759 27,223 138,536 82,531 56,005 1,298 28,502 26,205
4 139, 024 110,547 64,419 46,128 28,631 17,497 460 10,192 6,845
All 776, 829 615,585 93,398 522,187 315,509 206, 678 86,724 73,607 46,347
Source Murdock (1971), p.13. These are
the numbers called in a draft after volunteers
were obtained. The government calls for men
were, as best as can be determined, 500,000,
200,000, 500,000, and 300,000, respectively
(Geary, 1991, p.81). These individuals
apparently were discharged because their
districts had met their quotas.
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Table Two. Various Draft Percentages.
Draft called who reported reported not discharged examined held to svc. held to svc. who were drafted called who were drafted
1 87 100 35 19 3
2 76 98 53 8 3
3 71 84 40 47 11
4 80 42 38 39 5
All 80 85 40 22 6
Source Table One
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? who served estimates 1.5 m to over 2.5 m.
I use 2.1m. ? 92 of those who served were
volunteers. ? Volunteers ? non-regular army. ?
Regular army authorized to have 42,000
men---never did.
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Enrollment Act ? 50 days to meet
quotas ? then a draft occurred ? Bounties at
state local level to hire subs. vols. ?
285m. ? Federal bounties ? 300m.
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? Fall 63. A vol. in NYC, 300 (county), 75
(state), 200-400 (fed.) 775. ? Rafuse
(1970) a union private earned 6.40 per month
in 1864. ? Lonn (1928) pay was initially 13
per mo. rising to 16 by 5/64.
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Bounty system ? Jumping was a big
prob. ? 12/64 bounties held until men reached
the front. ? Incentive to pay up front one
counted even if he did not serve. ? Why?
Limited fed. power.
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? Long (1975) ave. annual earnings in
manufacturing of 297 (1860) 384 (1870). ?
Could those not wealthy afford to hire or
commute? YES!!
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1) Communities raise for subs.
commutation. 2) Draft insurance (formal
informal) existed. ? Pay for commut. or
subs. ? Fees 10-50.
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Draft opposition ? Why riots
oppo. to commutation? 1) Non-affluent wanted a
tax on the wealthy to pay for sub. commut. 2)
Commut. was a focal point. 3) Riots occurred
before people realized community funds would be
forthcoming. 4) Anti-fed. govt. sentiments.
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Why the draft? 1) Assertion of fed.
power to prevent disunion. 2) Feds. could not
pay for troops. ? Induce communities to pay.
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A model
a) Market for subs.
? inds. ?U on 0,N with density of 1. ? Random
draft of m inds., m lt N. ? Feds. pay WM. ? Each
enlistee gets B from the community. ? Seller
reservation wage W.
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? P price of a substitute. ? Hire if called
W-P gt WM B. ? Go as a sub. if not called
W lt WM B P.
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Mkt. clearing P m WM B. ? A sub. gets P
WM B m. ? Those with W lt m serve. ? D
of reluctant draftees.
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? Reluctant if drafted WM B lt W lt m. D
(m - WM - B)m/N. ? No resource
misallocation (wrong people in svc.).
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Figure One. Conscription with substitution.
Hire if called
Reluctant draftees if called
Go as a substitute if not called
W
0
WMB
N
WMBPm
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b) The community ? T total funds raised. ? F
fixed cost of fundraising. ? T Bm F. ?
Opposition to the community ?. ? ? ?(D,T).
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all gt 0.
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? Min. ? w.r.t. B totally differentiate
f.o.c. -1 lt dB/dWM lt 0, dB/dF lt 0. ? If dkD gt
0 ? an increase in ??/?D dB/dkD gt 0.
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c) The federal govt.
? Feds. min. C w.r.t. WM, C C(?, mWM). ?
S.o.c. requires dB/dWM lt 1. dWM/dkD gt 0.
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d) Costly substitution
? Let cost sW. ? Now hire if W gt W, go as a
sub (if not called) if W lt W
W
W WM B P.
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? As s?, demand for sub.?, P?, quantity of
subs.?. ? If s 0, W W m. ? ?D/?s gt 0
more reluctant draftees. ? Some of the wrong
people are now in the army.
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? With costly substitution, P Psgt0
Psgt0
-WM - B.
? With costless substitution, P Ps0
Ps0 m WM B. Psgt0 lt Ps0 lt Psgt0 sW.
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Figure Two. Costly substitution. Animation
Hire if called
Reluctant draftees if called
Go as a substitute if not called
W
m
0
WMB
W
W
N
Potential for the wrong people to be enlisted
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Commutation could...
...lower social cost. Instead of subs., have
commutation, with the fee z. ? Set z Ps 0
m WM B ? z. 1) Cost of finding subs. is
avoided 2) D? 3) eliminates resource
misallocation.
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? Ps gt 0 lt z lt Ps gt 0 sW. ? More commute
with z than substitute with Ps gt 0.
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Commutation actually...
...worked as a price ceiling. ? z was set lt PS gt
0. ? In 1862 (Militia Act), P 1000 in some
areas. ? 3/63, Enrollment Act set z 300.
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? Economists knew the effects of a price
ceiling (Mill, 1848). ? Did Lincoln his
advisors know? ? Apparently not.
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Conclusions
1) CW draft not to raise men directly. 2)
Designed to attract m soldiers with states
localities bearing some of the payroll cost. 3)
Many options to avoid svc.
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4) Commutation could have lowered social
private cost, but was used as a price ceiling, ?
fewer than m were enrolled.