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DISASTER AT DIEN BIEN PHU

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Title: Slide 1 Author: Paul O'Connor Last modified by: Paul O'Connor Created Date: 8/24/2006 1:25:47 AM Document presentation format: On-screen Show – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: DISASTER AT DIEN BIEN PHU


1
DISASTER AT DIEN BIEN PHU
  • The end of French rule in Vietnam

2
THE SITUATION IN 1954
  • France had been fighting an increasing dirty
    war (sale guerre) in Indo-China to keep control
    of Vietnam.
  • Despite considerable financial assistance from
    America, the French had not been successful in
    defeating the Viet Minh.
  • The French were seeking a means to fight a
    decisive battle to inflict a defeat on the Viet
    Minh.

3
The site of the battle
  • Dien Bien Phu was on the border with Laos.
  • It was a narrow valley that was a considerable
    distance from French supply lines based around
    Hanoi.

4
The French plan
  • Navarre, the French commander, aimed to use
    French forces as a bait for the Viet Minh.
  • He did not believe that the Viet Minh could
    assemble a force strong enough to defeat the
    French forces.
  • He believed that French tanks and planes could be
    used to destroy the Viet Minh.
  • He began to build up an armed camp at Dien Bien
    Phu to encourage the Viet Minh to attack him.

5
An historians view
  • As Navarre, the French commander, poured troops
    into Dien Bien Phu, Giap increasingly felt that
    this was the place to stand. The French, he
    observed, were "completely isolated" in the
    valley and dependent on airlifted supplies, which
    meant that they could be strangled. By contrast,
    their domination of the surrounding mountains
    gave the Viet Minh forces both the advantage of
    height for their cannon and a way to bring food
    and equipment in from the rear.
  • Karnow, Vietnam A History. 1994

6
The Viet Minh buildup
  • Giap, the Viet Minh commander, began to build up
    his forces, bringing men and material secretly
    through mountainous areas.
  • Navarre built an airfield to act as his main
    supply link to headquarters.

Members of the Peoples Militia resupply Viet
Minh troops around Dien Bien Phu
7
A false assumption
  • As in modern warfare the role of the artillery
    was to be decisive.
  • Navarre did not believe that the Viet Minh could
    provide sufficient artillery to threaten his
    base. He was wrong, as this quote indicates.
  • For three days Dong's company had been dragging
    the heavily camouflaged guns up the mountain,
    moving it no more than a yard a minute, half a
    mile in a whole day. To ease its passage, a long
    trench had been hacked out of the limestone by
    hand, and a camouflage of thick foliage had been
    woven into wide nets strung across the gully
    above their heads. The gun was the last of
    twenty-four 105-millimeter howitzers which
    General Giap's 351st. Heavy Artillery Division
    had dragged undetected through the five hundred
    miles of mountainous jungle between Dien Bien Phu
    and the Chinese border.
  • Grey, Saigon, 1982

8
The Viet Minh strategy
  • Giap wanted to wait until he had sufficient
    strength to overwhelm the French.
  • He accumulated forces and munitions to be able to
    mount a decisive massed assault.

Viet Minh 50,000, including 33 infantry
battalions, 6 artillery regiments and 1 regiment
of engineers. 20,000 working on supply trails
leading to the valley. French 13,000, half of
whom were inexperienced in combat
9
The assault begins
  • On 13 March 1954, Giap launched his attack on
    Dien Bien Phu with a huge artillery barrage
    (right)
  • Meanwhile Viet Minh troops moved forward to
    attack different French fire bases (right)

10
Eliminating the fire bases
  • As the artillery pounded the fire bases, Viet
    Minh troops moved in to overwhelm them one by
    one.
  • French artillery and planes could not locate and
    destroy the carefully camouflaged guns.
  • The airstrip was destroyed, preventing the French
    from easily re-supplying or reinforcing the
    French forces on Dien Bien Phu.

11
Reinforcing failure
  • Despite the deteriorating situation French
    paratroopers still volunteered to jump into Dien
    Bien Phu to assist with its defence.

12
It was the major surprise of the battle."
  • "All around our positions, the enemy had created
    a network of camouflaged paths which permitted
    the (unhindered) transport of ammunition ... to
    the vicinity of the batteries. We knew that a
    large number of artillery and antiaircraft gun
    emplacements had been prepared, but their
    camouflage had been so perfect that only a small
    number of them had been located prior to the
    beginning of the attack ... This way of using the
    artillery and AA guns was possible only with the
    "human ant hill" at the disposal of the Vietminh
    and was to make shambles of all the estimates of
    our own artillerymen. It was the major surprise
    of the battle."
  • Navarre, Agonie de L'Indochine, 1956

13
The final assault
  • On 7 May 1954, Giap ordered the final assault on
    the remaining French positions at Dien Bien Phu.
  • At 5.30pm Navarre ordered a ceasefire and the
    battle was over.

14
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15
Why did the French lose?
  • Navarre misread Giap's ability to move a huge
    force rapidly, so that his own troops were
    outnumbered by a ratio of more than five to one
    during the trial by fire. He rejected the notion
    that the Viet Minh could devastate his men with
    artillery deployed on the hills above
    Dienbienphu, nor did he foresee that the enemy
    emplacements would be protected by camouflage and
    antiaircraft guns against bombing from the air.
    He failed to anticipate that Giap's howitzers,
    poised within easy range of his airstrip, would
    cut off flights in and out of the valley, making
    it difficult for his besieged soldiers to receive
    supplies or evacuate wounded - much less withdraw
    themselves. He also chose a terrain presumably
    suitable for tanks only to discover that, unlike
    its description on his maps, its cover of thick
    bush entangled armoured vehicles and its monsoon
    rains flooded the plain in spring.
  • Karnow, Vietnam A History 1994

16
The cost of the battle
  • The battle lasted 55 days.
  • The Viet Minh lost 7900 killed and 15,000
    wounded.
  • The battle cost 2000 French lives and 5600 were
    wounded.

Some of the 6500 French prisoners that were taken
after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu.
17
What now?
  • Though the Viet Minh had won the battle, it did
    not immediately follow that they would become the
    rulers of Vietnam.
  • A conference was being held at Geneva to
    determine the future of both Korea and Vietnam.
  • In the tense Cold War atmosphere of the time,
    superpowers would determine Vietnams immediate
    future.
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