Phil 160

1
Phil 160

• Philippa Foot Morality as a System of
  Hypothetical Imperatives

2
Kants Distinction (to rehash)

• A duty is a kind of obligation, and Kant says
  that there are two sorts of obligations (or
  imperatives)
• Hypothetical Imperative If ______ then you
  should ______. E.g. If you want a burrito, you
  should go to Chipotle. This hypothetical
  imperative has no hold on anyone who does not
  want a burrito.
• Categorical Imperative Do what reason reveals as
  your duty. This is categorical because it
  applies to the whole category of rational beings.
  

3
Counterexamples

• Foot argues that regarding morality as a
  categorical imperative is not plausible, and
  provides two kinds of counterexamples
• The examples of etiquette and club rules
• The example of the amoralist

4
Etiquette and Club Rules

• Traditionally, it is argued that morality must be
  a categorical imperative because it obligates
  people to follow it no matter whether they feel
  like it or not. If the moral sense of the word
  should applies to people no matter what, it is
  not a hypothetical use of the word should, so
  therefore the moral should is categorical.
• Foot provides a counterexample to the above
  argument. The rules of etiquette are an example
  of rules that apply to people whether they feel
  like it or not, but are not therefore regarded to
  be categorically imperative.

5
The amoralist

• It is part of Kants distinction that if someone
  knows what morality demands of them, that they
  must necessarily be motivated to pursue it.
• The amoralist is a person who understands what
  morality demands, but simply doesnt care. If
  such a person is possible, then morality cannot
  necessarily motivate.

6
Foots Distinction

• Obligation

• Motivation

• Many kinds of obligation are non-hypothetical
  (they apply to people whether those people feel
  like following them or not)
• For Foot, morality is one of these. Foot agrees
  that morality obligates people to act in certain
  ways.

• What Foot disagrees with is the motivational
  force that is supopsed to come along with a
  categorical imperative. If someone knows what
  morality demands are they necessarily motivated
  to follow it, or only contingently motivated to
  follow it?

7
Moral Motivation is Contingent

• Foot contends that a person who understands what
  morality demands of them does not necessarily
  have any motivation to accede to those demands.
• Any persons motivation to follow what morality
  demands of them is contingent upon their having
  properly moral reasons for acting.

8
Where does this leave morality?

• Foot contends that we can preserve the important
  facts about morality even in the face of morality
  as a hypothetical imperative. Examples
• A person who is charitable because they happen to
  care about the well-being of others has a morally
  good motive, while someone who is charitable to
  build a repuation does not have a morally good
  motive. Though each may know what morality
  demands of them, the second is moral by accident,
  while the first is moral on purpose, and this is
  more worthy.
• Someone who is honest out of a desire to live
  openly and trust others is more worthy than one
  who is honest only because it is good for
  business.

9
Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives
is still deontological

• Even if morality is not a categorical imperative,
  it still seems that the right-making
  characteristics of an action are contained in the
  action itself, and not in the consequences.

10
Examination of morally proper motives is value
pluralistic

• Many motives that people can have could be
  distinct from one another and still be
  justifiably called moral.
• This mirrors what Ross argued in saying that we
  have many duties, and that they may conflict.
• This also mirrors what Feinberg points out in
  saying that we have many rights, and those may
  sometimes conflict as well.

11
Consolidating some vocabulary

• Foots Acting from morally good motives might
  as well be equivalent to Rosss Acting from one
  duty or another.
• Since duties imply rights (and vice versa), any
  talk of duties must be, ipso facto, talk of
  rights. Since acting from duty is equivalent to
  acting from morally appropriate motives, all of
  the deontologists we have read and discussed are
  up to essentially the same thing, though each
  goes about it in a different way.