The Duty to Obey the Law and Social Trust

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The Duty to Obey the Law and Social Trust

• The Experience of Post-socialist Bulgaria
• Ruzha Smilova PhD

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The starting point Decline in Trust in Authority
and Social Trust

• A general trend of decline in levels of trust
• not confined to post-socialist countries, need
  not be related only to transition, authoritarian
  legacy, etc.
• In post-communist countries - insufficient level
  of horizontal generalized out-group trust (as
  opposed to particularized in-group trust) and low
  vertical trust in authority (declining levels of
  law-abiding behavior/shaken belief in a duty to
  obey the law).
• There is a link between social trust and trust in
  authority/belief in a duty to obey both
  intuitively plausible and supported by their
  strong correlation in diverse value surveys
  (Newton 1999).
• The picture (uniformity in the levels of both
  types of trust) is static
• 1. does not give info on the precise character of
  the link between the two,
• 2. does not allow to specify the causal
  mechanisms of these phenomena.
• What is the precise relation between the two? A
  research into the dynamics of the processes that
  bring about these equilibria is needed.
• In my empirical research I explore the relation
  of social trust to the duty to obey the law

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The Tasks of the Research minimalist

• The minimalist task a thick description of the
  underlying these macro phenomena mechanisms.
• 1. Focus at the micro/the individual level. An
  important criticism of some work on social
  capital (Putnams society-centered model) it
  does not provide an explanation of how the
  individual practical reasoning of the citizens
  relates to the macro-social phenomena. The
  individual beliefs and expectations, determining
  citizens practical decisions and actions, are
  the building blocks of these phenomena, so an
  adequate explanation should include them.
• 2. A successful individual-level description
  would provide some insight into the causal
  mechanisms, determining a societys equilibrium.
  Here the research questions are
• at what levels of social trust a society
  freezes (trust is sticky)
• why and how.
• The task is to go beyond description and attempt
  to give an explanation for the phenomena.

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The Tasks of the Research maximalist

• The maximalist task answering the practically
  interesting questions. They are
• Whether, if at all, a society can move from a
  state of sub-optimal equilibrium (with low levels
  of both horizontal and vertical trust) to
  favorable ones (with higher levels of both
  types).
• I will look for an answer at the micro-level
  in the beliefs, mutual perceptions and
  expectations of the citizens toward the state
  institutions. These beliefs determine the
  mechanics of reaching a Schelling-type tipping
  point, at which enough generalized trust is
  accumulated to become self-sustaining.
• 2. And how can this move be done? Here could be
  the policy implications of my research the
  study will hopefully contribute to a
  contextually-sensitive answer to the question how
  to do the leap upwards towards an improved social
  equilibrium in post-socialist Bulgaria.

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Theoretical Background the social capital
literature

• The institution-centered account of social
  capital quality of government matters for social
  trust. Crucial for beneficial generalized social
  trust are well-performing and fair state
  institutions (Levi 1998, Rothstein 1998,) These
  (and possibly other) qualities of state
  institutions make them trustworthy enough to
  provide guarantees for social trust.
• Theoretical difficulties with a simple-minded
  institutionalist solution to trust problems
• Institutions are made of individuals, whom we
  may/may not trust to be our agents -the problem
  of trust reappears at the level of institutions
  (Offe 2004, Hardin 1998) so they cannot be used
  to solve it.
• in the post-socialist countries the
  institution-mediated building of social trust
  would anyway fail for precisely the same reasons-
  lack of trust in the new institutions, distrust
  toward the older elites, etc. (Elster, Offe,
  Preuss 1998).
• My main research hypothesis institutions matter
  for building social trust, but their influence is
  indirect. Some desirable qualities of the
  institutions allow/do not allow citizens to put
  their trust in them, and only then do these
  institutions generate and support (or undermine)
  social trust.

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Theoretical Background Normative political theory

• Theoretical challenges from normative political
  theory
• 1) legitimate authority (Wolff) is an
  incoherent concept the rationality paradox of
  authority A is either wrong or redundant,
  hence A cannot in principle be legitimate
• 2) There is yet no successful theory for a
  general duty to obey the law (Simmons)
• 3) the most promising candidate - H.L.A. Harts
  duty of fair play (Hart 1955, Klosko 1992,
  Simmons 1987). I will focus on it. My hypothesis
  valid fair play duty to obey depends on social
  trust.
• One of the tasks of my research is to provide
  material for this debate. Hopefully it will help
  answer the question which particular qualities of
  state institutions their fairness in
  law-application and law-enforcement (Tylor 2002,
  Uslaner 2005), their production of favorable
  outcomes for particular (groups of) citizens,
  their generally efficient performance/yet some
  other features, are responsible for boosting
  citizens trust in institutions, thereby
  strengthening social trust.

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Theoretical motivations why duty to obey

• 1. The resilience of the practice a general
  belief in the existence of this duty is observed
  in many surveys, case studies, etc., as testified
  by social psychologists, sociologists and
  political scientists
• 2. A dilemma for the political theorist
  theoretical coherence (there are no adequate
  answers to the theoretical challenges to
  legitimate authority/general duty to obey, and it
  is better not to pretend there are) or
  descriptive adequacy (there is general belief on
  the part of citizens in the existence of both)?
• 3. John Rawls method of reflective equilibrium
  the right political principles for a society
  should fit the considered convictions of its
  members. In political theory there is no
  theoretical validity without descriptive
  adequacy.
• If there is a general belief in the population,
  that they have a duty to obey, an adequate theory
  for this duty, meeting the theoretical challenges
  above, should be provided.

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The adequate theory a fair-play
duty to obey the law

• 1. Why is it adequate? It avoids some of the
  problems of
• a) The voluntarist accounts - no acceptance of
  the benefits, no consent or other volitional
  element required, thus the account is
  descriptively adequate
• b) the pure natural duty accounts one has to
  obey the law of ones own determinate community
  only, therefore the account meets the
  determinacy objection (why obey the law of
  ones own community rather the more just one
  somewhere else?)
• 2. What is fair play here? one has to obey
  the law of a community, whose benefits one has
  enjoyed, otherwise one takes unfair advantage of
  the members who obey
• 3. The main problem - the compliance condition
  one is under duty of fair play to obey only if
  enough others comply with the law

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Compliance Condition A Collective Action Problem

• Since both my own duty and everybody elses is
  conditional on the compliance of enough others,
  and this is general knowledge, no one is willing
  to start complying without a guarantee that
  enough others will follow. There is no valid
  duty, since compliance condition not met)
• The problem of the guarantee it is a common
  knowledge that compliance is
• 1) waste of effort at best when the public good
  of law and order is not produced,
• 2) typically much worse invites exploitation
  others enjoy the benefit without contributing.
• The exploitation scenario is the nightmare of
  homo economicus, whose individual rationality
  traps him and his fellows in a sub-optimal
  equilibrium (no public good) in Prisoners
  dilemma situations.

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The Role of Social Trust as Guaranteeing
Compliance Horizontal Trust

• 1. Horizontal trust and compliance the
  bootstrapping role.
• If enough citizens trust that enough others will
  obey, they will obey themselves, thus making it
  the case that enough people obey.
• The compliance condition is met the rest are
  under a duty to obey.
• 2. Duty through horizontal social trust -
  short, yet problematic way
• there is no generalized social trust in our
  society (WVS/EVS)
• even if there was, it would not be of the type
  required how to translate the in-group trust,
  generated in day-to-day personal contacts, with
  history of successful exchange, etc. into
  generalized, society-wide social trust, backing a
  society-wide duty to obey the law?
• Yet even if there was such trust, and it was of
  the right kind, a duty to obey entirely generated
  through such social trust is suspect since it
  has to also correspond to some objective
  characteristics of authoritative institutions
  such as efficiency, fairness, responsiveness,
  accountability, etc.

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The Role of Trust as Guaranteeing Compliance
Vertical Trust

• 1. Vertical trust in authority and institutions
  - second route to solving the collective action
  problem to rely that state institutions will
  guarantee a sufficient level of compliance with
  the rules, thereby creating the necessary
  condition for the duty of fair play.
• Problems
• - Vertical trust a misnomer here? The citizen
  trusts that the institution will step in to
  coercively enforce the law, even if he does not
  trust this institution otherwise (since it
  might be unfair, non-transparent,
  non-accountable, corrupt, etc).
• - if so, then even if enough others are forced
  to obey, one may not have a duty, if authorities
  cannot be trusted in the proper sense of trust
  
• institutions are made up of individuals, whom we
  may not trust (we are back to horizontal social
  trust problems above)
• quality of institutions also matters for trust
  proper some of the institutional characteristics
  of institutions may not allow for trust.

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The ultimate task of the research

• The dynamics of this process of
• 1. building generalized social trust (which
  allows citizens to comply with the law without
  exploiting each other) and
• 2. generating a fair-play duty to obey the law
  through reliance on the authority of
  substantively just and fair state institutions,
  is complex.
• It may require, in addition to building such
  institutions, that the state engages in creating
  social meanings (Edmundson 2002), strategically
  constructing collective memories (Rothstein 2001)
  or using yet other semantic techniques.
• The main aspects of this dynamic process, as
  well as the specific features of its development
  in post-socialist Bulgaria, deserve to be
  explored and described in detail. This is the
  ultimate task of my proposed research.

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Research Design of the empirical study of
attitudes to obligation to obey

• 1. Types of obligations studied the payment of
  electricity and central heating bills, and the
  payment of taxes, and the putative general
  obligation to obey the law.
• 2. In-depth individual interviews with citizens
  and officials, using questionnaires with
  hypothetical scenarios to reveal citizens and
  officials attitudes towards their obligations
• 3. Respondents (5 in each group) from five target
  groups 1. pensioners 2. students and young
  professionals 3. average income middle-age
  persons, 4. businessmen, and 5. state officials
  (from central and municipal administration, and
  the judiciary).
• The citizen groups differ in their period of
  socialization (socialism/transition or both) and
  in the levels of their average law-abidance. Does
  socialism/the transition period, influence the
  attitudes to law?

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Descriptive Outputs of the Empirical Research
Static and Dynamic

• 4.. A static map of the attitudes of 1. citizens
  (do citizens believe they have obligations to pay
  their bills/taxes, some differences between them?
  Do they believe to have a general moral
  obligation to obey the law, or they find some
  important differences between these. 2. of
  officials - toward non-complying citizens/their
  own obligations to charge them. (Do officials
  believe in unconditional duty to obey and apply
  the law and if yes - how do they understand this
  obligation? Do they use discretion/ how do they
  react to gaps, contradictions/injustice in the
  laws/governing regulations do they initiate
  motions for a change, apply the law as it is,
  find ways to drop the case?)
• 5. A thick description of the self-interpretation
  info on the subjective determinants of
  attitudes and on their dynamics (change over
  time). Personal experience of such changes may
  explain what prompts them changes in the social
  environment/institutions/inflated expectations
  towards the reforms and the transition period,
  followed by a disillusionment, etc. Questions to
  be answered how stable citizens believe their
  attitudes are can they change in the future, and
  how, under what (social) conditions.
• 6. The thick description is to provide insights
  into the dynamics of citizens attitudes to law
  and their obligations.

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Expected research results

• I will outline any similarities within the groups
  and differences between the groups in the
  self-interpretations of their attitudes, and in
  the citizens self-identified motivations and
  explanations of their compliance/non-compliance
  with their duties.
• I expect to find indications of the levels of
  both generalized social trust and vertical trust
  towards authority in the citizens
  self-explanations of non-compliance with their
  duties. These self-explanations may refer to
  other social groups or/and they may refer to
  state institutions.
• I hope to have determinate answers to which are
  the state institutions at the centre of public
  attention in this regard (expect these to be the
  law-applying and the law-enforcing institutions
  such as the courts and the police), and which of
  their qualities are critical for boosting
  attitudes of law-abidance.

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Main Research Hypothesis

• The attitudes of citizens towards compliance with
  the law depend on
• their perceptions of their fellow citizens
  levels of compliance,
• 2. on their experience with/expectations about
  the performance of certain state institutions.