MH-17: Victory in Europe

1
MH-17 Victory in Europe
2
Victory In Europe- Strategic Overview

• Germanys Leadership armys quality/quantity
  decline
• Logistics re-supply almost non-existent
• By contrast- Allied capability tactical/Ops
  skills rise
• Quantity in all areas even more superior
• Logistics, resources industrial capacity
  unmatched
• Overall cumulative impact gt wear Germans down
• Air War during 1944 (Feb-May) gt Allied
  victory
• Allies forcefully defeat Luftwaffe gt
• Achieve air superiority interdict German
  Logistics
• At the same time Allied air protects its Logistics

3
Allied Advances- Strategic Overview

• Sea Control established (in addition to air
  superiority)
• Amphibious landing at Normandy successful
• Infantry advance (once established) unstoppable
• Break-out from beachhead soon followed
• Logistic/re-supply uninterrupted (Air Navy
  protect)
• Intel collect, analysis, deception superior
  exploited
• Joint/combined military coordination much
  improved gt
• Especially between Anglo/American forces
• Although rivalries continue to exists example?
• East West advance on Both fronts gt
• Squeeze Germany ever more in the middle
• Actual penetration of Germanys borders
  approaching
• June 44 Russians cross into greater Germany from
  the East
• March 45 Western Allies cross the Rhine

4
Air War US Defeat of Luftwaffe (1943-44)

• British Bomber Command attacks on Berlin
• Encounter much difficulty suffer high
  casualties
• US 8th 15th Air Force attack deep inside
  Germany
• Fighter escort provided by long range P-51s
• US target focus of raids (Feb-May44) gt
• German Aircraft industry
• Battle of attrition ensues
• Both sides suffer high causalities

5
Results of Strategic Bombing Raids

• Raids fail to achieve objective
• Stop Germanys fighter product
• German fighter production actually increases
• But quality of fighter declines
• Also forced to close other A/C production lines
• German Air Defense (Night Fighters) weakens
• Suffer high casualties gt Defense becomes
  unsustainable
• By May44 US owned the sky over Germany at night

6
Air Support for Operation Overlord

• Battlefield preparation
• By Aprilgt Operation Overlord was ready
• Air Marshall Tedder the scientists Solly
  Zuckermann designed a plan to isolate Normandy
• Planning preparation Aims
• Maintain secret logistic build-up preparation
• How? (Essential pre-condition to success of
  landings?)
• Essential pre-condition to success of landings
• In addition to tactical surprise through
  effective OPSEC
• Air Superiority throughout Channel area gtwhy?
• Allow allies to establish ?______________________
  (How?)
• Through ?______________ of enemy aircraft
  attempting to fly in

7
Airmen Attitude Toward Overlord

• Airmen attitude toward plan for Overlord Air
  support?
• Air Marshall Harris?
• ?______________- attempts to exploit Political
  concern of Fr civilian casualties
• Ironic (given his outspoken support for area
  bombing)
• General Spaatz?
• Prefers to continue strikes on ?___________with
  shift to ?_____________
• Ikes Tedders response?
• ?______________
• POL interdiction of enemy transportation system
• Zuckermans analysis addressing Harris
  objections?
• Failed to take current ?______________
  __________results now in effect
• Airman eventually fell in line
• Transportation infrastructure interdiction
  successful
• Air contribution key to allied victory in France
• Denied Germany its re-supply re-enforcement
  capability

8
Allied POL offensive

• Luftwaffe staff also concludes their POL is a
  good allied target
• May44 8th AF attack synthetic POL plants
• Heavy allied causalities result
• But ULTRA validates POL as a credible target
• Decrypted message traffic reveals negative German
  reaction
• Germans redistribute air defense systems to
  protect POL
• Impact by late July
• German Aviation gas down by 98
• Air defense restricted no air/ground training
  why?
• Not enough ?______________, Aircraft and
  ?______________

9
Western Campaign Italy (Oct 1943- June 1944)

• Allied drive stalled at Gustav Line
  by late 43
• Allies attempt by-pass by amphibious
  landing at Anzio
• Operation Shingle
• Planning execution shortfalls
• Also missed opportunity
• Operational Objective
• Cut off German supplies
• Force Germans to withdraw
• MG Lucass hesitationgt
• Allowed Germans to shift from a vulnerable
  position was soon relieved
• Result allies stalled other attacks fail at
  high cost in CAS until May44

10
Allied Tactical Success

• 11 May Allied Offensive successful after 3 days
• Free French break-thru Gustav Line over Mountains
  to east
• Other penetrations soon follow
• VI Corps (w/new CMDR- MG Truscott) finally breaks
  out of Anzio
• Attacks German 10th Army who is forced
  to withdraw to North
• LTG Mark Clark orders VI corps to turn NW to
  liberate Rome (5 June)
• Clark thus allows 10th Army to escape
• Reason Politics, publicity, ego, and glory
• Allies continue to press Germans who withdraw
  slowly North gt
• Fall back in fighting withdrawal to Gothic Line
• Germans continue to resist by exploiting weather
  mountainous terrain

11
Normandy Invasion- Dieppe Lessons

• Bitter lessons learned at port of Dieppe
  (Aug42)
• Failure of British commandos Canadians teach
  Allies what?
• Ports normally too well defended just too hard
• Dieppes failure applied to planning for second
  attempt at cross channel invasion
• Invasion requires extensive planning, logistics,
  OPSEC, force
• Over the beach invasion at unexpected spot more
  likely to succeed

12
Normandy Order of Battle

• Allies 21st Army Group (Monty)
• US 1st (Bradley) Army
• Brit 2nd (Dempsey) Army
• 36 infantry 3 Airborne Divisions (2.9Million
  troops)
• 7000 ships, landing craft, GFS
• 12.8K aircraft (Air transport CAS)
• Germans OB West (Rundstedt)
• 7th 15th Armies
• Armor Corps (reserve)
• 58 Divisions (1.9 Million troops)
• 561 ships
• 919 Aircraft (many not operational)

13
Normandy- Planning Objectives

• Plans Objectives
• Major challenge for logistics planners?
• Right mix of ammo fuel (miscalculated at onset-
  how?)
• Need more ?______initially and more ?______ later
  during break-out
• Transportation follow-on support build-up
  needed
• Operational Priorities Considerations
• Essential to secure initial foot hold
• Secure foot hold needed for subsequent
  breakthrough attempt
• Protect build-up by screening German response
• Who is tasked to ensure above is accomplished?
• 82nd 101st Airborne Divisions
• German Defensive Strategy (disunity over
  tactics)
• 1. Rommel stop Allies at beaches (static forward
  defense)
• 2. Rundstedt mobile defense (inflict high
  causalities)
• Concentrate on main allied thrust
• What factors would affect all of above the most?

14
Friction, Battlefield Prep, Execution

• Friction
• Factors affecting both sides
  during landing include
• Weather affects of tactical
  surprisegt in turn all impact
• Landing, CAS, ABN ops
• Battlefield preparation
• Allied air interdiction gt
  secure
  protected zone for troop
  landings
• Beach landing sites
• Numerous obstacles
  (courtesy of Rommel)
• NCDU clearance ops (52 CAS 7 Navy Crosses)

15
Execution- at 0001 on 6 June 1944

• Airborne operations commence
• Objective secure vital bridges in rear
• Link up later with amphibious force
• Para glider troops widely spread out
• 82nd 101st move to objectives at 1st light
• Pre-dawn NGF air strikes lift at 0600
• 0630 seaborne forces land across 5 beaches
• British landings go generally IAW plan
• But HQ adheres rigidly to plans timeline
• Missed opportunity to take Caen early on
• American landings
• Strong resistance met at Omaha Beach
• Arty small arms fire pin down 1st 29th ID
• By 1100 NGF make German barrages abate
• Troops cross to dunes establish footholds
• By end of D-day 155K troops landed
• Allies established firmly on Continent

16
Results

• Allies establish new front
• Steadily press Germans back
• Ikes Assessment of Normandy landings later
  breakthrough
• Very difficult because
• Quality of German soldier
• Superior German tactical skills
• Nature of Northern France terrain
• Thick hedgerows conceal threats
• Weather (overcast skies- problem?)
• Reduced visibility for Air support CAS
• Also key lost opportunities
• British over-caution preventing early capture of
  Caen on 1st day
• Rigid devotion to plans timeline over-rode
  tactical opportunity ground truth

17
Breakout - Operation Cobra

• Allied attack concentrated on German defenses at
  St. Lo
• Massive Air Strike (8th AF) to soften German
  defenses
• Friendly fire at front line
• Infantry pay heavy costs of this advance when
  bombs fall short
• (LTG Lesley McNair killed by friendly air
  strikes) why?
• Inaccurate CAS on perpendicular run
• (Bad weather blamed in part)
• Key command changes
• Ike activates 12th Army Group (General Omar
  Bradley)
• 1st Army (Hodges)
• 3rd Army (Patton)

18
Key Allied Penetration- Aug 1944

• Aug 1 Allies attack thru Avranches bottleneck
• Turn West to capture St. Malo, Brest, Lorient
• Operational value of these
  objectives questioned
• Soon ordered to turn East
  toward Mortain
• Hitler plans counter-attack with Kluge leading
  it
• Ultra alerts allies of threat to US 1st Army
• Bradley preempts Kluge attempt to cut off US 1st
• Allied airpower pound Germans throughout day
• Kluge now vulnerable to Allied encirclement
• About to be caught in Falaise Pocket-
• What happens?
• Missed opportunity
• Bradley Monty fail to coordinate close off
  gap in Falaise Pocket in time
• Many Germans able to escape Falaise Pocket
• 5th Panzer, 7th Army, Panzer Group Eberbach
  escape to east to fight another day

19
Allied Advance Toward the Rhine

• Ikes Original Plan
• Conduct supply build-up then proceed on broad
  front to Seine
• But with stunning allied advances on the ground
  posed
• Key Question becomes continue or halt?
• 1. Factors for halting allow Allies to re-supply
  consolidate
• 2. Factors for continuing exploit current
  momentum
• Next question if decision is to proceed then
  how?
• Two options ?_______________(original plan) or
  single ?_______________
• (Who was for the latter)?
• Ikes decision (29 Aug)
• Original Plan ?_______________ front until
  logistics run out
• But extra weight (POL) given to 1st Army on
  Northern axis
• Result 21st Army Group benefits at Pattons 3rd
  Armys POL expense

20
Tactical Objectives Command Relations

• Tactical Situation Objectives
• 1. Monty take Antwerp drive toward Ruhr
• 2. Bradleys 12 AG is spread across the the front
  of the Ardennes
• Hodges drives North while Patton goes to east
  Metz
• Command Relationships
• 1 Sept Ike assumes command of Ground Campaign
• (Over Montys strong objections)
• Both 21st Army Group 12th Army Groups now
  report to directly to Ike

21
Montys Complaints Errors

• Monty continues to complain about lack
  of adequate logistic support
• Proposed Bradley halt divert his fuel
• But Monty missed key opportunity at Antwerp
• Opportunity to strike decisive blow go a
  long way to end war - what/how?
• Failed to secure Scheldt water way for enabling
  use of Antwerp as re-supply port
• Significance of this key missed opportunity-?
• Logistics base to supply Allied advance
• Monty advanced to Belgium captured Brussels on
  3 Sept 44
• 4 Sept Montys 11th Armor Div seized Antwerp in
  tact
• Monty s failure to take Scheldt at Antwerp
  allowed 15th Army to escape to east delay
  opening of forward resupply port at Antwerp
• Monty was focused on what upcoming operation
  employing a single thrust across Rhine?

22
Operation Market-Garden- Order of Battle

• Tactical Sit OOB
• Market (Air) 3 1/2 Corps
• 82nd, 101st, Poles 1st para, British 1st
  ABN
• Aircraft glider force
• Garden (Ground)
• XXX Corps misc. support
• German Forces
• 11 SS Panzer Corps
• Just redeployed to Arnhem
• 9th SS Panzer Division
• 10th SS Panzer Division
• Students 1st Parachute Army
• 15th Army (recently escaped from Holland)

23
Plans Objectives

• Strategic Operational Objectives
• 1. Shock Germany already on ropes
  out of war
• 2. Conduct powerful strike into heart of Germany,
  then proceed to Ruhr Valley
• Tactical Objectives
• Airborne forces secure key bridges to facilitate
  XXX corps strike
• 1. Eindhoven Bridge over lower canal
• 2. Son Bridge over Wilhelmina Canal
• 3. Veghel Bridge over Zuit Willems Canal
• 4. Graves Bridge over Maas (Meuse)
• 5. Nijmegen Bridge over Waal river
• 6. Arnhem Bridge over lower Rhine

24
Concept of Operations

• Mission
• Market conduct airborne assault
  into Germany
• Secure 8 Bridge heads over 3
  rivers 4 canals until relieved
• Garden XXX Corps (LTG Horrocks) conduct thrust
  across lower Rhine
• Relieve airborne forces within 2-3 days
• Battlefield preparation
• Intelligence analysis
• LTG Browning (I ABN Corps) ignored panzers
  reported around Arnhem by his G-2
• General attitude dont rock boat
• Monty threw caution to wind
• Over optimism as momentum for op builds

25
Airborne Targets Execution
Graves
Nijmegen
Son
26
Execution (Arnhem) Intel Friction

• Brit 1st ABN dropped 6 miles from the objective
  (Bad aircrew advice)
• Frictions role Murphys law ran against Allies
• Panzer SS Army soon arrived with superior fire
  power
• Made holding key bridge by lightly armed airborne
  troops at Arnhem until relieved by
  XXX Corps highly unrealistic
• XXX Corps 64 mile transit to ETA at Arnhem
  underestimated
• 36 hour delay taking Nijmegen precluded timely
  arrival relief
• Lt Col Frosts DSO citation describes his
  Battalions actions at Arnhem best

27
Results Analysis

• Tactical defeat at a high cost
• Sacrifice of good troops
• 8000 out of 10,000 of 1ABN Div
• Little to show for it (morale)
• Severe consequences of over optimistic Cmdrs
  ignoring Ultra, Photos HUMIT
• LTG Browning summed it up best
• Arnhem was A Bridge too far

28
Collapse of GermanyAir contribution 3 prongs

• 1. AM Tedders stressed unified focused
  campaign
• Objective German Transportation system
• 2. AM Harriss objections
• Insisted strategic bombing of cities the best
  objective
• Agreed to use Rail system as Aiming point
  compromise
• 3. Gen Spaatz argued for POL targets as primary
• Transportation as secondary targets
• Result Steady then rapid decline of German
  transport system
• Distribution of coal cut off from rest of Germany
• No means of transporting out of Ruhr Valley

29
Battle of the Bulge- Order of Battle

• Background
• Impact of successful air campaign
• Logistics POL cut off by allied air
• Germanys industrial economy collapsing
• Forces desperate measures
• Hitlers big gamble Surprise counter-offensive
• Order of Battle
• Army Group B (FM Model) gt
• 500K troops armor
• 5th 6th Panzer Army 7th Army
• US 12th Army Group (Gen Bradley)
• 655K troops, armor, air support
• US 1st 3rd Armies
• 82nd 101st ABN as strategic reserve

30
Plans Objectives Wacht am Rhein

• Strategic, Operational, tactical Objectives
• 1. Antwerp split allies capture key allied
  re-supply point
• 2. Capture fuel dumps to allow advance (!)
• Concept of Operations (Map)
• Battlefield preparation
• Concentration behind Ardennes forest (extreme
  OPSEC)
• SOF invade behind US frontlines
• Capture key choke points
• Spread confusion in allied rear

Dietrich
Manteuffel
Brandenberger
31
Execution

• Germans achieve operational tactical surprise
• Initial tactical success with mixed results
  later
• Strong initial US resistance at weak points delay
  German advance
• Eisenborn Ridge, St. Vith, later- Bastogne
• Isolated units perform heroically
• Allies dont panic counter-attack effectively
• Allied cooperation superb well coordinated
• 101st hold Bastogne
• BG McAuliffe Nuts to surrender
• Pattons 3rd Army relieves Bastogne

32
Offensive Stalls Bulge Results

• Germans halted well short of objectives
• Most forward SS Panzer units are cut off from
  their LOCs
• Weather clears- allied air attacks
• Germans lose the tactical operational
  initiative
• Just one column of 5th PZ reaches Meuse at Dinant
  (eve of 24 Dec)
• Allied air ground soon force
  German retreat
• By mid-Jan Allies push line back
• German casualties 100K
• Strategic impact No more Reserves
• Allied casualties 82K (15K POWs)

33
Germany- Collapse in the East

• Soviets launch two offenses during same period
• 1st Belorussian 1st Ukrainian Fronts gt
• Breakthrough between Warsaw Carpathian
  mountains
• Central portion of Eastern Front
• In the North gt 2nd 3rd Belorussian Fronts
  attack gt
• East Prussia Pomerania

34
The Hitler Factor

• Factors hindering German Commanders
• Hitlers interference with Operational decisions
  gt
• Create confusion undermine Ground Commanders
  initiative
• Results in disaster for Germans Forces
• Germans become rapidly overrun surrounded
• Survivors scramble West in desperate retreat
• Soviets invade exact harsh revenge on Germans

35
Germany- Collapse in the West (Jan-Feb 1945)

• Germanys defenses unravel at rapid pace
• Pattons 3rd Army Hodges 1st race east to
  Rhine
• Soon cross Rhine into Germany
• Monty finally is ready
• Breaks thru in North
• Combines w/American advance south of Ruhr
• Germanys situation becomes hopeless

36
Final Collapse

• By April 1, 1945
• Models Army Group B encircled within Ruhr
• Only scattered pickets of Nazi fanatics left to
  oppose advance
• German troops surrender in droves
• Soviet forces press toward allies w/German in
  middle
• 25 April Soviets US units toast each other on
  Elbe
• Germany is now cut in half with no where to go
• 30 April Hitler commits suicide as Russian press
  in
• WWII in Europe is over

37
WWII Assessment

• Germany simply out manned and outgunned
• More significantly out supplied (logistics)
• Fighting major industrial or more populous foes
• (US, Britain, USSR)
• US could out produce all combined
• Allied Airgt destroys Ger. transport system by
  late44
• Germany war economy simply collapsed
• w/o POL gt Luftwaffe cant fly tanks cant move
• No tactical or operational mobility to fight
• Allied s overwhelm Germans on both East West
  fronts
• Hitler compounded problems by rudder orders
  from rear
• His tactical, operational, strategic direction
  made bad sit. worse
• Esp. by refusal to allow Cmdrs to withdraw soon
  to be encircled
• Hitler contributed much to their Armys
  destruction
• NTL gt Hitlers iron will forces fight to bitter
  end

38
WWII Assessment- 2

• Wehrmachts tactical/op skills prevail in early
  years
• But soongt German leadership tactical/op skills
  decline
• In contrast, allies leaders, Op/Tactical skills
  improve
• Allies learn hard bitter lessons well
• All above surpassed by allied s logistic
  superiority
• Allied firepower industrial capacity only grows
  w/time
• Allied integration of infantry, tanks, arty air
  excellent
• Impact extends allied power projection
  capability
• Makes invasion at Normandy breakthrough
  possible
• Momentum gathers makes drive to Germany
  unstoppable

39
WWII Assessment- 3

• Joint-combined ops very effective under Ikes
  leadership
• Excellent coalition builder as supreme allied
  commander
• Allied Intel (Ultra) effective deception ploys
  
• Exploited German mistakes to seize opportunities
• Pattons paper army in London concern to OKW
• Impact tied down German Reserves during invasion
• Gave false indication of allied landing at
  Calais
• Costs of WWII- in addition to soldiers
• WWII killed 10s of millions of innocent people
• 50-60 million died great material damage
  inflicted
• Also set stage for 45 more years of Cold War

40
(No Transcript)
41
Back-up Slides
42
Breakout - Operation Cobra

• Allied attack concentrated on German defenses at
  St. Lo
• Massive Air Strike (8th AF) to soften German
  defenses
• Friendly fire at front line
• Infantry pay heavy costs of this advance
• (LTG Lesley McNair killed by friendly air
  strikes) why?
• Inaccurate CAS
• (Bad weather blamed in part)
• Key command change
• Ike activates 12th Army Group (General Omar
  Bradley)
• 1st Army (Hodges)
• 3rd Army (Patton)