Nuclear Arms Control: From the End of the Cold War to the Present and Beyond

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Nuclear Arms ControlFrom the End of the Cold
War to the Present and Beyond

• Nikolai Sokov
• Senior Research Associate
• James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
• Monterey Institute of International Studies

December 2008
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Last years of the Cold War a breakthrough in US
and Soviet nuclear arsenals

• Deep reduction of strategic weapons about 50
  percent strategic, zero in land-based
  intermediate, 5-7 times in tactical

• A series of innovative agreements INF, START I,
  PNIs

• A new stage of cooperation assistance programs
  in transportation, safety, security, and
  elimination of nuclear weapons.

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U.S. and Soviet/Russian Nuclear Arsenals
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Reduction of nuclear arsenals after Cold War
Source Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 2007-2008
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Arms reductions by categories
Intermediate
Strategic
Tactical
Land
500
5.500
1987 INF
800
SLBMs
SALT I, SALT II, START I, START II, SORT
1991 PNIs
SLCMs
600
ALCMs
Aircraft
8000
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End-of-the Cold War Treaties
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INF Treaty
NEGOTIATIONS 1981-83, 1985-87
SIGNED December 8, 1987
Elimination completed 1991
Inspections ended May 2001
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Key Features

• An entire category of nuclear weapons eliminated
  land-based missiles with 500 to 5,500 km range

• Breakthrough in verification. Principles used in
  START I and II, CFE, etc.

• Included both nuclear and conventional missiles

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START I Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty
START I serves as baseline last successful
treaty. Negotiations May 1982 November 1983,
resumed 1985 Signed in Moscow by Bush and
Gorbachev 1991 Entered into force December 5,
1994 Reductions completed December 5,
2001 Remains in force until December 2009
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Key Features
Applies to strategic weapons (5,500 km and more
in land-based missiles) (800 km and more in
sea-based ballistic missiles) (600 km and more in
nuclear cruise missiles) (8,000 km and more in
heavy bombers)
30-50 percent reduction (depending on the
category) in the number of deployed warheads on
various classes of delivery vehicles
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START I Limits and Sublimits
(warheads)
6,000 total warheads
4,900 ICBM and SLBM warheads
1,100 mobile ICBM warheads
1,540 heavy ICBM warheads
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Reduced the number of warheads usable in the
first strike
Special accounting rules hid part of warheads
from account and reductions about 15 percent
for the Soviet Union and about 30 percent for the
US.
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US and Russian Strategic Offensive Arsenals START
I Memorandum of Understanding, 1990-2007
Russia
US
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VERIFICATION MECHANISM

• Five types of short-notice inspections

• Seven types of planned inspections

Total Inspections Russia 243, US 335 (by
June 2002) Russia 329, US 461 (by June
2005) Number of Inspectable Facilities US - 27
(43 in 1991) Russia 41 13 other NIS (69 in
1991)

• Perimeter and portal continuous monitoring at
  production facilities

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VERIFICATION MECHANISM

• comprehensive data exchange (Memorandum of
  Understanding) data supplied day-by-day via
  notifications and aggregated twice a year

• exchange of telemetry information from all test
  flights obligatory transmission of telemetry,
  exchange of equipment to read it

• Confidence-building measures to enhance
  effectiveness of national technical means

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Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons
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Unilateral statement by George Bush (September
27, 1991) Elimination or storage of all tactical
nuclear warheads except gravity bombs of the Air
Force. Included SLCMs, which the Soviet Union
considered strategic weapons.
The statement reflected concerns about Soviet
control over nuclear weapons following August
1991.
Response by Mikhail Gorbachev (October 5,
1991) Similar measures somewhat deeper
reductions. Boris Yeltsin confirmed and slightly
expanded on January 29, 1992 in the name of
Russia.
In the fall of 1991 the Soviet Union proposed
negotiations on a legally binding treaty on TNW
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Unilateral parallel initiatives led to deep
reductions of TNW
Official data on stockpiles is absent. Estimate
of the scale of reductions according to Natural
Resources Defense Council data (data
questionable)
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According to other source, the Soviet Union had
almost 22,000 TNW warheads. With full
implementation of the 1991-92 initiatives should
now have about 8,000, of them 3.500 deployed.
Actual number is lower.
US planned to complete elimination by 1998.
Postponed twice, completed in the end of 2003.
Russia planned to complete elimination by 2000.
Last time mentioned in 2004.
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• Positive Aspects
• Achieved quickly (10 days)
• No attention to technical details and procedures
• Flexible reductions and posture, cheap
  reductions, no spending on verification

• Negative Aspects
• Absence of official data and verification breed
  suspicions, remors can lead to full-scale crises.
• withdrawal at any time even without advance
  warning. Unclear whether Russia has implemented.

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Nuclear Arms Reductions after the Cold War A
History of Failures
New treaties did not enter into force (START II),
negotiations failed (START III), or treaties
seriously flawed (SORT)
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START II

• Discussions and consultations September 1991
  May 1992 (Lisbon ministerial)
• Framework agreed Washington summit June 1992
• Negotiations July-December 1992

Signed January 3, 1993 US Senate gives advice
and consent 1996 Ratified by Russian parliament
2000 Announced by Russia null and void June
14, 2002 after US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
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Key Features
Aggregate level - 3 500 warheads (original US
proposal, 4,800 Russian, 2,500). Both parties
eliminate land-based missiles with several
warheads. This alters the structure of Russian
arsenal. Russia implements reductions primarily
through elimination of missiles, US through
downloading missiles (removing warheads) and
reorienting heavy bombers to conventional
roles.
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Key problems for Russia with START II

• Imbalance of uploading capabilities U.S. can
  return warheads to missiles and increase arsenal
  40-60 percent Russia has to eliminate most of
  them.
• Too expensive
• 3,500 limit too high
• Cannot utilize old missiles

Key U.S. mistake in 1992 won too many battles to
win the war. Two questionable assumptions --
The Soviet Union lost the Cold War -- Yeltsin
can control all outcomes in Russia
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START III

• Helsinki summit (March 21, 1997)
• Joint Statement on Parameters of Future
  Reductions in Nuclear Forces

• Aggregate limit of 2,000-2,500 nuclear warheads

• Transparency of strategic nuclear warhead
  inventories and elimination of warheads, other
  measures toward irreversibility

• Explore measures relating to nuclear SLCMs and
  tactical nuclear systems, including CBMs and
  transparency

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START III

• Consultations
• On and off from Fall 1997 to Fall 2000
• US draft tabled January-February 2000
• Russian draft tabled June 2000 .
• No Agreement

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Main reason for failure of START III talks
laziness of Russian bureaucracy work on draft
sporadic and slow-paced until U.S. tabled its
draft in January-February 2000.
Parallel intrigue maneuver U.S. into withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty to abrogate START II and
possibly also START I.
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SORTStrategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
Negotiations began January 2002
Treaty signed May 24 2002
Entered into Force May 2003 Effective until
December 2012
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SORT (of a treaty)

• U.S. force unpredictable in size, capability,
  deployment pattern

• Unlimited uploading capability

• Missile defense has become a potential problem
  for the next decade

• Additional transparency and predictability
  consultations never took off the ground

Overall Joint statement (original U.S. proposal)
called a treaty (original Russian proposal).
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• Same shortcomings as with PNIs and START II
• No data exchange and verification unclear
  whether the treaty is implemented modernization
  will not be limited after START I expiration
  (until December 2009 transparency partially
  provided by START I verification system).
• Uploading cannot be verified.
• Arms race can resume immediately after the
  completion of reductions in 2012 (unless a new
  treaty is concluded).

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US withdrawal from 1972 ABM Treaty

• Purpose of limiting missile defense in 1972
  defense can weaken second strike of the other
  side and thus stimulates race of offensive
  weapons.
• Stages of withdrawal
• 1983 Reagan, Star Wars
• Late 1990s Clinton (under Republican pressure),
  National Missile Defense (33)
• 2001 George W. Bush, decision to withdraw.

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Missile Defense The most controversial issue
1. Russians do not believe justification (Iran,
North Korea), search for more plausible reason
for deployment. Logically conclude Russia is the
main target. Lavrov at 2007 Shanghai Cooperation
Organization Summit U.S. missile defense is
intended against Russia and China first open
MFA statement
2. Main concern- stability of strategic
deterrence foundation for stable political
relationship, deterrence of more likely limited
(regional) conflicts.
3. Current plans not a significant problem as
defense is penetratable. Worry mostly about the
future modernization of and increase in number
of interceptors, enhanced detection and targeting
capability.
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Russian proposal (summer 2007) Refrain from
deployment of missile defense in Eastern Europe
in exchange for access to Gabala (Azerbaijan) and
Armavir radars for monitoring Iranian missile
program. If missile threat to US materializes,
Russia could agree to deployment of missile
shield.
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• New US proposals (October 2007)
• System will incorporate Gabala and Armavir
• US could give access to (not veto on) system to
  Russian officers
• Systems activation could be postponed if no
  threat materializes.

U.S. written proposals of late November 2007 were
rejected by the Russians as a step back from the
October initiatives. Discussions resumed in the
spring and fall of 2008 without result. The issue
remains deadlocked.
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START I Replacement
Expires in December 2009 Putin proposed
replacement June 2006 Rice-Lavrov statement
July 2007.
Key elements and choices -- Simplified START or
strengthened SORT? -- Prevent or limit uploading
allowed by SORT -- Likely limit 1,200-1,500
warheads -- Will likely include elements of
Russian START III proposal
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START I Replacement
Possible provisions

• New problem conventional strategic weapons.
  Possible solutions (a) only declared ICBMs with
  verification, (b) limited number of SLBMs with
  tighter verification.

• Tactical nuclear weapons
• part of a broader package,
• limited transparency measures,
• with ban on deployment outside national
  territories.
• More likely will try to avoid the issue
  altogether.

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START I Replacement
Verification
Maintain transparency and verification Replace
short-notice inspections with visits, leave
small number of short-notice inspections as
suspect-site. Reduce the volume of routine
notifications, emphasize regular exchanges with
aggregate data changes.
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Russian withdrawal from the INF?
Raised at high level in 2006-07 no decision has
been made October 2007 abrogation not
urgent. Rationale -- The Treaty is bilateral,
other countries continue to develop INF (China?
India? Pakistan? Iran?) - Russia might need
conventional INF. October 2007 US and Russia
jointly proposed multilateralization of the INF
Treaty
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Negatives of INF withdrawal -- US could again
deploy INF in Europe (shorter flight time than in
the 1980s) -- Worsening relations with China?
Other countries? -- Negative impact on
disarmament, article VI.
There are no missions that long-range Air Force
cannot achieve
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Bottom line of post-Cold War period

• Promise of the last Cold War years has remained
  unfulfilled.
• Instead slowdown, in 2000s even reversal.
• Likely reasons
• lower threat of nuclear war, hence lower
  interest in disarmament
• bilateral US-Russian balance no longer central
  Russia is weaker, American attention switched to
  other problems.
• Overall uncertainty of the international system
  has created uncertainty with regard to the future
  of nuclear disarmament.