PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

1
PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST DARFUR
2
Situation at a Glance

• More than two million people are living in camps
  because they have fled the region due to the four
  years of fighting
• Sudans government and pro-government militias
  are accused of war crimes against regions black
  population, UN has not called
• it genocide
• Sudan is unwilling to allow International
• Criminal Court to name and try war criminals

3
Situation at a Glance

• Began in the region early in 2003 after a rebel
  group began attacking the government officials,
  reason was that they believed that the region was
  being neglected by Khartoum
• Oppressing blacks in favor of Arabs
• Many years of tension over land and grazing
  rights mostly between the nomadic Arabs and
  farmers who are native to the land (Fur,
  Massaleet, and Zagawa communities)
• Two main rebel groups Sudan Liberation Army
  (SLA) and Justice of Equality Movement (Jem)
• Peace talks were complicated due to the splits in
  both groups, some along ethnic lines
• Groups opposed to the May 2006 deal with
  government have formed a new group called the
  National Redemption Front led by former Darfur
  governor Ahmed Diraige
• Janjaweed is a group that is being accused of
  cleansing the territory of black Africans
• Government admits mobilizing self-defence
  militias but deny link to the Janjaweed

4
Situation at a Glance

• Refugees of Darfur state that following air raids
  by the government, the Janjaweed come in to
  slaughter men, rape women and steal
• US and human rights states that genocide is being
  committed but a UN investigation team say that
  war crimes have been committed but no intent for
  genocide
• Due to strong international pressure the Sudanese
  government has promised to disarm the Janjaweed
  who they regard as thieves and gangsters, but
  there has been no evidence that this has happened
• Darfur is inaccessible to aid workers and
  researchers, so calculating the death toll during
  the past three years is impossible (latest
  research published in September 2006 places the
  death toll at above and beyond 200 000, but this
  number does not make a distinction between those
  dying of violence and those dying of starvation
  or disease in refugee camps

5
Historical Roots
During the First World War, the British invaded
Sudan and incorporated Darfur into Sudan in 1916.
Under colonial rule, financial resources were
directed to the tribes by the British, but
development was slow. To this was added an
element of political instability caused by the
proxy wars between Sudan, Libya and Chad. The
influence of an ideology of Arab supremacy of
Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi excluded the
African, placing a prejudice. A famine in the
mid-1980s led to the first significant fighting
amongst Darfuris. A low level conflict continued
for the next 15 years, with the government arming
Arab militias against its enemies. The fighting
reached a peak in 2003 with the beginning of the
Darfur conflict.
6
Attempts at Peace
Kofi Annas Strongest Warning on Sudanese
Genocide
7
May Peace Agreement

• Signed on May 5, 2006
• Between the government of Sudan and a splinter
  group of the SLM
• Sudanese Government of National Unity is to
  complete verifiable disarmament and
  demobilization of Janjaweed by mid-October 2006
• Places restrictions on the movements of the
  Popular Defense Forces and requires their
  downsizing
• Democratic processes have been laid out for the
  Darfurians to choose their leaders and determine
  their status as a region
• Commits the international community to holding a
  donors conference to pledge additional funds for
  Darfur for reconstruction
• Buffer zones are to be established around camps
  for IDPs, and a commission has been created to
  work with the UN to help refugees and IDPs return
  to their homes
• Problems
• Darfurians were not informed of the agreement due
  to bad communications system
• Other rebel groups such as the JEM and the
  original SLM did not sign it, who are more
  popular with the people of Darfur
• The common Darfur people were not involved in the
  process, so there was limited popularity of the
  agreement
• SLA leader, Minni Minawi, who signed the May 2006
  peace deal was given a large budget but his
  fighters have already been accused by Amnesty
  International of abuses against people in the
  areas opposed to the deal

8
US Sanctions

• US sanctions on Sudan
• Targeted 163 Sudanese companies and 3 people
  linked to the violence in Darfur
• Purpose was to pressure the Sudanese government
  into stopping the fighting in the region
• Problems
• Weak as much of Sudanese trade is with the
  Chinese
• Sudan has very few commercial ties with the US
• Almost ¾ of Sudanese trade is with Arab and Asian
  nations
• While the Chinese have voted for increased UN
  presence and has pressured the Sudanese
  government into resolving the conflict, little
  change has resulted.

9
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement

• Signed on April 8, 2004
• Between Sudan gov, JEM and SLM
• Janjaweed and rebels continue armed conflict
  since the ceasefire
• Problems
• Failure of the groups to respect the terms in the
  agreement
• The NMRD did not sign the ceasefire agreement

10
The African Union

• Presence of African Union in Darfur
• AU sent in as military observers to monitor the
  2004 ceasefire agreement, and has remained there
  since
• Though some criticized them for not making a
  difference in Darfur, others say that the AU
• deterred the rape of women
• reduced recruitment of children into armed forces
• protected humanitarian and aid convoys
• reduced looting of animals belonging to Arab
  nomads
• helped displaced persons return to their homes
• Problems
• The AU has
• too few troops and police - the African Union
  currently has 7000 troops deployed over land the
  size of France
• a weak mandate
• limited military equipment
• limited funds the African Union claims they
  lack the necessary funds to continue operations
  for much longer

11
Solution
12
Solution
The solution to the Darfur crises is complex, and
one must first identify the root problem the
government. The Sudanese government is suspected
of both encouraging and ordering the Janjaweed
militia to rape and murder civilians,
particularly dissidents. Furthermore, the
government has resisted international peacekeeping
efforts to resolve the conflict. Affirming the
governments lack of cooperation in the ceasefire
of January 2007, it is clear that the
administration must be removed, even with the
risk of armed intervention from an international
effort. To deal with the government
realistically, there must be universal
international cooperation. Such a unified front
would be most effective in persuading the
executive body of the Sudanese government to
resign and allow for the creation of a
provisional government. The provisional
government would last for a period of ten years
and no longer - allowing for a stable political
body to form, and correspondingly form a more
stable social and economic atmosphere, while
preventing the creation of an abusive political
body. This government would be run by an
executive council representing major
international powers, adjacent countries. The
Sudanese, however, will be represented in
majority and shall hold equal representation
among ethnicities.
13
Solution
Following the implementation of the government,
the first major necessary reform towards peace
must involve the Janjaweed. Though their
executive body may have been removed (the
government), many individuals would continue
their militant operations or some degree of
violence, while many would have difficulties
assimilating into society considering their
history. Therefore the first step must involve a
full pardon to all low ranking members of the
Janjaweed, while all high ranking officials will
receive full sentencing. If the majority of
militants are not pardoned, their will be a large
residual population of militants who would impair
further progress in Darfur. Those with full
sentencing are those targeted by the ICC
(international Criminal Court, a United Nations
Organization). To assist in the transition, and
to disarm other militants, funds should be
directed towards exchanging food and monetary
rewards for weapons and munitions. To prevent
abuse from individuals, limits should be
placed. If the situation does not change soon,
there are increased risks of famine and
starvation, and combined with the pillaging and
ravaging by the Janjaweed, the death toll will
steadily rise.