Military Order of Foreign Wars

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Military Order of Foreign Wars

• Reserve Component
• Issues

Professor David T. Buck Buckwalter 841-6432/buck
wald_at_nwc.navy.mil 5 November 2005
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Reserve Component Issues
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Reserve Component Issues Overview

• Reserves 101 (History, Categories, Employment,
  AC/RC Force Mix)
• RC Challenges (Civ-Mil Relations, OPTEMPO,
  Rebalancing, Recruiting/Retention, BRAC)
• RC Opportunities (JFHQs/HLD/CS, Reachback,
  Continuum, Rotational Presence)

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The Reserve Components
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History

• 1636 Old North Regiment, Mass Bay Colony
• 1792 Militia Act
• 1903 Dick Act
• 1912 Reserve Act
• 1916 National Defense Act of 1916
• 1948 Formal Reserve organization, training,
  pay retirement programs organized
• 1955 Reserve Categories established
• 1970-74 Total Force/Abrams Doctrine/AVF
• 2001 RC Chiefs promoted to Three-Star Rank

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Reserve Categories
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Reserve Manpower

• Ready Reserve 1.1 million (a/o 1 Oct 05)
• (subject to mobilization)

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR/ING) non-drilling ma
npower 284,442
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National Guard

• Derived from tradition of colonial militia and
  the constitutional power of the state
• Responsive to Federal govt. (national security)
  State Governor for state missions
• Can be mobilized - 90 Federal funding
• State missions disaster response support to
  law enforcement as prescribed by state law

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National Guard Duty Status Comparison
FEDERAL
STATE
State Active Duty
Title 10
Title 32
10
Guard ReserveComposition
USCGR 1.2 10,000
USMCR 4.6 39,600
National Guard 53.2 Army - 350,000 Air
106,800
USNR 8.5 73,100
USAR 23.9 205,000
USAFR 8.6 74,000
FY 2006
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AC/RC Mix by Service

• Service
• USA
• USN
• USMC
• USAF
• USCG

• Regular Reserve
• 47 53 (555K)
• 81 17 (73K)
• 81 18 (40K)
• 66 34 (181K)
• 81 19 (10K)

All Services 62 38
All Services 55 45
(inc. IRR) 7 of the Budget
FY 2006
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RC Challenges

• Civ-Mil Relations
• OPTEMPO/Rebalancing
• Recruiting/Retention
• USAF/ANG FTF, QDR, BRAC

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Connection to the Citizens

• If standing armies are dangerous to liberty,
  an efficacious power over the militia in the same
  body ought, as far as possible, to take away the
  inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly
  institutions What shadow of danger can there be
  from men who are daily mingling with the rest of
  their countrymen and who participate with them in
  the same feelings, sentiments, habits, and
  interests?
•  
• - Hamilton (Federalist 29)

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Abrams Doctrine Total Force Policy

• I have trouble seeing why we have to have a
  reserve call-up anytime we want to engage in
  conflict. It simply tips off the fact that that
  is what we are going to do months before we are
  able to do it. From the standpoint of strategic
  surprise, I think that is foolish.
• - Secretary of Defense Memo
• 30 December 2002

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OPTEMPO

• Key Indicators of Stress
• Frequency
• 76,600 (2,200 non-vols) called up more than once
• Percentage of Inventory Used
• 58 (500,000) have been mobilized since 9/11
• Duration
• Desert Storm (156) GWOT (300 to 1-2 years)
• Need about 9,000 early involuntary mobilizations
  some specialties already are highly stressed

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REBALANCING

• Targets
• Minimize involuntary mobilizations first 30
  days
• One year out of six (17/Yr)
• Rebalancing Order of Magnitude 10-12
• ( 120,000)

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Currently Mobilized

• Service
• USA
• USN
• USMC
• USAF
• USCG
• As of 5 October 2005

• Total
• 122,147
• 4,610
• 8,606
• 6,732
• 519
• 142,614

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Reserve Mobilization
Source OASD-RA (R, T, M) Rebalancing Forces
Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve, 15
January 2004 and 2001 Statistical Abstract of
the United States. Estimates and projections by
author.
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Recruiting/Retention

• RC components 2005 recruiting goals 19k
  short
• ARNG (Achieved 80 of 63,002 goal)
• USAR (Achieved 84 of 28,485 goal)
• USNR (Achieved 85 of 11,491 goal)
• ANG (Achieved 86 of 10,272 goal)
• USMCR (Achieved 102 of 8,180 goal)
• USAFR (Achieved 113 of 8,801 goal)
• FY 2005 end strength 829,005 -30,000 - 95
  (preliminary)
• Stop Loss ( unit stop loss) still in effect
  for the Army

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USAF/ANG FTF, QDR, BRAC

• A Perfect Storm?
• Future Total Force (FTF)
• New missions
• QDR Force Reductions
• BRAC
• 30 ANG bases (inc. Otis)
• 29/88 lose aircraft
• Court challenges PA, IL, MO, CT

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Other Challenges

• Readiness/equipage (1.3 bn)
• National Guard issues (State v. Fed)
• Family issues/support
• Employer support (ESGR)
• Pay systems, Security clearances, etc.

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RC Opportunities

• Joint Forces HQs HLD/CS
• Reachback Initiatives
• Continuum of Service
• Rotational Overseas Presence

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Joint Forces HQs HLD/CS

• October 2003 NG-initiated Re-org.
• Each State/4 Territories
• Forward Deployed INCONUS
• NORTHCOM relationship
• Retain Federal war plan mission
• DoD Strat. for HLD/CS (dual-mission)
• Katrina effect?

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Katrina Effect?

• President, 15 September 2005
• It is now clear that a challenge on this scale
  requires greater federal authority and a broader
  role for the armed forces
• DoD Strat. for HLD/CS (dual-mission)
• RAND report calls for 10 dedicated Bns (one for
  each FEMA region)

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Reachback

• Virtual Presence but Real Time Support
• IDT/ADT vice Mobilization

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Continuum ofService
Continuum of Service
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Rotational OverseasPresence

• Judicious and Prudent Planning
• Manage OPTEMPO of the AC stationed OUTCONUS

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RC Prospects

• Transformation Rebalancing AC/RC Mix
• Role in HLD/CS Global Engagement
• From Force in Reserve to Relevant Force
  in Readiness

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• Reserve Component
• Issues
• Questions?

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Posse Comitatus

• Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances
  expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act
  of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army
  or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to
  execute the laws shall be fined under this title
  or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
• Extended to USN/USMC by DoD directive
• Legislative exceptions for insurrections, WMD ,
• counter-drug