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Revival of Professional Unions?
International Workshop European Trade Unionism in
Transition ? WZB Berlin, September 9th/10th2008
Rudi Schmidt, Universität Jena
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A. Initial Question
1. Two tendencies could be observed in German
industrial relations over the last ten
years - Merging of sectoral unions towards
multi-sectoral unions (Ver.di, IG BC)
- Emergence of autonomous small professional and
specialist unions (air controller, physicians,
pilots, train drivers) 2. In doing so these
small unions take advantage of the high
homogeneity and sanctioning capability of their
members an affinity towards
Anglo-American business unions is not to be
ignored 3. Reason for this development is not
only the vacuum produced by the multi-sectoral
unions
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4. .a reason is also the increasing
heterogeneity of the working and living
conditions of the employees, intensified by
profit-oriented restructuring and shareholder
value strategies within the enterprises 5. Thus
my thesis is If the large unions are not able
to find sophisticated answers to this
heterogeneity, the small sectoral unions may
position themselves successfully in Germany 6.
By the example of the strike of the German train
drivers (GDL) 2007/08 the organizing and policy
competency will be examined on the following
charts At first I will illustrate the actors
and the course of the conflict, then comment on
its outcomes and finally draw a short conclusion.
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B. The Actors

• General characteristics of the Deutsche Bahn
  company
• The following characterisics of the Bahn
  employees should be considered
• Shaped by the historical background a state
  owned enterprise providing livelong employment
  and company benefits. Thus there is a
  traditionally high awareness of status (civil
  servants, job security).
• 2. up to now the three railway unions have
  remained sectoral unions, competing against each
  other
• 3. After World War II and especially after
  1989/90 (merger of the West German Deutsche Bahn
  and the East German Deutsche Reichsbahn) there
  was a massive reduction of employment, the
  workforce was reduced by more than 50
• 4. The unions mainly Transnet und GDBA,
  connected in one tariff community were trying
  to secure employment especially of the elder
  personnel (their members) by concessions
  regarding wages and working conditions, while
  simultaneously arranging a social compensation
  plan. (collective labour agreement on job
  security).
• 5. In general they were pursuing an industry-
  resp. company affiliated strategy, bringing them
  closer to the cooperation with the management,
  whereas the GDL (the third union), didnt
  consider such collaboration.

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Deutsche Bahn AG 1. Since 1994 the DB has the
egal form of a corporation, 100 state-owned,
initial public offering scheduled for 2008. 2.
240.000 employees working for the whole group,
for the main company 180.000, 135.000 of them
payed in accordance with the salary scale of the
unions and about 45.000 as civil
servants 3. 2003 in the black for the first
time, since then increase of profit, reduction of
debts and massive employment reduction. 4. Techno
logical Modernisation (change-over from
electromechanic to electronic signal and switch
control, semiautomatic train control of the ICEs
etc.) 5. The change of the employment and wage
policy is determined by the transformation of
the compensation system from the civil service
pay to a performance and skill-related pay
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• The Train Drivers (1/1)
• 19.600 of the 240.000 employees of the group,
• a small, but very homogeneous group, high
  sanctioning capability.
• There is a traditionally high awareness of status
  (civil servants or relatively secure jobs in the
  past) self-image of the train drivers as the
  Captains of the Railway!
• Although the semi-skilled occupation train
  driver is a job-dead-end (a good secondary
  school degree and a training of 6-8 months),
  without any chance of career advancement (up to
  now only two wage groups containing four
  seniority groups).
• Factually train drivers have been degraded to be
  only responsible for measuring and steering.
• In this context a war against loss of
  significance and relativisation can be observed
  from the semantic dispute between DB AG and GDL
  on locomotive driver vs. train driver
  (Triebfahrzeugführer)

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• The Train Drivers (1/2)
• Crucial for the payment of the train drivers are
  neither qualification nor performance, but strain
  mainly caused by the exposure to unfavourable
  working times (shift work, night duty, long
  distances to the assigned train and then back
  home, transfer time between the trains, overnight
  stays away from home and long absence from the
  family).
• Neither experience nor responsibility are
  although they were emphasised repeatedly during
  the dispute against Deutsche Bahn not that
  relevant, because real sovereignty over the rails
  is carried by train dispatchers in the control
  centres.
• Before the strike 13-14.000 of the 19.600 train
  drivers at DB AG were unionised by the GDL,
  about 5.000 by Transnet and GDBA.
• 8.000 of the train drivers are civil servants
  and so are not allowed to strike.

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• The Unions
• The union Transnet (former GdED) is the biggest
  of the three Bahn-unions with about 230.000
  members in 2007 (without any retirees
• 140.000). Most of Transnets members are working
  in the area of the railway system (incl. railway
  control centres), repair shops and crew (e.g. the
  majority of the conductors and service personnel)
• The transportation union GDBA has about 45.000
  members. It focusses on the administration, the
  former strongholds of the civil servants but
  there are also 2.500 engine drivers among its
  members.
• Gewerkschaft Deutscher Lokomotivführer GDL, had
  34.000 members before the strike, (without any
  retirees 22.000), there were about 1.500 new
  entrants through the strike. The GDL was founded
  in 1867 and thus is the oldest (still existing)
  union in Germany. It was not until the
  privatisation of the DB that it pursued an
  independent tariff policy. Its strongholds are in
  East Germany, where 80 of the train drivers are
  unionised by the GDL (especially in the regional
  transportation DB Regio).
• Transnet belongs to the DGB. As former exclusive
  civil servants unions GDBA and GDL are both
  unionised in the DBB (German Civil Servants
  Union). Transnet and GDBA join one tariff
  community.

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C The Trade Dispute The Prehistory

• 1. The main problem was the massive loss of
  members caused by the reduction of employment
  since 1990. Concerning a rate of unionisation of
  80, a stabilisation respectively a raise of
  memberships can only be achieved at the expense
  of the rates of the other unions.
• This is exactly what the GDL intended to do when
  it pursued an sectoral collective agreement for
  the whole crew personnel in 2003 (incl.
  conductors and service personnel), although it
  had only unionised the majority of the train
  drivers so far.
• 3. The GDLs claim failed in former bargaining
  rounds. The postulation - essential for the union
  - of a separate collective labour agreement (a
  sectoral agreement) for the crew (incl.
  conductors and service personnel) was packed
  into massive wage increase and better conditions
  regarding working times.

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Reasons for the Permanence and Severity of the
Conflict

• (The bargaining conflict lasted more than 10
  months.) The GDL fought against the employer and
  its rival unions (Transnet und GDBA)
• Interest of differentiation (GDL) vs. call for
  integration traditionally one collective
  bargaining unity within DB AG
• Cannibalisation of the neighbouring unions by
  the GDLs expansion on the crew (sectoral
  collective agreement)
• The GDLs refusal to adopt the company-wide,
  comparable compensation system (a conflict of
  privilege regarding Transnet/GDBA)

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Characteristices of the Conflict

• The railway strikes were very effective, because
  they were a strong weapon economically and
  socially.
• A surprising tolerance of the clients of the Bahn
  towards obstructions caused by the strike a
  perception of the personnel as representatives
  at least one group is fighting the permanent
  decline of real wages in Germany
  (Stellvertreterkrieg)
• GDL called for political intervention (owner
  state) Transnet/GDBA and DB AG were against
  that, according to the tariff autonomy the GDL
  otherwise is claiming for to legitimize the
  separate collective agreement for the driving
  crew.
• The minister of transport did so Tiefensee
  intervened several times (to prevent further
  strikes) and forced DB AG to give in, despite
  the weakness of GDL in the late phase.
• The GDLs success by the acknowlegdement of its
  special status since March 1st 2008. From this
  time on it is having sole responsibility for the
  train drivers bargaining.

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D. The Outcome

• What was achieved by the GDL? After all their
  major aim, the separate collective agreement for
  train drivers, but limited to train drivers on
  the track (Streckenlokführer).
• Since September 1st 2008 an increase of wages by
  11, (according to the duration of the treaty
  1.7.07 28.2.09 only 7).
• Improvement of the working time conditions

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• What was achieved by the other unions?
• The same.
• The Bahn had to agree to the equal treatment
  because of the strike threat by Transnet/GDBA.
  (counterbidding!)

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• Transnat/GDBA and all of the Bahn employees
  benefited from the strike policy of the GDL.
  After all with an increase of wages of 7 in this
  barbaining round they accomplished the highest
  agreement of all sectors of the German economy..
• For the Bahn this doesnt just mean an increase
  of costs. At the same time competition in
  regional transportation is growing. By now the
  DBs share of regional transportation is 80,
  regarding recent biddings it only gets 50. And
  the initial public offering is scheduled for fall
  2008.
• In the future the Bahn wants to avoid conflicts
  with the GDL by outsourcing. The 1.000 newly
  trained train drivers will supposably be employed
  in a new company, where the collective agreement
  for the train drivers is not effective.

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E. Conclusions

• The offensive reinvention of a profession-related
  civil servants organisation - as a sectoral union
  able to handle conflicts effectively - leads to
  the question, if this development could be
  symptomatic for the unions in Germany or if this
  is only characteristic for the railway sector
• As pilots, air controllers and physicians the
  train drivers constitute a homogeneous,
  sufficiently distinct professional category,
  possessing a high sanctioning capability
• All of the four professional unions in Germany
  has been fighting for separate treaties were
  emerging out of an existing large solidarity
  agreement, because they felt that their interests
  were not considered sufficiently. This
  development over the last ten years indicates a
  proceeding societal and economic differentiation,
  which can be also observed with collective
  bargaining policy.

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• This raises the question, if the large sectoral
  unions are able to find an elaborate answer to
  this differantiation process and so to take out
  the wind of the sails of existing or emerging
  small unions. So far they have been showing
  difficulties in doing so.
• The special interest policy of the transformed
  GDL is clientelistic, very market-oriented and
  competitive. Habitus and practice seem very
  American the appearance is un-ideological,
  actions show a radical lust for strike. To
  traditional characteristics of German unions as
  Class-solidarity the GDL doesnt pay any
  attention.
• Is there a new trend indicated by the successful
  strikes by the GDL?
• Hardly that the trade dispute of the Deutsche
  Bahn is an unique incident. Because of the
  tripartite constellation with an efficient
  labour-cartel in a (at present) monopolistic
  company it can barely be imitated somewhere else.
• But it could encourage other groups of
  specialists to demand more differentiation in
  favour of their interests with bad consequences
  for those groups in the German DGB-Unions fit out
  with little bargaining power

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• If anything the unions of physicians, air
  controller or pilots can be seen as symptomatic
  examples but strictly speaking they also contain
  some special characteristics.
• Each of the four unions recruit their members
  from state-related infrastructural sectors of the
  national economy (similar to the situation in
  France and Italy) but that the industrial sector
  is also susceptible to such organisations should
  be challenged at the moment.
• However, if the tariff rivalry at Deutsche Bahn
  should expand beyond this particular case, the
  companies will have to respond to a new
  environment, which will be determined by
  permanent battles provoked by the sectoral
  unions!
• A renaissance of the sectoral unions would put
  extreme pressure on the German production model
  to change towards instability and a short-term
  orientation a transformation already induced by
  shareholder value strategies of the actors of the
  financial market