Bab 5

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Bab 5

• Epistemologi

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EpistemologiSumber Pengetahuan

• Bidang Epistemologi
• Epistemologi adalah teori tentang pengetahuan
• Bagaimana orang mengetahui
• Apakah pengetahuan kita itu benar
• Dua Jenis Pengetahuan
• Pengetahuan a priori
• A priori adalah sebelum
• Pengetahuan a priori adalah pengetahuan sebelum
  pengalaman
• Umumnya mencakup logika, matematika
• Pengetahuan a posteriori
• A posteriori adalah setelah
• Pengetahuan a posteriori adalah pengetahuan
  setelah pengalaman (diperoleh dari pengalaman)
• Umumnya mencakup pengetahuan alam

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• A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
• A priori knowledge, in Western philosophy
  since the time of Kant, knowledge that is
  independent of all particular experiences, as
  opposed to a posteriori knowledge, which derives
  from experience alone. The Latin phrases a priori
  (from what is before) and a posteriori (from
  what is after) were used in philosophy
  originally to distinguish between arguments from
  causes and arguments from effects.
• The first recorded occurrence of the phrases
  is in the writings of the 14th-century logician
  Albert of Saxony. Here, an argument a priori is
  said to be from causes to the effect and an
  argument a posteriori to be from effects to
  causes. Similar definitions were given by many
  later philosophers down to and including Leibniz,
  and the expressions still occur sometimes with
  these meanings in nonphilosophical contexts. It
  should be remembered that medieval logicians used
  the word cause in a syllogistic sense
  corresponding to Aristotles attia and did not
  necessarily mean by prius something earlier in
  time. This point is brought out by the use of the
  phrase demonstratio propter quid (demonstration
  on account of what) as an equivalent for
  demonstratio a priori and demonstratio quia
  (demonstration that, or because) as an
  equivalent for demonstratio a posteriori. Hence
  the reference is obviously to Aristotles
  distinction between knowledge of the ground or
  explanation of something and knowledge of

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• the mere fact.
• Latent in this distinction for Kant is the
  antithesis between necessary, deductive truth and
  probable, inductive truth. The former applies to
  a priori judgments, which are arrived at
  independently of experience and hold universally
  the latter applies to a posteriori judgments,
  which are contingent on experience and therefore
  must acknowledge possible exceptions. In his
  Critique of Pure Reason Kant used this
  distinctions, in part, to explain the special
  case of mathematical knowledge, which he regarded
  as the fundamental example of a priori knowledge.
• Although the use of a priori to distinguish
  knowledge such as that which we have in
  mathematics is comparatively recent, the interest
  of philosophers in that kind of knowledge is
  almost as old as philosophy itself. No one finds
  it puzzling that one can acquire information by
  looking, feeling, or listening, but philosophers
  who have taken seriously the possibility of
  learning by mere thinking have often considered
  that this requires some special explanation.
  Plato maintained in his Meno and in his Phaedo
  that the learning of geometrical truths was only
  the recollection of knowledge possessed in a
  previous existence when we could contemplate the
  eternal ideas, or forms, directly. Augustine and
  his medieval followers, sympathizing with Platos
  intentions but unable to accept the details of
  his theory, declared that the ideas were in the

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• mind of God, who from time to time gave
  intellectual illumination to men. Descartes,
  going further in the same direction, held that
  all the ideas required for a priori knowledge
  were innate in each human mind. For Kant the
  puzzle were to explain the possibility of a
  priori judgments that were also synthetic (i.e.,
  not merely explicative of concepts), and the
  solution that he proposed was the doctrine that
  space, time, and the categories (e.g.,
  causality), about which we were able to make such
  judgments, were forms imposed by the mind on the
  stuff of experience.
• In each of these theories the possibility of
  a priori knowledge is explained by a suggestion
  that we have a privilege opportunity for studying
  the subject matter of such knowledge. The same
  conception occurs also in the very un-Platonic
  theory of a priori knowledge first enunciated by
  Thomas Hobbes in his De Corpore and adopted in
  the 20th century by the logical empiricists.
  According to this theory, statements of necessity
  can be made a priori because they are merely
  by-products of own rules for the use of language.
  

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EpistemologiRasionalisme dan Empirisisme

• Dua Paham Epistemologi
• Kedua paham itu adalah
• Rasionalisme
• Empirisisme
• Paham Rasionalisme
• Pengetahuan adalah a priori
• Pengetahuan bersumber dari penalaran
• Terutama pada logika dan matematika melalui
  deduksi
• Paham Empirisisme
• Pengetahuan adalah a posteriori
• Pengetahuan bersumber pada pengalaman
• Terutama pada pengetahuan alam, melalui
  eksperimentasi, observasi, dan induksi

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• EPISTEMOLOGY
• The first question of the theory of
  knowledge is the question whether there can be
  any such thing as valid knowledge the issue
  posed by skepticism. Supposing that skeptical
  doubts can be met, the next question is whether
  such knowledge as men can justly claim extends to
  things as they are in themselves or is confined
  to phenomena as they must appear to us within the
  limits of the human senses and human
  understanding. Those who conceive that what we
  know is things as they actually are, independent
  of our minds, are called realists in
  epistemology those who believe that we can have
  no knowledge of absolute realities but only of
  their sensible manifestations, are called
  phenomenalists.
• The earliest skeptics were the ancient
  Sophists and Cynics the most notable of modern
  skeptics is David Hume. The outstanding
  representatives of the phenomenalist theory are
  Immanuel Kant and Herbert Spencer.
• Both realists and phenomenalists, it should
  be noted agree that there is an absolute reality,
  and disagree only as to whether we can know this
  absolute nature which it has whereas idealists
  believe that there is no reality out of relation
  to minds. Idealistic theories of knowledge are,

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• however, too various and complex for us to
  attempt to summarize them here.
• Theories of knowledge in generalidealistic
  ones includedare also divisible into those which
  assign the major role in valid knowledge to
  intellect or reason, and so are rationalistic,
  and theories which take sense perception to be
  the sole or the principal ground of knowledge,
  and so are empiricistic. In modern philosophy,
  the Continental philosophers, Rene Descartes,
  Baruch Spinoza, and Gottfried Wilhelm von
  Leibniz, are accounted the outstanding
  rationalists and the outstanding empiricists are
  the British philosophers, John Locke, George
  Berkeley, and David Hume. Immanuel Kant is
  notable for having recognized that both sense and
  intellectual understanding are indispensable for
  any valid knowledge.
• In the 20th centuryand perhaps particularly
  in Great Britain and Americaphilosophic thinking
  shows some tendency to converge upon
  epistemological conceptions which may be
  suggested as follows
• (1) There are two types of knowledge that
  which is a priori (knowable without reference to
  particular occasions of experience and sense
  observation) and that which is a posteriori and
  empirical (requiring to be based on and
  corroborated by sense observation).

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• (2) All knowledge of the natural-scientific
  sort is a posteriori, dependent upon sense
  observation for the assurance of it. It is only
  in logic itself and in pure mathematics that we
  have scientific knowledge which is a priori.
• (3) Consonantly, it is only in the realm of
  the logical and mathematical that theoretical
  certainty is possible. Both our common knowledge
  of the external world and the generalizations of
  natural science, though they may achieve an
  approximation to certainty which is sufficient
  for all practical purposes, and even for theory
  which is bent upon practical application, cannot
  become strictly and theoretically certain.
• Agreement on these thesesespecially as here
  briefly formulatedwould be by no means
  universal and whether the tendencies so
  suggested will continue to predominate cannot, of
  course, be forecast.
• Epistemology is a difficult and complex
  subject. Here particularly, historical selections
  probably afford the best introduction. Since Kant
  is a notable contributor to epistemology but
  peculiarly difficult to read, a brief outline of
  his conceptions is mentioned by George Berkeleys
  Principles of Human Knowledge and by Alexander
  Dunlop Lindsays Immanuel Kant.

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EpistemologiRasionalisme

• Rasionalisme
• Rasionalisme mengutamakan penalaran dan
  kecerdasan di dalam pemerolehan pengetahuan
• Ada sejumlah aliran seperti
• Rasionalisme epistemologik
• Rasionalisme etik
• Rasionalisme religius
• Ada dua macam fungsi penalaran yakni diskursif
  dan intuitif
• Fungsi Diskursif (langkah demi langkah)
• Mengetahui terputus-putus secara bertahap dari
  premis sampai ke kesimpulan
• Fungsi Intuitif (Langsung)
• Secara naluriah langsung mengetahui

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• RATIONALISM
• Rationalism, in philosophy, a method of
  inquiry that regards reason as the chief source
  and test of knowledge and, in contrast to
  empiricism, tends to discountenance sensory
  experience. It holds that, because reality itself
  has an inherently rational structure, there are
  truthsespecially in logic and mathematics but
  also in ethics and metaphysicsthat the intellect
  can grasp directly. In ethics, rationalism relies
  on a natural light, and in theology it replaces
  supernatural revelation with reason.
• The inspiration of rationalism has always
  been mathematics, and rationalists have stressed
  the superiority of the deductive over all other
  methods in point of certainty. According to the
  extreme rationalist doctrine, all the truths of
  the physical science and even history could in
  principle be discovered by pure thinking and set
  forth as the consequences of self-evident
  premises. This view is opposed to the various
  systems which regard the mind as a tabular rasa
  (blank tablet) in which the outside world, as it
  were, imprints itself through the senses.
• The opposition between rationalism and
  empiricism is, however, rarely so simple and
  direct, inasmuch as many thinkers have admitted
  both sensation and reflection. Locke, for
  example, is the rationalist in the weakest sense,
• holding that the materials of human knowledge
  (ideas) are supplied by sense experience or
  introspection, but that knowledge consists in
  seeing necessary connections bet-

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• ween them, which is the function of reason (Essay
  Concerning Human Understanding).
• Most philosophers who are called
  rationalists have maintained that that the
  materials of knowledge are derived not from
  experience but deductively from fundamental
  elementary concepts. This attitude may be studied
  in Rene Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and
  Christian von Wolff. It is based on Descartess
  fundamen-tal principle that knowledge must be
  clear, and seeks to give to the philosophy the
  certainty and demonstrative character of
  mathematics, from the a priori principle of which
  all its claims are derived. The attack made by
  David Hume on the causal relation led directly to
  the new rationalism of Kant, who argued that it
  was wrong to regard thought as mere analysis. In
  Kants views, a priori concepts do exist, but if
  they are to lead to the amplification of
  knowledge, they must be brought into relation
  with empirical data.
• Ethical rationalism is the application of
  epistemological rationalism to the field of
  morals. The primary moral ideas (good, duty) are
  held to be innate, and the first principles of
  morals (e.g., the Golden Rule) are deemed
  self-evident. It is further claimed that the
  possession of reason provides an adequate motive
  for moral conduct. In ethical rationalism, reason
  is generally contrasted with feeling or moral
  sense.
• Religious rationalism asserts the claims of
  reason

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• against those of revelation or authority. The
  fundamental principles of religion are held to be
  innate or self-evident and revelation
  unnecessary. Religious rationalism thus stresses
  the importance of natural as opposed to revealed
  religion.

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EmpirisismeRasionalisme

• Penalaran (Reasoning)
• Ada banyak arti berbeda tentang penalaran.
  Beberapa di antaranya
• Proses mental beranjak dari sesuatu yang
  diketahui, langkah demi langkah, ke mengetahui
  sesuatu lainnya yang sebelumnya tidak diketahui
• Berpikir dari umum ke khusus serta dari khusus ke
  umum
• Berpikir tentang hal yang berbeda untuk menemukan
  hubungan, keurutan, kemiripan, perbedaan
• Melakukan eksperimen di dalam pikiran
• Penalaran Immanuel Kant
• Menghasilkan karya Critique of Pure Reason dan
  Critique of Practical Reason

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• REASONING OR INFERENCE
• Reasoning is the mental process in which we
  advance from some known fact or principle to the
  truth of some other fact which is different from
  the starting-point. The basis for the transition
  is always found in the knowledge from which we
  set out. This is taken or assumed to be real, and
  in it is found the ground and justification for
  the advance to something else. The differential
  of reasoning thus appear to be mediation when we
  reason we infer that something is true because
  something else is true. Knowledge derived from
  reasoning may, therefore, be termed mediate, as
  oppose of immediate knowledge obtained from
  sense perception and memory. The question at once
  arise how any metal content can justify an
  advance to something different from itself? How
  are we warranted in passing from the known to the
  unknown? This is not merely the question that
  Mill raised as to whether all syllogistic
  reasoningall advance from premises to
  conclusionwas not a petitio principii but it
  concerns all reasoning, inductive and deductive
  alike. The dilemma is that if the result is not
  contained in the starting-point the advance does
  not seem to be justified if it is already
  present, the reasoning shows nothing new. The
  view of Leibniz was that all reasoning is
  analysis, a drawing out and fuller explication of
  the original datum of the mind. Kant pointed out
  that thinking involves also synthesis, new
  constructions and additions to the material from

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• which it starts, and he takes as the fundamental
  problem of his Critique of Pure Reason the
  question how such synthetic judgments are
  possible. His answer is essentially identical
  with that which Aristotle gave, namely, that the
  mind or reason itself enters into the process as
  a premiseor, in other words, that it is through
  the creative activity of the mind that the new
  truth is reached. Whether or not one can connect
  one fact with another in a logical way depends
  upon ones intellectual ability to discover
  points of essential resemblance or identity
  between facts. The good reasoner is he who can
  look beneath the surface and detect identities
  that are not at once obvious, as Newton, for
  example, did when he reasoned from the fall of
  the apple to the movement of the heavenly bodies.
  Reasoning then, may be defined as the process of
  discovering essential resemblances or points of
  identity between things.
• It follows from what has been said that
  reasoning is not a process of mind that can go on
  apart from experience. The thinkers of the modern
  period down almost to the end of 18th century
  continues to believe that reason was a kind of
  special organ or faculty that could yield truth
  of the highest order of certainty quite apart
  from ordinary experience. Kant, however, uses the
  term Understanding (Verstand) for the thinking
  faculties as employed in interpreting experience,
  and reserves the name Reason (Vernunft) for the
  vain and illusory attempt of thought to operate
  in independence of any given material of
  experien-

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• ce. Apart from this terminology, however, which
  has not been generally followed, the result of
  Kants teaching was to exhibit the close and
  essential connection that exists between thinking
  and sense-perception on the one hand, thought is
  empty apart from the material of
  sense-perception, and, on the other, what we call
  ordinary perceptive experience is constantly
  interwoven with more or less explicit processes
  of reasoning. Reasoning does not go on in a
  vacuum, nor is it a separate and distinct
  function of mind that in some mysterious way
  spins truth out of itself. But reason is on one
  side a universal function of receptivity it
  receives its material from every channel of
  experience, and is itself just the unifying,
  co-ordinating and systematizing life of
  experience. Deduction and induction are often
  spoken of as if they were distinct species of
  reasoning. Reasoning, however, is always one and
  the same process. It consists, as we have seen,
  in connecting parts of experience by the
  discovery of some identical element in them. This
  identity, as present in various particulars, we
  may speak of as universal, or general, principle,
  and, therefore say that when we reason we unite
  particulars through a general law or principle.
  Now, the difference between deduction and
  induction is the difference in the starting-point
  and in the direction in which we proceed. If we
  are already in possession of the general law, and
  set out to apply it to particular cases, we are
  using deduction. If, however, our starting-point
  is the

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• particular instances, then we reason inductively
  to discover the universal law of connection. In
  both cases the structure of the completed
  inference is the same, and consists in the
  connection of particulars, in virtue of our
  insight into the universal law or principle
  expressed in them.
• In this reference to a universal principle,
  we have also that which distinguishes reasoning
  from the transition from idea to idea of the
  associative process. In the large part of the
  conscious life that usually is described as
  thinking, one idea by its very presence seems to
  call up another, without the apprehension of any
  universal or essential law of connection. But
  this is mere drifting on the part of the mind. In
  reasoning, the mind is fully awake it sets a
  definite purpose before it, and proceeds by
  active attention and analysis to discover
  essential and necessary points of connection. It
  thus uses association for its own purposes so
  that if we define reasoning as a process of
  association, we must add that it is association
  guided and controlled at every step by the
  purposes of thought itself. How conscious and
  explicit must this direction be before we can
  call the process reasoning? Can animals properly
  be said to reason? These questions do not admit
  of any off-hand answer. The conscious direction
  of the mind, the clearness with which it
  apprehends the universal in the particular, is a
  matter of degree. We may say that some direction
  on the part of the mind there must be, as well as

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• some apprehension of the terms as universal, if
  reasoning to occur, without attempting to
  determine just when these conditions are
  fulfilled in any in individual mind on in any
  species. What we call conscious reasoning is
  doubtless continues with associative and
  instinctive mental processed that seem entirely
  mechanical and irrational, and the connection
  between the two extremes may be mediated by
  actual observable processes. This continuity,
  however, gives no justification for refusing to
  regard the differences as important, or for
  explaining either extreme of the process in terms
  of the other.

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EmpirisismeRasionalisme

• Ciri Umum Rasionalisme
• Mengutamakan penalaran di dalam pemerolehan
  pengetahuan
• Banyak menggunakan logika deduktif
• Penalaran berlangsung secara diskursif dan
  intuitif
• Dunia adalah keseluruhan yang teratur yang
  rasional
• Penganut Rasionalisme
• Mencakup di antaranya ahli filsafat terkenal
  seperti
• Rene Descartes
• Spinoza
• Leibniz
• Hegel

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EpistemologiEmpirisisme

• Empirisme
• Empirisisme mengutamakan pengalaman di dalam
  pemerolehan pengetahuan
• Tidak ada kecerdasan yang sebelumnya tidak
  berasal dari indera
• Ada sejumlah aliaran
• Empirisisme absolut
• Empirisisme substantif
• Empirisisme parsial
• Menganggap bahwa penalaran matematika pada
  rasionalisme hanyalah hubungan tanpa substansi
• Ada Dua Komponen Teori
• Teori arti (konsep)
• Teori pengetahuan

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EpistemologiEmpirisisme

• Teori Arti (Theory of Meaning)
• Penjelasan tentang sesuatu melalui kata-kata
• Kata-kata dapat dipahami hanya jika terkait
  dengan sesuatu yang dapat dialami
• Misalnya penjelasan tentang arti mobil, buku,
  Susi, baik hati, minat
• Sering tidak mudah untuk dilaksanakan dengan baik
• Teori Pengetahuan
• Pengetahuan tentang sesuatu melalui kata-kata
• Misalnya, Budi baik hari, Susi pandai, besi
  memuai, harga saham meningkat
• Perlu dibenarkan melalui pengalaman (diuji
  kebenarannya)
• Pengujian melalui pengalaman memerlukan rancangan
  yang tepat dan sering kali memerlukan alat ukur
  yang sesuai

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• EMPIRICISM
• Empiricism (from Greek empeiria
  experience), in philosophy, an attitude
  expressed in a pair of doctrines (1) that all
  concepts are derived from the experience to which
  they are applied and (2) that all knowledge of
  matters of fact is based on, or derived from,
  experience. Accordingly, all claims to knowledge
  of the world can be justified only by experience.
• Empiricism argues that knowledge derived
  from a priori reasoning (involving definitions
  formed or principles assumed) either does not
  exist or is confined to analytical truths,
  which have no content, deriving their validity
  merely from the meanings of the words used to
  express them. Hence a metaphysics that seeks to
  combine the a priori validity of logic with a
  scientific content is impossible. Likewise there
  can be no rational method the nature of the
  world cannot be discovered through pure reason or
  reflection.
• In practice three different types of
  Empiricism are recognized, depending on the
  degree to which adherents admit a priori concepts
  or propositions. Absolute Empiri-cist admit
  neither a priori concepts nor a priori
  propositions, although they may recognize such
  analytical a priori truths as tautological
  definitions. Substantive Empiricists distinguish
  between formal and categorial a priori concepts.
  The existence of formal a priori concepts

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• is admitted, provided such formal concepts are
  confined to the ways ideas interact categorial a
  priori concepts such as causation are denied.
  Substantive Empiricists argue that every a priori
  proposition is virtually a tautology, although it
  may take deduction to reveal this. Partial
  Empiricists claim that certain non-formal ideas
  may be a priori. Examples include the concepts of
  natural cause and effect, morality, etc. After
  granting this, however, the Partial Empiricist
  verifies everyday propositions about matters of
  fact by empirical means.
• Historically, the first Western Empiricists
  were the ancient Greek Sophists, who concentrated
  their philosophical inquiries on such relatively
  concrete entities as man and society, rather than
  the speculative fields explored by their
  predecessors. Later ancient philosophers with
  Empiricist tendencies were the Stoics and the
  Epicureans, although both were principally
  concerned with ethical questions.
• The majority of Christian philosophers in
  the Middle Ages were Empiricists. A notable
  thinker of the 14th century, for example, was
  William of Ockham, who argued that all knowledge
  of the physical world is attained by sensory
  means. In the 16th century another English
  Empiricist, Francis Bacon, believed in building
  up observed data about nature so as to arrive at
  an accurate

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• picture of the world. To this extent he laid the
  foundations of the scientific method. John Locke
  in the 17th century was probably the leading
  Empiricist of the late- to post-Renaissance era.
  Later philosophers who subscribed to some degree
  of Empiricism included the Irish-born Bishop
  George Berkeley in the 17th and 18th centuries,
  the Scot David Hume in the 18th century, and the
  Britons John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell in
  the 19th and 20th centuries respectively. Mill
  (who denied that he was an Empiricist) and
  Russell on occasion even claimed that
  mathematical truths or logical concepts are
  essentially Empirical.
• The antithetical position to that of
  Empiricism in philosophical arguments over
  theories of knowledge has usually been the
  Rationalist one. Discussion centres on the extent
  to which concepts are innate or acquired.
• Another group of Empiricists, but one that
  operated outside the Anglo-Saxon tradition,
  consisted of the Logical Positivists of the
  Vienna Circle. Logical Positivists hold that
  metaphysical statements are meaningless because
  they are inherently unverifiable.
• The following ideas may be attributed to
  Empiricist influence, although not all of them
  need be held by any particular Empiricist
  thinker (1) Experience is intelligible

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• in isolation, or atomistically, without reference
  to the nature of its object or to the
  circumstances of its subject. Hence an experience
  can be described without saying anything about
  the mind that has it, the thoughts that describe
  it, or the world that contains it. (2)
• The person who undergoes experience is in some
  sense the recipient of data that are imprinted
  upon his intelligence irrespective of his
  activity the person brings nothing to
  experience, but gains everything from it. (3) All
  method is scientific method. To discover the
  nature of the world it is necessary to develop a
  method of experiment whereby all claims to
  knowledge are tested by experience, since nothing
  but experience can validate them. (4)
  Reductionism All facts about the world can be
  reduced to what are facts inasmuch as experiences
  confirm claims to knowledge as facts hence no
  claims to knowledge of a transcendental world can
  have any foundation.
• Empiricisms influence may be seen in the
  broad thesis of Nominalism, according to which
  reality is held to reside in the particular
  rather than in the universal. Nominalists argue
  that the whole has no reality that is not derived
  from that of its parts.
• In the metaphysical sphere Empiricism
  generates a characteristic view of causation,
  seemingly an almost inevitable consequence of the
  Empiricist theory of knowledge. According to
  Empiricist metaphysics the world consists of a
  set of contingently connected objects

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• and situations, united by regularities rather
  than necessities, and unrelated to any
  transcendental cause or destiny. Science,
  according to this view, investigates connections,
  and its aim is to make predictions on the basis
  of observed regularities. Furthermore, judgments
  of value have no place in science, say the
  Empiricists as such judgments are subjective
  preferences of the investigator.

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EpistemologiEmpirisisme

• Ciri umum Empirisisme
• Pengalaman dapat dipahami secara terisolasi
• Manusia yang mengalami menjadi penerima data
• Semua metoda harus berupa metoda ilmiah
• Pengetahuan dapat terdiri atas bagian-bagian yang
  lebih sederhana (reductionism)
• Dunia merupakan seperangkat obyek dan situasi
  yang berkaitan
• Banyak menggunakan logika induktif
• Penganut Empirisisme
• Mencakup para ahli filsafat seperti
• John Locke
• George Berkeley
• David Hume
• John Stuart Mill
• Penganut Positivisme Logika
• Penganut pragmatisme

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• REDUCTIONISM
• Of a given kind are collections or combinations
  of entities of a simpler or more basic kind or
  that expressions denoting such entities are
  definable in terms of expressions denoting the
  more basic entities. Thus the ideas that
  physical bodies are collections of atoms or that
  thoughts are combinations of sense impressions
  are form of reductionism.
• Two very general forms of reductionism have
  been held by philosophers in the 20th century
  (1) Logical Positivists have maintained that
  expressions referring to existing things or to
  states of affairs are definable in terms of
  directly observable objects, or sense-data, and,
  hence, that any statement of fact is equivalent
  to some set of empirically verifiable statements.
  In particular, it has been held that the
  theoretical entities of science are definable in
  terms of observable physical things, so that
  scientific laws are equivalent to combinations of
  observation reports. (2) Proponents of the unity
  of science have held that the theoretical
  entities of particular sciences, such as biology
  or psychology, are definable in terms of those of
  some more basic science, such as physics or that
  the laws of these sciences can be explained by
  those of the more basic science.
• The Logical Positivist version of
  reductionism also implies the unity of science
  insofar as the definability of the theoretical
  entities of the various sciences in terms of

30

• the observable would constitute the common basis
  of all scientific laws. Although this version of
  reductionism is no longer widely accepted,
  primarily because of the difficulty of giving a
  satisfactory characterization of the distinction
  between theoretical and observational statements
  in science, the question of the reducibility of
  one science to another remains controversial.

31
EmpirisismePositivisme

• Perkembangan Empirisisme
• Dari empirisisme muncul aliran positivisme
• Positivisme kemudian berkembang menjadi
  positivisme logika
• Positivisme logika berkembang menjadi empirisisme
  logika
• Positivisme
• Berkembang pada abad ke-19, terutama oleh Auguste
  Comte
• Aliran ini dikenal juga sebagai filsafat ilmu
• Positivisme hanya membahas bagian filsafat yang
  dapat diuji secara positif (empiris)
• Ada kalanya metodologi penelitian kita dikenal
  sebagai metodologi penelitian positif karena
  berdasarkan aliran positivisme ini

32

• POSITIVISM
• Positivism in a term frequently used to
  characterize a number of theoretical positions in
  philosophy as well as in the social sciences. A
  remarkable heterogeneity of meaning has always
  accompanied this term, and this peculiarity is in
  central ways associated with the 19th century
  French philosopher Auguste Comte, who coined the
  term and elaborated his conception of it in his
  writings. His two major works dealing with
  positivism are the course of Positive Philosophy
  (1830-1842) and the System of Positive Polity, or
  Treatise on Sociology Instituting the Religion of
  Humanity (1851-1854). Although many of Comtes
  ideas were not original with him, his work
  nevertheless represents the first major
  systematic formulation of modern positivism. His
  system was so stimulate in turn certain central
  developments in logic, the philosophy of science,
  psychology, and sociology.
• Positive Philosophy as a Philosophy of
  Science. One of Comtes principal aims was to
  transform all philosophy into a philosophy of
  science, which he called positive philosophy. The
  central purposes of his positive philosophy as a
  distinct discipline were to coordinate the
  general findings of the basic scientific
  disciplines of mathematics, astronomy, physics,
  chemistry, biology, and sociology. By serving
  these ends, philosophy could guide and accelerate
  the direction and progress of the special
  sciences.

33

• Positive philosophy as the philosophy of
  science, is the final stage in the development of
  philosophy. Throughout history man attempted to
  comprehend the order that prevails in the world
  of phenomena. In the earliest stage of thought,
  the theological stage, men attribute the
  occurrence and order of phenomena to the working
  of supernatural agents. In the nest stage, the
  metaphysical stage, order is explained by
  references to abstract forces. But it is only in
  the last stage, the positive stage, that the
  human mind gives up the search for first and
  final causes and instead attempts to discover the
  invariable relations of succession and likeness
  between phenomena. In this way the actual laws
  that govern phenomena are discovered.
• The Role of Reason and Mathematics in
  Scientific Method and Positive Philosophy. For a
  clear understanding of Comtes positivism and of
  the philosophy of science that has developed
  since his day, it is essential to note Comtes
  opposition to a strictly empiricist theory of
  knowledge. Although valid knowledge must be based
  on the observation of phenomena, observation and
  induction in Comtes view will never by
  themselves lead to the discovery of the laws of
  phenomena. All observation of phenomena must in
  fact be guided by conjectures or theories about
  their order. In the past, theological and
  metaphysical theories were expressions, although
  imperfect ones, of this use of faculty of
  reasoning. In the positive stage, reasons comes
  into its

34

• own in the formulation of scientific hypothesis
  to guide scientific inquiry. What was later to be
  elaborated as the hypothetico-deductive method of
  understanding already existed in its essentials
  in Comtes rudimentary conception of scientific
  method.
• Comte considered mathematics the cornerstone
  of both positive philosophy and the positive
  method. In contrast to geometry and mechanics,
  which he regarded as natural sciences,
  mathematical analysis, because of its purely
  logical and rational nature, represents the ideal
  of scientific method.
• Positivism and Social Phenomena. Comte
  sought to apply scientific method to the study of
  social phenomena, thereby bringing the last
  remaining class of phenomena into the realm of
  the observational sciences. He believed that by
  means of the positive science of social physics,
  or sociology, man could discover the laws that
  determined social order and progress.
• Comte postulated that mankind, like all
  other phenomena in nature, was governed by
  invariable laws of coexistence and succession.
  Hence such metaphysical notions as freedom and
  will in human affairs were invalidated, since
  they were not scientifically observable entities.
• Comte argued that to the extent that men
  possess knowledge of the invariable laws
  determining order and

35

• change in society as well as in nature, they will
  consciously behave in accord with them. When man
  mistakenly assumes that human affairs can be
  arranged or altered at will, he in fact obstructs
  the working out of historical laws, produces
  social disharmony and strife, delays progress,
  and prevents himself and others from becoming
  reconciled to the prevailing order of things.
• This is not to suggest that he believed
  mankind must submit passively to what is.
  Knowledge of these laws will enable man to
  predict phenomena and act successfully on both
  nature and society. Throughout Comets career,
  his overriding purpose was to reorganize Western
  society and institute a permanent social order
  free from chaos and revolution. His vast
  philosophical system was designed primarily to
  serve this end and is inseparable from it.

36
EpistemologiPositivisme

• Pandangan Positivisme
• Semua pengetahuan berkenaan dengan fakta materi
  didasarkan kepada data positif dari pengalaman
• Di luar dunia fakta terdapat logika murni dan
  matematika murni
• Menolak pengetahuan yang tidak dapat diverifikasi
  melalui metoda ilmiah empirik
• Penjelasan dikemukan dalam bentuk hipotesis atau
  hukum empirik lainnya berkenaan dengan hubungan
  tetap di antara gejala yang teramati
• Hubungan kosal (sebab akibat) diverifikasi
  melalui hubungan di antara gejala yang teramati
• Kesahihan hipotesis ditentukan melalui pengujian
  empirik (observasi dan eksperimentasi)
• Perkembangan
• Dari positivisme berkembang positivisme logika

37
EpistemologiPositivisme Logika

• Kelompok Wina
• Kelompok ahli fisafat dan ilmuwan di Wina yang
  berpaham positivisme
• Kepada positivisme ditambahkan logika
• Tertarik kepada ulasan Wittgenstein tentang
  bahasa (filsafat bahasa atau filsafat analitik)
• Aliran Positivisme Logika
• Masalah filsafat adalah masalah bahasa sehingga
  bahasa harus jelas
• Bahasa yang jelas adalah bahasa yang merupakan
  potret dari kenyataan
• Semua pernyataan harus dapat dijustifikasi
  sehingga perlu menyertakan cara untuk mengujinya
  secara empirik
• Metafisika dan hal yang tidak dapat diuji secara
  empiris tidak memiliki arti (meaningless)
  sehingga tidak dibicarakan

38

• VIENNA CIRCLE, German, Wiener Kreis
• A group of philosophers, scientists, and
  mathemati-cians formed in the 1920s that met
  regularly in Vienna to investigate scientific
  language and scientific methodology. The
  philosophical movement associated with the Circle
  has been called variously logical positivism,
  logical empiricism, scientific empiricism,
  neopositivism, and the unity of science movement.
  The work of its members, although not unanimous
  in the treatment of many issues, was
  distinguished, first, by its attention to the
  form of scientific theories, in the belief that
  the logical structure of any particular
  scientific theory could be specified quite apart
  form its content. Second, they formulated a
  verifiability principle or criterion of meaning,
  a claim that the meaningfulness of a proposition
  is grounded in experience and observation. For
  this reason, the statements of ethics,
  metaphysics, religion, and aesthetics were held
  to be assertorically meaningless. Third, and as a
  result of the two other points, a doctrine of
  unified science was espoused. Thus, no
  fundamental differences were seen to exist
  between the physical and biological sciences or
  between the natural and social sciences.
• The founder and leader of the group was
  Moritz Schlick, who was an epistemologist and
  philosopher of science. Among its members wer
  Gustav Bergmann, Rudolf Carnap, Hebert Feigl,
  Philipp Frank, Kurt Gödel, Otto Neurath, and
  Friedrich Weismann and among the

39

• members of a cognate group. The Gesselschaft für
  empirische Philosophie (Society for Empirical
  Philosophy), which met in Berlin, were Carl
  Hampel, and Hans Reichenbach. A formal
  declaration of the groups intentions was issued
  in 1929 with the publication of the manifesto
  Wissenschaftliche Welauffasung Der Wiener Kreis
  (Scientific Conception of the World The Vienna
  Circle), and in that year the first in a series
  of congresses organized by the group took place
  in Prague. In 1938, with the onset of World War
  II, political pressure was brought to bear
  against the group and it disbanded, many of its
  members fleeing to the United States and a few to
  Great Britain.

40
EpistemologiPositivisme Logika

• Bahasa Dalam Filsafat
• Positivisme logika memiliki tiga unsur penting
  logika, bahasa, dan verifikasi
• Masalah filsafat adalah masalah bahasa karena
  filsafat diungkapkan melalui bahasa
• Perhatian terhadap bahasa ini melahirkan filsafat
  bahasa yang dikenal sebagai filsafat analitik
• Filsafat Analitik
• Mula-mula filsafat analitik muncul dari
  Wittgenstein yang diserap oleh positivisme logika
• Kemudian berkembang berbagai pikiran tentang
  filsafat analitik atau filsafat linguistik
• Pokok utama yang dipermasalahkan adalah arti dari
  kata-kata yang perlu jelas

41

• ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
• Analytic philosophy, also called linguistic
  philosophy, a movement, dominant in Anglo-US
  philosophy in the mid-20th century, distinguished
  by its method, which has focussed upon language
  and the analysis of the concepts expressed in it.
  Representatives of the Analytic school have
  tended to hold that the purpose of philosophy is
  therapeutic--to clarify obscurities and
  confusions, in the expectation that many of the
  traditional problems of philosophy will thus
  dissolve.
• Analytic and Linguistic philosophers have
  advanced a variety of divergent view. The
  Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), for
  example, in a career perhaps unique in the
  history of philosophy, wrote two major works
  central to the development of Analytic
  philosophy--Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and
  Philoso-phical Investigations--the second of
  which refuted the first.
• Analytic philosophy, flourishing between
  1945 and 1960, was the successor of the Logical
  Positivism of the 1930s, which in its turn
  derived to some extent form the Realism and
  Pluralism of the British thinkers Bertrand
  Russell and G.E. Moore, worked in the decade
  before 1914. Russell was an inspirer of
  Positivism (the insistence on a knowledge based
  on facts verifiable by the method of empirical
  sciences) Moore, with his determination to avo-

42

• id unintelligibility in philosophical discourse
  and his resistance to beliefs at odds with common
  sense, was the chief anticipator of the Analytic
  and Linguistic philosophy of 1945 to 1960.
• The leading exponents of the movement were
  Wittgenstein and the British thinkers Gilbert
  Ryle (1900-76) and L.J. Austin (1911-60). Its
  explicit formulation began with Wittgensteins
  return, after a period of withdrawal, to
  philosophy and Cambridge in 1929. While the
  brightest young philosophers were becoming
  committed to the Positivism of the Vienna Circle,
  in the British form given to it in 1936 in the
  Language, Truth and Logic of A.J. Ayer,
  Wittgensteins new ideas were confined, with a
  few exceptions, to a close circle of personal
  disciples in Cambridge.
• The conquest of philosophically more
  populous Oxford was signaled in 1946 by a
  celebrated symposium paper of Austins on the
  topic of other minds. Ryles The Concept of Mind
  (1949) was the first important book in the new
  mode. Wittgensteins earlier, and in many ways
  different, view were not generally available
  until his Philosophical Investigations was
  published posthumously in 1953, to be followed by
  a long sequence of other writings. In the U.S.
  his influence was rapidly diffused after 1945 by
  former pupils teaching at Cornell.

43

• The schools decline clearly began in
  1960--the year of Austins death and of the
  publication of Word and Object by the U.S.
  thinker W.V. Quine, a constructive and highly
  original development of the Positivism of of the
  1930s. That was also the epoch of the emergence
  of the U.S. linguist Noam Chomskys radical
  renovation of linguistic science, which must have
  indirectly helped to undermine the classically
  based amateurism of the British Analytic
  philosophers.
• The starting point of Analytic philosophy is
  not simply the belief that language is the proper
  or immediate object of philosophical inquiry.
  That is the conviction of many philosophers of
  the past, particularly when they have been
  academic or professionalized. It is also accepted
  by those who, taking thought and knowledge to be
  the prime business of philosophy, realize that
  all but the most primitive thoughts require
  linguistic articulation. The distinguishing mark
  of Analytic philosophy is the thesis that
  traditional philosophical problems can be solved,
  or dissolved, by close attention to the manner in
  which the words employed in stating and
  discussing them are actually used.
• The Analytic philosophers agreed in reciting
  as arbitrary and absurd the verification
  principle of their Positivist predecessors, which
  implied that only utterances

44

• Affirming matters of empirical or conceptual fact
  are meaningful. Both its branding as senseless of
  utterances not in the indicative mood and
  judgments of value, and the past so as to bring
  them under the principle by main force, were to
  Analytic philosophers outrages on common sense.
• In its place, they argued that language is
  a social and functional phenomenon, art of the
  natural life of the human species. It is not an
  abstract calculus whose essence has been revealed
  once and for all by modern mathematical logic. It
  is used in many different ways and for many
  different purposes. There is no single basis of,
  or paradigm for, significant speech to which
  everything must be forcibly reduced if it is not
  to be ruled out as senseless. Echoing Moores
  attachment to the convictions of common sense,
  the Analytic philosophers took conflict with such
  convictions to be a sign of conceptual confusion,
  a misunderstanding of the rules that actually
  govern the use of words in normal everyday life,
  and which can be followed perfectly well in
  practice, but which one is led to ignore in
  reflective moods by mistaken but seductive
  analogies (according to Wittgenstein) or mere
  oversimplification, a one-sided diet of
  examples (in the words of Austin). From this it
  follows that the right way to deal with
  philosophical problems is to bring to light the
  mistakes about the meaning of words that give
  rise to them.

45

• True philosophy, therefore, is a kind of therapy
  for conceptually confused intellect.
• Wittgenstein applied his new conception of
  language to a large extent to the problem of
  explaining discourse about metal
  processes--understanding, suffering, pain, and
  intentionality. Ryles Concept of Mind offered a
  simplified, perhaps simplistic, version of
  Wittgensteins ideas on this subject, which
  arrived in the end at something close to the
  behaviourism of most Positivists, but by way of a
  mass of interesting detail. Austin wrote
  brilliantly but inconclusively about perception,
  truth, promising, and responsibility. By his
  inconclusiveness he succeeded in avoiding the
  philosophical theory that philosophy should
  propound no theories.
• Where Wittgenstein philosophized about
  language only so far as needed for the
  therapeutic purpose in hand, the Analytic
  philosophers of Oxford were well disposed to the
  study of language for its own sake. Ryles view
  of philosophy as conceptual geography suggested
  the possibility of a comprehensive atlas. Austin,
  in his last book, How to Do Things with Words
  (1962), sketched the outlines of a systematic
  theory of the uses of language. Although Ryle and
  Austin have passed into history as influences,
  Wittgenstein remains a living force in
  contemporary philosophy.

46
EpistemologiPenalaran

• Arti Penalaran
• Penalaran adalah reasoning dengan berbagai arti,
  mencakup
• Proses mental untuk beranjak dari fakta atau
  gejala yang diketahui ke pengetahuan akan fakta
  atau gejala yang sebelumnya tidak diketahui
• Proses untuk menemukan kemiripan atau perbedaan
  di antara dua hal yang berbeda
• Proses berpikir dari hukum umum melalui deduksi
  ke kasus atau dari kasus melalui induksi ke hukum
  umum
• Proses berpikir yang mengaitkan satu hal dengan
  hal lain
• Proses melaksanakan eksperimen di dalam pikiran
• Keterbatasan Penalaran
• Penalaran mengenal keterbatasan

47
EpistemologiPenalaran

• Alat dan Pembenaran Penalaran
• Bernalar melalui berpikir atau intuisi terutama
  melalui berpikir
• Bernalar menggunakan bahasa dan matematika (dan
  statistika), termasuk berkomunikasi tentang hasil
  nalar
• Pembenaran penalaran melalui koherensi,
  korespondensi, atau pragmatisme
• Pembenaran Melalui Koherensi
• Pembenaran melalui kecocokan dengan sesuatu yang
  sudah diketahui (hukum atau teori atau
  sejenisnya)
• Biasanya berbentuk berdasarkan hukum, teori,
  rumus, tertentu, maka ...
• Pembenaran melalui proses deduktif

48
EpistemologiPenalaran

• Pembenaran Melalui Korespondensi
• Pembenaran melalui kecocokan dengan kenyataan
  atau fakta (empirik)
• Memerlukan data untuk pencocokan
• Pembenaran melalui proses induktif
• Pembenaran Melalui Pragmatisme
• Pembenaran berdasarkan kegunaan di dalam
  kehidupan praktis
• Melalui ide yang berguna, praktis, terkerjakan
• Mementingkan kegiatan, pengalaman, hasil, atau
  verifikasi
• Berkembang di Amerika Serikat pada bagian awal
  abad ke-20

49

• PRAGMATISM
• Pragmatism, school of philosophy, dominant
  in the United States during the first quarter of
  the 20th century, based on the principle that the
  usefulness, workability, and practicality of
  ideas, policies, and proposals are the criteria
  of their merit. It stresses the priority of
  action over doctrine, of experience over fixed
  principles and it holds that ideas borrow their
  meanings from their consequences, and their
  truths from their verification. Thus, ideas are
  essentially instruments and plans of action.
• The pragmatist position was first
  systematized by the American philosophers Charles
  Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and William James
  (1842-1910), who agreed on the practical nature
  of meaning but differed as to the implications of
  such doctrine. For Peirce, pragmatism was
  primarily an investigation of the proper methods
  of procedure in the natural sciences, a reductive
  doctrine equating the meaning of theoretical
  terms with their impact upon experience. Peirces
  is a highly theoretical view of the proper
  meaning of ideas, derived from Immanuel Kant and
  the British empiricists. By contrast, James moved
  in a much more practical and moralistic
  direction. The virtues of belief, including
  truth, became in his view matters of their
  efficiency in enabling a person to cope with the
  problems of living. The vital good of a be-

50

• lief in ones whole life became its
  justification. James could thus write On
  pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God
  work satisfactorily, in the widest sense of the
  word it is true. The antirational implications
  of this statement shocked many critics, including
  G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, who saw it as an
  invitation to wish-fulfillment and
  self-deception. That religious beliefs exhibit
  certain consoling and uplifting effects and work
  well in the lives of particular believers in an
  unarguable fact but it is another matter
  entirely to assert that such attributes
  substantiate the beliefs themselves. Even Jamess
  fellow pragmatists, including Peirce, drew back
  from this identification of utility with truth.
• Controversies over truth continued to dog
  the movement. Peirces own account of truth was
  that which is fated ultimately to be agreed by
  all who investigate in this view, truth
  represents a kind of limit of scientifically
  formed opinion. But Peirces definition failed to
  account for those facts that are inaccessible
  to actual investigation. The real intention of
  the definition is to stress the role of
  practically motivated inquiry in shaping concepts
  and judgments and the particular truths accepted
  on their basis.
• The more practical aspects of pragmatism
  were follow-

51

• ed up in the works of the American philosopher
  and theorist of education John Dewey (1859-1952).
  Dewey developed what he saw as a new attitude
  toward experience. In Deweys view, the
  phenomenon of experience, which empiricists
  tended too often to regard as a passive,
  mechanistic reflection of the world, was in
  actuality an active, social process. Knowing, he
  asserted, is primarily a matter of knowing how.
  Inquiry tells us how to transform situations for
  the better thus, knowledge is assertion
  warranted by inquiry. This insight was probably
  more influential on the practice of education
  than on philosophy, particularly after the
  logical positivists made their mark on the
  philosophy of science. However, specific emphasis
  on practice and technique regained prominence in
  American philosophy during the second half of the
  20th century. It dominated the later work of
  Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), who saw
  possession of any kind of language as mastery of
  a body of techniques W.V. Quine argued that the
  considerations that model changes of theory are
  largely pragmatic and not, for instance, dictated
  by previously fixed concepts and meanings that
  interact with raw experience. The picture of
  truth that emerges from Quines works, and the
  works of those influenced by him, is that the
  truth of any individual assertion is itself
  secondary. It is a derivative virtue of sentences
  that are members of theories which themselves
  work, as efficient means to practical ends.
  Whereas the positivists hoped to reduce the
  content of scientific theory,

52

• this kind of instrumental view concedes to
  theories their own irreducible role but still
  sees their fundamental virtue as that of working
  in practice.