Afghanistan: Lost Cause or the Road to Success

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AfghanistanLost Cause or the Road to Success?

• Alex Bellamy
• Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to
  Protect

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Agenda

• Where are we?
• How Did we Get Here?
• Where Too Now?

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Where are we?

• 2008 is a pivotal year
• Presidential election in 2009
• Resurgent Taliban
• Fractures in NATO alliance (publics divided)
• Stalling economic reconstruction 174th out of
  178 on UNDP development index
• Explosion of poppy cultivation
• Regional instability (Pakistan)

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But progress has been made

• Afghanistan ruled by elected government for 3
  years
• Currency is stable
• 2 million females in school
• Basic healthcare provided for 82 of the
  population

• BUT these gains threatened
• 2008 Karzai 300,000 children forced to stay
  home due to violence (50 increase on 2007)

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Key problems

• Security
• Poppy cultivation
• Economic development
• Poor governance/low capacity
• Regional instability

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Security key points

• Taliban has a permanent presence in approx. 54
  of Afghanistan
• ISAF casualties escalated 240 in 2007, highest
  since 2001
• North stable but fragile peace dependent on
  consent of co-opted strongmen who cooperate with
  government only when in their interests

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Security Political Repercussions

• UK/Canada/US casualties creates calls for burden
  sharing
• Public pressure to reduce casualties
• Canada threat to withdraw
• Europeans reluctant to increase burden without
  greater say in decision-making

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Poppy cultivation

• 2006 165,000 hectares
• 2007 193,000 hectares
• 93 of world supply
• 80 of this is grown in areas near Pakistan
  border
• Expansion of poppy cultivation inside Pakistan
  itself
• Helmand (Taliban stronghold) 43 increase in
  2007
• Regions without poppy cultivation also profit
  from the industry

• Symptom and cause of problems
• Growth linked to failing economy and insurgent
  strength
• Heart of problem drug money
• Growers receive 20 of income (enough to sustain
  basic life not a problem in itself)
• Problem other 80 goes to strongmen/insurgents/T
  aliban entrenching their power

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Economic Development

• Annual foreign assistance up to 3bn from 1.2bn
  in 2002
• economic growth is 8.7
• Inflation is single digit
• Govt has 5bn of reserves
• Agriculture and construction booming

• But major problems persist, some get worse
• GDP per capita is 377
• Most Afghans live on less than 1 per day
• Life expectancy is 42.9 years
• Adult literacy is 28
• This fuels poppy cultivation
• 2005-7 Corruption has got worse
• Insecurity hampers development (one school
  rebuilt three times)

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Poor Governance Capacity

• Very small pool of educated professionals to fill
  government posts
• Many senior political figures (including
  governors, parliamentarians, cabinet members)
  associated with human rights abuse
• Civil servants underpaid and expected to do
  dangerous jobs (poppy eradication)
• Officials and militia control trade routes
• Poppy eradication very uneven due to political
  loyalties/alliances
• Police capacity almost non-existent outside
  Kabul rule of law extremely patchy

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Difficult Neighbourhood

• Pakistan highly unstable key sanctuary and
  support for Taliban
• Pashtun belt crosses border
• Pakistan has launched military ops in area but
  these have proven ineffective
• Iran public support for Karzai but deeper
  alliance with Northern Alliance
• Iran has supplied arms into Afghanistan
• Iran enemy of Taliban since it murdered diplomats
  in 1998
• BUT worsening US relations could make
  supporting Taliban more attractive

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How did we get here?

• Afghanistan is a complicated and difficult place
• Problems compounded by the nature of
  international engagement

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Key problems

• No unity of purpose
• Fragmented and uncertain military mission
• Unclear political priorities
• Ineffective aid

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1. Unity of Purpose

• International engagement in Afghanistan
  comprises
• UN Assistance mission
• NATO ISAF
• US-led Operation Enduring Freedom
• EU Policing mission
• US, EU, Japanese and Arab development programs

• Different capacities and priorities
• Many contributors participate out of loyalty to
  US/NATO, NOT primary concern for Afghanistan
• Some want UNAMA to coordinate, others do not (UN)
• OEF civilian casualties undermines ISAF, UNAMA
  capacity building
• Major players prioritise poppy/Taliban
  eradication rather than whole of country approach
• Eg. Priority given to Afghan Army not Police
• This results in regions falling in and out of
  focus
• Encourages locals to not fully engage and
  play-off internationals for short-term gains

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2. Fragmented and Uncertain Military Purpose

• Numbers are an issue NATO has only 90 of its
  stated requirements
• ISAF unable to clear and hold territory (esp. in
  Helmand) means that territory has to be
  forcibly reclaimed several times
• BUT military problems are deeper than just
  numbers
• Military component does not have civilian
  leadership therefore not integrated with wider
  effort
• IAF/OEF are themselves not fully integrated and
  sometimes at cross-purposes
• OEF sometimes does pk ISAF sometimes does
  counter-insurgency
• Regions often pacified by dealing with local
  strongmen bolstering them, weakening governance
• Latest solution place US General in command of
  ISAF to integrate through US
• BUT (1) creates problems owing to US priorities
  (poppy Taliban eradication) being different to
  Euro priorities (state building, hearts and
  minds)
• BUT (2) doesnt resolve operational problem of
  having two commands in one theatre

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3. Unclear Political Priorities

• No overarching strategy guiding political,
  military, economic operations
• Focus on poppy eradication without economic
  alternative places interveners interests ahead
  of Afghanistans
• Capacity building efforts stalling
• Oversight body (joint coordination and monitoring
  board) has become unwieldy and ineffective
• There are (loose) benchmarks but no consequences
  for failing the meet them
• Very poor standards of accountability and
  transparency in accounting
• Benchmarks on disarmament and transitional
  justice all but forgotten
• Little oversight of government donors are not
  holding it accountable
• Buying short term stability by co-opting
  strongmen undermines long-term goals
• Strengthens strongmen weakens government
• Enables poppy cultivation by allies
• Undermines legitimacy by rewarding human rights
  abuses
• Key Case Karzais Refusal to Accept a Strong UN
  Special Representative (Paddy Ashdown) for fear
  of weakening his positionand the fact that the
  international community let him

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3. Unclear Priorities (2) Army and Police

• Fragmented Sector Leads (different sectors lead
  by different states incoherence)
• E.g. disarmament of northern alliance (US lead in
  military sector Germany and then EU lead in
  police sector)
• 1. demand for NA to disarm and be integrated into
  new national army
• 2. new army to reflect ethnic diversity
• 3. So NA commanders are demobilised and
  transferred to Ministry of Interior as police
  commanders
• 4. This works because the police component (under
  different sector lead) does not yet have program,
  resources, strategy etc. and the two sectors are
  not coordinated

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4. Ineffective Aid

• Although aid has increased, it remains relatively
  low (av. 80 per person, compared with 412 per
  person in Kosovo)
• But problems are deeper than money
• (1) no coherence donors have different
  priorities, encouraging government to shop
  around for sympathetic donor on different areas
• (2) accountability patchy no oversight of
  government/public appointments below senior
  levels
• (3) Provincial Reconstruction Teams
• Fragmented (5 regional commands, little
  coherence)
• Structurally problematic (military-led)
• Association with military causes legitimacy probs
  when OEF/ISAF cause civilian casualties
• Deliver assistance rather than building capacity

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Where to Now?

• many of the challenges caused by ineffective
  international strategies

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Overall

• Strengthen political leadership international
  effort should be spearheaded by dynamic,
  proactive, political heavyweight (Paddy Ashdown)
• Articulate a clear vision of the end-state
• Develop integrated political, military, economic
  and social strategy for arriving at that
  end-state
• Deliver the capacities required to achieve the
  plan and coordinate accordingly
• Cease the practice of dealing with strongmen
  hold political actors accountable, set and
  enforce clear benchmarks

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Security

• Vitally important
• As Taliban strengthens, so Afghans will hedge
  their bets and be less willing to support
  coalition government
• Insecurity damages development and capacity
  building
• Integrate OEF/ISAF into a single military command
  with a clear mission driven by the overall
  political goals
• Increase military capacity to enhance
  counter-insurgency and hold land
• Increase over the horizon capacity to respond
  to emergencies and periods of heightened
  insecurity (e.g. elections)
• Bolster efforts to choke the insurgency by
  improving border security
• Overhaul Provincial Reconstruction so that they
  focus on security and security sector reform and
  hand over development to civilians
• Improve civil-military coordination (under
  civilian lead)

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Governance and Capacity

• Set and stick to minimum standards of behaviour
  when it comes to appointment of officials
• Direct funding towards building government
  institutions rather than following-on in problem
  areas (eg. If Helmand province were a country it
  would be 5th largest recipient of USaid)
• Focus on
• Law and order
• Building capacity of regional governments
• Do not do side deals with local strongmen and
  resist temptation to enter into political
  dialogue with Taliban
• Begin preparatory work for 2009 election to
  ensure genuine process and smooth transition
• Crash-program to rapidly improve stock of
  professionals
• Measures to ensure that Afghans have access to
  the legal system

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Poppy Eradication

• Any program of crop eradication must be
  even-handed and must target allies as well as
  enemies
• Forced aerial eradication (US proposal) would be
  counter-productive
• Targets poor Afghans
• Alienate farmers delegitimize Coalition
• Would not tackle the underlying source of the
  problem
• Afghans themselves should be engaged in deciding
  the most effective strategy
• Key provision of alternative source of income
  (building regional infrastructure, encouraging
  investment etc.)
• Call for voluntary restraint whilst providing
  real and viable alternatives
• Alternatives must provide all the services
  provided to farmers by drug traffickers
• Short-term loans
• Technical assistance
• Guaranteed markets
• Relatively high income

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Economic Development

• Reduce opportunities for bribery by increasing
  salaries for public servants
• Improve efficiency by using conditionalities to
  end government patronage
• Donors should rapidly advance construction of
  infrastructure (roads, power, water)
• Focus on rapid building of human capital
• Encourage foreign direct investment by offering
  tax breaks to investors
• Help Afghan government develop capacity to
  regulate investment

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Neighbourhood

• Diplomacy Afghanistan and Pakistan need to
  build good relations
• International assistance/pressure on Pakistan to
  clamp down on Taliban sanctuaries and police its
  side of the border more effectively
• Engage Iran in playing a constructive role
  (precondition improved Iran-US relations)